PSQ
OCT 16 1974

Political Science Quarterly

PROPERTY OF THE
LINCOLN CITY LIBRARIE
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA

Vol. 89 No. 3 Fall 1974

Published by
The Academy of Political Science

On the Presidential Succession
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

Coups and Countercoups in Greece 1967–1973 (with postscript)
Stephen G. Xydis

Convention Reform and Conventional Wisdom: An Empirical Assessment
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Denis G. Sullivan

From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms
Michael Roskin

Congress and National Science Policy
Sanford A. Lakoff

Political Change in Israel: The Case of a New Town
Myron J. Aronoff

Is Presidential Power "Poison"?
Richard M. Pious

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD OF THE POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

ALLAN BLOOM
University of Toronto

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

LEWIS J. EDINGER
Columbia University

RICHARD R. FAGEN
Stanford University

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

FRANCIS A. J. IANNI
Teachers College, Columbia University

ROBERT L. JERVIS
University of California, Los Angeles

JOYCE K. KALLGREN
University of California, Davis

DORIS H. KEARNS
Harvard University

WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON
The University of Texas at Austin

ALPHEUS T. MASON
Princeton University

ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY
Barnard College, Columbia University

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
The Brookings Institution

SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH
University of Chicago

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

GEORGE L. SHERRY
United Nations

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
Columbia University

GADDIS SMITH
Yale University

TOM WICKER
The New York Times

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is published by the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, 10025. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy. Regular membership, $12 a year. Three years, $30. Students, $9 a year. Libraries and institutions, $15 a year. Second-class postage paid at New York, New York, and additional mailing offices. Volume 89 Number 3. Fall 1974.

Subscribers are urged to notify the Academy of any change in address.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Managing Editor

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

Barnard College
Columbia University

Assistant Managing Editor

MARY ANN EPSTEIN

. . . .

Associate Editor

JOYCE FINE SCHULTZ

The POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study of contemporary and historical aspects of government, politics, and public affairs.

Publishing continuously since 1886.

Copyright © 1974, by The Academy of Political Science.
All rights reserved.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science
will sponsor a conference in New York City on

INFLATION:
Fiscal, Social, and Economic Impact

November 11, 1974

Programs will be mailed to members of the Academy.

Manuscripts, books for review, and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. Manuscripts must be submitted in duplicate and accompanied by an abstract of between 100 and 200 words specifying the article's major theme or conclusions. Authors wishing their manuscripts returned must enclose return postage. Correspondence concerning advertising and reprint permission should be addressed to William V. Farr, Business Manager, The Academy of Political Science. Editorial and business offices: 2852 Broadway, New York, New York 10025.

Articles that appeared in the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY before 1953 are indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and since that year in the *Social Sciences Index*. Currently articles are also listed in *ABC Pol Sci*, the *International Bibliography of Political Science*, and the *Public Affairs Information Services Bulletin* and abstracted in *The International Political Science Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*. Book reviews are listed in the *Book Review Index to Social Science Periodicals*, *Book Review Index*, and *Book Review Digest*. A title page and an index of articles and book reviews for each volume of the QUARTERLY are included in its Winter issue.

Back issues prior to 1966 and reprint editions may be ordered from Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, New York, New York 10016. Other back issues may be ordered from the Academy. A check payable to the Academy of Political Science should accompany all orders. Single issue, $3.00. Reprints of articles are available from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106. One copy, $3.00. Additional copies, $.50 each. Complete issue, $.08 per page.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.
Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume 89
Number 3
Fall 1974

Contents

On the Presidential Succession
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. 475

Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967–1973 (with postscript)
STEPHEN G. XYDIS 507

Convention Reform and Conventional Wisdom: An Empirical Assessment of Democratic Party Reforms
JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN AND DENIS G. SULLIVAN 539

From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy
MICHAEL ROSKIN 563

Congress and National Science Policy
SANFORD A. LAKOFF 589

Political Change in Israel: The Case of a New Town
MYRON J. ARONOFF 613

Is Presidential Power "Poison"?
RICHARD M. PIOUS 627

Book Reviews 645

Reference Books and Source Materials Received 712

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Moynihan, Coping: On the Practice of Government — Alice M. Rivlin — 645

Wilson, Political Organizations — Pamela Doty and Amitai Etzioni — 647

Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems; *Benedict*, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson — Larry R. Matheny — 650

Kohlmeier, "God Save This Honorable Court!"; *Simon*, In His Own Image: The Supreme Court in Richard Nixon's America — D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. — 652

Heimann, ed., The Future of Foundations — Elinor G. Barber — 654

Greeley, Building Coalitions: American Politics in the 1970s — James L. Sundquist — 657

Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief — John Spanier — 658

Johnson and Evans, eds., The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, Volume III: Governor of Illinois, 1949–1953 — Hermon Dunlap Smith — 660

Blum, ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946; *Markowitz*, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century — Robert F. Campbell — 661

Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal — Stephen J. Wayne — 663

Harbaugh, Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis — Stephen Botein — 665

Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness, Man's World — Annette K. Baxter — 666

Fishel, Party and Opposition: Congressional Challengers in American Politics — Raisa B. Deber — 668

Fellman, The Deceived Majority: Politics and Protest in Middle America — Frances Fox Piven — 669

Patterson, Black City Politics — Shirley E. Ostholm — 671

Sigal, Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking — Doris A. Graber — 672

Verba and Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality — Gerald Finch — 674

Stewart, One Last Chance: The Democratic Party, 1974–76; *Sullivan, Pressman, Page, and Lyons*, The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972 — Judith H. Parris — 676

Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States — Frank J. Sorauf — 678

Bryan, Yankee Politics in Rural Vermont — Louis Maisel — 680

Peirce, The Deep South States in America — Clifton McCleskey — 682

Brown, An American Philosophy of Social Security — Eveline M. Burns — 683

Strickland, Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy — George Rosen — 684

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1940–1948; *Divine*, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952–1960 — H. Bradford Westerfield — 686

Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy — Michael Leigh — 688

Iriye, The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction — Walter LaFeber — 690

Bell, Party and Faction in American Politics: The House of Representatives, 1789–1801 — Joseph Cooper — 691

Mohr, The Radical Republicans and Reform in New York During Reconstruction — Richard L. McCormick — 693

Munro and Inglis, eds., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948–1957 — Thomas P. Peardon — 695

Cook and Ramsden, eds., By-Elections in British Politics — Stephen Koss — 697

Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy, 1918–1922 — Nicholas Mansergh — 699

Joll, Europe Since 1870: An International History — René Albrecht-Carrié — 700

Pryce-Jones, The Face of Defeat: Palestinian Refugees and Guerrillas — Naomi Williams — 702

Roos, L. and Roos, N., Managers of Modernization: Organization and Elites in Turkey (1950–1969) — Serif Mardin — 704

Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development — Audrey C. Smock — 706

Bevan, Marx and Burke: A Revisionist View — Michael Levin — 708

Robinson, ed., Developing the Third World: The Experience of the Nineteen-Sixties — Harry G. Johnson — 709

Buenker, Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform — Kenneth T. Jackson — 711

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., examines the present manner of filling vacancies in the offices of president and vice president. Schlesinger, concluding that the vice presidency is a pointless and even mischievous office which should be abolished, recommends that vacancies in the presidency be filled, as he contends the founding fathers intended, by the formula of a temporary acting President and a special election.

STEPHEN G. XYDIS, in analyzing the authoritarian, no-party regime dominant in Greece between 1967 and 1974, examines the gainers and losers of that regime's policies, discusses its impact on Greece's foreign relations, and draws attention to the historical, economic, and demographic factors that contributed to its longevity.

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN and DENIS G. SULLIVAN present empirical data which challenge widely expressed assertions that recent Democratic party convention reforms were crucial in the 1972 nomination of George McGovern, that they radically changed convention behavior, and that they were a major factor in the Democratic defeat of that year.

MICHAEL ROSKIN argues that overall American foreign policy can profitably be understood as being based on a succession of generational "paradigms" about whether the country's defenses should begin at the near or far side of the oceans. Roskin contends that each generation's foreign policy elite comes to favor such an "isolationist" or "interventionist" paradigm by living through the catastrophe brought on by the application *ad absurdum* of the opposite paradigm by the previous elite generation.

SANFORD A. LAKOFF reviews options being considered by members of Congress anxious to improve their ability to shape the pattern of governmental support for science and technology. He concludes that the current mood of assertiveness on Capital Hill could yield beneficial changes.

MYRON J. ARONOFF, in his analysis of political and social change in an Israeli new town, explores the relation between local developments and the external environment of national Israeli culture, law, and political institutions.

RICHARD M. PIOUS surveys recent books on the American presidency, describing dominant trends in the mode of analysis and the assessment of the office.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the Presidential Succession

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

On the eve of the bicentennial of independence, the American experiment in self-government was confronted by a startling development: the President and Vice President who would lead the celebrations on July 4, 1976, would be persons who had come to office and power, not through election, like all their predecessors, but through appointment. Even more disturbing was the thought that the source of this President's appointment was a former President whose first Vice President had resigned in disgrace as a confessed felon and who himself had resigned in the face of virtual certainty that he would otherwise have been impeached and removed because of high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States.

Nothing like this had ever happened, or could ever have happened, in the earlier history of the republic. The right of the people to choose their own leaders had been assumed by definition as a fundamental point of self-government. A major premise of American politics had always been —at least up to 1967—that the President was an elected, not an appointed, official. The Constitution (Article II, Section 1) expressly provided that the President and Vice President were to "be elected." The Founding Fathers believed that no one who had not been elected to the Presidency should serve as President any longer than necessary to organize a new

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York, served as Special Assistant to President Kennedy from 1961 to 1963. His major books include *The Age of Jackson; The Crisis of the Old Order, The Coming of the New Deal, The Politics of Upheaval* (volumes in the Age of Roosevelt); *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House;* and, most recently, *The Imperial Presidency.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

presidential election. The Framers would unquestionably have been astounded and appalled to find as President and Vice President 200 years after the Declaration of Independence two men, neither of whom had ever faced a national election and each of whom owed his office to his direct predecessor.

It was the Twenty-fifth Amendment—ratified in 1967 without, it must be said, any clear view of the consequences[1]—that discarded the wisdom of the Founding Fathers and threatened to introduce so extraordinary an innovation into the American system. Under that amendment President Nixon, after the resignation of Vice President Agnew in 1973, named Gerald Ford as his Vice President. When Nixon himself went under, Ford, now President, was obliged by the same amendment to name a Vice President of his personal choice. "For the first time in the history of this great Nation," John Pastore of Rhode Island cried with pardonable senatorial grandiloquence, "the President and Vice President will both be appointed—not elected by the people and not responsive to any mandate from the citizens. The Nation will no longer be democratically governed."[2]

I

Nixon's Secretary of State, a former professor of political science, had observed in March 1974, "There have been, very rarely, fully legitimate governments in any European country since World War I."[3] This was perhaps an imprudent remark from the representative of a government whose legitimacy lay at that very moment (and for many moments thereafter) under the most serious question. But what would Dr. Kissinger make of the legitimacy of an allegedly democratic government headed by two men receiving their office and power through appointment rather than through election?

No doubt such a government, though on the face incompatible with Article II of the Constitution, had become technically constitutional through the Twenty-fifth Amendment. But it could not be said that those who drafted that ill-considered amendment desired this particular result. The constitutionality of the appointive Presidency was thus inadvertent, not premeditated. And for anyone concerned with democracy in a philosophical sense the prospect raised the sternest difficulties. Not only was the conception of the Presidency as an elected office breached; but the assignment to a President of the personal power to appoint a

[1] Certainly not on the part of this writer.
[2] *Congressional Record*, November 15, 1973, S 20429.
[3] *New York Times*, March 12, 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vice President in case of a vacancy added a quasi-dynastic aspect to the process of presidential succession.[4]

In 1945 President Truman, noting that it lay within his authority to appoint the person (then the Secretary of State) who would be his successor in the event of his own disability or death, said with customary directness, "I do not believe that in a democracy this power should rest with the Chief Executive."[5] The Twenty-fifth Amendment cavalierly tossed away Truman's old-fashioned scruple and thereby contributed its mite to the aggrandizement of the Presidency. And, if Truman had supposed that the principle applied to himself, an elected Vice President, how much more powerfully must it apply to a Chief Executive who was an appointed Vice President and whose name had never been submitted to a national electorate. A system that permitted an appointed President to appoint his own successor was a system that removed the most vital political choices farther and farther from the people. One doubted whether such a regime could be called, in the phrase with which Professor Kissinger flunked a half-century of government in Europe, "fully legitimate."

The fix into which the Twenty-fifth Amendment placed American democracy was emphasized by a striking contrast with events in France soon after the Secretary of State delivered his excommunication of Europe. General de Gaulle had designed a very powerful Presidency for himself; but even that towering leader had not claimed for Presidents of France the authority the Twenty-fifth Amendment bestowed, in special cases, on Presidents of the United States: that is, the power to nominate his own successor. Instead Article 7 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic said that in case of a vacancy in the Presidency a new presidential election must be held within thirty-five days. In the meantime, the functions of the President (save for the powers of calling a national referendum and of dissolving the National Assembly) are to be exercised by the president of the senate. On April 2, 1974, President Pompidou died. On May 5 the French had their election, followed by a runoff on May 19 and the inauguration of the new President on May 27. In less than two months, in short, France had a new President, freely chosen by the people and equipped by them with a fresh mandate. Which government is the more legitimate—the elected government of France after the death of Pompidou, or the appointed government of the United States after the resigna-

[4] The objection that Presidents name their Vice Presidents anyway at the nominating convention is dealt with in the discussion of the Twenty-fifth Amendment below, section X.

[5] H. S. Truman, *Public Papers . . . 1945* (Washington, 1961), p. 129.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of Nixon? Which political system is, in this respect at least, the more democratic?

The signal difference between the French and American systems in dealing with a vacancy in the Presidency is obvious: *the French have no Vice President.* The results surely favor the French on essential tests of legitimacy and democracy. The contrast therefore calls on Americans to reconsider the utility of the Vice Presidency in their own system.

II

History had shown the American Vice Presidency to be a job of spectacular and, I believe, incurable frustration. Gerald Ford, like his predecessors, entered into the office with soothing presidential assurances that he, unlike his predecessors, would be given tasks of substance and responsibility. One could be absolutely certain that these shining prospects would disappear whenever he reached out to grasp them. Nixon, even in his feeble condition of 1974, was no more disposed to share power with Ford than he had shared power with Agnew. When James J. Kilpatrick asked Nixon whether he had told his Vice President of 1971 about the plan for the diplomatic opening to China, Nixon, replying in what Kilpatrick described as an "incredulous" tone, said, "Agnew? Agnew? Oh, of course not."[6] Yet a year later he kept on as his running mate and successor the Vice President he excluded from his councils. Still President Nixon's tone could hardly have been more incredulous than Eisenhower's when interrogated in 1960 about Vice President Nixon's role in the eight years of the Eisenhower Presidency. To the question "What major decisions of your Administration has the Vice President participated in?" Eisenhower responded, "If you give me a week, I might think of one."[7]

Nor was Nixon merely doing unto others what others had done unto him. He was behaving the way all Presidents have behaved—as they appear to have no inclination and perhaps little choice but to behave—toward their Vice Presidents. It is a doomed office. No President and Vice President have fully trusted each other since Jackson and Van Buren.[8]

[6] *Washington Star-News,* May 16, 1974. Jeb Stuart Magruder of the Nixon White House writes of Agnew in 1970: "He'd been frozen out by Nixon, for almost two years." J. S. Magruder, *An American Life* (New York, 1974), p. 128.

[7] *New York Times,* August 25, 1960.

[8] It should perhaps be added that Polk had amiable personal relations with George M. Dallas, McKinley with Garret Hobart, and Truman with Alben Barkley, but none of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Antagonism is inherent in the relationship. "The only business of the vice-president," wrote the sardonic Thomas R. Marshall, who served for eight years under Wilson, "is to ring the White House bell every morning and ask what is the state of health of the president."[9] The only serious thing the Vice President has to do is to wait around for the president to die. This is hardly the basis for cordial and enduring friendships. "The Vice President," said Lyndon Johnson, who experienced both ends of the relationship, "is like a raven, hovering around the head of the President, reminding him of his mortality."[10] Presidents inevitably resent the death's head at the feast; Vice Presidents equally resent the monarch who stuffs himself at the banquet table while they scramble for leavings. Elbridge Gerry worried in the Constitutional Convention about the "close intimacy" that he thought "must subsist between the President & vice-president." Gouverneur Morris responded acidly, "The vice president then will be the first heir apparent that ever loved his father."[11]

The single contemporary point of the Vice Presidency is to provide for the succession in case of the death, disability, resignation, or removal of the President. Of course there have been repeated attempts to give it other points. They have all failed. They are all bound to fail. The Constitution does say that the Vice President "shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided." When there was objection to this in the Constitutional Convention, Roger Sherman observed that, if the Vice President did not preside over the Senate, "he would be without employment."[12] Sherman's observation was prophetic, except that the Vice President's constitutional employment soon became a farce. Agnew as Vice President, for example, never went near the Senate if he could help it. Early Vice Presidents of a philosophical bent filled their days by meditating attacks on the power of the national government. Jefferson wrote the Kentucky Resolution as Vice President, Calhoun the South Carolina Exposition. Their successors have lacked a taste for political philosophy. Richard M. Johnson ran a tavern as Vice President. Thomas R. Marshall and Alben Barkley made jokes. But most Vice Presidents, especially in modern times, have lacked a taste for humor too.

---

these Vice Presidents played any significant role in the policy decisions of their respective administrations.

[9] T. R. Marshall, *Recollections* (Indianapolis, 1925), p. 368.

[10] As told by President Johnson in retirement to Professor Doris Kearns, with whose kind permission I am repeating this exceedingly apt aphorism.

[11] C. C. Tansill, ed., *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States* (Washington, 1927), p. 682.

[12] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

Why have Presidents not given the Vice President serious work? For a long time they supposed themselves constitutionally forbidden to do so. Washington did on occasion ask his Vice President to attend cabinet meetings; but Jefferson as Vice President was quick to erect a wall of separation. "I consider my office," he wrote, "as constitutionally confined to legislative functions, and that I could not take any part whatever in executive consultations, even were it proposed."[13] Most Presidents and Vice Presidents have accepted the Jeffersonian doctrine. Thus Truman wrote in 1955 that the Vice President "is not an officer of the executive branch" and Eisenhower as late as 1963 that the Vice President "is not legally a part of the Executive branch and is not subject to direction by the President."[14]

The practice of vice presidential participation in cabinet meetings is a recent development. In 1896 Theodore Roosevelt thought it would be desirable "to increase the power of the Vice-President. . . . It would be very well if he were given a seat in the Cabinet."[15] But when he became President himself after an exasperating interlude as Vice President, he did not give his own Vice President, Charles W. Fairbanks, a seat in the cabinet or anywhere else. Vice President Marshall presided at cabinet meetings when Wilson was at Versailles. But, since he regarded himself as a "member of the legislative branch," he questioned the propriety of doing so and carefully explained to the cabinet that he was acting "in obedience to a request" and "in an unofficial and informal way."[16] Harding was the first President to make his Vice President, Calvin Coolidge, a regular at cabinet meetings. Coolidge expected his own Vice President to follow this example; but Charles G. Dawes rejected any such entanglement with the executive as a "wrong principle" and in due course supported farm legislation from his office on Capitol Hill that his President opposed and eventually vetoed.[17] Franklin D. Roosevelt, who from the time of his own vice presidential candidacy in 1920 had cherished the hope of making something of the office,[18] reinstituted vice-

[13] J. D. Feerick, *From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession* (New York, 1965), p. 70.

[14] H. S. Truman, *Year of Decisions* (New York, 1955), p. 197; D. D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (New York, 1963), p. 6.

[15] Theodore Roosevelt, "The Three Vice-Presidential Candidates and What They Represent," *Review of Reviews*, September 1896. TR also thought that the Vice President should be given a vote on ordinary occasions in the Senate and "perchance on occasions a voice in the debates."

[16] I. G. Williams, *The Rise of the Vice Presidency* (Washington, 1956), pp. 109–110.

[17] Ibid., pp. 134, 138.

[18] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Can the Vice President Be Useful?" *Saturday Evening*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

presidential attendance at cabinet meetings, and it became routine thereafter. Truman got Congress in 1949 to make the Vice President a member of the National Security Council by statute. But Vice Presidents continued to operate out of an office at the Hill. It was not till Kennedy that a Vice President was given space in the Executive Office Building.

Nor, despite ritualistic pledges at the start of each new term, have Presidents ever delegated real power to Vice Presidents. FDR did make Henry Wallace head of the Board of Economic Warfare—the only big job handed a Vice President in the history of the American Presidency—but this merely proved the embarrassment bound to arise when an agency chief who happened to be Vice President got into fights with powerful members of the President's cabinet. Nixon as Vice President appointed himself the political hit man of the Eisenhower administration and subsequently as President assigned the same delicate responsibility to Agnew, thereby making him, as Eugene McCarthy wittily said, "Nixon's Nixon." When Ford succeeded Agnew, Nixon began by trying to insert him into the same slot. This is hardly a promising development. If there is anything certain to cast the Vice Presidency into permanent disrepute, it is the theory that the Vice President is the appointed outlet for an administration's partisan rancor.

For the rest the Vice Presidency is make-work. Presidents spend time that could be put to far better use trying to figure out ways of keeping their Vice Presidents busy. "They seek to put him," as Tom Marshall said, "where he can do no harm."[19] So Vice Presidents serve meaninglessly as chairmen of interdepartmental committees like the Aeronautics and Space Council or the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. The suggestion is sometimes made that the Vice President could take over the ceremonial side of the President's job. But Presidents perform few ceremonial functions they do not want to perform; and Vice Presidents would be acceptable substitutes only on the most footling occasions. Nor would a purely ceremonial role satisfy any but the most vacuous Vice President. Getting Vice Presidents out of sight through foreign travel is a solution much favored by recent Presidents. This is all make-believe too. Despite the pieties, the Vice Presidency remains "the fifth

Post, October 16, 1920. FDR claimed to regard the Vice Presidency as a major example of "industrial waste" in Washington. He did not think that attendance at cabinet meetings would make much difference but argued that the Vice President should be used to overcome the gap between Congress and the executive branch and to help bring about government reorganization. He acknowledged that a constitutional amendment would be required to give the Vice President serious executive authority but thought that even without an amendment there were things a Vice President could do.

[19] Marshall, *Recollections*, p. 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wheel in our government" (Albert J. Beveridge), "the spare tire on the automobile of government" (John Garner).[20] As Gertrude Stein said of Oakland, California, there is no there there.

But what of the suggestion, advocated by Roosevelts when they aspired to be Vice Presidents (and forgotten once they became Presidents), that the power of the Vice Presidency might be increased? Carl Kaysen, director of the Institute for Advanced Studies, has made the ingenious proposal, for example, that the Constitution be amended to make the Vice President an officer of the executive branch. Then let the presidential candidate promise the nominating convention that he will appoint his Vice President to one of the four great cabinet offices, State, Treasury, Defense or Justice, and specify which. This would provide a there there. But it would also create problems if the Vice President turned out to fail at the job or to disagree with the policy and could not, like other incompetents or dissidents, be easily dismissed.

Moreover this would have to be an informal, and hence unstable, arrangement; for any formal allocation of power to the Vice President would run up against the clause in the Constitution vesting the undivided "executive power" in the President. And the resistance to any sharing of authority is visceral as well as constitutional. When William O. Douglas, who had been chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, suggested to Franklin Roosevelt that he have the heads of the independent agencies report to his Vice President, Henry Wallace, FDR replied, "Would you like to see Henry instead of me? What would Henry know about all those matters?"[21] No President in the nature of things, is going to yield power to a Vice President.

For this reason, Benjamin V. Cohen, that wise veteran of the New Deal, recommends a different approach. He would frankly recognize that there is, and can be, no there there and have presidential and vice-presidential candidates separately voted upon in the general election. This would have meant in 1968, for example, that Nixon would have been elected President and Muskie Vice President. The fact that Muskie could not have taken part in a Nixon administration would have made no difference, since the Vice President has nothing to do anyway; and Muskie would have been an infinitely more attractive heir apparent. But this proposal raises the possibility of a shift in party control of the White House without the intervention of a new election.[22]

[20] A. J. Beveridge, "The Fifth Wheel in Our Government," *Century*, December 1909; Garner quoted in J. MacG. Burns, "A New Look at the Vice Presidency," *New York Times Magazine*, October 9, 1955.

[21] W. O. Douglas, *Go East, Young Man* (New York, 1974), pp. 310–311.

[22] So too would Endicott Peabody's otherwise attractive proposal that the Twenty-fifth Amendment be revised to require the choice of a new Vice President, in case of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Neither of these ideas goes to the heart of the matter. Nor certainly do the reform proposals generated by the Agnew and Eagleton fiascoes. In 1973 the Democrats appointed a Vice Presidential Selection Committee under the chairmanship of Hubert Humphrey, whose own vice presidential wounds had hardly healed. Its recommendation was that the parties slow up the process of nominating the second man by making the convention longer and even, if necessary, holding the choice over to a later meeting of the party's National Committee.[23] This procedure, it need hardly be said, would not have saved the Republicans from twice anointing Agnew, which did not prevent a corresponding committee of the Republican National Committee from contemplating the same change. Senator Robert Griffin of Michigan, the Republican whip, in what he called, presumably as a recommendation, "a small step in the direction of the parliamentary system," would do away altogether with party participation in the nomination and have the new President submit his choice to Congress in the manner in which Mr. Nixon chose Mr. Ford under the Twenty-fifth Amendment.[24] This would be another formula for Agnews.

Fiddling with the way vice presidential nominees are chosen is beside the point. The real question is why have a Vice President at all? "His importance," as Woodrow Wilson said, "consists in the fact that he may cease to be Vice-President."[25] The only conceivable argument for keeping the office is that it provides an automatic solution to the problem of succession. No doubt it does. But does it provide the *best* solution?

IV

There is first the mystical argument that the Vice President is the proper successor when a President vanishes in mid-course because, as Truman said and many have repeated, "There is no officer in our system of government, besides the President and Vice President, who has been elected by all the voters of the country."[26] Truman's proposition, advanced nine weeks after Roosevelt's death, was natural enough to a man concerned with legitimating his own recent succession to the Presidency. But insofar as it implied that the voters in some sense intended him or any other Vice President (since 1796) for the Presidency, it was a myth. No one

---

vacancy, through special election rather than through appointment. See "On the Threshold of the White House," *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1974.

[23] *Congressional Record*, December 21, 1973, S23756–S23758.

[24] Ibid., October 23, 1973, S19448–S19450.

[25] Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (Boston, 1901), p. 240.

[26] Truman, *Public Papers . . . 1945*, p. 129.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

votes for a Vice President *per se*. He is a part of a package deal, "a sort of appendage to the Presidency" (Truman's own phrase); not an independent choice.[27]

To this hazy theory of an electorally sanctified connection between the Vice Presidency and the succession there is added the conventional wisdom of political science departments (and of Vice Presidents) that the Vice Presidency is the best school for the Presidency. It is above all, we are told, a "learning office" where men educate themselves for the great responsibility that may one day be theirs. Even if the Vice President has nothing to do, he can—we are assured—watch what others are doing and prepare himself to take over if calamity strikes. Thus Richard M. Nixon: "The Vice Presidency . . . is the only office which provides complete on-the-job training for the duties of the Presidency."[28]

This implies, one fears, an unduly romantic view of Presidents. Nixon himself made this perfectly clear as soon as he had a Vice President or two at his mercy. Presidents, whatever they may say, do not pick their running mates because they want to raise them up to be their successors. All Presidents see themselves, if not as immortal, at least as good for a couple of terms. They pick a running mate not because he is the second citizen of the republic and splendidly qualified to replace them in the White House but because of occult and very often mistaken calculations about the contribution he will make to their own victory at the polls. "Whether they should or not," Congressman James G. O'Hara of Michigan has realistically observed, "they will not, in the final analysis, choose their Vice-Presidential candidate to succeed them. They will choose them to help them succeed."[29]

These calculations, I say, are very often mistaken. It is an exceedingly rare case when the vice presidential candidate makes a difference. Very likely Johnson made a difference in 1960. But much more typical was the outcome in 1948. Earl Warren was the most popular governor California had had in a generation, but Truman carried California against the Dewey-Warren ticket. As for the idea, much discussed by the sages of the press, of a "balanced ticket," this is a fraud on the public. It pretends that the Vice President's views will somehow "balance" the views of the President when all our history testifies that they have no impact at all on the President. Should the President die, however, then the difference in views could have a cataclysmic effect. Theodore Roosevelt, recalling what

[27] Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 53.

[28] In his testimony in 1964 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, reprinted in Senate Judiciary Committee, *Selected Materials on the Twenty-fifth Amendment*, Senate Document 93–42, 93 Cong., 1 Sess. (1973), 95.

[29] James G. O'Hara, testimony before the Vice Presidential Selection Commission of the Democratic National Committee, November 7, 1973 (mimeo.), p. 10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had happened when Tyler succeeded Harrison and what might have happened had Grover Cleveland died and Vice President Adlai Stevenson taken over, observed, "It is an unhealthy thing to have the Vice-President and the President represented by principles so far apart that the succession of one to the place of the other means a change as radical as any possible party overturn."[30]

Presidents not only do not choose Vice Presidents to become successors, but, after they make the White House themselves, they do as little as possible to prepare them to become successors. A Vice President can learn only as much as a President is willing to have him learn—which, given presidential resentment of vice presidential existence, is not ordinarily very much. Truman, recalling how little he had been told as Vice President, tried harder than most Presidents to clue in his second man. His conclusion about on-the-job training is not encouraging. "No Vice-President," he wrote three years after he left the White House, "is ever properly prepared to take over the presidency because of the nature of our presidential, or executive, office." In the nature of things, "it is very difficult for a President to take the Vice-President completely into his confidence." The President "by necessity" builds his own staff and makes his own decisions, "and the Vice-President remains an outsider."[31]

Moreover, seeing things as an ill-informed, impotent, and often sullen outsider, the Vice President will very likely "learn" the wrong things. Lyndon Johnson thought Kennedy too cautious at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and in Vietnam. What Johnson "learned" as Vice President led him on to policies of overkill in the Dominican Republic and Indochina. In any case, where does a successor's responsibility lie? "A Vice-President might make a poor President," said Tom Marshall, who had to reflect on this question in Wilson's season of disability, "but he would make a much poorer one if he attempted to subordinate his own mind and views to carry out the ideas of a dead man."[32]

A learning office? With Presidents less generous than Truman—and that in this context is most Presidents, however generous they may be in other relationships—the Vice Presidency is much less a making than a maiming experience. The way most Presidents treat their Vice Presidents, far from preparing them for the succession, is more likely to erode their capacity to succeed. McKinley, wrote Theodore Roosevelt as Vice President, "does not intend that I shall have any influence of any kind, sort or description in the administration from the top to the bottom. This he has made evident again and again. . . . I have really much less influ-

[30] Roosevelt, "The Three Vice-Presidential Candidates," p. 292.
[31] Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 54.
[32] Williams, *Rise*, p. 110.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence with the President now that I am Vice-President than I had even when I was governor."[33] Fortunately, for T. R., he only had to endure six months of frustration. When he acquired a Vice President of his own, he could not have been more destructive of poor Charley Fairbanks. He used to regale Washington with Finley Peter Dunne's crack after the President remarked he was going down in a submarine: "You really shouldn't do it—unless you take Fairbanks with you."[34] Tom Marshall, who at least extracted a good deal of shrewd humor out of his predicament, concluded that the Vice President "is like a man in a cataleptic state: he cannot speak; he cannot move; he suffers no pain; and yet he is perfectly conscious of everything that is going on about him."[35] Lyndon Johnson, when Vice President, once remarked to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., "Your daddy never let his Vice Presidents put their heads above water."[36]

In recent years, as men of larger aspirations and capacities have responded to the actuarial attractions of the office, the damage to Vice Presidents has increased. The more gifted and ambitious the Vice President, the more acute his frustration—and the less his President is inclined to do to alleviate it. Everyone knows the humiliation that Eisenhower repeatedly visited on Nixon. Malcolm Moos, the political scientist, after watching that relationship as an Eisenhower special assistant, concluded that the office was "a kind of coffin."[37] Only a man who has the overpowering ego of a Lyndon Johnson and is treated by his President, as Johnson was, with relative consideration can survive the Vice Presidency; and even Johnson was a subdued and shrunken man by 1963. "It's like being naked in the middle of a blizzard with no one to even offer you a match to keep you warm—that's the vice presidency," said Hubert Humphrey in 1969, eight months after he had been released from confinement. "You are trapped, vulnerable and alone, and it does not matter who happens to be President."[38] Few Vice Presidents can survive the systematic demoralization inflicted by the office without serious injury to themselves. Bill Moyers, who was with Lyndon Johnson both as Vice President and President, later remarked that the Vice Presidency "is a man eater. It destroys individuals. This country was very lucky that Harry Truman was the vice president for only a year [actually for less than three months]. When he became President, he still had so much left.

[33] Theodore Roosevelt, *Letters*, ed. E. E. Morison, vol. III (Cambridge, 1951), p. 57.
[34] Williams, *Rise*, p. 89.
[35] Alben Barkley, *That Reminds Me* (New York, 1954), p. 221.
[36] As told by FDR, Jr., to me; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston, 1965), p. 704.
[37] *Minneapolis Tribune*, June 2, 1974.
[38] *Time*, November 14, 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If we had gotten Truman three years later, he would have been much different."[39]

V

The Vice Presidency does a poor job of preparing politicians to become Presidents. But it has recently begun to do an excellent job of preparing politicians to become presidential candidates. For the Vice Presidency is the only place except the Presidency itself that insures its occupant automatic and comprehensive national exposure. Moreover, a new sense of the frailty of Presidents—FDR's death in office, the attempted assassination of Truman, Eisenhower's sicknesses, the successful assassination of Kennedy, the movement to impeach Nixon—has focused unprecedented public attention on the Vice Presidency. As a result, the Vice Presidency has returned to somewhat the status it enjoyed in the early republic as the stepping-stone to the Presidency. In the 160 years before 1948 only five Vice Presidents had ever won election to the Presidency on their own. Of the five Presidents elected since, three were former Vice Presidents. Every man who has served as Vice President since 1953 has become a candidate for President, except for Agnew, who was well on his way to becoming a candidate until the law caught up with him, and for Ford, whom the office transformed from a little-known congressman into a national favorite in a few weeks and who, even before he became President, seemed destined to be a presidential candidate in 1976.

The irony is that this process has nothing to do with the presidential qualifications a Vice President might have and everything to do with the publicity in which the office bathes him. Whether or not a Vice President is any good, the office instantly makes him a front-runner in the polls. At the same time the office makes it impossible to find out whether or not he is any good. "The Vice President," Donald Graham has written, "is the one American politician who is not held responsible for what he says."[40] If he makes a hawk or a zealot or a fool of himself, it is always supposed that he is doing so at the behest of his President. No doubt he is, which is one reason why, at the very time the office enhances his political availability, it depletes and despoils his substantive value. So while the Vice Presidency is coming to be the main avenue to the Presidency, it is, alas, an avenue that typically specializes in the delivery of damaged goods.

There is no escape, it seems to me, from the conclusion that the Vice

[39] Jimmy Breslin, "Police Riot," *New York Magazine*, September 16, 1968.

[40] Donald Graham, "The Vice Presidency: From Cigar Store Indian to Crown Prince," *Washington Monthly*, April 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Presidency is not only a pointless but even a dangerous office. A politician is nominated for Vice President for reasons unconnected with his presidential qualities and elected to the Vice Presidency as part of a tie-in sale. Once carried to the Vice Presidency not on his own but as second rider on the presidential horse, where is he? If he is a first-rate man, his nerve and confidence will be shaken, his talents wasted and soured, even as his publicity urges him on toward the ultimate office for which, the longer he serves in the second place, the less ready he may be. If he is not a first-rate man, he should not be in a position to inherit or claim the Presidency. Why not therefore abolish this mischievous office and work out a more sensible mode of succession?

VI

Such a revision of the Constitution would not be an affront to the Founding Fathers. They had no great commitment to the Vice Presidency. Though they had had considerable experience with lieutenant or deputy governors in the colonies and though most of the thirteen states had provided for such officers in their own constitutions, the Constitutional Convention did not resort to the Vice Presidency in order to solve the problem of succession. Instead the August 6 draft from the all-important Committee of Detail proposed that, in case of a vacancy in the Presidency, "the President of the Senate shall exercise those powers and duties, *until another President of the United States be chosen.*"[41] This, it might be noted, was the formula adopted a century and three-quarters later by General de Gaulle for the French Constitution and employed so expeditiously in France in the spring of 1974.

There was some objection to the President of the Senate as acting President of the nation. Gouverneur Morris thought that the Chief Justice should be "provisional successor." Madison suggested that "the Executive powers during a vacancy" be administered by a Council of State.[42] Wherever the line of devolution went, however, all agreed that it was to prevail only until the voters could choose, *de novo*, a new President by special election.

Then a fortnight before the Convention adjourned, a new drafting committee went off for a weekend and came back with the Vice Presidency. The committee did *not* devise the Vice Presidency primarily as a means of dealing with the succession. The delegates already had a solution to that problem. Indeed, as Charles Warren later wrote, they paid surprisingly little attention in considering the Vice Presidency "to the chief

[41] Tansill, ed., *Documents*, p. 479. Emphasis added.
[42] Ibid., p. 621.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

part which the Vice-President has, in fact, played in history, that is, to his succession in case of the death of the President."[43] The Vice Presidency came to the fore for entirely distinct reasons. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, a member of the new drafting committee, frankly told the Convention that "such an office as vice-President was not wanted. He was introduced *only* for the sake of a valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time."[44]

The Vice Presidency entered the Constitution, in short, not to provide a successor to the President—this could easily have been arranged otherwise—but to ensure the election of a *national* President. For the United States had as yet little conviction of national identity. Loyalty ran to the states rather than to the country as a whole. If presidential electors voted for one man, local feeling would lead them to vote for the candidate from their own state. The new draft now recommended that they be required to vote for two persons, "of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves."[45] By means of the double vote, localism could be overcome, and a President with broad appeal beyond his own state would emerge. "The second best man in this case," as Madison observed, "would probably be first, in fact"[46]—i.e., the favorite second choice would be the person commanding national confidence.

In addition, the double vote was also intended to defeat cabal and corruption in the selection process. Because each elector must vote for two persons without indicating a preference, "the precise operation of his vote," James Wilson observed, "is not known to himself at the time when he gives it." Conspiracy would therefore be "under the necessity of acting blindfold at the election" and would be "defeated by the joint and unforeseen effect of the whole."[47] Hamilton concluded in *Federalist* #68 that through the double vote the Constitution had made it a "moral certainty" that the Presidency would be filled "by characters preeminent for ability and virtue." Popularity and intrigue might enable a man to carry his own state; "but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union."

Under the double vote, the person winning most votes became President, the runner-up Vice President. It was not logically essential to the

[43] Charles Warren, *The Making of the Constitution* (Boston, 1928), p. 635.
[44] Tansill, ed., *Documents*, p. 682. Emphasis added.
[45] Ibid., p. 679.
[46] Ibid., p. 454.
[47] James Wilson, *Works*, ed. R. G. McCloskey, vol. I (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 439.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operations of the system that the runner-up be anything at all; and no doubt considerations of the succession played a larger part here than were reflected in the discussions at the Convention and in subsequent debates at the state ratifying conventions. For both President and Vice President would have been voted on for the Presidency, and both presumably would be well qualified for the office. The primary point of the Vice Presidency, however, was not as a mode of succession but as an organic part, in Williamson's phrase, of the "valuable mode of election."

VII

Even then the new office was not received with great enthusiasm. Elbridge Gerry told the Convention that he was "ag.st having any vice President."[48] Gerry was the only member of the Convention ever to become Vice President. George Clinton, not a delegate, denounced the office from outside as dangerous and unnecessary. Clinton later served as Vice President under two Presidents. James Monroe told the Virginia ratifying convention that he saw no need for the office.[49] The *Federalist* tried to ignore the issue, devoting two quick paragraphs to it in the entire series of eighty-five papers. Noting that the Vice Presidency had been "objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous," Hamilton defended it in perfunctory fashion because the Vice President's casting vote could prevent deadlocks in the Senate and because the Vice President himself could be on occasion a "constitutional substitute" for the President. Privately he complained to James Wilson, "Every body is aware of that defect in the constitution which renders it possible that the man intended for Vice President may in fact turn up President."[50] The First Congress even wrangled over the question of whether the Vice President should be paid a salary. Some members thought he should only receive *per diem* for those days when he actually presided over the Senate. Finally they voted him $5000 a year.

The double vote did produce two remarkable figures, Adams and Jefferson, as the first two Vice Presidents. But as an occupation for a grown man the Vice Presidency proved a disaster. "I am Vice-President," Adams told the Senate. "In this I am nothing, but I may be everything"—a concise statement of the paradox of the office. To his wife Adams complained that the Vice Presidency was "the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived. . . . I

[48] Tansill, ed., *Documents*, p. 682.
[49] Feerick, *From Failing Hands*, pp. 52, 54.
[50] Alexander Hamilton, *Papers*, ed. H. C. Syrett, vol. V (New York, 1962), p. 248.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

can do neither good nor evil." Jefferson called it "the only office in the world about which I am unable to decide whether I had rather have it or not have it."[51] In the meantime, the rise of the party system, a development unanticipated in 1787, was placing the "valuable mode of election" under severe strain. In 1796, the Federalists gave their second ballots to Thomas Pinckney, who was manifestly not the second citizen of the country. Adams himself, the top Federalist candidate, would have preferred, if he had been defeated, to lose to Jefferson rather than to his fellow-Federalist.[52] In 1800 the Republicans gave the same number of electoral votes to Jefferson, their presidential choice, as they gave to Aaron Burr, a man of undoubted talents who, however, was trusted by no one in the long course of American history, except for his daughter Theodosia and Gore Vidal. Burr was nearly chosen President, though the voters never intended him for the Presidency. The fear of comparable slipups in 1804 led to the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment requiring the electoral college to vote separately for President and Vice President.

With the abolition of the "valuable mode of election," the Vice Presidency lost the function for which it had originally been designed. Separate voting ended any prospect that the Vice President would be the second man in the country. The office would no longer attract men of the highest quality. It would become, as was immediately noted, a bargaining counter in the presidential contest—"a bait to catch state gudgeons," in Gouverneur Morris' scornful phrase.[53] Samuel White, a senator from Delaware, summed up with admirable prescience the consequences of the Twelfth Amendment: "Character, talents, virtue, and merit will not be sought after, in the candidate. The question will not be asked, is he capable? is he honest? But can he by his name, by his connexions, by his wealth, by his local situation, by his influence, or his intrigues, best promote the election of a President?" Roger Griswold of Connecticut said that the Vice Presidency would thereafter be "worse than useless." A number of political leaders, Republicans and Federalists—John Randolph of Roanoke; former Speaker of the House, now Senator Jonathan Dayton; Griswold; Samuel W. Dana—drew the logical conclusion. The Vice Presidency was an organic part of a particular mode of election. That mode of election was now about to be terminated. Should not the Vice Presidency therefore be terminated too? "The reasons of erecting the office," Dayton correctly said, "are frustrated by the amendment. . . . It will be preferable, therefore, to abolish the office." Unfortunately for

[51] Feerick, *From Failing Hands*, pp. 66–67, 63.
[52] Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., *The Electoral College* (Beacon paperback, 1964), pp. 33–34.
[53] Michael Harwood, *In the Shadow of Presidents* (Philadelphia, 1966), p. 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the republic the effort failed by 19–12 in the Senate and 85–27 in the House.[54]

But the dismal predictions were correct. The Twelfth Amendment sent the Vice Presidency into prompt decline. The first two Vice Presidents had moved on directly to the Presidency. After the amendment the Vice Presidency became a resting-place for mediocrities. Who can remember Burr's successors—George Clinton, Elbridge Gerry, Daniel D. Tompkins? For a generation the Secretary of State became the stepping-stone to the Presidency; thereafter, until very modern times, Presidents were elected from anywhere except the Vice Presidency. In the 170 years since the Twelfth Amendment only one Vice President—Martin Van Buren—has advanced directly to the Presidency by election. More than half our Vice Presidents in the nineteenth century were actually *older* than their Presidents. William R. King, when nominated as Vice President with Franklin Pierce, was known to have an incurable disease and died six weeks after inauguration. Clinton, Gerry, Henry Wilson, Thomas A. Hendricks, and Garret A. Hobart also died in office. Apart from their families, few cared or even noticed. The Vice Presidency was nothing. "It is not a stepping stone to anything except oblivion," said Theodore Roosevelt when Boss Platt conned him into accepting the vice presidential nomination in 1900. "I fear my bolt is shot." Asked if he planned to attend McKinley's second inaugural, Platt replied with relish, "I am going to Washington to see Theodore take the veil."[55] Four years later the Democrats nominated Henry G. Davis, then 81 years old, for the Vice Presidency (the ticket lost). For thirty-eight years—almost a quarter of the time that has passed since the ratification of the Twelfth Amendment—the republic was without any Vice President at all. No catastrophe resulted.

VIII

Theodore Roosevelt concluded that the Vice Presidency was "an utterly anomalous office (one which I think ought to be abolished)."[56] He was indisputably right. But what would take its place? How else to deal with the succession? Here it would not seem unreasonable to go back for a moment to the Constitutional Convention. The Founding Fathers were not a pack of fools. While they did not suppose that their descendants would be governed forever by what made sense for an agricultural

[54] Feerick, *From Failing Hands*, p. 73.
[55] Williams, *Rise*, p. 81.
[56] Roosevelt, *Letters*, vol. III, p. 60.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society of four million souls, they had insights into the principles of self-government that later generations did not conspicuously improve.

Their first thought, as we have seen, had been to give the President a provisional successor—most probably the President *pro tem* of the Senate—and then, as soon as possible, elect a new President. When the Convention, for other reasons, moved on to the idea of a Vice Presidency, the delegates resolved to empower Congress to designate the next in succession in case of a double vacancy. The early proposal was that the officer thus designated by Congress should "act" as President "until the time of electing a President shall arrive." Madison at once pointed out that "this, as worded, would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election of the President" and offered language, immediately accepted by his colleagues, stipulating that the designated officer "shall then act as President . . . until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."[57] The constitutional scholar Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., accurately stated the principle of the Founding Fathers in a letter to Walter Lippmann in 1946: "A man who had not been voted on for the Presidency ought not to hold the office for longer than it takes to choose a new President."[58]

Before the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, Vice Presidents had been voted on for the Presidency. Indeed, as the young republic began to develop and assume a national consciousness, people quickly forgot that the original reason for the double vote was to overcome localism and increasingly supposed that its point was, in the words of Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, "to obtain the second best character to fill the place of the first, in case it should be vacated by any unforeseen accident."[59] If the Vice President were thus so well qualified to act as President, the instant problem of succession seemed under control.

So, when the Second Congress passed the Presidential Succession Act of 1792, the act assumed without specification that, if anything happened to the President, the Vice President would take over. If both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency were vacated, Madison's idea of an "intermediate election" was to prevail. The President *pro tempore* of the Senate (or, if there were none, the Speaker of the House) would "act as President . . . until a President be elected," and a special election would be called for the next November to choose a new President unless the double vacancy occurred in the last months of the presidential term.[60]

[57] Tansill, ed., *Documents*, p. 680. Emphasis added.

[58] Walter Lippmann, "A Letter about Vice Presidents," *Washington Post*, December 7, 1946.

[59] Wilmerding, *Electoral College*, p. 30.

[60] The text of the 1792 Act can be conveniently found in Edward Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency* (Boston, 1901), pp. 36–38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"It is unlikely," E. S. Corwin, that mordant annotator of the Constitution, has written, "that Congress ever passed a more ill-considered law."[61] This is harsh language. Corwin did not live long enough to see the Twenty-fifth Amendment. Still, the Act of 1792 unquestionably had its defects. Corwin was particularly upset because he regarded the intrusion of the legislative branch into the line of succession as a violation of the separation of powers. (Madison had made this point against the bill in Congress, but Madison was aggrieved because, had Hamilton not intrigued to shift the succession to Congress, Jefferson as Secretary of State would have been next in line. If Jefferson had been President *pro tem* of the Senate and Hamilton Secretary of State, would Madison have cared so much about the separation of powers?) In any case, the Madison-Corwin doubt had not impressed the Committee of Detail in the Constitutional Convention; and it may be considered to have been laid to rest by the long life of the Act of 1792 and by the reenactment of the principle of congressional succession in 1947.

There still remained, though, the more substantial objection that the qualifications for President *pro tem* and for Speaker are less stringent than for the White House. The congressional officers, for example, need not be natural-born citizens; the Speaker may be under 35 (as Henry Clay demonstrated in 1811); and, peculiarly, neither is required to be a member of the body over which he presides, which makes them less than perfect exemplifications of the elective principle. Still, in practice, the congressional officers have met the presidential qualifications most of the time. A graver objection was that they might be on occasion members of the opposite party; in 1792, however, Congress was not thinking in terms of the party system. A still graver objection was that there might be times when there would be neither a Vice President nor a President *pro tem* nor a Speaker.

The Twelfth Amendment came a dozen years after the Act of 1792. It was intended to make it impossible for persons who had not been voted on for the Presidency to become President. It had precisely the opposite effect.[62] After 1804 Vice Presidents were not voted on for the Presidency except in a highly metaphysical sense. But the retention of the office and the ambiguity of the Constitution enabled Vice Presidents to make themselves President.

IX

The Founding Fathers, so far as we can tell, assumed that, if a President died, the Vice President would inherit the powers and duties of the

[61] E. S. Corwin, ed. *The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation* (Washington, 1953), p. 387.

[62] As Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., pointed out in two penetrating essays on the Vice

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President but not the office itself; he would only be acting president. Corwin judged it the clear expectation of the Framers that, if there were a vacancy in the Presidency, "the Vice-President should remain Vice-President, a stopgap, a locum tenens, whatever the occasion of his succession, and should become President only if and when he was elected as such."[63] A careful modern scholar, John D. Feerick, agrees that the men who signed the Constitution accepted the words limiting tenure ("until . . . a President shall be elected") "as applicable to all successors, including the Vice-President."[64]

The final language was a hurried and cryptic condensation by the drafting committee of two resolutions previously adopted by the Convention. This language—that in case of the President's death, resignation, removal "or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President"—contained a capital ambiguity. By "same" did the Framers mean merely the powers and duties of the Presidency or did they mean the office as well? Since earlier language consistently had the Vice President acting as President and exercising presidential powers and duties, the Framers plainly thought that the Vice President was *not* to inherit the office. The Twelfth Amendment substantiates this surmise; for it provides that, if a presidential choice went to the House and could not be made before inauguration day, "the Vice-President shall *act* as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President" (emphasis added). But the debate over the Twelfth Amendment showed incipient congressional confusion as to whether the Vice President, in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, was only to exercise the powers and duties of the office or was to acquire the office as well, thereby becoming President in every sense of the term.[65]

Then in 1841 William Henry Harrison died a month after his inauguration. At last there was brought to test, as John Quincy Adams said, "that provision of the Constitution which places in the Executive chair a man never thought of for it by anybody." Vice President John Tyler in effect staged a constitutional coup by successfully insisting—"in direct violation," Adams testily noted, "both of the grammar and context of the Constitution"[66]—that, when a Vice President inherited the powers and

Presidency, "The Presidential Succession," *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1947, and "The Vice Presidency," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 68 (March 1953).

[63] E. S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York, 1957), p. 54.

[64] Feerick adds: "The debates at the Convention clearly show that the Vice-President was merely intended to discharge the powers and duties of the President temporarily. All of the drafts before the Committees of Detail and Style were explicit in this regard." Feerick, *From Failing Hands*, pp. 50–51.

[65] Ibid., pp. 74–75.

[66] J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, ed. C. F. Adams, vol. X (Philadelphia, 1877), pp. 457,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duties of the presidential office, he inherited the office too and became, not acting President but President in his own right. There were unavailing protests from senators who thought that a man could gain the Presidency only by election.[67] But Tyler won his point, though the point did not gain explicit constitutional sanction until 125 years later in the Twenty-fifth Amendment.

The United States lived under the Succession Act of 1792 for ninety-four years. Since a double vacancy never occurred, the intermediate-election feature, evidently intended by the Founding Fathers as a routine part of the process, never came into play. In 1881 James A. Garfield, shot by an assassin, died at a time when there was neither a President *pro tem* of the Senate nor a Speaker of the House. If anything happened to his vice presidential successor, Chester A. Arthur, the Presidency would have been in limbo. This was strangely also the case when Grover Cleveland's Vice President died four years later. Moreover, the Republicans were in control of the Senate in 1885, which meant that the President *pro tem* of the Senate, when chosen, would be of the opposite party from Cleveland as well as his statutory successor.

The cry for reform produced the Presidential Succession Act of 1886. The new law put the line of descent through the cabinet, thereby making succession automatic and preventing the mechanics of succession from transferring the Presidency from one party to another without an election. Some members of Congress opposed this idea—among them Congressman William McKinley of Ohio—especially on the ground that it would contravene the elective principle by empowering a President to name his successor.[68] The 1886 law did not, however, eliminate the idea of intermediate elections. It provided that the cabinet successor should "act as President until the disability of the President or Vice-President is removed, or *a President shall be elected.*" It was "the powers and duties of the office of President," and apparently not the office itself, that devolved upon the cabinet successor, and "it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said powers and duties shall devolve" to convene Congress within twenty days, presumably in order to provide for a special election.[69]

463–464. J. Q. Adams' great-great-grandson, Thomas B. Adams, now president of the Massachusetts Historical Society, has speculated that, if a special election had been held following Harrison's death, Henry Clay would probably have been the choice of the nation, in which case there might have been no President Polk, no Mexican War, and a different course of national development. See "On the Threshold of the White House," *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1974.

[67] Feerick, *From Failing Hands*, p. 95.

[68] Ibid., p. 146.

[69] For text, Stanwood, *History of the Presidency*, pp. 451–452. Emphasis added.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The republic operated under this law for another sixty years. Again no occasion arose to call the provision for intermediate elections into play. Then in 1945 Harry S. Truman, abruptly translated to the Presidency, faced the prospect of serving the balance of Roosevelt's term—nearly four years—without a Vice President. The law of 1886 put the Secretary of State next in line. But Truman, as we have noted, thought it undemocratic for a President to have the power to appoint his successor, contending that the Vice President should always be an "elective officer"—i.e., someone who held public office through election. So he proposed a reversion to the principle of the Succession Act of 1792, though with the Speaker of the House first and the President *pro tem* of the Senate second. There were manifest defects in the scheme. Neither the Speaker nor the President *pro tem*, as we have seen, need be elective officers. Both posts were in part the reward of seniority, which often meant long tenure in a safe and therefore unrepresentative district. James F. Byrnes and George C. Marshall, Truman's second and third Secretaries of State in 1947–1948 were far better equipped for the Presidency than Joseph Martin of Massachusetts, who, as Speaker of the House, was heir apparent for the same period under the Truman reform. In general, Secretaries of State have been more impressive figures than Speakers. Polk is the only Speaker to have made it to the White House.

Truman, however, saw this part of the scheme as provisional. Reaffirming the conviction of the Founding Fathers, he said, "No matter who succeeds to the Presidency after the death of the elected President and Vice President, it is my opinion that he should not serve longer than until the next Congressional election or until a special election called . . . to fill the unexpired term of the deceased President and Vice President."[70] As Walter Lippmann put it in 1946, the Founding Fathers "thought the country should never for more than a few months have a President who had not been elected. They did not believe, as we now assume, that there could never be a Presidential election except once every four years."[71] If the country was without an elected President, it should proceed as expeditiously as possible to elect a new one. There was nothing sacrosanct about the four-year election system.

X

Truman's proposal that the intermediate election fill the unexpired term has given some trouble to constitutional scholars who read the language

[70] Truman, *Public Papers . . . 1945*, p. 130.

[71] Walter Lippmann, "Wrong Answer, Right Question," *New York Herald Tribune*, November 12, 1946.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the Presidency in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution—"He shall hold his Office during the term of four Years"—as guaranteeing every new President four years in the White House. The Succession Act of 1792 did provide that the term following the special election should be for four years. The Act of 1886 was mute on the point, though the debate assumed a four-year term. It is far from self-evident, however, that the Constitution forbids elections to fill unexpired terms. We have such elections every day for senators and representatives, though they, no less than Presidents, serve for terms specified in the Constitution. The House Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of that rugged old Texas strict constructionist Hatton W. Sumners, went into this question at length in 1945 and found no consitutional problem in the case of the Presidency

The Constitution, the House Judiciary Committee said, "does not provide that the term of each incumbent shall be 4 years, but that the President shall hold his office 'during the term of 4 years.' This language appears to have reference to a fixed quadrennial term, permitting the filling of an unexpired portion thereof by elections. The tradition of special elections for unexpired terms of other officers also supports the provision."[72] "During" often means "in the time of"; it does not necessarily mean "throughout the entire course of." Had the Constitution said "*for* a Term of four Years," this would clearly assure a four-year term to every new President. But the Constitution does not say this.

And if John Tyler was correct in saying that a Vice President became President, not just acting president, and if it is correct to construe the Constitution as assuring every President a four-year term, then this reading must surely apply to Presidents who gain the office by inheritance quite as much as to those who gain it by election. This would mean that, when a President dies, the Vice President who succeeds him is entitled to a four-year term of his own. Ben Butler made this point during the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson. "Whose presidential term is the respondent now serving out?" he asked. "His own or Mr. Lincoln's? If his own, he is entitled to four years up to the anniversary of the murder, because each presidential term is four years by the Constitution."[73] But no one has ever argued, not even John Tyler, that a Vice President has any right to do more than serve out his President's unexpired term. On what principle, when there is no Vice President, should a specially elected "constitutional substitute" be in a more favored position?

The House unwisely deleted Truman's provision for special presiden-

[72] The report is reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, June 26, 1947, 7854–7855.
[73] D. M. DeWitt, *Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson* (New York, 1903), p. 411.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tial elections before passing the Sumners bill in 1945, and the Senate took no action on the proposed change in the line of succession. The 1946 mid-term election gave the Republicans control of Congress. The Republican leadership, determined to make Joe Martin Truman's absolute and not provisional successor, now favored Truman's bill while opposing the idea of intermediate elections. As finally enacted, the law thus departed critically from Truman's original intention. He signed it, however, in order to shift the succession back to elective officers.

The elimination of intermediate elections was a bad mistake. The mistake was compounded twenty years later by the ratification of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. Section 2 of that amendment, by authorizing a President, whenever there was a vacancy in the Vice Presidency, to nominate a new Vice President, sanctified the appointive principle at the highest level of government and created the monstrous possibility—within a decade a probability—that an appointed Vice President would himself become President and appoint his own Vice President.

There was some opposition to this procedure. The Presidency, as Charles Mathias of Maryland observed in a brilliant dissent from the House report, would no longer be a purely elective office if the amendment were adopted. The Constitutional Convention "would surely have rejected an appointed Vice President on grounds of principle alone." The amendment, Mathias continued, was based not only on a false view of democracy but on a false view of human nature. It assumed

> that a President will always be enlightened and disinterested in naming a Vice President. While this optimism reflects well on the 20th Century's opinion of itself in contrast to the pragmatic 18th century estimate of human frailty, it may not be a prudent basis for constitutional law.

Mathias dismissed the argument that Presidents picked their Vice Presidents anyway at the nominating convention. A candidate for the Presidency, bent on winning the approval of the electorate, was a different man from an incumbent President safe and secure in the White House. "The electability of the vice-presidential candidate is a form of accountability for the head of the ticket." Once elected, a President could employ any criteria he personally preferred. Since the rest of the proposed amendment gave the Vice President new authority with regard to the declaration of presidential inability, a President might well "hesitate in seeking a vigorous and aggressive Vice President" and prefer instead a "respectable, but pallid" appointment. Congressional confirmation would be "a mere formality in a period of national emotional stress." In addition, the choice by the presidential candidate of his running mate was merely the contemporary political custom. It had not always been the custom in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the past and might not be the custom in the future. Putting it into a constitutional amendment would transform a passing practice into a permanent principle.[74]

Nonetheless, Congress, with the support of the establishment press, the American Bar Association, and, alas, an assortment of scholars, voted overwhelmingly for the Twenty-fifth Amendment. The error was deepened in 1973 when Congress, cheering through the nomination of Gerald Ford, acquiesced in Nixon's interpretation of the amendment as making a Vice President thus nominated not a choice genuinely shared with Congress (as some in Congress had ingenuously supposed when voting for the amendment) but a unilateral presidential appointment subject to congressional confirmation.

XI

This removal of the Presidency from the elective principle is unnecessary, absurd, and incompatible with the constitutional traditions of American democracy. It is also not beyond recall. If the American people want to restore authentic legitimacy to their government, it is plain what must be done. We must adopt a constitutional amendment abolishing the Vice Presidency, an office that has become both more superfluous and more mischievous than Hamilton could have imagined when he wrote *Federalist #68*; and then provide for the succession in the spirit of Founding Fathers through a congressional statute reestablishing the principle of special presidential elections. This principle, announced by Madison in the Constitutional Convention, authorized by the Constitution, applied by the Second Congress in 1792 to the prospect of a double vacancy, reaffirmed in this context by the Forty-eighth Congress in 1886, reaffirmed again by Truman in 1945 (and actually again by Eisenhower

[74] Senate Judiciary Committee, *Selected Materials on the Twenty-fifth Amendment*, 67–68. Oddly Richard M. Nixon at the time took what superficially appeared to be a similar position, arguing that the selection of the Vice President "should reflect the elective, rather than the appointive process" so that "whoever held the office of President or Vice President would always be a man selected by the people directly or by their elected representatives, rather than a man who gained the office by appointment." On closer examination, however, the Nixon proposal was designed to strengthen the presidential domination of the process. His objection to placing the power of confirmation in Congress was that Congress might be controlled by the opposition party. Instead he proposed that the President make his recommendation to the reconvened electoral college, which "will always be made up of a membership a majority of which is the President's own party," and which would presumably serve as a rubber stamp, as in the quadrennial elections. This seems an emaciated view of an elective process. *Selected Materials*, 94, 97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1965),[75] would, if the Vice Presidency were abolished, work fully as well for a single vacancy. More than this: it would repair the fatal errors of the Twelfth and Twenty-fifth Amendments and make it certain that the republic would never have to suffer, except as a *locum tenens*, a Chief Executive who, in the words of John Quincy Adams, was never thought of for that office by anybody.

The notion is occasionally advanced that intermediate elections would be unconstitutional. This can be ignored. Madison himself introduced language into the Constitution specifically to make such elections possible. The Second Congress, which contained men who had served five years before in the Constitutional Convention, authorized them by statute. Anything with such patriarchal blessing may be taken as safely consitutional.

Most of the objections to intermediate elections seem to spring primarily from a reverence for routine. The quadrennial rhythm, though not regarded as untouchable by the Founding Fathers, has evidently become sacrosanct for their descendants. Thus Lewis Powell (before, it must be said, his ascension to the Court, though he was still holding forth from a respectable eminence as president-elect of the American Bar Association) rejected the idea of intermediate elections as a "drastic departure from our historic system of quadrennial presidential elections."[76] One must regard such an objection, especially in view of the clear expectation of the Founding Fathers, as frivolous. If the specially elected President fills out his predecessor's term, the sacred cadence will not be disturbed. If not, then Congress could consider E. S. Corwin's proposal: if the vacancy occurs in the first half of the time, the special presidential election should take place at the time of the mid-term congressional election, thereby preserving the assumption that the terms of the new President, a new House and one-third of the Senate would start together.[77]

[75] Eisenhower proposed that in case of a double vacancy there should be a return to the 1886 law, but the cabinet successor would be an "acting President" and "unless the next regularly scheduled presidential election should occur in less than 18 months, the Congress should provide for a special election of a President and Vice President to serve out the presidential term." He seemed to believe this would require a constitutional amendment. See Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, p. 648. It is also of interest that, when the Louis Harris survey put the question in 1973 whether it would be a good idea to have a special election for President in 1974, its respondents favored such an election by 50 to 36 percent. *Washington Post*, January 7, 1974.

[76] Senate Judiciary Committee, *Selected Materials on the Twenty-fifth Amendment*, 124.

[77] Corwin, *The President*, p. 57. Corwin's proposal was directed to the possibility of a double vacancy, but it would serve as well for a single vacancy. If the President vanished after the mid-term election, however, it would risk leaving the country in the hands of a nonelected President for as long as twenty-six months.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is also the objection, formulated by (among others) that thoughtful and lamented student of the Presidency, the late Clinton Rossiter, that "it would be simply too much turmoil and chaos and expense to have a special nationwide election."[78] But one wonders how carefully Professor Rossiter considered the proposition. This plainly was not the French experience with regard to the Presidency in 1974, nor indeed has it been the experience in parliamentary states where elections are held at unpredictable intervals. Are we to suppose that the French and Italians, for example, are so much more cool and imperturbable, so much more Anglo-Saxon, than the Americans?

It could of course be said that special elections in a time of national disarray might only deepen popular confusions. Would it have been a good idea to hold such elections after the wartime death of Franklin Roosevelt, after the murder of John Kennedy, after a successful presidential impeachment? Hubert Humphrey has made the point that special elections in wartime, for example, might cause dangerous delay and irrelevant bickering at a time when the nation could afford neither.[79] No doubt such elections would test the poise and stamina of American democracy. Yet what is the gain in undue protectiveness? The same argument can be made against holding presidential elections in wartime at all. The elections of 1864 and 1944 were held in the midst of the two greatest crises of our history. They caused much irrelevant bickering. Had Lincoln and Roosevelt lost, there would have been an embarrassing interlude of lame-duckery and interregnum. But the nation survived these elections without undue trauma. Democracy is a system for foul weather as well as for fair. Though a special election in a time of stress might conceivably demoralize the country, it might equally help it to resolve its confusions and restore its nerve. At the very least it would reaffirm the principle of self-government and place in the White House a man chosen by the people to be their President rather than, as the present system has done, a man chosen by a President who himself was forced to resign to avoid the virtual certainty of being then impeached and convicted for high crimes and misdemeanors.

XII

If the principle be accepted—the principle that, if a President vanishes, it is better for the people to elect a new President than to endure a Vice

[78] Professor Rossiter's reference, however, was to the proposal of a special election to choose a new Vice President. He might have thought differently if the purpose was to choose a new President. See Senate Judiciary Committee, *Selected Materials*, 136.

[79] "On the Threshold of the White House," *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President who was never voted on for that office, who became Vice President for reasons other than his presidential qualifications, and who may very well have been badly damaged by his vice presidential experience —the problem is one of working out the mechanics of the intermediate election. This is not easy but far from impossible. The great problem is that there can be no gap, no chink, in the continuity of the Presidency. "The President under our system, like the king in a monarchy," said Martin Van Buren, "never dies."[80] It would require up to three months to set up a special election. In the meantime the show must go on. If the Vice Presidency were abolished, who would act as President until the people have a chance to speak?

The historical preference, except for 1886–1947, has been for the President *pro tem* of the Senate (Committee of Detail in the Constitutional Convention, Succession Act of 1792) or the Speaker of the House (Succession Act of 1947). But given the regularity with which in recent years one party has controlled Congress and the other the executive branch, this formula risks an unvoted change in party control of the White House and in the whole direction of government. Such a change would be a graver infringement of the democratic principle than the provisional service of an appointed officer as acting President. The confusion would be even greater in the event of temporary presidential disability, in which case the Presidency might shuttle back and forth between the two parties in a period of a few months.

Fidelity to the results of the last election and to the requirements of continuity in policy creates, it seems to me, an irresistible argument for returning the line of provisional descent to the executive branch. A convenient way would be simply to make the Secretary of State acting President for ninety days. If the Secretary of State is foreign-born or under thirty-five or has some other disqualifying eccentricity, then the Secretary of the Treasury could be the automatic successor, and so on down the 1886 list of succession.[81]

Then, as soon as possible, let the people make their choice (unless the

[80] Martin Van Buren, *Inquiry into the Origin and Course of Political Parties in the United States* (New York, 1867), p. 290.

[81] In an earlier version of this argument, in the *Atlantic Monthly* (May 1974), I proposed devolution to the Secretary of State only long enough to permit the choice of an acting President from the cabinet. The reason for this was that the Secretary of State might not be the member of the cabinet best qualified to serve as acting President. It then seemed to me that the cabinet itself might well select the acting President, using the corporate authority already bestowed on it by the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which gives a majority of the cabinet, plus the Vice President, power to declare the President *non compos mentis*. An alternative would have been to permit Congress to select an acting President from the cabinet—a device that would preserve continuity, spread re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President vanishes in his last year in office, in which case it might be simpler to let the acting President serve out the term). Some have argued that a national election is too hard to organize; therefore Congress should choose the person to serve the remainder of the term. But this would give Congress the right, limited as it might be, to elect a President —a right the Founding Fathers carefully denied Congress and reserved for the voters. If it be said that ninety days is not time enough to organize an election, let us recall that the French allow themselves only thirty-five days, and who will say that the French are better organizers than the Americans? This would only be an election to fill out a term and thus would not require the elaborate foreplay of the quadrennial orgy. Candidates can be established with astonishing speed in the electronic age. Let the national committees, which have become increasingly representative bodies under the new party rules, canvass opinion and make the nominations. Short campaigns, federally financed, would be a blessing, infinitely appreciated by the electorate. Perhaps their brevity and their economy might have a salutary impact on the quadrennial elections, which in recent years have stretched out to intolerable length and swelled to intolerable expense.

In doing this, we would not be departing from the spirit and intent of the Founding Fathers. Quite the contrary: we would be reaffirming their view—and what view could be more sensible for a self-governing democracy?—that the Chief Magistrate of the United States must, except for the briefest periods, be a person elected to that office by the people. "We have only to operate the Constitution as the men who wrote it thought it should operate," Walter Lippmann wrote in arguing for inter-

---

sponsibility, afford a choice of sorts, and perhaps stimulate Presidents to choose better cabinets. I agree, however, with Richard Neustadt (in the *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1974) that the temporary succession should be automatic within the cabinet.

I still think there is merit in this more complex approach; but on balance I have come to believe that two acting Presidents in a period of three months before a new President is chosen would be too cumbersome and confusing. I therefore now favor the simpler system outlined in the text. I have also dropped the proposal that the acting President be declared ineligible as a candidate in the special election, this in order to avoid the advantage created by the inevitable rush of sympathy to the new person in the White House. Demetrius Sakellarios has reminded me that democracy implies as few restrictions as possible on a people's right to choose its rulers.

I have not discussed the issue of presidential inability—an issue that may have received attention out of all proportion to its importance. In any case, the Vice President is not indispensable to a solution of the inability issue. The majority of the cabinet, when making its determination of presidential inability as authorized in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, could simply designate one of their own number to serve as acting President until the inability is removed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mediate elections in 1946. "If we are the prisoners of a rigid system today, the fault lies not in the Constitution but in our own habits which have only rather recently become so hard and so fixed."[82] *

[82] Lippmann, "Wrong Answer, Right Question."

* This article has been adapted from a new appendix prepared for the forthcoming paperback edition of *The Imperial Presidency*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Gift Membership

Enroll a friend in the Academy of Political Science, and they will receive:

- A year's subscription to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY beginning in December—plus a free copy of the September 1974 issue.
- Two additional books
- Invitations to all conferences
- A membership card

The recipient will be notified of your generosity.

The membership fee is $12.

Please send a gift membership to:

Name (please print)

Address

City State Zip

Enclosed is my check payable to the Academy of Political Science, 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, 10025. **Any names and addresses for additional gift memberships are included on a separate sheet.**

My name

Address

City State Zip

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-1973 (with postscript)

STEPHEN G. XYDIS

The military coup d'état of April 21, 1967, set up an authoritarian no-party system of government in Greece which resisted internal and external pressures for a change toward a multiparty system but resulted in 1973 in the abolition of the monarchy and the formal establishment of a republic. After first giving a summary of the main political events in Greek affairs during the years from 1967 to 1973, this article goes on to indicate the principal gainers and losers from this series of events both within and outside Greece. In describing the serious problem created for Western governments and international organizations subscribing to the values of representative government by the emergence of an authoritarian regime in Athens, the article recounts Western European steps designed to bring about a change in Greece as well as the complications created in the relations between Greece and the United States. An effort then is made to explain the unprecedented durability of this era of authoritarian rule in Greece by reference to economic, social, and demographic factors. Furthermore, the article underlines the difficulties of restoring civilian control over the military in order to move toward a multiparty system, especially when efforts are exerted to combine a quasi-dictatorial chief executive with representative institutions. Finally, the article deals with the impact of the Greek situation on the polycentric communist sector of world politics.

STEPHEN G. XYDIS is professor of political science at Hunter College, City University of New York. His books include *Greece and the Great Powers, 1944–47; Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation;* and most recently, *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Summary of Political Events

The following were the main political events in Greece during the years from 1967 to 1973:

(1) The bloodless military coup d'état of April 21, 1967, was carried out under the leadership of George Papadopoulos, an army colonel who was serving on the Planning Board of the Army Chief of Staff. About ten years earlier Papadopoulos had set up a secret organization called the Union of Young Greek Officers (EENA).[1] The leaders of the coup were drawn from this organization. The new regime suspended the multiparty system which had prevailed in Greece from the end of World War II and indeed throughout most of modern Greek history. This new regime functioned as an authoritarian no-party system under the name of the "Revolution of April 21, 1967." Introducing martial law throughout the country and assuming constitutional, executive, and legislative powers, it began issuing a large number of legislative decrees in an assertion of "revolutionary legality." Promising the regeneration of the "Greece of the Greek Christians," it chose as its symbol the phoenix rising from its ashes, with a soldier at attention in its breast.[2]

(2) A new constitution replaced the previous one, of 1952, and was adopted by plebiscite on October 29, 1968, with 91.87 percent of the voters reported to favor its adoption. Despite an abortive coup on December 13, 1967, by King Constantine II against the military regime and his self-imposed exile in Rome, the constitution preserved the "crowned republic" but greatly limited the king's powers. It also provided for the restoration of the multiparty system, which, however, would be under strict state control. Moreover, it vested the armed forces with the role of guardians of the constitution and of the political and social status quo.

In order to implement many of the general provisions of this constitution, several *lois cadres* subsequently were prepared. Some of these were debated in a consultative body not provided for in the constitution—the Advisory Committee on the Preparation of Legislative Decrees—which began work in January 1971. Martial law was lifted from the rural areas on December 18, 1971; after December 16, 1972, it was limited to Greater Athens.

(3) The abolition of the monarchy and the adoption of a republican constitution based on the 1968 constitution was the result of a "coup from

[1] A. Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint* (London, 1971), pp. 189-190. This union (EENA) was opposed to IDEA, a secret organization of officers set up in 1945.

[2] Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first President of Greece, had used the phoenix as a symbol of free Greece. He also had invoked the precept of *salus populi suprema lex esto* when setting aside the constitution of Troezene (1827) and establishing in 1828 a quasi-dictatorship.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

above" announced on June 1, 1973. Papadopoulos, who by now held the posts of regent, premier, and minister of national defense and of foreign affairs, was proclaimed the president of the new presidential parliamentary republic. Under the new constitution he was vested with reserved powers in the sectors of national defense, foreign affairs, and public order. He also shared legislative powers with Parliament. The new republic's symbol remained the phoenix; however, the soldier at attention was excised from its breast. The period of the "Revolution of April 21, 1967" was officially stated to have come to an end.

The new constitution again provided for a multiparty system, but also called for its implementation by the end of 1974 at the latest. This constitution was adopted by a plebiscite held on July 29, 1973, with 77.55 percent of the voters reported to be in favor of the change. On October 29, 1973, an all-civilian cabinet took over, under Spyros Markezinis, a professional politician. Their task was to prepare general elections in 1974 for a Parliament with revisionary powers.

(4) On November 25, 1973, a military coup from within was carried out, this time under the leadership of Brigadier-General Dimitrios Ioannidis, the head of ESA, the military police. President Papadopoulos was replaced by another military man, enjoying more limited powers. A return to the regime of the "Revolution of April 21, 1967" was proclaimed. The soldier at attention once again was grafted into the phoenix's breast. The election plans were shelved. Behind the façade of an all-civilian cabinet, a new political struggle was going on among the members of the former Union of Young Greek Officers.

The Impact of No-Party Authoritarianism

In the analysis that follows, a sort of balance sheet will be drawn up of the impact of this authoritarian no-party system in Greece and abroad from the viewpoints of various institutions and organized groups involved as well as of other governments, and also in terms of gainers and losers in a loose set of nonzero-sum games, keeping in mind that in the long run gainers could become losers and losers become gainers.

Gainers

In the Greek arena, the primary gainers were Colonel Papadopoulos and his acolytes in the Union of Young Greek Officers. This group had been conceived a decade or so earlier in a climate, first, of Greek indignation against the policies of Eden and Dulles in the Cyprus question, and, second, of admiration for Nasser's defiance of the West in the national-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ization of the Suez Canal company and for Imre Nagy's revolt against the USSR in Hungary. The coup of April 21, 1967, exorcised the specter of their being purged from the army ranks by George Papandreou, whose victory in the elections scheduled for May 28 they feared. It also saved them from the shame of seeing amnesty and reward granted to the convicted members of ASPIDA, another secret organization of officers, with allegedly neutralist tendencies, which looked to Andreas Papandreou for leadership. Moreover, by preempting a coup by the generals, it allowed them to enjoy the trappings of political power, while their leader undertook the ambitious project of putting an end to "corrupt" politics and creating a new Greece.

The six years from 1967 to 1973 witnessed a considerable strengthening of Papadopoulos' status and power in the triumvirate that emerged from the coup. From the collective dictatorship by an association of former colonels, by 1972 the regime had turned into the personal dictatorship of the man who formerly had been only first among equals.

The process had been gradual. During the first eight months after the coup, the "colonels' " revolutionary council shared power with King Constantine II and a civilian premier (a concession to the king), as well as with a number of civilian ministers (none of them professional politicians, however).

After the king's abortive coup and his self-imposed exile in Rome, General Grigorios Spandidakis, who had played a key role in the coup, dropped out of the picture.[3] Papadopoulos, who at the outset had served as minister to the Premier's Office and then, under a decree of November 2, 1967, had become head of a special body for coordinating government policy in matters relating to defense, security, finance, education, and social welfare, took over the premiership and the Ministry of National Defense.

A year later, after the constitution of 1968 formally came into force on November 15, 1968, another decree, of November 21, 1968, reorganized the responsibilities of the various ministries and concentrated even greater power in the premier's hands. The revolutionary council no longer had a role in the country's government. A cabinet, made up of a large number of Papadopoulos' trusted colleagues, took over.

Then, after Foreign Minister Panayotis Pipinelis, an ultraroyalist former premier, died on July 19, 1970, Premier Papadopoulos took over that ministry as well.

[3] At the time of the coup, General Spandikakis, not a member of EENA, was army chief of staff, and, when Athens was taken over, he was induced to give the green light for the implementation of the "Prometheus Plan" to the rest of Greece, as he was empowered to do. *Akropolis*, January 27, 1973.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Less than two years later, General George Zoïtakis, who had acted as regent after the king's flight to Rome,[4] was dismissed on March 21, 1972, and Papadopoulos also assumed the office of regent.

Thus the coup from above of June 1, 1973, which deposed the king and proclaimed Papadopoulos as president of the Republic, appeared to be the logical culmination of an ongoing political process and represented an effort to institutionalize the gains he had made during the six years of the regime of April 21, 1967.

The armed forces as a whole also benefited from the military coup. The "Revolution of April 21, 1967" raised officers' pay—before that a general's pay had been lower than that of an American sergeant[5]—and decreed various other allowances and benefits for officers, such as low-interest loans for homes and cars.[6] Officers' pensions were increased so that retirement no longer meant a life of humiliating want, as it had for many of them in the past. Moreover, various postretirement jobs in government, public enterprises, and banking were made available to army officers. Thus, among a population that was experiencing keenly the "revolution of rising expectations," the regime, by catering to the demands of the active and retired military cadres, was taking a short cut toward the modernization of part of the peasant and petty-bourgeois sector of Greek society.

Although the gap between agricultural and other income may have grown during this period, the large agricultural sector of the Greek population also derived some benefits from the regime of April 21, 1967, which canceled all agricultural debts shortly after assuming power. Industrial workers benefited when a new program of low-cost housing was launched. Within a rapidly growing consumer-oriented economy, the regime, following policies of encouraging free enterprise, was very generous in providing credits to persons whose applications for loans would probably have been turned down in the past. Its "classless conception of the nation," if not exactly revolutionary, was, nonetheless, egalitarian—

[4] Zoïtakis, also not an EENA member, reportedly had informed Papadopoulos that the generals intended to carry out a coup on April 22, 1967 (*Akropolis*, January 27, 1973).

[5] Pay differences in multinational forces have been found to be sources of conflict. C. C. Moskos, "Conflict in Peace-Keeping Organization: UNFICYP," *Review of Social Studies*, Nos. 7-8 (Athens, January-June 1971), 53-62. The same phenomenon may also appear in alliances such as NATO, with certain direct effects on the behavior of the military in the society of the less privileged country.

[6] Compared with an increase in 1966 over 1965 of $19.1 million in the expenditures of the Ministry of National Defense, the expenditures of this ministry rose by $71.3 million in 1967. By contrast there was a rise of only $27.5 million in 1970 compared with 1969. National Statistical Service of Greece, *Statistical Yearbook of Public Finance 1971* (Athens, 1972), p. 116.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

especially toward friends—when viewed from the perspective of the older social and economic establishment, which it did not destroy.

In line with social ideals expressed in the novel constitutional provisions concerning the duties of the state toward society as a whole, the regime took steps that favored not only the military and the shipowners but also the wage earners, civil servants, and pensioners. Late in 1972, to the discomfiture of opponents who looked down on the "colonels" as Boeotian boors, the government began wooing intellectuals and artists with pensions and prizes, despite often hardly concealed mutual antipathies. In brief, the regime wielded not only the stick, but also the carrot.

In the Western NATO sector of the international setting, the United States, Turkey, and Italy all gained from the authoritarian no-party system in Athens and its policies. The six-year regime was a period of political stability that ensured the continued alignment of Greece with the United States and its strategic needs not only in the NATO defense area but also beyond it, in the Middle East. In an agreement of January 8, 1973, between the United States Navy and the Hellenic Navy, the Greek government granted home-porting facilities near Athens to the Sixth Fleet, "to serve the purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance."[7]

The regime's moves in the Cyprus question, which had become a Greek-Turkish competition for the control if not the possession of the whole island, turned out to be to the advantage of Turkey. The "colonels," assisted by General George Grivas-Dighenis in Cyprus, and ignoring the advice of the experts on Cyprus in the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, were largely responsible for the Cyprus crisis of December 1967 which brought Greece to the brink of a war with Turkey. This resulted in the withdrawal of the 8000 Greek troops who had been sent to Cyprus by George Papandreou's government during an earlier crisis in 1963–1964. Furthermore, Ankara must have welcomed as signs of a grave rift in the Athens-Nicosia Axis the conflict that arose in connection with Alexander Panagoulis' attempted assassination of Premier Papadopoulos on August 13, 1968, which was followed by the attempted assassination of Cypriot President Makarios on March 8, 1970, and with the assassination of the Cyprus minister of the interior, Polykarpos Georghadjis,

[7] To be implemented in two stages, this agreement was to serve about 6500 military personnel attached to the Sixth Fleet and their estimated 3350 dependents. It was based on several previous agreements: the one between the parties to NATO of June 19, 1951, concerning the status of their forces; the ones between Greece and the United States of October 12, 1953, concerning military facilities in Greece, and of September 7, 1956, on the legal status of United States armed forces in Greece; and agreement No. 6553 between the competent Greek authorities and the United States on June 2, 1956, concerning customs clearance procedures of personnel, personal effects, and official supplies through the U.S. 7206th Support Group, Hellenikon.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a week later. A further sign of a rift in Greek-Cypriot relations was the secret return of the activist Grivas to Cyprus (in priestly garb, it was said) in September 1971, with the acquiescence if not connivance of Athens, and his subsequent attempts to overthrow President Makarios.

As for the European Economic Community's (EEC) stand toward the "colonels' " regime in Athens, it represented a gain for Italy in the competitive agricultural sector.[8]

Losers

Foremost among the losers in Greece were the king and his entourage, and the professional politicians. From 1965 to 1967 they had created a political situation that invited, as it were, a coup d'état.[9] King Constantine II, however, remained head of state, even after his abortive coup against the "colonels," of December 13, 1967, and his flight to Rome, when a regency was set up to act in his name in Greece. Nonetheless, the six years of the regime of April 21, 1967, witnessed a considerable weakening of his position not only de facto, because of his absence from Greece, but also constitutionally. The far from fully implemented constitution of 1968, already being drafted before the king's flight to Rome, greatly limited the crown's constitutional role compared with its powers under the constitution of 1952.[10] By contrast, it greatly strengthened the positions of the premier and the cabinet vis-à-vis both crown and

[8] For further details on this, see the section "Western Europe and the Greek Regime," below.

[9] J. Brown, "Political Performance within Polities: A Case Study in Greece," *Review of Social Research*, no. 3 (Athens, July 1972), 6–8. In late December 1967, an unnamed Greek personality told an investigator from the Council of Europe that almost everyone in Greece was preparing his own coup. The "colonels" carried out theirs first. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Nineteenth session, *Documents*, *Document* 2322, p. 23. Early in 1965, leaders of EDA (Union of the Democratic Left) were predicting in Parliament a coup by the king and a junta of generals. In March 1966, S. Konstantopoulos, journalist and publisher of *Eleftheros Kosmos*, who was to support the regime of April 21, 1967, drew attention in a series of public lectures not only to the dictatorial element in communist practice but also to possible Bonapartism in a coup from above by George Papandreou. S. Konstantopoulos, *The Fear of Dictatorship* (Athens, 1966), pp. 99 and 109 (in Greek). C. L. Sulzberger, in the *New York Times*, October 5, 1966, commenting on the polarization between Left and Right in Greek politics, wrote that King Constantine II might temporarily suspend some articles of the constitution, evidently by proclaiming a state of emergency.

[10] In the abstract, this constitution sought to deal with several specific political issues that involved the monarchy in post-World War II Greece. Thus it included provisions that would have prevented King Paul from appointing Constantine Karamanlis as premier after the death of Alexander Papagos; his wife, Queen Frederika, from running her Queen's fund; their son, Crown Prince Constantine, from getting the education

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Parliament, and also gave the armed forces a self-governing status in the Greek body politic.

From Rome, King Constantine II had consistently rejected several backstage approaches for some sort of accommodation with the regime in Athens. In 1968 he made it clear that he would not return to Greece if invited to do so, unless all political prisoners were released, censorship was lifted, and free elections were assured. It is not clear whether or not he had backed the attempted coup of certain naval officers late in May 1973; but after his deposition on June 1, 1973, he stated that he had absolutely no connection with it. He had never previously condemned the underground activities of organizations using the crown as a symbol of their resistance.

The decision to abolish the monarchy seems to have been made well before the attempted naval coup of May 1973. Several months earlier, Ioannidis, the head of the military police, had informed a number of Greek politicians that the abolition of the monarchy was the price that would have to be paid for the restoration of parliamentary government and the return of the armed forces to their barracks. Junior officers who had sided with the regime during the king's abortive coup of 1967 were said to fear that if he returned to Greece, they would be prosecuted for breach of military discipline because of their fidelity to the "junta." The statement of the secretary of the Greek Communist Party of the Interior, Dimitrios Partsalidis, during his trial in Athens in January 1973, that his party favored the king's return,[11] may well have been a sort of kiss of death for Constantine II and his dynasty.

For the professional politicians and the 300 members of the dissolved Parliament, many of them lawyers, the deprivation of political freedoms was more immediate and equally severe. With the suspension of representative government and the multiparty system, they were shorn of their various political roles. Their aspirations and expectations of becoming ministers or prime ministers were dashed. Their political careers were cut short. What made matters worse were the indignities to which the politicians were subjected under the "colonels," who blamed them for the breakdown of the previous multiparty system, to which the April 21, 1967, revolution had merely administered a coup de grâce—a view shared by many other Greeks, including some of the politicians themselves.[12] Among leading politicians, Panayotis Kanellopoulos,

---

that he did; and their elder daughter, Sophia, from getting a $300,000 dowry out of public funds, on her betrothal to Juan Carlos, the heir presumptive to the Spanish throne.

[11] *To Vima*, January 26, 1973.

[12] In a private conversation with the author, a former minister and member of Par-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leader of ERE (National Radical Union) and last precoup premier, was thrown out of office, arrested, placed under house detention, and thereafter kept under constant police surveillance, including even telephone tapping. Other members of his cabinet were subjected to similar treatment. George Papandreou, leader of EK (Center Union), and the members of his party, also were treated in this manner. Papandreou, additionally, felt cheated of the victory he had expected from the never-held elections of May 28, 1967. His son, Andreas, greatly fearing for his life, was imprisoned; he expected a political trial on charges of high treason. Leaders of EDA (Union of the Democratic Left), a façade for the Greek Communist party (outlawed since 1947), as well as a considerable number of people suspected of having communist sympathies, were deported to isolated islands in the Aegean. These initial measures later were relaxed. Andreas Papandreou was allowed to leave the country at the end of 1967. Late in March 1968 about 5400 of the more than 6000 persons—mainly members of EDA, communists, and fellow travelers—who had been deported to the island of Yaros in the Northern Cyclades were released. At the end of October 1968 the government announced that this internment camp was soon to be closed.

However, throughout this more than six-year period, censorship and press fears of severe penalties, as well as denial of access to other mass media, paralyzed the efforts of politicians to denounce the coup, express their indignation over the loss of their freedom of speech, and criticize various measures taken by the "colonels." Suspension of the right to organize and assemble impeded their efforts to mobilize their followers against the regime, and left them with no alternative but underground opposition, for which most were ill prepared. These experiences undoubtedly left deep scars in the minds of the Greek political elite. It is no wonder then that the leaders of the three major parties active in Greek politics prior to the coup of April 21, 1967, should have been opposed to the regime. Quite consistently they refused to recognize the validity of the 1968 constitution—which, however, enabled government spokesmen to argue against an early return to a multiparty system.

Other losers were certain high public officials (some elected, like the mayors of Athens and Piraeus), civil servants, professors in institutions of higher education, trade union leaders, and members of the judiciary and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, who were dismissed from their positions. Most of them were not allowed to appeal to the Council of State against their dismissal or forced retirement. Also denied the right to appeal were those persons whose citizenship was withdrawn and whose

liament acknowledged that "we were to blame" for the coup and the state of affairs that followed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

property was confiscated on the ground that they had acted "unpatriotically."

The military hierarchy itself was not spared from purges. Well aware of the fundamental importance of maintaining absolute control over the armed forces, the Union of Young Greek Officers, after seizing power, decreed the ex officio retirement of army and gendarmerie officers who were members of ASPIDA. They also proposed to retire some 400 other officers, many of them their superiors, whom they believed to be "unreliable"—loyal primarily to the king or critical of the coup. King Constantine II, however, refused to sign the relevant decree and, counting on the help of several officers threatened with retirement, attempted a coup of his own. When this coup failed, the regime was free to proceed with the original purge with a vengeance—after granting on December 23, 1967, an amnesty to its ASPIDA opponents and those connected with a purge plan of the Papandreou government in 1964!

Communists, monarchists, and others apprehended for acts directed against the regime such as political graffiti, oppositionist pamphlets, symbolic violence, or participation in underground organizations, often were ill treated. At times they were psychologically pressured and physically tortured by agents motivated by a desire for advancement or even by sheer sadism. Military courts imposed harsh penalties that civil courts would never have imposed. Temporary releases from prison "because of grave damage to health" were not infrequent—which suggested humanity or inhumanity, depending on the facts of the case and the viewpoint. For example, Lady Fleming, widow of Sir Alexander Fleming, was convicted in 1971 of having taken part in a plot to help Panagoulis, the would-be assassin of Premier Papadopoulos, to escape from prison; later she was freed and then deported from Greece since she was also a British subject.[13]

A major casualty in the press field was the prestigious conservative Athens paper *Kathimerini*, together with its subsidiary publications. Its owner and publisher, Helen Vlachos, refused to comply with the rules of preventive censorship and found it financially advantageous, as some members of her staff saw it, to close down the paper instead of following in the footsteps of her father who had wholeheartedly supported the Metaxas dictatorship of August 4, 1936.[14] Subsequently the newspaper *Ethnos* was another casualty. Although in October 1969 censorship prior to publication was abolished, the press law issued in 1970, which was based on article 14 of the 1968 constitution, provided for severe sanctions against its violators. Furthermore, the vagueness of some of

[13] A. Fleming, *A Piece of Truth* (Boston, 1973), recounts her experiences.

[14] For her account, see H. Vlachos, *House Arrest* (London, 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the law's provisions and the uncertainty as to whether military or civil courts maintained jurisdiction over press offenses acted as additional deterrents to freedom of expression in the press. Some opposition papers were treated with greater severity than others. After the overthrow of the Papadopoulos-Markezinis regime in November 1973, the traditionally pro-Karamanlis and pro-king afternoon paper *Vradyni* was closed without explanation. Earlier the paper had been deprived of government-sponsored advertisements and on several occasions its representatives had been brought to court because of items published in it. By contrast, the traditionally pro-Papandreou, pro-Venizelos, and pro-republic morning newspaper *To Vima* was even able to obtain approval for a large loan.

Western Europe and the Greek Regime

All the deprivations imposed by the regime of April 21, 1967, upon its opponents stemmed from its anxious efforts to consolidate its hold on the governmental apparatus and on the country as a whole, and to promote its professed long-range goal of regenerating Greece. Thus, for the regime itself these inroads on personal freedom represented a set of victorious battles. The battles, however, were won with a high cost to the regime's own image, and even more. Silencing opponents at home was one thing; silencing opponents abroad was another. The coup d'état itself, the suspension of representative government and of political and civil liberties, together with the treatment of the regime's foes, caused, initially at least, quite an outcry not only in the USSR and the Soviet-inclined international bloc—which from 1945 on had attacked all Greek governments as "monarcho-fascist" and as "tools of imperialism"—but also among the Western nations. The image of Greece as the "cradle" or "bastion" of democracy was tarnished.

Although no government withheld recognition of the regime of April 21, 1967, or of the republic proclaimed on June 1, 1973,[15] West Germany's *Bundestag* on April 2, 1968, resolved to grant no further governmental credits to Greece until parliamentary democracy had been restored. Some NATO members, during council meetings, made certain unfavorable observations about the regime in Athens, eliciting sharp retorts from the Greek delegates to the effect that it was not NATO's business to interfere in the domestic affairs of member states. Parliament members of various countries (including certain Democratic congressmen in the United States), often in response to the pleas of Greek opponents of the Athens regime, found it politically valuable to voice public-

[15] On the latter occasion, Denmark and Sweden, which had recalled their ambassadors from Athens because of the April 1967 coup, decided to appoint new ones.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ly their indignation about events in Greece and the treatment of some of their colleagues there. Journalists and workers also spoke out through their domestic, transnational, or international organizations, as did certain nongovernmental organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International, each for its particular interests and purposes, in solidarity with individuals and groups in the Greek population who had been adversely affected by deprivations imposed by the "Revolution of April 21, 1967."

The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe took up the Greek question five days after the military coup. By the end of September 1967, its Commission of Human Rights took up the complaints from Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden that the Greek government had violated the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Greece was a party.

On November 18, 1969, the European Commission on Human Rights presented to the Ministers' Committee of the Council of Europe a 1200-page report detailing alleged violations of human rights in Greece. Earlier, in January of that same year, the Consultative Assembly produced a report on the Greek situation prepared by a three-man commission under Max van der Stoel, of the Dutch Labor party, after two fact-finding visits to Greece in 1968.[16] (The Greek government did not allow a third such visit in January 1969.) When the Committee of Ministers met in Paris on December 12, 1969, it was apparent that at least eleven out of its eighteen members—Belgium, Britain, Denmark, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden—favored suspending Greece from membership in the Council of Europe. The committee had also decided that this could be done by a simple majority vote. However, before the Committee of Ministers could vote on suspension, the Greek representative, Foreign Minister Pipinelis, announced that Greece had decided to withdraw from the council and walked out of the meeting. At a press conference he charged the Council of Europe with trying to impose upon Greece a concept similar to the Brezhnev doctrine of the limited sovereignty of communist-bloc countries.

Meanwhile, in June 1967, EEC's European Parliament, on the initiative of some of its Italian members, had decided that the EEC's association agreement with Greece could not operate, because the EEC-Greece Joint Parliamentary Committee, which was essential to the proper work-

[16] Council of Europe, European Commission of Human Rights, *The Greek Case: Report of the Commission*, 4 vols. (Strasbourg, 1969). The Van der Stoel report was published on September 22, 1969, as document 2637, the Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing of the agreement, could not function in the absence of elected institutions in Greece.[17] As a result, negotiations about the association's future development, especially on harmonizing agricultural policies, were suspended. Moreover, EEC withheld from Greece $56 million—the unused balance of an EEC development loan to Greece of $125 million through the European Investment Bank. It also decided to grant no further loans to Greece for financing development projects that would contribute to the association's goals. Finally, in a resolution of May 7, 1969, the European Parliament reserved its right to have the association agreement revised or suspended.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) investigated the policies of the regime toward trade unions, after complaints were made to the International Labour Conference on June 25, 1968, by the workers' delegates to the conference, from West Germany, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and also Czechoslovakia. On March 6, 1969, the ILO set up a commission under Lord Devlin to examine these complaints. The Greek government either denied that the acts in question had been committed or argued that, if committed, they were not in breach of ILO conventions 87 and 98, which Greece had ratified in 1962. The regime also contended that, because of the emergency, it was relieved of the obligation of compliance. The commission, however, responded by arguing that a state may not rely on the terms of its domestic law or otherwise invoke national sovereignty in order to justify nonperformance of an international obligation. A plea of *force majeure*, it added, generally required a showing both of imminent danger and of a proportionate relationship between the danger and the measures adopted for defense. In the opinion of the commission, nothing emerged from its investigation to show that there existed in Greece in April 1967 such a state of emergency or such exceptional conditions as to justify temporary noncompliance with the relevant international conventions.

The Devlin Commission found that the measures taken by the Greek government after the coup at first affected only a minority of trade unions—those which in the government's view were communist dominated. Later, however, the government had tried to control the trade union movement as a whole. The commission acknowledged that previous Greek legislation did not fully satisfy the requirements of the freedom-of-association conventions ratified by Greece. However, it found that the new trade union legislation was not in harmony with the relevant international standards. It therefore recommended that certain provisions of these new legislative decrees be repealed and that other

[17] *EEC Bulletin*, no. 7 (July 1967), 81. For a summary of the debates, see ibid., pp. 67–69.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

provisions be amended. The commission concluded that, unless civil liberties were fully restored, its recommendations could not be carried out.[18] In June 1972 Greece was listed among several other states that had not complied with a number of ILO conventions and recommendations.[19]

American Involvement and Reaction

Many normally pro-American elements in Greece, Western Europe, and elsewhere (including factions in the United States) blamed the United States government either for having supposedly masterminded and conspired in the coup of April 21, 1967, or for not having exerted sufficient pressure upon the postcoup regime to bring back parliamentary government to Greece. To the extent that this was believed, the prestige of America as the leader of the "Free World" was tarnished.

It would require far more than the flimsy evidence put forward mainly by Greeks to substantiate the charge of United States complicity in the "colonels" coup.[20] Like the king, the Kanellopoulos government, and the Greek generals, the U. S. Embassy in Athens was surprised by it. During the previous weeks embassy officials had been trying to conciliate the leaders of the two main political parties in order to ensure orderly developments through elections. They were also trying to bring

[18] ILO, *Official Bulletin, Special Supplement*, LIV, no. 2 (1971), *Report of the Commission Appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the Internatinal Labour Organization to Examine the Complaints concerning the Observance by Greece of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention 1949 (No. 87) and of the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 (No. 98), Made by a Number of Delegates to the 52nd Session of the International Labour Conference*, pp. 1, 8–21, 23–26, and 54–56.

[19] ILO Conference, *Report II* (Part 4A), 57th session, Geneva 1972, *Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations*, Vol. A. *General Report and Observations concerning Particular Countries* (Geneva, 1972), pp. 140, 154–157, 170, 178, 185, and 194.

[20] Papandreou, in *Democracy at Gunpoint*, pp. 192–193, blames the CIA and the Pentagon for the coup and asserts that Cyrus Vance was the top advisor for the CIA team. By contrast, the generals' plan for a coup with the king's assent, he believes, was backed by the British. C. Tsoucalas, in *The Greek Tragedy* (London, 1969), pp. 205–207, likewise subscribes to the view that the CIA was behind the coup. The counterarguments to Tsoucalas is given by the British journalist of the *Sunday Times*, D. Holden, in *Greece Without Columns* (London, 1972), pp. 244–250. M. Goldbloom, "U.S. Policy in Post-War Greece," in R. Clogg and G. Yannopoulos (eds.), *Greece under Military Rule* (London, 1972), p. 240, likewise rejects the theory of United States complicity in the coup. On the other hand, S. Rousseas, in *The Death of a Democracy*, rev. ed. (New York, 1968), pp. 58–59 maintains that the United States government was backing a coup by the king and the generals.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about a meeting between Andreas Papandreou and the King, by predicting to the former the possibility of a military coup,[21] and by raising before the latter the specter of a popular uprising in Athens led by Papandreou. The State Department, too, was surprised by this particular coup and did not favor it. In fact, Secretary of State Dean Rusk authorized the U. S. Embassy in Athens to contact a leading Greek politician and find out his views about what, if any, steps the United States government might take in order to counteract the coup.

The question remains as to whether the Pentagon or the CIA, or both, were behind the coup—a charge made at the outset by Soviet propaganda.[22] It is tempting but hazardous to infer from the fact that U. S. Army and Navy officers subsequently appeared to support the regime of April 21, 1967, that the Pentagon, Army Intelligence, or United States NATO officers backed the plot that brought about the coup. Postcoup gestures of good will toward the regime could well have been motivated by a desire to counteract negative congressional attitudes toward the Greek government at a time when the Department of Defense was interested in securing home-porting facilities near Athens.

On the other hand, the fact that on the day of the coup, its leaders ignored the deputy head of KYP (the Greek equivalent of the CIA) when he arrived at the Greek "Pentagon" with a CIA message for them and also that they subsequently dismissed him and KYP's director from their posts indicates at the least that if CIA collusion was involved, it was definitely not through KYP's leaders. If, however, it is true that for quite a while before 1967 CIA agents in Greece (and perhaps British intelligence agents also) had contacts with Papadopoulos, this would not exclude the possibility that on the night of April 20–21, 1967, he acted on his own, without any CIA authorization, on the assumption of a favorable if not grateful response from the United States government and the CIA for his accomplishment.[23]

As the State Department was to put it, the nature of the government that originated from the military coup of April 21, 1967, posed a problem in United States-Greek relations: how to support mutual interest in Western security in the eastern Mediterranean while encouraging a

[21] Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, pp. 162–163.

[22] *International Affairs*, no. 6 (Moscow, June 1967), 85–86. Ibid., no. 7 (July 1967), 59. In December 1966, Soviet propaganda asserted that the "reactionaries" in Greece were preparing to impose a dictatorship with the help of the Pentagon and the CIA, in order to "lash" the country "closer to the Washington-Bonn axis" and "to liquidate the Republic of Cyprus with the aid of Greek reactionaries." Ibid., no. 12 (December 1966), 92.

[23] Another possibility is that a green light was given by a CIA agent without prior top-level authorization in Washington.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

return to representative government, which the United States believed necessary for the long-term stability and progress of Greece.[24] The United States government responded to this coup by suspending delivery of major items of military equipment to Greece. With one exception—the delivery of some heavy military equipment after the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968—that suspension remained in force until September 22, 1970, when the United States announced that it would resume normal military shipments to Greece. In August 1971, the U. S. House of Representatives passed a $3.4 billion foreign aid authorization bill, but voted against further aid to Greece unless the president found that "overriding" national security requirements justified waiving the ban. President Nixon decided that they did. As the State Department observed in September 1971, Greece, despite a number of changes in government, had consistently honored its NATO obligations and its bilateral agreements with the United States. The regime of April 21, 1967, the department also noted, had taken steps to improve relations not only with Turkey, but also with its Balkan neighbors.

In the view of responsible United States officials, resuming normal military aid to Greece helped keep open the channels of communication between the two governments. It thus enhanced the ability of the United States to influence the Greek government's outlook. It did not imply support for or endorsement of the form of government set up in Greece after the 1967 coup. Responsible Greek political opposition leaders who had been consulted agreed that military aid was necessary for the defense of Greece and for the continuation of its role in NATO, regardless of the regime's nature. They also said that as Greeks they would resent the withholding of this aid as a form of pressure, as would most of the Greek people. The State Department had come to recognize that, in general, withholding military or economic aid was an ineffective tactic for persuading foreign governments to move in directions that the United States considered desirable. When such pressures were applied, they usually failed.

In the past, influencing the Greek government and politicians in directions desired by the United States had never been easy. From 1945 to 1947, the most critical years in modern Greek history, American efforts to get political leaders to cooperate with each other in setting up a broadly based government often had failed, despite suggestions of forthcom-

[24] Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Greece: U.S. Policy Dilemma*, Publication 8604, No. 2, Middle Eastern Series 80 (Washington, 1971). This is based on a statement by Roger P. Davies, deputy assistant secretary for Near East and South Asian affairs, before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 12, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing United States aid as an inducement.[25] Truman Doctrine aid to Greece and the Marshall Plan in the years from 1947 to 1953 gave the United States government its greatest capacity to influence the outlook and decisions of Greek governments and politicians through advice and guidance[26]—"interference," as opponents termed such efforts. United States grants were then at their maximum, as were the financial, economic, and military needs of the country. The USSR had not yet joined the foreign-aid game. France had yet to become one of the world's four leading suppliers of major arms to other states. Alternative sources of foreign aid to Greece were nonexistent then. This was no longer true in 1967. United States aid to Greece had tapered off by 1963–1964. Outright grants of military supplies to Greece constituted only a small percentage of the total of military aid obtained from the United States. Indeed, in 1972, irked by congressional criticism,[27] the Greek government decided to forego any gratis military aid.

Thus there was scant leverage available to the United States for influencing the Greek government's behavior by threats of halting aid. In the past, Britain had resorted mainly to peaceful blockades of Greece but such methods were out of fashion. Greece had become self-sufficient in wheat production since 1957, and thus was less vulnerable to such coercive techniques than it had been previously. Moreover, in the late 1960s the United States no longer enjoyed a virtual monopoly of naval

[25] See S. G. Xydis, *Greece and the Great Powers 1944–1947* (Thessaloniki, 1963), pp. 403–405 and 464. Also, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, VII (Washington, 1969), p. 271. (Cited hereafter as *FRUS*.)

[26] *FRUS 1947*, V (1971), pp. 262, 316–317, 323–325, 369 (setting up a new Greek government with Themistocles Sofoulis as premier). C. Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy*, pp. 121–122 (United States recommendation for new elections after the death of Sofoulis). S. Hourmouzios, *No Ordinary Crown* (London, 1972), pp. 221–223, and G. Dafnis, *Sophocles E. Venizelos* (Athens, 1972), pp. 464–469 (in Greek) (resignation of S. Venizelos from the premiership after publication of a letter from the U.S. ambassador). T. A. Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*, New Haven, Conn., 1966), pp. 53–60 (U.S. desire for elections with a simple majority system).

[27] The Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, in 1971 and 1972 heard a number of Greek witnesses and opponents of the Greek government, such as former ERE minister George Rallis and the former EK member D. Papaspyrou, as well as a number of American professors of Greek origin, who were keeping abreast of the Greek situation and had taken sides in the matter. *Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, First session, July 12, 14, 19, 21; August 3; September 9 and 15, 1971 (Washington, 1971). *Political and Strategic Implications of Homeporting on Greece, Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, Second session, March 7 and 8; April 12, 13, and 18, 1971 (Washington, 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power in the Mediterranean. It was inclined to avoid, if possible, any interference in the politics of other governments, so long as United States security and vital interests were not directly menaced. Opposition Greek politicians often were told that it was up to them to resolve their domestic problems.

All in all, in the early 1970s political factors lying within the international setting of Greece favored the stay in power of the "colonels." Because of the growing Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean during the 1960s and the USSR's political and military moves in the Middle East—in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—and because of the closing of Wheelus air base and other United States and British facilities in Libya after the overthrow of the monarchy in that country in 1969, the United States military facilities in Greece became more important than ever before to the Western position in the eastern Mediterranean. The State Department acknowledged that the strategic value of Greece to the United States and to the Sixth Fleet in particular was demonstrated during the Middle East crisis of May–June 1967, when the Six-Day War occurred. Access to Greek ports and repair and communication facilities allowed the United States to operate effectively in the area. Thanks to Greek government cooperation, thousands of United States citizens had been evacuated from the danger area to or through Greece. In 1972, President Nixon, evidently having in mind the various United States facilities in Greece, asserted that without continued aid to that country as well as to Turkey, no viable policy could exist for saving Israel. And during the new Middle East crisis of October 1973 these facilities were once again available, despite a formal statement by President Papadopoulos to Houari Boumedienne of Algeria that they would not be available. In this case, a situation had arisen in which, under certain circumstances, Greece was capable of inflicting severe deprivation upon the United States, rather than the reverse.

As the American ambassador to Athens, Henry Tasca, told a commission of lawyers on April 9, 1973, the Greeks were being wooed by the Russians, who were competing with the Chinese for their favor; Greece could purchase arms from France and Germany, and did not have to rely on the United States in this regard. Bulgaria, too, was making overtures to the Greek government. Their economy was good. Greece, moreover, gave the largest percentage of its gross national product to support NATO and had one of the best-trained armies in Europe. It benefited from its strategic location, near the Bosporus and the Middle East. Finally, the Greeks were fiercely nationalistic and resented outside pressure.[28]

[28] American Bar Association, "Report of an International Commission of Inquiry

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Durability of No-Party Authoritarianism

Together with the security measures taken by the government,[29] one factor that accounted for the longevity of the "Revolution of April 21, 1967" was the total lack of unity among the regime's opponents. The leaders of the two major parties would have nothing to do with Andreas Papandreou because of his New Left approach to Greek and international politics, and among the communists a split had occurred between the faction faithful to Moscow and the so-called Communist party of the Interior which was based in Rome and received support from the Communist party of Italy.[30]

Other factors that contributed to the regime's duration were of an economic, social, and demographic nature. For about five years, national and international economic factors generally favored the regime. The GNP continued to rise at high annual rates of close to 8 percent; in 1971 it reached $7.7 billion at constant 1958 prices, which represented a per capita GNP of close to $1,000. Inflation was kept down to an annual rate of between 2.5 and 3.0 percent. Despite the earlier-mentioned EEC sanctions, the obligatory provisions of the agreement on Greece's association with EEC continued to be implemented, mainly in the sector of trade. The implementation of the customs union continued at the rate called for under the agreement. Statistics of 1971 revealed that the step-

who visited Greece to investigate the incarceration of seven Greek lawyers" (mimeographed), May 22, 1973, p. 11.

[29] Between 1967 and 1970 the average annual rise of the expenditures of the Ministry of Public Order was more than double the rise which occurred in these expenditures between 1965 and 1966. National Statistical Service of Greece, *Statistical Yearbook of Public Finance 1971*, p. 111, Table IX: 15. On the other hand, the number of persons sentenced in 1967 was actually lower than it was in 1966, probably because of the prohibition of public assemblies. However, the percentage of those sentenced for violations of martial law amounted to 5.0 percent of the total, by contrast to the 2.3 percent of 1966. In 1968 and 1969, the percentage of individuals sentenced for martial law violations declined to 4.0 and 2.3, respectively. K. R. Legg, "Clientelism and Politics in Modern Greece," a paper prepared for the Modern Greek Studies Association symposium "Forces Shaping Modern Greece," held at Columbia University, November 9–11, 1973, p. 27, Table 8.

[30] The collapse of the façade party, EDA, had an implosive effect on the communist edifice that existed behind it. When the dust settled, the latent if not preexisting conflicts came to the surface between the Greek communist apparatus operating under the guidance and control of Moscow, on the one side, and EDA communists, on the other, who now feared lest they be cast in the role of scapegoats, because of their impotence to react against the military takeover. In February 1968, at the Twelfth Plenum of the Communist Party of Greece, these conflicts turned into an open split, and certain EDA leaders condemned the Soviet and Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Thus the Communist party of the Interior emerged, which resented the cautious and increasingly "correct" attitude of the USSR toward the Greek regime.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by-step reduction of tariff and other barriers had permitted a greater development of Greece's trade relations with EEC than with the rest of the world. While the events of April 1967 had prevented the further freeing of exchanges of certain agricultural goods, they did not perceptibly prevent the free circulation of industrial goods. As a result a customs union for industrial goods had been achieved.

Earnings from shipping, emigrants' remittances, and tourism, which traditionally helped redress the chronic deficits in the Greek balance of trade, were increasing at a rate of more than 10 percent annually.[31] A sense of economic euphoria pervaded the country, especially when compared with the period from 1965 to 1967. Those years were rampant with overt political conflict, riots, and strikes. The percentage of people who believed that standards of living were rising and that the following year would be a better one had dwindled from 36 and 59 percent in 1965 to 15 and 23 percent in 1966 (the year before the coup), despite an average rate of GNP growth amounting to 7.5 percent during those two years.[32]

All in all, the prevailing optimistic sense of a booming economy helped sustain the regime, sparing it as a target of economic and social discontent. The period of accelerated inflation that began in Greece in 1972—as it did elsewhere—endangered the value of the drachma, which declined following the dollar's devaluation in 1971; aroused demands for new wages, salary, and pension hikes (underlined by the first timid strikes); and necessitated a steep downward revision of the ambitious public investment budget of 1972.

As the emigration figures between 1959 and 1970 suggest, the masses of the Greek people did not vote with their feet against the social and economic conditions that prevailed during the regime of April 21, 1967. During the quadrennial that began in 1967, the average total emigration overseas and to Western Europe did not rise. On the contrary, it declined to 26,000 and 44,000 respectively, compared with the average annual emigration during the previous quadrennial of 1963–1966, which amounted to 28,000 and 75,000 respectively, and which was higher than it had been even during the preceding quadrennial of 1959–1962.[33]

Contributing to relatively favorable economic and social conditions

[31] Receipts from tourism increased the fastest. In 1971 total earnings were almost double those of 1969. About two-thirds of the tourist earnings came from the United States, as did about 40 percent of emigrants' remittances. Shipping remittances which had fallen slightly from $242.8 million in 1968 to $242.0 million in 1969, had risen to $346.4 million in 1971. And between 1967 and 1971 emigrants' remittances almost doubled—from $232.0 million to $457.8 million.

[32] Brown, "Political Performance," pp. 6–8.

[33] These statistics are from the National Center of Social Studies, *Greeks Abroad* (Athens, 1972), p. 15, Tables 2 and 3 (in Greek).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Greece and thereby sparing the regime of April 21, 1967—and previous governments, too—of inordinate demands from society, were demographic factors as well: a very low yearly population increase (only 0.41 on the average between 1961 and 1970), and a high percentage of aged in the population.[34] In 1969 almost 30 percent of the Greek population was over forty years of age, i.e., had been born before World War II. By contrast only 35 percent of this population was between twenty and forty years of age, and only 7.5 percent belonged to the fifteen- to twenty-year-old age brackets. Moreover, only 11.5 percent of the 1969 population consisted of males between the ages of ten and thirty.[35]

Because of this demographic structure, there was in Greece a large number of people, elderly or middle aged, who had lived through the dreadful years of war, occupation, and civil strife in 1944 and again from 1946 to 1949,[36] and attached greater value to tranquillity than to political freedoms. Indeed, they experienced a sense of relief on learning about the coup of April 21, 1967, and about its promises of stability and order after the political and social disorders of 1965 to 1967, which to them appeared to be omens of new civil strife. And they were inclined to rally behind the regime in its defiant attitude of regarding the antiregime action of the Council of Europe—the "Strasbourg coffeehouse," as Vice-Premier Stylianos Pattakos once called it—as unwarranted interference in Greek affairs. All in all, not a small number of Greeks, some of them "influential," seemed to prefer stability and freedom from fear from below, to freedom from fear from above. Some, indeed, considered the dictatorship of "colonels" of mainly peasant origins as less intolerable than the possible alternative of a dictatorship under the king and his generals and "aristocratic" entourage, which the "colonels' " coup may well have preempted.

Relief, of course, by its very nature, is short lived. Satisfaction and relaxation followed; then a sort of apathy; then a malaise about the future, even though for the elderly that future was short. And as the "Revolution of April 21, 1967" was advancing toward its sixth anniversary, death was depleting the ranks of these supportive people. Meanwhile, Greeks born in 1952 were reaching the voting age; others born in 1957 reached the student age.

[34] The percentage of aged (over sixty-four years) in the population rose from 4 percent in 1870 to 8 percent in 1961. D. G. Tsaoussis, *The Morphology of Greek Society* (Athens, 1972), p. 80 (in Greek).

[35] National Statistical Service of Greece, *Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1971* (Athens, 1972), p. 22, Table II: 6. Males are more aggressive than females.

[36] The December 1944 communist-led uprising was a particularly traumatic experience among the inhabitants of Athens. Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Nineteenth Session, *Documents, Document 2322*, p. 28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As the students' riots of February–March and November 1973 were to demonstrate, antiregime attitudes, sentiments, and behavior were forthcoming from among members of the younger age groups. For them war, occupation, and civil strife belonged to the realm of parents' tales. Student demonstrations of 1968 and 1969 in the United States and France served as models for action. However, as in the past, many high school graduates from affluent families were still able to pursue higher education in universities abroad—in Italy, France, Germany, Britain, and even the United States—if they so chose.[37] They returned to Greece with vivid experiences in techniques of student organization and action. As for other potentially dynamic elements and social and political malcontents in this age group, they continued to find an outlet for their restlessness and frustration in permanent or temporary emigration. The temporary emigrants came back to Greece with money made abroad, and, in contrast to graduates of foreign universities, were anxious to join the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie,[38] which was an important beneficiary of an essentially peasant-to-petty-bourgeois paternalistic dictatorship.

Relaxation of Military Authoritarianism

In response to challenges posed by contact with domestic and international political and other realities, a process of learning by doing had been going on—punctuated at first by frequent blunders. The belief that technocracy would resolve the economic, social, and other problems of Greek society—with all the antipolitical implications of this Saint-Simonian belief—was reflected not only in the constitution of 1968 but also in the inclusion of a large number of civilian experts in succeeding cabinets since 1970 and in efforts to prepare long-range programs for the future of Greece.

During the six years from the coup of April 21, 1967, there had been a cautious but steady downward trend in repressive measures. However, depending on internal and external circumstances, sharp oscillations between relaxation and tightening of the reins occurred at times. In September 1971 Premier Papadopoulos announced a step promised by

[37] In 1973 the student population of Greece totaled 72,000. At the same time, there were 10,000 Greek students in Italy alone. *New York Times*, November 3, 1973.

[38] For temporary emigrants, going abroad was like traveling to a promised land. They hoped to learn a skill there and amass some savings. The bulk of them wanted to return to Greece after spending a few years abroad. E. Dimitras, *Enquêtes sociologiques sur les émigrants grecs*, II (Athens, 1971), pp. 98, 100, 106, and 212.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

George Papandreou: henceforth certificates of social beliefs, introduced in 1948, and whose conditions had become more stringent after April 21, 1967, would be required only for civil servants. In August 1972, he declared that a massive effort would be exerted in the coming years to modernize the nation's primary and secondary education and to establish more institutions of higher learning. Details published suggested in some respects a reversion to George Papandreou's ambitious program for reforming the antiquated Greek educational system—a program previously considered anathema not only by the "colonels" but also by conservative elements of ERE and the extreme right wing.

After the end of prepublication censorship in 1969, articles critical of various steps taken by the regime appeared in conservative or other opposition newspapers. Also featured were oppositionist cartoons as well as the full proceedings in translation of the congressional hearings of 1971 and 1972 on military supplies to Greece and home-porting facilities, all of which contained statements critical of the regime. Although criticism of Premier Papadopoulos himself was studiously avoided, Vice-Premier Stylianos Pattakos was not spared. Both before and after the plebiscite of 1973 many Athens papers severely criticized the conditions under which the plebiscite was being or had been held: the maintenance of martial law in Athens during the referendum, the prohibition of any public meetings for members of the opposition, the monopoly of radio and television by government spokesmen, the activities of "cultural organization" among the electorate, the recruitment of civil servants and teachers to supervise the polling booths, and the various measures devised by the authorities to ensure the desired outcome of the popular vote.

Of course, political newspapers in the early 1970s were not exciting to read, as they had been before April 21, 1967. By contrast, the headlines of sports papers exploded with "glorious victories" and "ignominious defeats."[39] A passion for soccer especially seemed to have replaced the passion for politics of the previous era, spreading even to the old. Opponents of the regime asserted that this new passion was only an outlet for pent-up aggressiveness which otherwise would have been expressed in the political arena. The government, in their view, encouraged this passion not so much in order to build up healthy young citizens,

[39] A decline of 14.5 percent in the number of copies of political newspapers occurred in 1970 compared with 1969. By contrast, the number of copies of sports papers declined by only 4.9 percent in those two years (*Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1972*, p. 309). While the overall decline in both categories must be ascribed to the great expansion of TV during those two years, the greater decline in the number of copies of political newspapers sold may be attributed to the relatively bland character of their contents, because of censorship.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but rather to divert from politics the aggressive drives of youth. It played, they said, the imperial Roman game of "bread and circuses."

Meanwhile collections of scarcely veiled critical pieces by Greek writers were published and circulated freely. Bookstores flaunted in their windows not only a biography of Karamanlis but also translations of writings by Herbert Marcuse, Che Guevara, or Roger Garaudy. Newspaper kiosks sold the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Times* of London, *Le Monde*, *Pravda*, and *Izvestia* (though not left-wing Greek Cypriot newspapers), as well as English, French, and German paperbacks, including pornographic novels. However, the July 1, 1973, issue of the London *Observer*, which alleged that in 1944 Papadopoulos had served in the security corps set up under German occupation auspices to fight the communist-led resistance forces, and that he later had close ties with the CIA, almost instantly disappeared from newsstands, and no newspaper dared publish this article in translation.[40] Earlier, in June 1973, the translator of a book on urban guerrilla warfare was prosecuted.

Six years after the coup of April 21, 1967, the authoritarian political system had become more or less a personal dictatorship. However, it was not of the German, Italian, or Soviet sort—just as Greek democracy had never been of the American, British, French, or Scandinavian brand. As in the previous Greek political systems, the regime's leaders were extremely conscious of family and clientele ties in consolidating their hold over the apparatus of state and in shaping and using this apparatus in order to attain political and other goals. It would indeed have been extremely un-Greek of them (as well as impolitic) had they behaved otherwise. And like Kanellopoulos when starting out on his political career in the 1930s,[41] the "colonels" in 1967 swore to do away with *rousfetia* (favors), other forms of favoritism, and bribery and corruption. Like him, however, they soon found out that *rousfetia* performed important functions in Greek politics and society, when they had to deal with bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape. The experiment with an ombudsman to help resolve such problems quickly withered away.

[40] This article, by C. Foley, alleged, among other things, that Papadopoulos was known among senior staff members of JUSMAG as "the first CIA agent to become premier of a European country." Foley, who had sided with Grivas and the Greek Cypriots in their struggle for self-determination between 1954 and 1959, also quoted an unidentified American source as saying that Papadopoulos "gives good value because there are documents in the West he would not like let out." Incidentally, during research in January 1974, the author ascertained that this *Observer* issue was missing from the set of this London weekly kept by the British Information Service in New York as well as from the set kept in the browsing room of the periodicals library of Columbia University.

[41] *Greek Parliamentary Debates*, December 22, 1964, p. 713.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bureaucratic rectitude concealed a reluctance to take initiatives and revealed a phobia about assuming responsibilities and reporting facts—hence, stagnation. As in the past, this situation invited bribery and corruption, at times, to the premier's acute vexation. The gradual concentration of several major roles in a single person at the top contributed still further to this immobility, no matter how hard that leader worked. And within the bureaucracy, as a top-ranking Greek diplomat once told a regime officer, calumny and flattery were the regime's two greatest foes.

By 1973, it seemed that the would-be healers of the Greek body politic were infected by the same "sickness" that had troubled previous regimes. When they seized power, they compared Greece to a patient in a plaster cast. Subsequently, by some nightmarish process, the plaster seemed gradually to have encased them as well. Even those who had welcomed the coup of April 21, 1967, were relieved at Papadopoulos' downfall. But how did this downfall occur?

The Aborted Movement toward Representative Government

The package-deal plebiscite of July 29, 1973, was hailed as a great victory by the regime and its supporters. Its reported results, however, when compared with those of the plebiscite of 1968, suggested quite a decline in the popular toleration or acceptance of the regime or in the government's capacity to manipulate in its own favor the results of the referendum. Especially striking was the mere 51 percent majority of Yes votes achieved in Athens, where martial law still was in force. This may have been the result of an "unholy alliance" between Kolonaki, the royalist-inclined quarter of the capital, and the communist-inclined quarter of Kaissariani. The worsening of the economic situation which had occurred during the interval between the two plebiscites, the influx into the Greek voting body of persons born in 1952, the reduction in the number of older voters and the fact that those over seventy were allowed not to vote if they so wished, as well as the nonimplementation of the previously approved constitution were four factors that accounted for this decline in popular acceptance of the regime. Other factors were the different nature of the issues involved in the plebiscites of 1968 and 1973 as well as the institutionalized presidential dictatorship called for under the proposed republican constitution.

On taking the oath as president of the Republic on August 19, 1973, Papadopoulos declared that a civilian government would be formed in early October 1973. Its mission would be to deal with immediate economic and social problems, and also to prepare and conduct free and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fair elections, to blunt the conflicts of the past, and to achieve the highest possible degree of national unity. He also announced the immediate end of martial law in the Athens region. Moreover, he promised the establishment of the Constitutional Court (the licensor, as it were, of political parties) within September 1973, rather than by the end of December as originally provided for in the June 1, 1973, decree. He also promised elections and the establishment of a Parliament during 1974 (instead of at the beginning of 1975). Finally, he proclaimed an amnesty for all political crimes committed inside Greece since April 21, 1967, and granted pardon to the man who had attempted to assassinate him in August 1968. A few days later the more than 300 political prisoners were released and Papadopoulos' would-be assassin was free. Some of the president's colleagues felt that the phoenix was preparing its own funeral pyre.

On October 9, 1973, after the eleven military members of Papadopoulos' cabinet had reluctantly resigned, Markezinis was sworn in as premier. The new premier was the former leader of the small, ultranationalist, Progressive party, a firm believer in the role of great men in politics, and the author of a five-volume illustrated political history of modern Greece. Throughout the six years of the regime of April 21, 1967, he had refrained from any opposition to the "colonels," and had even been in touch with them. This former monarchist's scenario for a peaceful transition toward representative government through the abolition of the monarchy and its replacement by a strong, French-style presidential republic, with himself playing the role of Pompidou to Papadopoulos' de Gaulle, was now being tried out. His vice-premier, Mitrelias, had served as chairman of the committee that had prepared the basic draft of the constitution of 1968. His cabinet consisted of a mixture of civilian experts retained from the previous, Papadopoulos cabinet, and a number of professional politicians, former members of his Progressive party or of ERE. Shortly thereafter the Constitutional Court was set up. The Advisory Committee on Legislative Decrees wound up its work. The drachma was revalued by 10 percent. A decision was made to compensate the king partly for the confiscation of the royal properties by the State.

Further political developments depended, of course, also on the responses of the regime's opponents, who now included some disgruntled members of Papadopoulos' former entourage. Would all these opponents recognize as a political fact the new state of affairs, organize political parties, and, after getting over the hurdle of the Constitutional Court and taking part in the general elections promised for 1974, limit themselves to political opposition within the new constitution's rigid frame-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

work, seeking to alter it by lawful means? Or would they refuse to have anything to do with this system and even resort to violent methods for expressing their opposition and thus provoke the reimposition of martial law?

The leaders of the two main "bourgeois" parties, ERE and EK, after a period of silence issued statements indicating their inclination to boycott efforts to prepare for elections in 1974. Meanwhile, a ceremony was organized in Athens to commemorate the fifth anniversary of George Papandreou's death. Clashes with the police punctuated this commemoration. Then a group of well-organized militant students occupied the *Polytechneion* (Athens Institute of Technology), set up a radio transmitter, and began clamoring for the ouster of Papadopoulos, the establishment of democracy, and the departure of the Americans. Martial law was reimposed on November 23. Tanks were ordered to the scene. The rebellious students, who had been joined by other elements, finally were forced to leave the occupied building, but had to run the gauntlet of a not too gentle police. The official death toll was thirteen; however, some people believe that at least fifty lives were lost in this revolt—the second one that year.

The downfall of President Papadopoulos and the seizure of power essentially by Ioannidis, occurred at this juncture. Another military man, General Phaidon Gizikis, commander of the First Army based in Larissa, was sworn in as president of the Republic. In a new constitutional act, his office was shorn of its legislative and reserved powers in national defense, foreign affairs, and public order. The vice-presidency was abolished. A civilian premier, former minister in the Papadopoulos cabinet, Adamantios Androutsopoulos (believed by many Greeks to be a CIA agent) was installed. An all-civilian cabinet was recruited. The restoration of the regime of April 21, 1967, was proclaimed. The return to the multiparty system was put off for the Greek Kalends.

Thus, Papadopoulos' effort to institutionalize if not legitimize his "guided democracy" for eight more years abruptly came to an end. His attempt to reassert civilian rule over the military—a rule that he himself had flouted in his coup of April 21, 1967—had collapsed, as had Markezinis' pragmatic scheme for moving toward some sort of representative government and multiparty system under a constitution which he himself had considered unworkable.

Awareness of Greece's deteriorating economic and financial situation from 1971 on, external political pressures from both Europe and America, and a need for change, all had been responsible for the Papadopoulos-Markezinis experiment of 1973. Its failure was due partly to the Greek opposition's negative attitude toward this experiment, as well as to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effects of demographic processes expressed among militant students in the climate of a new Middle Eastern crisis.

If the United States government feared that the Papadopoulos-Markezinis regime would attempt a Mintoff sort of squeeze in the matter of home-porting facilities near Athens for officers and men of the Sixth Fleet,[42] it must have been relieved by this government's downfall. The new regime has not interfered in this matter, nor did it balk at the use of United States facilities in Greece during the latest Middle Eastern conflict.

The Greek Regime and the Communist Party States

The authoritarian no-party system in Athens produced gainers and losers in the polycentric communist sector of the international setting of Greece as it did in the West. In the Balkans, Albania, China's *wei ch'i* pebble in Europe, gained by concluding that Athens had tacitly dropped its long-standing claim to northern Epirus, a part of southern Albania, during the secret negotiations that resulted in the resumption of diplomatic relations with Greece, announced in a communiqué issued on May 6, 1971.

Yugoslavia, on the other hand was a loser. After the coup of April 21, 1967, the Greek government temporarily suspended minor frontier traffic with Yugoslavia. Then, in a note of May 13, 1967, it denounced the relevant agreement of 1959 with respect to frontier traffic on the ground that it no longer corresponded to the existing situation and that it had not served Greek interests as expected. Despite repeated Yugoslav demarches, Greece refused to renew this agreement. Immediately after the coup Greek authorities arrested a number of Yugoslav nationals and subsequently expelled them from the country. They also imposed visa restrictions on Yugoslav nationals and applied measures to the Slav-speaking element in northern Greece (ethnic Macedonians in the Yugo-

[42] Less than two years earlier, in a lecture entitled "Greece in the Mediterranean," before the Union of Foreign Correspondents in Athens, Markezinis had spoken against the granting of home-porting facilities to Sixth Fleet personnel and their dependents mainly on social grounds. He also said that it was historically, juridically, and politically unjustified to maintain that the Greek government was not free to decide on this matter, because it was bound to provide such facilities on the basis of the United States-Greek agreement of October 12, 1953. Finally, he had also expressed himself in favor of the withdrawal of both the United States and Soviet fleets from the Mediterranean. In October 1973, the first issue of a new Athens weekly, modeled on *Time*, which featured Markezinis on its cover and devoted a two-page spread to him, also carried a short piece on Premier Mintoff of Malta, which was not news, as well as a story on misdeeds of Sixth-Fleet Americans in Athens.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

slav view) that resulted in the overseas emigration of some of them. The Greek government was unhappy about both the public protests of certain Yugoslav organizations over the arrests and harassment of political prisoners in Greece and the support of these organizations to opponents of the Athens regime (including Andreas Papandreou). After 1970, however, Greek-Yugoslav relations improved on the Greek government's initiative.[43]

If the gains of the United States from 1967 to 1973 were losses for the USSR, American losses in Greece were gains for the USSR; Western Europe also shared in the latter gains at the expense of the United States. After harshly denouncing the coup of April 21, 1967, as a "military-fascist putsch" carried out under CIA auspices, and immediately halting the cultural diplomacy begun during the George Papandreou government of 1964–1965, the USSR adopted an ambiguous attitude toward the Greek government after the Warsaw Pact's intervention in Czechoslovakia. However, it never reneged on its earlier commitment to deliver a large turbine for a thermoelectric power plant in Greece. It even agreed to supply additional equipment requested by the Athens regime. Press attacks against the Greek government decreased in frequency as negotiations began for exploiting peat resources lying in Greek Macedonia. The USSR offered to set up an aluminum plant in Greece. In 1972 the Soviet government also allowed Pimen, the Patriarch of Moscow, to visit "Greece of the Greek Christians." The Russian prelate was received by Premier Papadopoulos himself. A desire to exploit the impact in Greece of the West's hostile attitude toward the regime, strains in relations with China, and interest in a successful European security conference may have accounted for this cautious attitude. As for the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies in the Balkans—Rumania and Bulgaria—which with Yugoslavia and Albania during 1946 to 1949 had played an important role in Greek politics by their material and moral support of the communist-led Greek rebels, they adhered impeccably to the "principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems" and refrained neither from cultural nor other diplomacy in their relations with Athens. Evidently they had no desire for another Vietnam in the Balkans.

The CPSU, before April 21, 1967, appeared to regard Greece as an excellent testing ground for the possibility of a parliamentary transition to "socialism." Perhaps after 1967, it has been considering that the ground is more favorable for a less laborious and more direct method of achieving this transition: through a military coup by a secret polit-

[43] "Relations between Yugoslavia and Greece, 1965–1972," *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. XIV, 112–117 and 121.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ical union of young Greek officers (possibly in the same age bracket as the militant Greek students of 1973), dedicated to the establishment of "democracy," the ouster of the Americans, and the nonalignment of Greece. The alignment of Greece with the "Commonwealth of Socialist States" could then come later.

If the story of the second Greek republic becomes a variation of that of the first republic of 1924 to 1935, with its coups and countercoups, the probability of such an outcome will be enhanced. In that event there could be an initial flight of large numbers of nationals from Greece along Cuban lines, and the deportation of others to the USSR along Baltic lines—perhaps to Kazakhstan, as in the case of the Black Sea Greeks in the 1940s. The rate of overseas emigration could decline. So could the inflow of emigrants' remittances, of retiring Greek-Americans, of private investments, and of tourists. Greek shipowners probably would revert to flags of convenience and would be reluctant to recruit Greek crews, even if the "People's Republic" allowed them to do so. United States military facilities in Greece could become Soviet facilities, and the country could be transformed into a new kind of military outpost. The waters beyond the beaches might even have to be mined. The seaside hotels and bungalows might be remodeled into fortifications and bunkers for Warsaw Pact men always on the alert against possible enemy landings or against vacationists' attempts to escape to the West, unless, of course, the situation there appeared to be worse than in the "Commonwealth of Socialist States"—or the millennium had been reached in world affairs.*

Postscript from Athens, August 1974: A Return to Democracy?

On July 23, 1974, the "Revolution of April 21, 1967" and the authoritarian military government came to an abrupt end. A civilian government took over the next day. This change, however, was the result neither of another military coup in Athens nor of a popular uprising. Rather, it resulted from Turkey's aggressive response to the regime's Cyprus policy in a period of high tension in Greek-Turkish relations because of a dispute over offshore oil in the multi-insular Aegean. Greek military cadres of the Cypriot National Guard carried out a coup against President Makarios in Nicosia on July 15 and replaced him with a follower of Grivas (who himself had died in Cyprus on January 15, 1974), also an ardent champion

* Research for this article was facilitated by a travel grant from the American Council of Learned Societies in 1972. The views expressed in it are, of course, those of the author.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece). Turkish troops then landed on the island of July 20, ostensibly in order to restore the constitutional state of affairs provided for by the Cyprus accords of 1959–1960 and to avert *enosis*. Their actual purpose, as subsequent Turkish statements and actions reveal, was to obtain an extended and permanent foothold on the island, which eventually would permit the annexation of Cyprus in its entirety to Turkey—the original proclaimed official Turkish goal of 1955.

When the Athens regime, in disarray, responded to this Turkish move by ordering a general mobilization, the reins of power dropped from its palsied hands. President Gizikis, urged on by the navy chief of staff and his other two colleagues, convoked a conference of leading Greek politicians to decide how to deal with this grave international crisis. These politicians were agreed on the need to set up immediately a broadly based civilian government to replace the tottering regime. They were also in unanimous agreement that the ideal man to head such a government was sixty-seven-year-old Constantine Karamanlis. For eight years between 1955 and 1963, Karamanlis had served as prime minister during one of the most stable and prosperous eras Greece had even known. From Paris, where he had been living after withdrawing from politics late in 1963, he had consistently and firmly spoken up against the "Revolution of April 21, 1967" and its policies.

Karamanlis was quickly approached by phone and accepted the proffered invitation, but on the condition that the armed forces return to their normal role of subordination to civilian leadership. The Greek people were delirious in their enthusiasm when they heard the news, which symbolized the end of seven years of authoritarian government and new hope for the future.

After Karamanlis was sworn in as prime minister in the early hours of July 24, political losers of the previous seven years began turning into gainers. Eighteen of the participants in the new thirty-one member civilian cabinet had been members of Parliament for ERE or EK, the two major parties that had emerged in Greek politics after World War II and had suffered from the suspension of the multiparty system after the military coup. Fourteen of them had been imprisoned, deported, or both, or had lost their posts through resignation or ouster at one time or another during the preceding seven years because of their opposition to the "Revolution of April 21, 1967."

In addition, political prisoners were released, Greek nationality was restored to those who had been deprived of it, and censorship was dropped. *Vradyni* returned to the newsstands, its circulation skyrocketing. On August 4, EDA began publishingz *Avghi*, its formerly outlawed press organ. And on August 10, *To Vima* published in translation the *Observer*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

article of July 1, 1973, about Papadopoulos' background and his links with the CIA. As the symbolic phoenix was vanishing from sight, the Constitution of 1952, abolished in 1968, was restored, but with its provisions concerning the monarchy suspended, on August 1, 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Convention Reform and Conventional Wisdom: An Empirical Assessment of Democratic Party Reforms

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN
AND DENIS G. SULLIVAN

For the past six years, the Democratic party has been implementing a number of significant changes in the process of selecting delegates to its national nominating conventions. The party's Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection headed by Senator George McGovern, which grew out of the turbulent 1968 convention, put forward a list of wide-ranging reforms in its 1970 report.[1] These recommendations, which have stimulated an ongoing controversy within the party, were designed to achieve two goals: to increase participation by groups previously underrepresented in party affairs, and to make the delegate-selection process itself more open. Addressing itself to the group-representation goal, the commission declared that blacks, women, and youth should be represented in each state delegation in "reasonable relationship to their presence" in the population of the state.[2] And with

[1] The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, D.C., April 1970). Senator McGovern resigned from his position as commission chairman when he announced his presidential candidacy in January 1971, and he was replaced by Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser.

[2] Ibid., p. 34.

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN is assistant professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. DENIS G. SULLIVAN is professor of government at Dartmouth College. They are coauthors (with others) of a recent book on national convention behavior entitled *The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reference to the openness goal, the commission set down requirements for timeliness in delegate selection, publicized and accessible party meetings, abolition of the unit rule, and the banning of proxy voting.[3]

Somewhat to the surprise of both regulars and reformers within the party, compliance with the changes was widespread at state and local levels. Young people, blacks, and women, who had been severely underrepresented at the 1968 convention, increased their participation in 1972. Table 1 shows how marked this increase was.

TABLE 1

Increase in Representation of Blacks, Youth, and Women at the 1972 Convention

	1968 Convention	*1972 Convention*	*Population Percentage*
Blacks	6%	14%	11%
Under thirty	2	23	30
Women	14	36	51
Total number	2,528	3,100	

At the same time state parties revised their rules to comply with the commission's recommendations for making delegate selection more open.

Especially in the aftermath of 1972, the Democratic convention reforms have been subjected to attack, primarily from party regulars who felt shut out of the 1972 convention. Critics have concentrated their fire on the group-representation provisions, declaring that such "quotas" constituted reverse discrimination and helped to turn "middle Americans" against the Democrats in 1972. The openness provisions have also been subject to attack on the grounds that such provisions made it too easy for inexperienced amateurs—not dedicated to the party or to the goal of winning elections—to take over a national convention.

A recent example of the criticism of the 1972 reforms is Judith A. Center's article on "1972 Democratic Convention Reforms and Party Democracy," which appeared in the June issue of this journal.[4] Although Center does not make explicit the causal relationships she believes are involved in the impact of the reforms, she appears to make three important assumptions which are widely shared among the reforms' critics:

1. The reform rules were responsible both for producing a nominating con-

[3] Ibid.

[4] Judith A. Center, "1972 Democratic Convention Reforms and Party Democracy," *Political Science Quarterly*, 89, no. 2 (June 1974), 325–349.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vention that was ideologically far to the left of the Democratic party as a whole, and for the nomination of George McGovern for president.
2. The delegates to the convention were uncompromising amateurs who cared more about issue purity than about winning elections.
3. The Democratic convention of 1972 contributed importantly to the party's massive defeat in the presidential election of that year.

In the following discussion, we will examine these assumptions in the light of available empirical evidence. Much of the data we will use comes from a Dartmouth College study of the 1972 convention which we helped to direct. Our research in that study was based on (1) structured interviews with a randomly selected sample of 234 delegates over the five-day period of the convention, (2) first-hand observation of caucuses, state-delegation meetings, and convention-floor proceedings, and (3) the results of a preconvention CBS poll of all delegates.[5]

While examining the key assumptions of reform critics, we will address ourselves to political scientists' continuing concern with the explanation of decision making at nominating conventions and with the analysis of delegate style. Given the changed selection rules and demographic composition of the 1972 convention, what changes could be observed in traditional patterns of decision making and in the orientations of delegates?

Finally, in considering the future course of party reform, we will speculate on the implications of the 1974 rules modifications and also identify some of the recurring dilemmas of nominating conventions.

The Rules Changes and the Selection of McGovern Delegates

One of the most persistent assertions made by opponents of the 1972 rules changes has been that those changes were responsible for the selection of very liberal delegates and the nomination of George McGovern. Center, for example, declares: "The reforms had succeeded in transforming 1968s substantial delegate minority into 1972s overwhelming delegate majority."[6] Indeed, some party regulars have voiced the suspicion that Senator McGovern deliberately designed rules to enhance his pros-

[5] A full treatment of the results of this study is contained in Denis G. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Pressman, Benjamin I. Page, and John J. Lyons, *The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972* (New York, 1974). The present article does not examine the hypothesis that the reform rules widened the gap between the liberalism of convention delegates and that of party rank and filers. Although our book does present some relevant data, a definitive treatment must await future research. See *Politics of Representation*, pp. 30–34.

[6] Center, "1972 Democratic Convention," p. 342.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pects for the nomination. As one of the non-McGovern delegates we interviewed put it, "McGovern is a bastard . . . changed the rules to suit his own candidacy."[7] The argument of the reform critics is that the open state caucus procedures enabled committed ideologues, who felt intensely about issues and were willing to spend time fighting for them, to dominate the delegate-selection process.

Although it is true that McGovern supporters were in a stronger position at the convention than in the rank and file of the party as a whole, their success in the nomination process can be traced to factors other than the new reform rules. The image of McGovern fanatics running roughshod over party regulars in state conventions is simply not supported by the facts. Actually, the bulk of McGovern's support came from his victories in primary elections. Over 51 percent of the delegates elected in primaries supported McGovern, while the combined opposition of Humphrey-Muskie-Jackson received only 21 percent. Thus, McGovern was a typical insurgent in the sense that he established his base in the more open forum provided by the primary elections. The picture is somewhat different when we turn to delegates selected in state conventions. In 1972 there were roughly 1009 delegates selected at such conventions, approximately one-third of the overall total. The new rules on open procedures surely helped McGovern in wresting delegates away from party regulars who wanted to travel to Miami uncommitted. And in some cases, amateur McGovernites did replace local and state party leaders on state delegations. But as Figure 1 shows, the new rules on procedures and group representation did not result in McGovern's domination of state conventions; by June 3, 1972, McGovern held only a slight edge in support among delegates elected in state conventions. Even though his margin of support increased through June, the difference by convention time was not large; McGovern was supported by 32 percent of state convention delegates, while 20 percent supported Muskie, Humphrey, or Jackson. Following the top line in Figure 1a, which traces the growth of delegate support in primary elections, it appears that the narrow McGovern victory in the California winner-take-all primary (271 votes) on June 6 accelerated McGovern's inroads into state convention delegates.

A major factor in McGovern's success was the fragmentation of the Democratic "center" and the weakness of the so-called center candidates—Humphrey, Muskie, and Jackson. Organized labor divided its support among these three candidates, as the AFL-CIO executive board was split on the question and George Meany declined to make a decisive move.[8]

[7] Sullivan et al., *Politics of Representation*, p. 17.

[8] For a good analysis of the collapse of the center, see David S. Broder, "The Democrats' Dilemma," *The Atlantic*, 233 (March 1974), 32–33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1

Delegate and Rank-and-File Support for Leading Democratic Candidates

a. Cumulative Percentage Among Delegates



b. Percentage Among Democratic Rank and File — Public Opinion Polls



Source: Delegate data from *National Journal* April 15 through July 1, 1972. Public opinion data from Gallup Opinion Index with the exception of a May 9-10 Harris Poll including Independents as well as Democrats. Gallup question reads as follows: "Which one of the men on this list would you like to see nominated as the Democratic candidate for President in 1972?"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Also contributing to the weakness of the Humphrey, Muskie, and Jackson efforts was the candidacy of George Wallace, which had a profound effect in the preconvention period. Although Figure 1a does not show it, Wallace was gaining in delegate strength, from 13 percent on April 29 to 27 percent on May 20, one week after the shooting. By July 1, his delegate support from primaries had slipped back to roughly 18 percent. Yet, despite the attempted assassination of Wallace, rank-and-file support for Wallace continued to increase, as Figure 1b shows, through June. Moreover, support for Wallace increased at the same time it increased for McGovern, suggesting that Wallace was gaining at the expense of more centrist candidates. A Gallup poll, released just before the New Hampshire primary, suggests precisely that.[9] Gallup shows, assuming the Democratic center to consist of Humphrey-Muskie-Jackson, that 68 percent supported a center candidate while only 7 percent supported McGovern. But with Wallace included in the list of possibilities, support for the center declines by 11 percent whereas McGovern loses only 1 percent.

The Democratic center was badly hurt by the Wallace candidacy. The shift in attention from the insurgency of Wallace to that of McGovern, as a result of the assassination attempt, may have heightened the impression that McGovern was gaining at the expense of support for the center. But the shift in attention did not slow the growth in support for Wallace, and by June 16, the combined support for the two insurgents represented a majority of rank-and-file Democrats, at least in terms of measured support in public-opinion polls. By June, the center was in disarray; the preconvention process did not, as Figure 1b shows, result in a convergence of public support around one candidate. The party was truly divided.

If public opinion among rank-and-file Democrats was divided, so was delegate support. As a comparison of Figure 1a and 1b reveals, the percentage growths in delegate strength through the medium of state conventions and favorable public opinion are roughly equal. Figure 1a also shows that McGovern's moderate surge in delegate support came as a result of the California primary. It is somewhat ironic that the effect McGovern's California victory seemed to have had on the remaining state conventions was precisely what J. P. Maloney, the Humphrey strategist, had forecast for Humphrey if he won the primary. Victory in the primary, Maloney said, would "be the most meaningful influence on delegates chosen in non-primary states."[10] So it was, as Figure 1a shows.

Of all the factors contributing to McGovern's success—the weakness

[9] See *Congressional Quarterly*, March 25, 1972, 657.

[10] Quoted in *National Journal*, 4 (July 1, 1972), 1086.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at the party's center, the Wallace candidacy, the intensity of McGovern's support, the impact of his narrow California victory, and the reform rules—the center's weakness relative to the intensity and capability of the McGovern organization seems most important.[11] Of course, it was possible that the intense, well-organized McGovern movement could take advantage of rules changes, but we think that the commitment and organization of the McGovernites, when compared to the Muskie and Humphrey efforts, was far more decisive.

Again, this is not to deny that there are ways in which the rules changes might have helped McGovern. The reform rules might, for example, have served as a useful symbol for organizing liberal activists.[12] And the changes may also have spread uncertainty among party regulars who were used to long-established patterns of behavior in the nominating process. Ironically, the rules changes might have helped McGovern most by leading state party officials to abandon caucuses and conventions in favor of primaries—as a means of avoiding the rules changes. David Broder has written that:

> In 1969–70, the McGovern commission set out to "clean up" the presidential nominating process by scourging its most questionable machinery—the party caucuses and state conventions, where organization leaders frequently railroaded through handpicked delegate slates. The rules adopted for "opening up" the caucuses and the conventions were quite effective—so effective, in fact, that several states thought better of continuing to use the caucus-convention system for choosing national convention delegates. Since the question of the presidential nomination is of secondary importance to many state and local professional politicians, several states decided to separate the decisions on presidential politics from their own district and state conventions, where more important matters like nominations for sheriff and state treasurer are settled. The upshot was that after a long period of years in which the presidential primary had fallen into increasing disfavor and disuse, seven additional states—for a total of twenty-three—adopted or reactivated presidential primaries for 1972.[13]

Thus, the McGovern commission—which had preferred state caucuses and conventions to primaries—ended up stimulating a return to the primaries. And it was the primaries that overstrained Muskie and gave

[11] Politicians tend to simplify arguments in order to favor their own power positions. Thus, conservative Democrats drop all factors from the list except the reform rules.

[12] William Cavala makes this point in "Changing the Rules Changes the Game: Party Reform and the 1972 California Delegation to the Democratic National Convention," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March 1974), 27–42.

[13] Broder, "The Democrats' Dilemma," p. 36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

McGovern his greatest success. In this roundabout way, then, the reform rules may be said to have been of benefit to McGovern.

Even with the collapse of the center, the Wallace candidacy, and the McGovern organizational effort, Senator McGovern's triumph was by no means easy. In her article, Center declares that "the great majority of delegates were . . . pro-McGovern"[14] and that "there was no meaningful contest for the presidential nomination at Miami Beach."[15] But the crucial vote of the convention, on the California credentials challenge, was decided by only 173 votes; the convention could hardly be called a closed one.

Delegate Style at the Convention: Triumph of the Purists?

Another common belief of the critics of reform has been that the McGovern delegates, who dominated the 1972 convention, were ideological activists who were unwilling to compromise in the interests of party unity and victory in November. Supporters of the "regular" candidates, who controlled the 1968 convention (and earlier ones), but lost out in 1972, are seen as pragmatic professional types who put the interests of party and electoral victory over those of ideological purity. Thus, it is argued, the 1972 convention represented a sharp—and disturbing—break with the past traditions of conducting party business.

The distinction between issue-oriented (ideologically pure) and party-oriented activists has been utilized in a variety of different studies of political participation and, especially in the 1960s, in studies of national nominating conventions. The arrival of "purists" as a significant element in nomination politics was noted by Aaron Wildavsky in his commentary on the 1964 Republican convention,[16] and the issue-oriented style was also noted by James Q. Wilson in his book on the emergence of amateur Democratic clubs in three cities in the late 1950s.[17] Wilson's analysis revealed a recurring conflict between Democratic regulars and issue-oriented amateurs. In his view, the issue orientations of the amateurs are connected, not to self or narrow group interest, but to a larger public interest. For the amateur, participation in politics becomes an extension of private morality into the public sector. In his analysis of Goldwater delegates at the 1964 Republican convention, Wildavsky

[14] Center, "1972 Democratic Convention," p. 341.

[15] Ibid., pp. 341–342.

[16] Aaron Wildavsky, "The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians, and the Two-Party System," *Review of Politics*, 27 (July 1965), 386–413.

[17] James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago, 1966). See especially Chapter 12, "The New Party Politics: An Appraisal."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spoke of the distinction between purists and politicians in much the same way as Wilson did for that between amateur and regular Democrats. Wildavsky continued the purist-versus-professional theme in his study of the 1968 Democratic convention, casting the young McCarthyites in the role of purists, and the Humphrey supporters in the role of professionals.[18] In another study of the same convention, Soule and Clarke developed a measure of purism or, as they called it, amateurism, that separated quite nicely the McCarthy supporters from the Humphrey delegates.[19] It seemed, then, that purism was not the sole property of the right; it could serve to distinguish rightist Goldwater delegates from more centrist party regulars as well as leftist McCarthyites from more centrist professional Democrats.

In 1972, the conflict between opposing styles could again be seen. The McGovern surge in the primaries and state conventions in that year was in many ways a continuation of the earlier McCarthy movement. And the same themes of political reform and purism dominated the rhetoric of the McGovern organization. Again, as in 1968, the conflict between the insurgent organization and the regulars was as much a clash of styles as it was a conflict over policy.

It would be a mistake, however, to divide the 1972 convention too neatly into camps of "purist" and "professional," and to argue that the convention itself constituted a radical break with past behavior. Although it is unquestionably true that McGovern delegates had many purist attributes, our evidence showed that these people were also willing to compromise repeatedly to advance the interests of their candidate. As in previous conventions, delegates directed their behavior toward the nomination of their preferred candidate rather than the expression of group interest through identification with special group causes. And in this way, their behavior conformed to patterns of decision-making observed in other conventions. Finally, there is some evidence that the "regular" delegates took on some purist attributes of their own during the course of the convention.

Platform

Although the McGovern delegates were very much concerned with issues —Vietnam, social programs, racial justice, environment, and many

[18] Aaron Wildavsky, "The Meaning of 'Youth' in the Struggle for Control of the Democratic Party," in Aaron Wildavsky, *The Revolt Against the Masses* (New York, 1971), pp. 270–287.

[19] John Soule and James Clarke, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (September 1970), 888–899.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

others—they recognized that, in order to enhance their candidate's prospects both at the convention and in the general election, they might have to compromise on the presentation of those issues in the party's platform. The McGovern organization played a central role in the Platform Committee's proceedings—not so much in writing platform language as in monitoring it, modifying it, and exercising occasional veto power. McGovern's representative in the committee's proceedings, Ted Van Dyk, declared: "We hope to see a platform that will be liberal, unite the party, and defeat President Nixon in November."[20] Toward this end, Van Dyk carefully shepherded the drafting process, working with the drafting subcommittee throughout its labors and striving to avoid language that might be construed as needlessly controversial.

The McGovernites' willingness to put the interests of electoral victory ahead of inflexible ideological purity was shown by their behavior with respect to the more radical "minority reports" of the Platform Committee. These included Senator Harris' redistributive tax reform, the National Welfare Rights Organization's $6500 guaranteed income plan, and the plank guaranteeing homosexuals protection from job discrimination and other harassment. Although many McGovern delegates were personally in sympathy with these planks, the candidate's organization was concerned that such stands might cause problems in November—and this concern was communicated to the delegates. The minority planks were defeated.

According to our interview evidence, and in apparent contradiction to the conventional wisdom, McGovern delegates did not tend to be ideological purists about the platform any more than did backers of the "regular" candidates. Table 2 shows that only the Wallace delegates tended to ignore completely the matter of winning votes; as many McGovernites as regulars cited this function of the platform as one of their concerns. As in conventions before 1972, the delegates bent their ideological preferences to attempt to write a platform with broad appeal.

Arenas of Decision

Other similarities in behavior between the 1972 convention and previous ones are evident when we examine patterns and arenas of decision making.

According to the classic model of convention decision making, the key units for bargaining are the state delegations. This model assumes

[20] *New York Times*, June 24, 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

McGovernites and Regulars on "Purist" Attitudes Toward Platform *

Goal for Platform	Candidate Commitment: McGovern	Wallace	Regulars	Total
Winning votes	24% (18)	0% (0)	24% (7)	21% (25)
Ideological purity	41 (31)	58 (7)	48 (14)	44 (52)
Both of the above	24 (18)	0 (0)	21 (6)	21 (24)
Other	12 (9)	42 (5)	7 (2)	14 (16)
	100 (76)	100 (12)	100 (29)	100 (117)

*Entries are based on delegates' explanations of why they wanted particular planks (or none) excluded from or included in the platform. The 40 percent who did not answer this question are excluded from the analysis, and those predominantly concerned with winning or correctness are combined with those who were exclusively concerned with these effects. "Regular" candidates are Muskie, Humphrey, and Jackson. The values are significant at $p < .10$.

that such delegations, operating under the unit rule,[21] bargain with each other and with candidate organizations. The rank-and-file delegates are manipulated by hierarchical leaders holding important roles in national, state, or local party organizations.[22]

But the 1972 rules changes appeared to falsify some of the assumptions of the classic model. Because of the abolition of the unit rule and the requirements for opening up the delegate-selection process, it could be expected that party leaders or high elected officials would have a harder time controlling the votes of a state delegation. Thus, the importance of hierarchical state delegation leaders in the bargaining process would be reduced. With decision-making power at the convention more widely dispersed, there would be an increase in the number of groups to be consulted and this would strain an already burdened information system. Therefore, there would be strong incentives to find ways to assemble the smaller groups into more manageable bargaining units.

The expected desire, and need, to develop new kinds of bargaining units appeared to coincide with the new forms of group representation

[21] The Democratic unit rule required that the entire vote of a state delegation be cast as the majority of the delegation desired, if the state delegation had been so instructed by the state convention.

[22] For further discussion of this model, see Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, D.C., 1960); Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, "Uncertainty and Decision-Making at the National Conventions," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston, 1963); and Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections* (New York, 1971).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at the convention. With the increase in participation by women, youth, blacks, and nonparty activists of all kinds, state delegations would be subject to even more factionalization than might be predicted by the change in the unit rule. It became clear that interest-group representation at the convention would go beyond the traditional testimony on the platform and the holding of labor union receptions. In the spring of 1972, there were calls for black caucuses, women's caucuses, youth caucuses—the formation of new arenas for bargaining. With strong loyalties to their race, sex, or age groups, the participants in such new caucuses might be expected to take these meetings very seriously.

Thus, it appeared that in 1972, convention decision making might conform to a somewhat different model. According to this model, the importance of state delegations as arenas of decision would be decreased, and the need for new bargaining units would be met by the emergence of group caucuses of blacks, women, and youth. Before the convention began, both journalists and political activists expected the group caucuses to be important arenas of decision.[23]

The experience of the caucuses, however, did not justify their organizers' optimism or the observers' expectations. Although there were meetings during convention week of a Black Caucus, Women's Caucus, and Youth Caucus (as well as a Latin Caucus, Senior Citizens' Caucus, and Jewish Caucus), none of these groups was able to become a major arena of decision making at the convention; most could not even make a sustained claim on the attention of their potential members. A number of caucus leaders had hoped to draw up lists of issue positions and then bargain with candidates to secure their support for such positions, but this never occurred. Although the liberal McGovern delegates were somewhat more likely than others to feel that the caucuses were important, Table 3 shows the general decrease over time in delegates' estimates of the potency of group caucuses.[24]

The group caucuses' failure to meet expectations can be explained by reference to a number of recurring organizational problems. One of these was the problem of time. Because of the fast pace and heavy workload of the convention itself, delegates were often in a rush, and they could not afford the time to go to special caucus meetings. Caucus leaders and participants found that there was not enough time to carry out the grand strategies that some of them had planned. Some members

[23] For example, see "Caucus Calling Meeting July 9 of Black Democratic Delegates," *New York Times*, June 14, 1972.

[24] Delegates were asked: "Where do you think the most important decisions were made or will be made concerning [delegate's convention goal]?" Respondents were permitted to check the names of as many different arenas as they wished.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3

*Delegates' Changing Estimates of Group Caucuses' Importance**

	Black Caucus		*Women's Caucus*		*Youth Caucus*	
	McGovern	*Non-McGovern*	*McGovern*	*Non-McGovern*	*McGovern*	*Non-McGovern*
Sunday–Monday	41% (19)	16% (5)	30% (14)	9% (3)	28% (13)	9% (3)
Tuesday–Wednesday	15 (5)	26 (8)	18 (6)	16 (5)	17 (6)	19 (6)
Thursday–Friday	23 (9)	7 (1)	18 (7)	7 (1)	22 (9)	36 (5)

*Number of cases upon which percentage is based is included in parentheses. Chi-square probabilities are:
McGovern delegates–Black Caucus: .021
Non-McGovern delegates–Black Caucus: .286
McGovern delegates–Women's Caucus: .259
Non-McGovern delegates–Women's Caucus: .601
McGovern delegates–Youth Caucus: .539
Non-McGovern delegates–Youth Caucus: .099

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Black Caucus had sought to hammer out a common program, see who the front runners were, and then bargain with them in the interests of black people. All this was to be done at the convention, but as District of Columbia delegate Walter Fauntroy told a news conference: "We looked and saw we couldn't wait that long."[25] Closely related to the problem of time was that of distance. The public transportation facilities in Miami were criticized by many delegates, some of whom cited lack of transportation as the reason why they did not attend group caucus meetings.

Another organizational problem for the caucuses was that of self-definition; it proved difficult for these groups to set and maintain their own boundaries. Who, for example, should be allowed into a Women's Caucus: All women delegates? Members of the National Women's Political Caucus? Women who subscribed to certain goals, such as easing of abortion laws? The Black Caucus tried to restrict its membership to delegates and alternates but found it impossible to keep nondelegates out. Finally, the decision was made to let any black person into the meetings of the Black Caucus, with full voting privileges. A broad definition of the group, while increasing membership, can lead to other difficulties. For the heterogeneity of the group can result in so much internal bickering that action is effectively impeded.

A final, critical problem for the special caucuses was that other organizations—notably candidate organizations—felt their own goals might be threatened by the existence of strong, independent group caucuses. The McGovern organization, for example, had serious reservations about an active Youth Caucus, and McGovern aides tried to discourage the senator's young delegates from building an independent youth group. There were also some clashes between the McGovern organization and the Women's Caucus, over a strong abortion plank and other issues. For delegates with multiple group identities, there were internal strains. Those who had a stake in the nomination of a particular candidate proved to be unwilling to drop their commitment to that candidate in favor of loyalty to a group caucus. McGovern delegates, many of whom had played a leading role in the development of the caucuses, were willing to subordinate caucus loyalty to candidate success. This strategy was in the best tradition of the professional who understands the role of compromise in the political process. And such behavior suggests once again that the McGovern delegates were not undiluted purists.

The special group caucuses were thus confronted with a number of

[25] "In Waning Hours, Mrs. Chisholm Courted 1st Ballot Support," *Washington Post*, July 13, 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serious organizational problems: time, distance, group self-definition, internal disunity, and conflict with the goals of other organizations. It is not surprising that they found it difficult to promulgate common lists of demands and then bargain with candidates and party leaders to further the acceptance of those demands.

In contrast to these caucuses, the state delegations had some significant advantages as arenas for delegate activity and decision making. Members of state delegations were housed together in Miami Beach; they had been selected at common conventions or in the primaries back home; and the delegates had often known each other prior to the national convention.

Furthermore, delegates had to attend state caucuses to receive their floor credentials and guest passes for the gallery—items of considerable importance. But state delegations were more than just dispensers of credentials and guest passes. In a number of cases, they provided the sites for discussion and planning of state political campaigns. Vermont's delegates spent considerable time in Miami Beach planning what turned out to be the successful Democratic campaign for the governorship. And various Connecticut political leaders sought backing from members of that state's delegation for their 1974 statewide races.

A final, and crucial, function performed by state delegations was the transmission of messages from candidate organizations to delegates. Delegates who already were committed wanted information on what issues would come before the convention and how their candidate felt about those issues. State delegations, not group caucuses, were the sites where delegates could gain information and instructions. The candidate organizations listed delegates by state and contacted them in their state delegations. State delegation chairmen, in turn, organized delegation meetings around presentations by candidate representatives. In this way, delegates were able to obtain the information they wanted.

It must be noted that the importance of candidate organizations at the convention was considerable. Among decision-making arenas at the convention, the McGovern organization was perceived by the delegates to be the most important. Over 50 percent of the delegates viewed the McGovern organization as the site of the most important decisions at the outset of the convention, and that figure rose to over 70 percent by Thursday and Friday. Table 4 shows that delegates who were not supporters of McGovern were even more likely than McGovernites at the end of the convention to view the McGovern organization as the most important arena.

The 1972 rules changes, combined with changes in the group composition of delegates, had led some observers to predict that special group

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4

*Delegates' Changing Estimates of the McGovern Organization's Importance**

	McGovern Delegates	*Non-McGovern Delegates*
Sunday–Monday	67% (31)	38% (12)
Tuesday–Wednesday	77 (26)	52 (16)
Thursday–Friday	68 (27)	86 (12)

*Number of cases upon which percentage is based is included in parentheses. Chi-square probability for McGovern delegates is .629; for non-McGovern delegates, .011.

caucuses would replace the traditional state delegations as the focus of delegates' attention. But the delegates' overriding purpose, as in the past, was to nominate a candidate—and candidate organizations continued to work through state delegations. Dramatic changes in the arenas of convention decision making never took place. The "New Politics" convention of 1972 utilized decisional structures which were similar to those found in its "Old Politics" predecessors.

Political Style: Inherent Characteristic or Response to Organizational Situation?

The clear distinction between issue-oriented purists and party-oriented professionals is complicated further when we look more closely at delegates' political styles and changes over time in those styles. In the literature, political style has usually been treated as an enduring characteristic of the person rather than of the particular political and organizational situation in which that person finds himself. But this may be an oversimplification. It is easy for the party regular to be a professional in a process of mutual adjustment when the center of gravity in the party reflects his issue position. The insurgent purist, on the other hand, worries more about issues precisely because the center of gravity of the party is so far removed from his issue preferences.

Other elements of the purist-professional dichotomy lend themselves to the same analysis. The rallying cry of the purists for intraparty democracy is also a request for reduction in the power of the regulars relative to that of insurgents. The reiteration of themes of moral purity is also a device for maintaining incentives for participation where there are no material rewards. Insurgents demand policy-making arenas where rational discussion and open debate predominate; from another perspective this is a demand that skills possessed by a middle-class insurgent group be weighted more heavily in policy making.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If style is partially a response to one's fortunes in the organization, a reversal of roles might be expected as the purists approach positions of leadership responsibility and as the regulars are displaced. Yesterday's regular is tomorrow's purist worried about the issue integrity of a party he no longer owns. And yesterday's purist is today's professional worried about organizational unity, incentives, and winning elections.

Regardless of which perspective we adopt in considering political style, almost all commentators agree that the McGovern and Wallace organizations were more purist in style than were the Humphrey-Muskie-Jackson delegates. When we look at how the delegates change over the course of the convention, the relevance of the differences between these two perspectives on style becomes apparent. If political style is independent of winning and losing, then we should expect no pronounced changes in orientation among McGovern supporters as they move into positions of leadership in the party. And those who are professionals on Monday should be professionals on Friday. On the other hand, if political style responds to winning and losing, then we should expect the McGovern forces to become increasingly pragmatic over the course of the convention and the Humphrey-Muskie-Jackson delegates to become increasingly purist.

To test the competing interpretations of political style, we developed a measure of the delegates' purist or professional perspectives from our interview data. Each delegate was asked to state what he really wanted to see done at the convention and the reasons for his preference. Using guidelines drawn from the previously mentioned work of Wildavsky, Wilson, and Soule and Clarke, we classified delegates according to the code set out in Table 5.

Thus, of the 234 delegates interviewed, we were able to classify 187 or 80 percent. In all our subsequent discussions of purist versus professional perspectives, we shall be using this measure. Of course, the validity of a measure of purism-professionalism would be in doubt if it did not differentiate McGovern supporters from those supporting Humphrey-Jackson-Muskie. Our measure does so quite nicely in Table 6.

But when we examine the results on change over the course of the convention, some interesting differences begin to emerge. As Figure 2 illustrates, the hypothesis that McGovern delegates would grow increasingly pragmatic as their organization assumed a position of leadership in the convention was not confirmed. The delegates, it seems, were willing to accept the discipline imposed upon them for the sake of a McGovern victory in the convention, but they were not willing to surrender their belief in the importance of correct issue stands and intraparty democracy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5

Classification of Delegates as Either Purist or Professional

A. Nomination of candidate	If delegate goal was nomination of preferred candidate because his candidate could win in in November	= Professional $N = 11$*
	If delegate goal was nomination of preferred candidate because candidate was correct on the issues, or correctly represented new groups or party reform	= Purist $N = 76$
B. Issue preference and platform	If delegate goal was party unity because of need to win in November, or if delegate goal was issue in platform because it would aid winning in November	= Professional $N = 27$
	If delegate goal was correct issue in platform for any other reason	= Purist $N = 19$
C. Convention decision process	If delegate goal was representation of new groups in convention decision making and party decision making, or party reform	= Purist $N = 26$
D. Party orientation	If delegate goal was nomination of winner to unify party, express traditional issues dividing Republicans and Democrats	= Professional $N = 28$

*N is the number in the sample.

Thus, the "organizational situation" hypothesis—that winning converts purists into professionals—does not receive support from our data. The reverse, however—that losing turns professionals into purists—is supported by the data. Whereas on Sunday and Monday Democratic regulars were thinking as professionals are reputed to think, on Thursday

TABLE 6

*The Delegates' Purism and Professionalism, by Candidate Preference**

	Purist	*Professional*	*Total*
Preference for McGovern	83% (98)	17% (11)	109
Preference for Wallace	65% (11)	35% (6)	17
Preference for HHH, Muskie, or Jackson	45% (22)	55% (27)	49
Total	70%	30%	175

*Candidate preference was assessed by asking each delegate the name of the candidate he most preferred for the nomination regardless of how he had voted or intended to vote. The results are roughly the same as the preconvention vote preference recorded by CBS for each delegate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 2

Changing Purist Orientation Among McGovern and Non-McGovern Delegates



For the HHH group the change in the purist percentage is statistically significant by chi square with probability less than .012. Candidate preference is candidate most preferred at time of interview.

and Friday they were almost as purist as the McGovern supporters. What we seem to see here is a process of radicalization. When party control shifts to an insurgent group, the issues assume as great an importance for the regulars as they formerly held for the insurgents. And the contrast between purists and professionals becomes blurred.

Thus, the evidence gleaned from the 1972 Democratic convention raises some serious questions about the assertion that the dominant group of delegates there were uncompromising ideologues who wrested control of the party from their pragmatic, "party regular" opponents and changed the nature of the convention process itself. Interview results and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other data show that: (1) McGovern delegates were willing to yield on ideological purity when such yielding would help their candidate's prospects in the convention and election; (2) despite some observers' expectations of sharp changes, the decision-making patterns and arenas at the 1972 convention were similar to those of the past; and (3) the supporters of "regular" candidates actually developed a "purist" orientation during the course of the convention.

The Convention and the Election

A third article of faith among the critics of the 1972 nomination process has been that the Democratic convention of that year—and the delegate -selection process that preceded it—played a crucial role in the massive electoral defeat in November. In her article, Center compares the 1972 convention unfavorably with its 1968 predecessor. She says:

> The 1968 Democratic National Convention nominated a candidiate who very nearly won the presidency in November. Since the *raison d'etre* of American political parties has always been the election of its candidates to public office, and the traditional function of national party conventions has been the selection of candidates most likely to win office, then the 1968 convention cannot be considered an abysmal failure in this regard.[26]

In contrast, consider her dim view of the contribution of the 1972 convention:

> The reforms had succeeded in transforming 1968s substantial delegate minority into 1972s overwhelming delegate majority. Yet not only did that majority's candidate lose the presidential election by a large margin, but surveys taken after the November election indicated that as many as 36 percent of Democratic voters cast their ballots for Nixon.[27]

The implication is clear: The 1968 convention was more successful than that of 1972, because Hubert H. Humphrey, the candidate it produced, came much closer to victory than did George McGovern.

This comparison between the "success" of 1968 and the "failure" of 1972 must be called into some question, for it omits a number of important differences between the two elections which worked against the Democratic candidate in 1972. One of these differences was the incumbency of Richard Nixon. In 1968, Nixon was a former vice-president; in 1972, he was an incumbent president who had just completed popular trips to China and the Soviet Union. Another difference was the absence of

[26] Center, "1972 Democratic Convention," p. 326.
[27] Ibid., p. 342.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

George Wallace in the 1972 general election. The University of Michigan's postelection analysis found that almost eight out of ten individuals who voted for Wallace in 1968 cast their ballots for Nixon in 1972;[28] with Wallace in the race, the election would have been much closer.

One common item of conventional wisdom has been that it was the convention itself—featuring televised views of young people, blacks, activist women, and assorted nonregular politicians—that cost the Democrats the 1972 election. But the Michigan study found that the "data strongly suggest that the popular myth has overestimated the importance of the Democratic convention as an explanation of the election outcome."[29] It appears that the 1972 convention did not play the decisive and disastrous role that some have attributed to it.

Looking toward the Future

The struggle over delegate-selection rules in the Democratic party has continued. It is interesting that so much of the conservatives' anger has been directed at the group "quota" provisions, for it would be hard to argue that those provisions had an effect on the convention's outcome. (After all, Humphrey, Jackson, and Muskie could all recruit women, minorities, and young people to serve as their delegates.) In view of the opposition these group-representation rules engendered, it is not surprising that a new party delegate selection commission recommended in late 1973 the abolition of the "reasonable representation" guidelines. Instead, the commission's report put forward an "Affirmative Action" program to ensure participation by women, youth, and minority groups "as indicated by their presence in the Democratic electorate." The new commission report, which was endorsed with only minor changes by the Democratic National Committee in March 1974 declared: "This goal shall not be accomplished either directly or indirectly by the Party's imposition of mandatory quotas at any level of the delegate selection process or in any other Party affairs."[30]

While Center professes to see in these changes "little more than token retrenchment from the McGovern-Fraser reforms,"[31] a somewhat dif-

[28] Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown, "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election." Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, p. 62.

[29] Ibid., p. 42.

[30] *Report of the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure as Amended and Adopted by the DNC Executive Committee, March 1, 1974.*

[31] Center, "1972 Democratic Convention," p. 347.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ferent answer is suggested if we focus on the provisions for compliance in the new guidelines. It is important to note, for example (as Center herself does), that compliance this time will not be determined by the presence of a "reasonable number" of young, women, or minority delegates, but rather by the vaguer standard of a state party's effort in encouraging participation by these groups. It is also important to keep in mind that party chairman Robert Strauss and the "regulars" prevailed over the "reformers" in determining the size of the compliance commission and in the choice of that commission's chairman (Robert Wagner, former mayor of New York).[32]

Another of the 1974 reforms, the provision for proportional representation of candidate preferences, may well have some significant effects. According to the new rules, winner-take-all primaries are banned, and delegate places in the relevant states are to be allocated proportionally on the basis of the vote (to those candidates having more than 15 percent of the total). In nonprimary states, proportional representation will operate at every stage of the selection process; any candidate receiving 15 percent of the votes at a particular level will be entitled to his proportional share of delegates at the next higher level.

The effect of this rules change will surely be to encourage candidates to mount campaigns in a larger number of states, for partial victories are possible—and necessary. No longer can a candidate afford to concentrate on a few large primaries and ignore the other states.[33] And without the bandwagon effect of the winner-take-all primaries, it will be harder for any one candidate to establish an overwhelming lead. Thus, the prospects for a multiballot, bargaining convention are enhanced. Penn Kemble, a critic of recent convention reforms, has predicted that proportional representation could have a fragmenting effect within the party and could lead to the formation of "constituency" slates such as labor or black caucuses.[34] But the 1972 experience of group caucuses indicates that there are limits to caucus loyalty in the presence of strong candidate organizations. As to the major participants in 1976, it is quite possible, we think, that the bargainers at the 1976 convention may be the very party regulars championed by critics of reform. Indeed, despite some predictions to the contrary, the evidence so far indicates that Democratic regulars are doing well in the delegate-selection process for the party's 1974 midterm convention.[35]

[32] See "Democrats Approve New Rules to Select Convention Delegates," *New York Times*, March 2, 1974.

[33] See Broder, "The Democrats' Dilemma," p. 38.

[34] See David S. Broder, "Democrats: The Unquota," *Washington Post*, February 10, 1974.

[35] "Democratic Regulars Controlling Selection of Delegates to Mini-Convention," *New York Times*, May 23, 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some Continuing Dilemmas

Regardless of short-run changes in convention rules and party-power relationships, the Democrats will continue to face a number of fundamental dilemmas with respect to the nomination process. The first dilemma arises from the issue of deciding who is entitled to participate directly in that process. Not all citizens who declare themselves in support of a candidate can be considered members of that candidate's party. But who is to decide where the boundary between member and supporter lies? Political parties are not private organizations that can easily refuse freely offered services. Moreover, in periods of dissatisfaction with political parties, amateur activists often demand that the scope of participation in the parties be widened to include them. Center speaks warmly of the "complexes of party traditions, old saws, and unwritten bylaws that had evolved and persisted since Andrew Jackson's time."[36] But these traditions operated to limit participation by young people, women, and minority groups. It should not be assumed that, in the absence of group-representation guidelines, some sort of open party merit system prevails, in which competence and experience are the criteria of success. For, like other kinds of organizational leaders, party officials often subordinate other goals to the maintenance of their own places in the organization.

A second dilemma lies in the party's necessary division of its attention between past and future constituencies. In its choice of leaders and platforms, a party may indicate a responsiveness to what has been "tried and true"—to the nurturance of old constituencies—or it might look to new constituencies in exchange for new support. And a party may, in its platform and choice of candidates, contribute to the development of new constituencies, creating sources of future support. The dilemma is, of course, characteristic of all organizations: as their political environments change, or seem to change, parties run the risk of losing the old while attracting the new.

Finally, there is a dilemma central to political life—the balance between issue purity and organizational power. Parties are organizations that must attract votes to survive. Yet they also exist as instruments to achieve issue goals. Awareness of this dilemma on the part of a party's members creates a profound organizational tension. And this tension has been increased by the high degree of issue polarization currently found in the Democratic party.[37] In such a situation, it becomes much harder for a nominating convention to perform its traditional functions of unifying the party and legitimizing the choice of nominee. And

[36] Center, "1972 Democratic Convention," p. 345.

[37] See Miller et al., "A Majority Party in Disarray," for a full discussion of this polarization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this polarization is unlikely to be summarily abolished by any combination of rules changes.

Given the deep divisions within the Democratic party and the continuing controversy over delegate-selection rules, it is perhaps inevitable that evaluations of convention reforms will reflect current political preferences. The McCarthy supporters overemphasized the closed nature of the 1968 convention, and non-McGovernites have exaggerated the exclusionary impact of the 1972 reform rules. But surely it is not unreasonable to request that those who analyze the effects of rules changes should base their evaluations, to the extent possible, on empirical evidence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy

MICHAEL ROSKIN

United States foreign policy can be seen as a succession of strategic conventional wisdoms, or "paradigms," on whether the country's defense should start on the near or far side of the oceans. An interventionist paradigm favors the latter, a noninterventionist paradigm the former. This article argues that each elite American generation comes to favor one of these orientations by living through the catastrophe brought on by the application *ad absurdum* of the opposite paradigm at the hands of the previous elite generation. Thus the bearers of the "Pearl Harbor paradigm" (themselves reacting to the deficiencies of the interwar "isolationism") eventually drove interventionism into the ground in Vietnam, giving rise to a noninterventionist "Vietnam paradigm." These paradigms seem to shift at approximately generational intervals, possibly because it takes that long for the bearers of one orientation, formed by the dramatic experiences of their young adulthood, to come to power and eventually misapply the lessons of their youth.

Recently much foreign-policy discussion has focused on economic interpretation of United States actions, bureaucratic politics and malfunctions, and executive-legislative relations. While such approaches have made interesting contributions to the field, none have been able to gather together seemingly disparate elements of foreign policy into an overall view that explains this behavior over several decades. The reason is that these popular approaches consistently downplay or even ignore

MICHAEL ROSKIN, a former foreign service officer and newspaperman, is assistant professor of political science at Lycoming College, Williamsport, Pa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the key element to such an overall view: the strategic assumptions held by decision-making elites—that is, who defines what as strategic; why; and when.[1] In other words, these approaches failed to consider that in certain periods United States policy makers deem much of the globe to be worth fighting for, while at other times they regard most of the world with indifference.

The Concept of "Paradigm"

The concepts of "paradigm" and "paradigm shift" are borrowed from Thomas Kuhn, who used them to describe intellectual growth in the natural sciences. Kuhn called paradigms "universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners."[2] A paradigm is the basic assumption of a field; acceptance of it is mandatory for practitioners (e.g., those who do not accept the conservation of energy are not physicists; those who do not accept the gas laws are not chemists). Practitioners, having accepted the paradigm, then typically engage in "normal science," that is, the interpretation and detailing of the basic paradigm, which itself is not open to question.[3]

The importance of Kuhn's framework for our purposes is that it is a dynamic view: the paradigms shift. When researchers, operating under their old paradigm, begin to notice that their empirical findings do not come out the way they are supposed to, disquiet enters into the profession. Anomalies or counterinstances crop up in the research and throw the old paradigm into doubt. Then an innovator looks at the data from another angle, reformulates the basic framework, and introduces a new paradigm. Significantly these innovators tend to be younger men who, "being little committed by prior practice to the traditional rules of normal science, are particularly likely to see that those rules no longer define a playable game and to conceive another set that can replace them."[4] The new paradigm does not triumph immediately and automatically. Now there are two competing, antithetical paradigms; each demands its separate world view. The discussants "are bound partly to talk through each

[1] This formulation owes something to John Kenneth Galbraith's 1962 query to President Kennedy apropos of Vietnam: "Incidentally, who is the man in your administration who decides what countries are strategic?" Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston, 1969), p. 311.

[2] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1970), p. viii.

[3] Ibid., pp. 19–20.

[4] Ibid., p. 90.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other" because they are looking at the same data from differing angles.[5] The new paradigm makes progress, however, because it claims it "can solve the problems that have led the old one to a crisis."[6] The new paradigm makes particular headway among younger workers. The old practitioners may be beyond conversion; they simply die out. This "paradigm shift" is what Kuhn calls a "scientific revolution," and these "revolutions close with a total victory for one of the two opposing camps."[7]

There is one more point we must include from Kuhn. Which paradigm, the old or the new, is the "truth"? The answer is neither. The new paradigm is at best merely a closer approximation to reality. It seems to explain the data better and offers better paths to future research; it is never the last word. Wide areas of uncertainty remain, especially during the changeover period when the data can be interpreted ambiguously. It is impossible to say when—or even if—the holders of the old paradigm are completely wrong. The profession merely comes to turn its back on them, ignoring them, leaving them out in the cold.[8]

Kuhn has suggested a theory of the innovation and diffusion of knowledge applicable to all fields, including foreign policy. The crucial difference with foreign-policy paradigms is that they are far less *verifiable* than natural-science paradigms. Students of foreign policy have only the crudest sort of verification procedure: the perception that the old paradigm has given rise to a catastrophe. More subtle perceptions of marginal dysfunctionality tend to go unnoticed (by all but a handfull of critics) until the general orientation produces an unmistakable disaster.

How, then, can we adapt the Kuhnian framework to the study of United States foreign policy? The community of practitioners is an elite of persons relevant to foreign policy—both in and out of government, the latter including such opinion leaders as professors and journalists—who structure the debate for wider audiences.[9] While the relationship between mass and elite opinion in foreign policy is well beyond our scope here, most scholarly opinion holds that the mass public has only low or intermittent interest in foreign affairs. One study, for example, found more "isolationism" as one moves down the educational

[5] Ibid., p. 148.
[6] Ibid., p. 153.
[7] Ibid., p. 166.
[8] Ibid., p. 159.
[9] The role of the elite in foreign policy should need little elaboration here. See Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (New York, 1960), pp. 138–139; James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1961), pp. 35–36; James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N. J., 1963), pp. 6–10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ladder.[10] Foreign aid has never been popular with American voters; only elite opinion sustains it. When the elite ceases to define overseas situations as threats to United States security, the mass public soon loses interest. Major American participation abroad is sustainable only when the elite has been mobilized to support it. Lose this support and America stays home.

The content of the foreign-policy paradigm varies in detail but is generally reducible to the question of whether overseas areas "matter" to United States security. That is, should the defense of America start on the far or near side of the ocean? The Yale scholar of geopolitics Nicholas Spykman recognized the question as "the oldest issue in American foreign policy" and posed it in 1942 as well as anyone has ever done: "Shall we protect our interests by defense on this side of the water or by active participation in the lands across the oceans?"[11] The former view constitutes what we shall call a "noninterventionist" paradigm; the latter is an "interventionist" paradigm. These antithetical views shift under the impact of catastrophes which seem to prove that the old paradigm was wrong and its adherents mistaken. At that point the previous outsiders (gadflies, radicals, revisionists, etc.) find many of their views accepted as mainstream thinking; their critique becomes the new framework.

Our model resembles Kuhn's but with the important provision that neither old nor new foreign-policy paradigms have much intrinsic validity because neither can be objectively verified in an indeterminate world. Instead of verified, a new foreign-policy paradigm is merely internalized. Counterinstances are ignored; the range of conceivable strategic situations is narrowed to exclude possible alternate paradigms. It may be impossible to distinguish whether this process is emotional or rational, affective or cognitive. The acrimony accompanying foreign-policy paradigm shifts, however, suggests a strong emotional component. Chances are that a member of the American elite who as a young person witnessed the events leading up to Pearl Harbor has developed a very definite orientation to foreign policy, an interventionist one, the

[10] Herbert McCloskey, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1967), pp. 51–109. As Almond put it: "There is some value in recognizing that an overtly interventionist and 'responsible' United States hides a covertly isolationist longing." Almond, *The American People*, p. 67. An attempt to refute Almond's "instability of mood" theory was marred by having all its data drawn from the peak years of the cold war. William R. Caspary, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (June 1970), 536–647.

[11] Nicholas John Sypkman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York, 1942), pp. 5, 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assumptions of which are not open for discussion. Similarly, by the early 1970s the interventionist views of Walt Rostow, Dean Rusk, and William Bundy produced mostly irritation (if not outright vituperation) on the part of younger foreign-policy thinkers.

It is here that we add the concept of generation to the Kuhnian model. Political scientists have not looked much at generations in their analyses. Some hold that to separate out a "political generation" is to reify an abstract and nebulous concept. People are born every day and constitute more of a continuum than a segment. The German sociologist Karl Mannheim agreed that generation is a reification, but no more so than the concept of social class, which is indispensable for much modern analysis.[12]

An elite generation freezes upon either an interventionist or noninterventionist paradigm usually after some foreign-policy catastrophe wrought by the application of the opposite paradigm. During a transition period the two paradigms clash. Because they are antithetical, compromise is impossible. The two generations with their different assumptions talk past each other. Eventually the new paradigm wins because it gains more younger adherents, while the advocates of the old paradigm retire and die off. The new paradigm triumphs not so much on an intellectual basis as on an actuarial one.

The Pearl Harbor Paradigm

It may be profitable to look at the foreign-policy paradigm as having a natural life—a birth, a period of growth, and a death. The birth is characterized by a mounting criticism of the old paradigm and then by the conversion of a large portion of the elite to the new paradigm. An event "proves" the old paradigm wrong, as it did to Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg, a staunch isolationist whose turning to interventionism "took firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for any realist."[13] In honor of Vandenburg's conversion we can label this interventionist orientation the "Pearl Harbor paradigm."

Pearl Harbor, of course, was merely the culmination of an increasingly heated argument in the interwar period between the dominant noninterventionists and interventionist Cassandras. We could also call the latter

[12] Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. by Paul Kecskemeti (London, 1952), p. 291. Samuel P. Huntington has recently stressed the importance of generations in American political change. See "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many," *Political Science Quarterly*, 89, no. 1 (March 1974).

[13] Arthur H. Vandenburg, Jr. (ed.), *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenburg* (Boston, 1952), p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

view the Munich paradigm, the Ethiopian paradigm, or even the Manchurian paradigm.[14] But the Pearl Harbor attack clinched the interventionists' argument by demonstrating they were "right" in warning that an isolated America was impossible. The isolationists either shut up or quickly changed sides.[15] The handful of holdouts, such as those who charged Roosevelt with dragging the country into war, were by and large simply ignored.

The most clearly visible starting point for the rise of the Pearl Harbor paradigm was Secretary of State Stimson's 1932 "nonrecognition" of Japanese expansion into Manchuria. Thereafter concern slowly grew among the American elite that aggressive powers abroad could eventually threaten America. The growth of this concern among younger persons is important for two reasons: First, people who were in their twenties during the late 1930s were less committed to the then-prevailing noninterventionism of the older generation. Accordingly, more of the younger group were open to formulate a new paradigm—an interventionist one. Second, although some older elite members may have been similarly alarmed at overseas threats, it was mostly the younger generation that would staff foreign-policy positions in future decades.

By the time war broke out in Europe in 1939, elite opinion was starting to split. The formation of two committees expressed this division: the isolationist America First and the increasingly interventionist Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. On December 7, 1941, the interventionists could (and did) say, "I told you so," and then enshrine their argument—permanently, they thought—as the basic assumption of American foreign policy: If we do not nip aggression in the bud it will eventually grow and involve us. By not stopping aggressors immediately, you encouraged them. Apart from the moral issue of helping a victim of aggression, you are also setting up the first line of defense of your own country. Accordingly, altruism and self-interest merge.

The discredited "isolationists" could only meekly retort that, in principle at least, the defense of the United States did not start on the other side of the globe, for that merely guarantees American participation in wars that were not intrinsically hers. The last gasps of the remaining noninterventionism came in the 1951 debate to limit troops in Europe and the 1954 Bricker amendment to restrict executive agreements. Occasional

[14] Paul Seabury and Alvin Drischler called it "the Manchurian assumption" and saw it as the basis for our postwar alliances. Seabury and Drischler, "How to Decommit Without Withdrawal Symptoms," *Foreign Policy*, 1 (Winter 1970–1971), 51.

[15] It is surprising to learn, for example, that liberal internationalist Chester Bowles served on the national committee of America First. See Wayne S. Cole, *America First: The Battle Against Intervention* (Madison, Wis., 1953), p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whiffs of preinterventionist views could be sensed in debates over foreign aid.

The interesting aspect of the Pearl Harbor paradigm, however, was its duration long past World War II. The interventionist orientation had been so deeply internalized in the struggle with the isolationists that it did not lapse with the Allied victory. By that time almost all sections of the globe now "mattered" to American security, particularly as a new hostile power—the Soviet Union—seemed bent on territorial and ideological aggrandizement. In the 1930s, the fate of East Europe bothered Washington very little, but in the span of a decade East Europe became a matter of urgent American concern.[16] Not only had the Soviets inflicted brutal, Hitler-like dictatorships upon the nations of East Europe, it was taken for granted that they were preparing to do the same to West Europe and other areas. But this time America was smarter and stood prepared to stop aggression. In the span of one decade, 1945–1955, the United States committed itself to the defense of more than seventy nations.

A few quotes might suffice to demonstrate the persistence of the Pearl Harbor paradigm into the Vietnam era. Warning of a "new isolationism," Senator Thomas J. Dodd, in a 1965 floor speech, explained:

> The situation in Viet-Nam today bears many resemblances to the situation just before Munich. . . .
>
> In Viet-Nam today, we are again dealing with a faraway land, about which we know very little.
>
> In Viet-Nam today, we are again confronted by an incorrigible aggressor, fanatically committed to the destruction of the free world, whose agreements are as worthless as Hitler's. . . .
>
> If we fail to draw the line in Viet-Nam, in short, we may find ourselves compelled to draw a defense line as far back as Seattle and Alaska, with Hawaii as a solitary out-post in mid-Pacific.[17]

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, in commenting on Lin Piao's 1965 statement on the universal applicability of "people's war," said, "It is a program of aggression. It is a speech that ranks with Hitler's *Mein Kampf*."[18]

[16] Historian Norman Graebner poses the following as the key question in the debate over the origins of the cold war: "Why did the United States after 1939 permit the conquest of eastern Europe by Nazi forces, presumably forever, with scarcely a stir, but refused after 1944 to acknowledge any primary Russian interest or right of hegemony in the same region on the heels of a closely won Russian victory against the German invader?" The shift of foreign-policy paradigms helps answer this question. Graebner, "Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate: A Review of the Literature," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 (March 1969), 131.

[17] U. S., *Congressional Record*, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), CXI, Pt. 3, 3350–3351.

[18] *New York Times*, October 3, 1965 (supplement), p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Johnson too was immersed in the World War II imagery. In his 1965 Johns Hopkins speech he warned:

> The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."[19]

In a 1966 speech to NATO parliamentarians, Senator Henry M. Jackson, put it this way:

> Analogies with the past may be misleading and I would not argue that this is the 30's all over again. But looking back we think, as I am sure many of you do, that it is wise to stop aggression before the aggressor becomes strong and swollen with ambition from small successes. We think the world might have been spared enormous misfortunes if Japan had not been permitted to succeed in Manchuria, or Mussolini in Ethiopia, or Hitler in Czechoslovakia or in the Rhineland. And we think that our sacrifices in this dirty war in little Vietnam will make a dirtier and bigger war less likely.[20]

President Johnson said, in a 1966 talk in New Hampshire:

> Few people realize that world peace has reached voting age. It has been 21 years since that day on the U.S.S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay when World War II came to an end. Perhaps it reflects poorly on our world that men must fight limited wars to keep from fighting larger wars; but that is the condition of the world. . . .
>
> We are following this policy in Vietnam because we know that the restrained use of power has for 21 years prevented the wholesale destruction the world faced in 1914 and again in 1939.[21]

The Pentagon Papers are replete with the World War II analogy. Among these, in a 1966 memo, Walt Rostow explained how his experience as an OSS major plotting German bomb targets taught him the importance of cutting the enemy's POL—petroleum, oil, and lubricants:

> With an understanding that simple analogies are dangerous, I never the less feel it is quite possible the military effects of a systematic and sustained bombing of POL in North Vietnam may be more prompt and direct than conventional intelligence analysis would suggest.[22]

[19] U. S., President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, D. C.: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service, 1945–), Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, p. 395.

[20] U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, *United States Troops in Europe*, Report, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. October 15, 1968 (Washington, D. C., 1968), p. 18.

[21] *Public Papers of the Presidents*, Johnson, 1966, Book II, p. 861.

[22] *The Pentagon Papers, as Published by the New York Times* (New York, 1971, paper ed.), p. 499.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rostow seems to have retained a petroleum version of the Pearl Harbor paradigm and to have assumed that Hanoi had *Panzers* and a *Luftwaffe* that could be knocked out.

The Special Role of Kennedy

One member of the foreign-policy elite deserves to be examined at greater length. John F. Kennedy not only internalized what we are calling the Pearl Harbor paradigm, he helped install it.[23] His 1940 best seller, *Why England Slept*, originally written he was 21–22, was his Harvard senior thesis. The book concerned not only Britain's interwar somnolence in the face of the German threat but posited America in the same position. Kennedy's position at that time, it is interesting to note, was in marked contrast to the isolationism of his father, who was then the United States ambassador to Britain.[24]

The *Why England Slept* of Kennedy's youth laid down a remarkably full-blown view of national security, one that Senator and later President Kennedy retained practically intact. The following were some of the important themes which first appeared in *Why England Slept* and then in his senatorial and presidential speeches:

1. Peace-loving democracy is weak in the face of expansionist totalitarianism.[25]
2. The democratic leader's role is to teach the population that isolated events form an overall pattern of aggression against them.[26]
3. Defense preparedness must be kept up, even if this means increasing defense expenditures.[27]
4. Reliance on a single-weapon defense system is dangerous; a country must have several good defense systems for flexibility.[28]
5. Civil defense measures must be instituted in advance to protect the population in case of war.[29]

[23] A parallel figure in the field of journalism was Kennedy's friend Joseph Alsop, who also published a book in 1940 that established his views for decades. See Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, *American White Paper* (New York, 1940).

[24] Such items raise the possibility that some of the paradigm shift may be explicable in terms of father-son conflict on the psychoanalytic plane. But that approach tends to minimize the substantive issue of strategic assumptions, which is the one that concerns us here. The elder Kennedy's isolationism is from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Greenwich, Conn., 1967, paper ed.), pp. 85, 125.

[25] John F. Kennedy, *Why England Slept*, 2d ed. (New York, 1961), p. 222.

[26] Ibid., p. 186.

[27] Ibid., p. 223.

[28] Ibid., p. 171.

[29] Ibid., pp. 169–170.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6. The nation must be willing actually to go to war in the final crunch; bluffing will not suffice.[30]

In the case of Britain in the late 1930s, argued the young Kennedy, democracy simply did not take the Nazi menace seriously, and British leaders failed to point out the danger and build up defenses. British defense was overconcentrated on the fleet, at the expense of the army and most importantly of the air force. Britain's civil defense was weak, particularly in antiaircraft batteries. And finally, British leaders had been so hesitant to actually apply force when needed that Hitler could not take them seriously.

Representative and later Senator Kennedy found these arguments highly applicable to the Eisenhower period, which he often compared to interwar Britain, as in this 1959 speech:

> Twenty-three years ago, in a bitter debate in the House of Commons, Winston Churchill charged the British Government with acute blindness to the menace of Nazi Germany, with gross negligence in the maintenance of the island's defenses, and with indifferent, indecisive leadership of British foreign policy and British public opinion. The preceding years of drift and impotency, he said, were "the years the locusts have eaten."
>
> Since January, 1953, this nation has passed through a similar period. . . .[31]

America in the 1950s, said Kennedy, refused to see the "global challenge" of Soviet penetration of the Third World. Eisenhower had let United States defense preparedness slide; a "missile gap" had appeared. America must spend more on defense: "Surely our nation's security overrides budgetary considerations. . . . Then why can we not realize that the coming years of the gap present us with a peril more deadly than any wartime danger we have ever known?"[32] The country relied on "massive retaliation" when it needed a flexible response of many options, including counterinsurgency. Kennedy accordingly opposed Republican cuts in our ground troops. And, in a 1959 interview, he emphasized that the United States must be willing to fight for Berlin:

> If we took the view which some Englishmen took, that Prague or the Sudentendeutsch were not worth a war in '38—if we took that view about Berlin, my judgment is that the West Berliners would pass into the Communist orbit, and our position in West Germany and our relations with West Germany would receive a fatal blow. . . . They're fighting for New York and Paris when they struggle over Berlin.[33]

[30] Ibid., pp. 229–230.

[31] John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace*, ed. by Allan Nevins (New York, 1960), p. 193.

[32] U. S., *Congressional Record*, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), CIV, 17571.

[33] Kennedy, *Strategy of Peace*, p. 213.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One might be tempted to dismiss Senator Kennedy's views as campaign rhetoric. But once in the presidency, Kennedy proceeded to implement them: bigger defense budgets, larger ground forces, "flexible response" (including counterinsurgency), civil defense (especially the 1961 fallout-shelter panic), and finally overt warfare in Southeast Asia. Throughout his presidency, Kennedy and his advisers stuck to the image of the Pearl Harbor paradigm. In his dramatic 1962 television address on the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, Kennedy used his favorite analogy: "The 1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war."[34] Vice-President Johnson, in a 1961 memo to Kennedy on Vietnam, wrote:

> The battle against Communism must be joined in South-east Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there—or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores.[35]

One wonders if Johnson or one of his assistants had read Spykman. Further perusal of the Pentagon Papers shows much the same evaluation of the alleged strategic importance of Vietnam; its fall was defined as a major setback to United States security.[36]

We do not here argue that Vietnam is important or unimportant to the defense of America. That is indeterminate, although within the last decade a considerable portion of elite opinion has switched from the former view to the latter. What interests us is the inability of Kennedy and his advisers to define Southeast Asia as anything but strategic.

Kennedy's age surely contributed to his highly interventionist orientation. He retained what we are calling the Pearl Harbor paradigm as a young man in his early twenties. Eisenhower, by way of contrast, was twenty-seven years older and witnessed the events that led up to American involvement in World War II as a man in his forties. It seems likely, then, that the impact of the events of the late 1930s and early 1940s was far stronger in forming Kennedy's foreign-policy orientation than Eisenhower's.

This perhaps partially explains why the Pearl Harbor paradigm eventually was applied to an extreme, and why this process took about a generation. A generation of the United States elite experienced as relatively young people the momentous events leading up to Pearl Harbor. Kennedy was of this generation, which gradually surfaced into public life.[37] Each year there were more members of this generation in posi-

[34] *Public Papers of the Presidents*, Kennedy, 1962, p. 807.

[35] *Pentagon Papers*, p. 128.

[36] Ibid., pp. 27, 35–36, 148–149, 284.

[37] For a good exposition of this "age-cohort hypothesis," in this case on the atti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions of foreign-policy leadership. The older generation retired and the proportion of this new generation increased. After about twenty years, there were few members of the older generation left in the political machinery. By the time Kennedy assumed the presidency, there were few countervailing views to dilute and moderate a policy of thoroughgoing interventionism. In this sense, we can say that the Pearl Harbor paradigm "blossomed" under Kennedy, who applied it more completely than did Eisenhower.

But while Kennedy was applying the wisdom learned in his youth to its full extent—the Green Berets, the Peace Corps, the Agency for International Development, the Counterinsurgency Committee—the real world was going its own way, becoming less and less relevant to the mental constructs of American foreign-policy planners. We have then a "dysfunction" growing between policy and reality. On the one hand, we have a foreign orientation essentially frozen since the 1940s, and, on the other hand, a world which defied pigeonholing into the compartments of the 1940s.

The most conspicuous indicator of this discrepancy was the persistent American inability to evaluate "communism" as no longer monolithic. Here, as with Kuhn's scientific paradigms, the data can be interpreted ambiguously in transitional periods. One side reads the data as still showing essentially a monolith, the other as a badly fractured movement. But at what point in time did it become unreasonable for United States foreign-policy planners to continue to hold the former view? Scholars had been emphasizing the Sino-Soviet split since the early 1960s,[38] but it was not until the early 1970s—after the trauma of Vietnam had set in—that reality was incorporated into policy. When communism became perceivable as nonmonolithic, under President Nixon, it perforce lost its most threatening attribute. Thus redefined, Indochina was no longer worth evaluating as a strategic prize, and American withdrawal became possible. The paradigm had shifted: Vietnam was no longer part of a gigantic pincer movement enveloping us.

After the Vietnam debacle was over, few voices could be heard advocating a return to "business as usual," that is, to continuing the interventionist paradigm. Nixon introduced a policy markedly different from that of his predecessors. It differed rhetorically in announcing to Amer-

tudes of European youth toward regional integration, see Ronald Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?" *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967), 94–99.

[38] See, for example, G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York, 1961); Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton, N. J., 1962); and Leopold Labedz and G. R. Urban (eds.), *The Sino-Soviet Conflict* (London, 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ica's allies that they would have to bear primary responsibility for their defense,[39] and it differed physically in reducing United States ground forces to the point where few were available to send abroad. (Total U.S. armed forces fell from 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.2 million in 1974; especially hard hit were the army and the marines, without whom there can be no overseas intervention.)

Just as Pearl Harbor brought with it a massive and general shift in the foreign-policy orientation of the United States elite, so did Vietnam. Pearl Harbor and Vietnam were the points in time at which critics could say, "I told you so," and win widespread if grudging agreement from the old guard. The Pearl Harbor paradigm, applied for three decades to a world from which it was increasingly alienated, eventually was "shipwrecked" on Vietnam.

The Vietnam Paradigm

What follows? It is not difficult to discern an emerging noninterventionist orientation which can be termed the "Vietnam paradigm." Varying in emphasis and nuance, the bearers of the new view all urge *limitation* of American activity (above all, military activity) overseas, particularly in the Third World. John Kenneth Galbraith, for example, wants

> an even more positive commitment to coexistence with the Communist countries. It means a much more determined effort to get military competition with the Soviets under control. . . . It means abandoning the Sub-Imperial ambitions in the Third World and recognizing instead that there is little we can do to influence political development in this part of the world and less that we need to do.[40]

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., believes the "lessons of Vietnam" show:

> *First, that everything in the world is not of equal importance to us.* Asia and Africa are of vital importance for Asians and Africans . . . but they are not so important for us. . . .
>
> *Second, that we cannot do everything in the world.* The universalism of the older generation was spacious in design and noble in intent. Its flaw was that it overcommitted our country—it overcommitted our policy, our resources, and our rhetoric. . . .[41]

[39] The Nixon doctrine was first enunciated on Guam, July 25, 1969, to this effect. See *Public Papers of the Presidents*, Nixon, 1969, p. 552.

[40] John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Decline of American Powers," *Esquire*, March 1972, p. 163.

[41] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Vietnam and the End of the Age of Superpowers," *Harper's*, March 1969, p. 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The critics of only a few years ago might reflect with satisfaction on how much of their critique (not all, to be sure) has been absorbed by the Nixon doctrine.

A deluge of foreign-policy criticism has appeared in the last several years. If we were to boil down the new conventional wisdom and compare it with the old, it might look like this:[42]

Pearl Harbor Paradigm	Vietnam Paradigm
Communism is a monolithic threat.	Communism is a divided spastic.
If we don't intervene overseas we may get dragged into a war.	If we do intervene overseas we are sure to get into a war.
We must nip aggression in the bud.	We are not the world's policeman.
The dominoes are falling. Quick, let's do something!	The dominoes are falling. So what?
United States aid and technology will develop backward countries.	Backward countries will develop themselves or not at all.

The catastrophe that each generation experienced implanted viewpoints which, based on the importance for United States security accorded to overseas events, are flatly antithetical. Rational discussion between the two paradigms tends to be impossible, not for want of "facts" but for how they are structured. The structure, or paradigm, is imparted by a traumatic foreign-policy experience. Without such a trauma the inadequacies of the old paradigm might have gone unnoticed. Unfortunately, the indiscriminate application of one paradigm to increasingly changed circumstances tends to produce just that mishap. Given many interventions, it is likely that one will misfire. The adventures which do not misfire conspicuously—Lebanon, the Congo airlifts, Berlin, the Taiwan Straits, Santo Domingo—can be shrugged off or even used to justify continuing interventionism ("It worked there, didn't it?"). In this manner a foreign-policy paradigm actuates a built-in self-destruct mechanism: its eventual application *ad absurdum* by its elite generation.

The Foreign-Policy Paradigms of Yesteryear

Is the above a comparison of just the two most recent epochs in United States diplomatic history, or might the approach be extended backward

[42] Graham Allison came up with a similar, but longer, comparison of his foreign-policy "axioms" from interviews with more than 100 elite young Americans. Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," *Foreign Policy*, 1 (Winter 1970–1971), 150–154.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in time to validate the generational-paradigm approach as a more general tool of analysis? The author wishes to attempt the latter by dividing American foreign policy into periods on the basis of alternating interventionist and noninterventionist paradigms. To do this, it is necessary to ask how the elite of a given period answered Spykman's old question of where the defense of America should start—on the near or far side of the oceans. If the answer is "far," then the lands across the seas "matter" to United States security. If the answer is "near," the lands across the seas "do not matter" so much to the security of the United States. In the former case, we have an interventionist period; in the latter, we have a noninterventionist period.

Let us examine United States diplomatic history, looking at periods first in reverse chronology and then by functional categories. As previously stated, the bearers of the Pearl Harbor paradigm were themselves reacting to what they believed were the gross deficiencies of the interwar "isolationism." The 1920 to 1940 period can be called the "Versailles paradigm"; its bearers were condemned as blind for failing to recognize the obvious threat from abroad in 1939–1941. Who were these people? Prominent among them were Senators Borah, Hiram Johnson, Nye, and La Follette, the same "battalion of irreconcilables" who opposed the Versailles Treaty and League Covenant in 1919–1920.[43] For such persons World War II was a conflict the United States must and could—through rigorous application of the Neutrality Acts—avoid. Their great lesson was the aftermath of World War I, which, they believed, had achieved nothing: Europe stayed fractious and, even worse, refused to pay its war debts. American participation in that war had been a mistake. As with the Pearl Harbor paradigm, in their arguments self-interest and morality were intertwined. Versailles had been unfair to various nations (the demands of ethnic groups played a role here); the treaty enshrined the victors in positions of superiority; and the League of Nations' Covenant would then entangle America in the next European crisis. The depth of the interwar bitterness probably was not reached until the 1934–1936 Nye Committee hearings which, in part, sought to blame munitions manufacturers for United States involvement. Out of the Nye hearings grew the Neutrality Acts of 1935–1937. Like the Pearl Harbor paradigm, the Versailles paradigm seems also to have reached full flowering shortly before its demise, exaggerating its increasing irrelevance to the world situation.

It took the critics of the Versailles paradigm at least half a decade to dislodge it. The "isolationists" fought the growing interventionism ev-

[43] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913–1945* (New York, 1968), p. 260.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ery inch of the way. Strong emotions came to the surface. "I could scarcely proceed further without losing my self-control," wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull of a 1939 confrontation with Senator Borah in which the latter disparaged State Department cables on an impending war in Europe.[44] Other sources said that Hull actually wept at the meeting. It took the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor to squelch the obdurate bearers of the Versailles paradigm.

Was this Versailles paradigm a reaction to a previous orientation—an interventionist one? That there was a previous period, sometimes called imperialistic, from the 1890s extending into the next century, cannot to be doubted. The problem with labeling the period from 1898 (the Spanish-American War) through 1919 (the aftermath of World War I) an "imperial paradigm" is that the continuity of an interventionist policy between the two wars is not clear. With the Pearl Harbor paradigm we can show a consistent propensity for United States intervention over three decades, but with the 1898–1919 period we have interventions mostly clustered at the beginning and end. In 1898 the United States occupied Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Wake (and part of Samoa in 1899). Then, mostly relating to World War I, the United States occupied or had troops in Mexico, the Virgin Islands, France, and Russia. In between there were only the relatively minor Caribbean occupations. Thus, if this was an imperial paradigm, it sagged in the middle. It may be further objected that two distinct lines of thought accompanied respectively the beginning and end of this period. The earlier thinking favored unilateral colony grabbing, in recognition of the fact that the great European powers were carving up the globe and leaving America without colonies or areas of influence. The later thinking, accompanying World War I, was much more internationalistic, stressing cooperation rather than unilateralism. Some figures, like Senator Albert J. Beveridge, were imperialists at the turn of the century and isolationists about World War I.[45]

The author agrees that such an imperial paradigm is not nearly so consistent as the later interventionist epoch, the Pearl Harbor paradigm. Nonetheless there is a good deal of unity in the three decades of the 1890s, 1900s, and 1910s, and the period generally was an interventionistic one. In the first place, it was a time of almost continual United States naval growth. Starting with Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy's 1889 plans for a vast American fleet and pushed by Theodore Roosevelt

[44] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), Vol. 1, pp. 650–651.

[45] Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction* (New York, 1966), pp. 28–29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(both as assistant secretary of the navy and as president), the U. S. Navy rose from sixth to fourth place in 1900, to third place in 1906, and to second place (to Britain) in 1907. The naval budget went from $21 million in 1885, to $31 million in 1891, to $79 million in 1902, to $104 million in 1906, and to $137 million in 1909. Wilson, although initially cutting the naval budget somewhat, ended up with a $2.2 billion one in 1919.[46] In respect to naval expenditures then, the imperial paradigm did not "sag in the middle."

Further, although some of the foreign-policy elite of this period moved from unilateral imperialism at the turn of the century to equally unilateral withdrawal from Europe's war, there was also a good deal of consistency in positing a need for a major United States role abroad. Woodrow Wilson, for example, after some uncertainty, endorsed both the war with Spain and the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines. His motives, to be sure, differed from the imperialists; Wilson wanted to prepare Puerto Rico and the Philippines for self-government.[47] But we are less interested in motive than in general orientation, and in this Wilson was unmistakably an interventionist. Indeed, as president, Wilson "carried out more armed interventions in Latin America than any of his predecessors."[48] In 1898 the twenty-seven-year-old Cordell Hull even raised his own infantry company and went with his men as their captain to Cuba (although they requested the Philippines).[49] Liberalism by no means precludes interventionism, as Waltz has pointed out.[50]

We might even consider the imperial paradigm as a sort of training period for the senior staffers of the later Pearl Harbor paradigm: Congressman Hull as ardent Wilson supporter; Franklin D. Roosevelt as enthusiastic assistant secretary of the navy under Wilson; and Stimson as secretary of war under Taft. This helps explain why the Pearl Harbor period was not staffed exclusively by young converts to the growing interventionism of the late 1930s. There was on hand a much older age cohort who had internalized an interventionist framework some forty years earlier and who were eclipsed by the militant noninterventionism of the 1920s and 1930s. This group formed a countertrend subculture which sat out the interwar isolationism until called back into power for the higher positions during World War II. By the 1950s, however, they

[46] Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt*, pp. 8–9.

[47] Harley Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1965), pp. 106–129.

[48] Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of American People*, 8th ed. (New York, 1969), p. 553.

[49] Hull, *Memoirs*, pp. 33–36.

[50] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, 1959), pp. 95–114.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had mostly been replaced by the younger interventionists of the Kennedy generation.

Can we discern a period still further back out of which grew the imperial paradigm? The 1870s and 1880s are commonly considered the "nadir of diplomacy." The period was marked by massive indifference to overseas affairs, Anglophobia (over Britain's aid to the confederacy) preoccupation with filling out the presumably self-sufficient United States. We might, therefore, label this epoch the "continental paradigm." As with later periods, a minority critique starts in the middle of it on the strategic assumptions of the established orientation. In this case there was a growing strategic insecurity and the efforts of navalists—of whom Admiral Mahan was not the first—to rebuild the decrepit United States Navy. The year 1889 was a turning point; the Harrison administration began to discard the passive, inert policies which had characterized the previous two decades and to start actively making policy for the first time since the Civil War.[51] One need only compare the relatively weak American reactions to the bloodshed of the Cuba uprising of 1868–1878 to the much firmer stand of the 1890s.

It is not necessary to go further back than this. Our principal analytical distinctions—a near or far defense, interventionism or noninterventionism, few or many troops overseas—do not readily apply to nineteenth-century America. The United States was too busy, in a Turnerian sense, with filling out its own frontiers. Further, America had little to fear from Europe or Asia, especially with the British fleet ruling the waves.

Comparing Paradigms

While this division of United States diplomatic history into periods is admittedly an artificial construct, we can compare the periods, or the "paradigms" that accompany the periods. (This comparison is summarized in Table 1.) The concrete expression of an interventionist or noninterventionist view is the number of United States troops overseas. During the imperial and Pearl Harbor periods America had relatively many troops abroad, and they were abroad not merely because of World Wars I and II respectively. Long before our entry into World War I, there were American soldiers in Cuba, the Philippines, and throughout the Caribbean, including Mexico. During the intervening Versailles period the troops came home not only from Europe, but from the Caribbean as well. Only in Nicaragua and Haiti did United States occupation continue past the 1920s. The Philippines were lightly garrisoned and almost for-

[51] Robert L. Beisner, *From the Old to the New Diplomacy, 1865–1900* (New York, forthcoming 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Paradigms in Comparison

	Continental 1870s, 1880s	*Imperial* 1890s–1910s	*Versailles* 1920s, 1930s	*Pearl Harbor* 1940s–1960s	*Vietnam* 1970s–?
General view of foreign areas	"Don't matter"	"Matters"	"Don't matter"	"Matters"	"Don't matter"
View of Europe	Indifference (Anglophobia)	Imitation (Anglophilia)	Irritation	Salvation	Irritation
Losers		Antiimperialists	Wilsonian internationalists	Isolationists	Globalists
Troops overseas	Almost none	Carribbean, Philippines, China, West Europe, Russia, Mexico	Few in Caribbean, Philippines	Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa	Decreasing
Congress	Obstructive	Cooperative	Obstructive	Cooperative	Obstructive
Funds for overseas	None	War loans	Begrudging of war debts, anticancellationists, Johnson Act	Marshall Plan, Point Four, AID, arms-sales credits	Begrudging of aid, balance of payments force cutback
Commitments	None	Open Door, Caribbean protectorates, Associated Power in World War I, Philippine defense	Continued Open Door, reduction of Caribbean protectorates	U.N., NATO, SEATO, (CENTO), Congressional resolutions on Formosa, Middle East, Cuba, Berlin, Vietnam	Senate res. 85, War Powers Bill, attempt to repeal resolutions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gotten in the interwar period. During the Pearl Harbor period there were troops overseas not only during World War II but long after it. The United States foreign-policy elite during this time was disposed to consider an overseas defense as the only reasonable American strategy. With President Nixon, this strategy seems to be changing, and there are fewer troops overseas.

Much of United States foreign policy hinges on the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches of government. If the Congress follows the president's lead and delivers what he wants, the United States is then able to engage in interventionist moves. When the Congress, specifically the Senate, tires of such activity and starts resenting strong presidential leadership, the possibilities for intervention are reduced. We would therefore expect to find an assertive Congress during noninterventionist periods, particularly at the beginning of these periods. It is for this reason that we get dramatic showdowns between key senators and the president. Especially important is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, whose chairmen appear "irascible" and "contentious" when they engage in limiting executive initiatives in foreign affairs. Ranting Anglophobe Charles Sumner defeated President Grant's scheme to annex Santo Domingo in 1870. Henry Cabot Lodge (and William Borah) stopped America's entry into President Wilson's beloved League. J. William Fulbright (and Mike Mansfield) cut down President Nixon's foreign-aid program and tried to put the executive on a leash by means of the 1973 War Powers Bill.

There are also, to be sure, executive-legislative difficulties when the paradigm shifts the other way, from noninterventionist to interventionist, which are perhaps not quite as dramatic because in this case the congressional opponents are the "losers" (see below). From 1898 to 1900 there was the bitter but unsuccessful rear guard of those protesting the war with Spain and the Philippines annexation, such as George F. Hoar and George G. Vest in the Senate and Thomas B. Reed, speaker of the House.[52] In 1939 to 1941 there was a similar rear guard (discussed earlier), of those demanding United States neutrality. One characteristic of a paradigm shift in either direction, then, is a serious fight between the White House and Capitol Hill over who will have the upper hand in foreign policy. When the paradigm is established, conflict between the two branches subsides because there is relative consensus and the acquiescence of one branch to the other; a spirit of "cooperation" and "bipartisanship" then prevails.

The shift from one paradigm to another also involves a rather clearly

[52] Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900* (New York, 1968), pp. 139–164, 203–211.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

identifiable group of "losers"—those whose orientation is repudiated. This is not a happy process and much rancor accompanies the displacement of the bearers of the old pardigm and their consignment to obscurity. The antiimperialists of 1898–1900 sought to preserve a more limited, continental America. Their arguments—strategic, moral, constitutional, and economic—bear a striking resemblance to some of the arguments used to oppose the Vietnam war.[53] The antiimperialists were condemned by the interventionists of their day; Theodore Roosevelt called them "simply unhung traitors." The losers of twenty years later, the Wilsonian internationalists, also did not go down without a vituperative fight. The isolationists were the clear and unhappy losers as the Pearl Harbor paradigm replaced the Versailles paradigm. One is not yet certain what to call the present crop of losers, but perhaps "globalists" is a label that will stick.[54] Those who defend the dying paradigm appear as obdurate fools who are unable to come to grips with the new realities and who must therefore be ignored. The losers, who stick with the old paradigm while the new one triumphs, gradually cease to be practitioners.

Another characteristic of noninterventionist periods is the begrudging to friends and allies of United States aid, which flowed rather freely during the preceding interventionist period. The failure of the European powers to pay their World War I debts created both a public and congressional furor in the 1920s and culminated in the 1934 Johnson Act prohibiting debtor nations from raising funds in the United States. The "anticancellationists" helped spread the feeling that America had been cheated by tricky and unreliable ex-partners. In the late 1960s a critique of United States foreign aid developed along similar lines: billions have been wasted; they'll never be repaid; we've been much too generous; the recipients are ungrateful; etc. The interesting point here is that the critique came not only from conservatives, but from liberals who previously spoke in favor of foreign aid.

Arms and munitions appear as a minor but interesting point in noninterventionist periods. Arms sales abroad are viewed with great suspicion, as a possible avenue by which the country could get dragged into foreign wars. The Nye Committee hearings and the ensuing Neutrality Acts in the 1930s were attempts to prevent a repetition of America's gradual entanglement in another European war. It can be argued that pre-

[53] Robert L. Beisner, "1898 and 1968: The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXV, no. 2 (June 1970).

[54] See, for example, Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 1938–1970* (Baltimore, 1971); and Gary Porter, "Globalism—The Ideology of Total World Involvement," in Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (eds.), *The Vietnam Reader* (New York, 1965), pp. 322–327.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cisely such an entanglement was repeated under Roosevelt with "cash and carry," Lend Lease, and the destroyers-for-bases deal with Britain. It indeed led to de facto war in the North Atlantic between the United States and Germany months before Pearl Harbor. But, it is interesting to note, in the interventionist Pearl Harbor period there was practically no regret that the Neutrality Acts had thus been circumvented. The problem of arms sales again flared as the Pearl Harbor paradigm came under question. As a result of a 1967 Senate debate, arms sales by means of Export-Import Bank financing and Pentagon loan guarantees were stopped. Nixon's program to supply military hardware instead of United States troops was severely trimmed in the Senate.

The movement away from interventionism seems also to include the congressional and popular scapegoating of manufacturers of munitions. While Senator Nye had his "merchants of death," Senator Proxmire has his "military-industrial complex." In both cases it was alleged that armaments programs take on a life of their own and weapons makers manipulate public spending to their own advantage. The Nye Committee even "began to attack the warmaking potential of the executive branch of the government," records Wayne Cole, and "also began to see the President as part of the compound."[55]

In interventionist periods there is a willingness to enter into arrangements that pledge the country to military action overseas. Admittedly, this was slow in coming during World War I which the United States entered belatedly and only as an "associate" of the Entente. During the Pearl Harbor period, however, the United States carpeted the globe with commitments.

Following these times of generous pledges have come periods of limiting or discarding commitments. In addition to the already-mentioned League rejection and the Neutrality Acts there was the interesting Ludlow Amendment (shelved in the House in 1937 by a vote of 209–188) to require a national referendum to declare war except for actual invasion. As the Vietnam paradigm took hold there was the National Commitments Resolution (without force of law) in 1969 expressing the sense of the Senate that America should fulfill no commitment without specific legislation. In 1973 a War Powers Bill to permit the president only ninety days to use troops abroad without additional legislation overrode Nixon's veto. Further conflict over commitments seemed inevitable as Senator Mansfield continued his efforts to prune United States forces in Europe.

On a more general level, in the noninterventionist periods there is a

[55] Wayne S. Cole, *An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations* (Homewood, Ill., 1968), p. 443.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lessened interest in Europe and in the interventionist periods a heightened interest. During the Continental period there was aloof indifference to Europe buttressed by a sharp Anglophobia in the wake of Britain's aid to the Confederacy. As American leaders adopted imperial views there was an imitation of Europe (colony grabbing) and some cooperation, as in the Peking expedition in 1900. There was also a marked Anglophilia starting in the Spanish-American War. After Versailles there was disgust at European greed and squabbling and regret that America had ever become involved in Europe's war. During the Pearl Harbor period there was the virtual United States occupation of West Europe and an almost crusading American involvement in European recovery, rearmament, and unification. By the early 1970s the devalued dollar and pressure to withdraw our forces marked the beginning of a diminished American role in Europe, a trend that was heightened in 1973 and 1974 by differing United States and European approaches to the Middle East and the petroleum shortage. Again the view surfaced that the Europeans were selfish and hopelessly fractious.

On a more general level still, in the noninterventionist periods the lands abroad "do not matter" much to the United States elite; in the interventionist periods foreign lands "matter" a great deal. (Professors in foreign-area and international studies, as well as of foreign languages, have recently noticed the former view among students.) We may also note that the last three periods each began with a catastrophe of overseas origin. Versailles appeared to demonstrate that American participation in a European war had been futile and a profound mistake. Pearl Harbor appeared to demonstrate that the interwar "isolationism" had been absurd and had led to a disaster. And Vietnam appeared to demonstrate that the long-standing interventionist policy had been "wrong" and had led to a disaster.

Cyclical Theories Revisited

This approach to diplomatic history, of course, is not completely new or unique. Several writers have advanced views that United States foreign policy tends to swing like a pendulum (an image used by both President Nixon and Senator Fulbright) from extremes of overinvolvement to underinvolvement. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, discerned "the two *tempi* of America's foreign relations," alternating "from phrases of withdrawal (or, when complete withdrawal is impossible, priority to domestic concerns) to phases of dynamic, almost messianic romping on the world stage."[56] Hans Morgenthau saw United States policy mov-

[56] Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1969), p. 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing "back and forth between the extremes of an indiscriminate isolationism and an equally indiscriminate internationalism or globalism."[57]

Getting more specific, historian Dexter Perkins divided American foreign relations into cycles of "relatively pacific feeling," followed by "rising bellicosity and war," followed by "postwar nationalism," and then back to "relatively pacific feeling."[58] Getting even more specific, a behaviorally inclined political scientist, Frank L. Klingberg, using such indicators as naval expenditures, annexations, armed expeditions, diplomatic pressures, and attention paid to foreign matters in presidential speeches and party platforms, discovered alternating phases of "introversion" (averaging twenty-one years) and "extroversion" (averaging twenty-seven years). Klingberg added: "If America's fourth phase of extroversion (which began around 1940) should last as long as the previous extrovert phases, it would not end until well into the 1960's."[59] As social scientists, of course, we do not accept the notion that God plays numbers games with United States foreign policy. The most fruitful approach to this cyclical phenomenon, the author believes, is the generationally linked paradigm, which helps explain both the changes in orientation and their spacing in time.

Other writers have found a roughly generational interval of about twenty-five years between upsurges of world violence. (Klingberg too mentioned generations as one possible explanation for his foreign-policy cycles.) Denton and Phillips suggest what we might term a "forgetting" theory to explain their twenty-five-year cycles of violence: That generation, and particularly its decision makers, that experienced an intensive war, tends to remember its horrors and avoid similar conflicts. The following generation of decision makers may forget the horrors and remember the heroism; this generation is more likely to engage in violence.[60] This explanation helps account for our Versailles paradigm, but it is flatly at odds with our Pearl Harbor paradigm, during which a generation, virtually all of whom experienced World War II first hand, displayed little reluctance to apply force overseas. This generation was of course repelled by the violence of World War II, but used it to explain why aggression must be "nipped in the bud" to prevent another large

[57] Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States* (New York, 1969), p. 15.

[58] Dexter Perkins, *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 146–147.

[59] Frank L. Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, IV (January 1952).

[60] Frank H. Denton and Warren Phillips, "Some Patterns in the History of Violence, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XII (June 1968), 193.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conflagration. Walt Rostow, for example, continued to insist that Vietnam *prevented* a large war. "If we had walked away from Asia or if we walk away from Asia now, the consequences will not be peace," said Rostow in 1971. "The consequence will be a larger war and quite possibly a nuclear war."[61]

This author subscribes to a cyclical theory of United States foreign policy only in the most general terms—namely, that if there are alternating orientations of interventionism and noninterventionism then logically the former will produce more "action" and this will show up as intermittent peaks in statistical tabulations. The question of cycles falls behind the question of the conventional wisdom of foreign-policy thinkers.

In searching for explanations of any cyclical theory, of course, we cannot rule out purely external factors such as threats or challenges from abroad. It may be that such external forces have impinged upon the United States at roughly generational intervals and that we have merely reacted to them. This then dumps the generation question onto the offending land across the sea. The problem here is that during one epoch American foreign-policy thinkers may largely ignore threats and in another epoch they may take threats very seriously. As we have already considered, the Cuban uprising of the 1870s elicited relatively little response from the United States compared to our response to the Cuban uprising of the 1890s. America paid little attention to East Europe in the 1930s and a great deal of attention in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1948 the Soviet-Yugoslav split was seen as an anomaly; in the 1970s the Sino-Soviet dispute is seen as natural, the almost inevitable collision of two nationalisms. *Quisquid recipitur recipitur secundum modum recipiensis.* The world changes, of course, but it takes a changed set of American attitudes to perceive the new situation.

The problem is one of perception catching up with reality not on a continual and incremental basis, but delayed and in spurts. May we hazard that Vietnam will leave behind it a continuation of this pattern? The immediate impact of Vietnam on United States foreign policy is already apparent: the Senate's restorative revolt, demoralized armed forces, international economic difficulties, and skeptical allies. The longer-term effects may be far deeper. If the above generational-paradigm hypothesis is even approximately correct, we can expect persons who witnessed Vietnam while they were in their twenties to retain a noninterventionist orientation. As the elite of this generation gradually surfaces into policy-relevant positions, we can expect them to implement their views. The most important reactions to Vietnam, then, may be yet to come. We

[61] *Washington Post*, July 12, 1971, p. A14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might remember in this regard that the depths of interwar isolationism did not come immediately after Versailles but, rather, a full decade and a half later, with the Neutrality Acts. Will the foreign-policy elite of the 1980s and 1990s still be slaying their long-dead foes?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congress and National Science Policy

SANFORD A. LAKOFF

The recent efforts by Congress to reassert some of its constitutional prerogatives, which began with the reaction against involvement in Vietnam and continues in the wake of the Watergate affair, have made the role of the legislative branch a more lively issue than it has been at perhaps any other time in this century. The degree of legislative involvement affects many areas of government policy, including the complex of issues and activities that together make up "science policy." The role of Congress in setting and maintaining science policy has never been very well defined or delimited. Congressional influence has often been felt in specific cases, such as the development of atomic energy, the Apollo project, and controversial and expensive weapons systems. In general, however, the pattern and direction of federally supported research and development has been set in the executive branch and embodied in the budget presented annually to Congress.

As the deployment of scientific resources becomes a critical instrument of government in virtually every area of public concern, science policy has come to be regarded as one of the vital levers of social action. For this reason, it is entirely possible that Congress may take advantage of the present climate of political uncertainty to try to assert more authority in this area of public policy than it has had either the will or the opportunity to do since the end of World War II.

SANFORD A. LAKOFF, currently at the University of Toronto, will shortly become chairman of a new department of political science at the University of California, San Diego. He is the author (with J. S. Dupré) of *Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics* and editor of *Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Opportunities for Increased Congressional Influence

In at least two respects, conditions for improvement are propitious. First, the executive apparatus for setting science policy, laboriously built up since the sputnik crisis of 1957, has been dislodged and dismembered, though not destroyed. In the aftermath of that crisis, President Eisenhower made two moves aimed at improving the links between the White House and the nation's scientists. At the suggestion of James R. Killian, Jr., he created the post of special assistant to the president for science and technology. Along with it, he created the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), to which he appointed leading nongovernment scientists, mainly from the universities. In time, a third element was put in place when the staff which served both the special assistant and PSAC was converted by a reorganization plan into the Office of Science and Technology (OST). In 1973, however, President Nixon decided to abolish both PSAC and OST and to replace the special assistant with a science adviser located in the National Science Foundation (NSF) rather than in the White House. In place of OST, a new Science and Technology Policy Office (STPO) has been created within the NSF.

The relocation of the science-policy apparatus not only deprives its directors of a relatively exalted place in the executive hierarchy but also of whatever small degree their predecessors could claim of that precious quality known in Washington as political "clout." In theory, the special assistant and PSAC had direct access to the president, and in practice the staff offices of OST were located in the Executive Office Building along with the president's other advisers and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The new STPO reports only indirectly to the president, is housed with the other offices of the NSF, and must attempt to influence the activities of other agencies of government from a notch in the bureaucratic hierarchy considerably lower than that occupied by OST.

The termination of PSAC cuts even the tenuous connection to the presidency previously enjoyed by the leaders of the scientific community. For the past several years, moreover, many of these same leaders have found Congress more receptive than the executive on such matters as arms control and the ABM issue. In a limited but significant sense, therefore, a power vacuum has been created in science policy. It is conceivable that Congress may now seek to enter that vacuum, as part of a larger effort to challenge the expansion of executive power and to recover some of the ground the legislative branch had lost.

The second reason for anticipating an increase of congressional concern with science policy has to do with the well-known sensitivity of members of the legislative branch to shifts in public opinion. A few years ago, when there was considerable popular frustration over some of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the uses to which science had been put, as well as the unforeseen social and environmental problems brought about by the introduction of new technology, congressmen were apt to be sympathetic to the charge that science was more a part of the problem than of the solution. Now, however, with the energy shortage causing hardships, and with the association between research and the so-called military-industrial complex somewhat attenuated, there is reason to think that congressmen and their constituents will once again seek counsel and practical help from scientists and engineers.

Several signs clearly indicate serious congressional interest in asserting more control over science policy. In both houses, proposals have appeared calling for the declaration of a statutory national science policy, coupled with appropriate administrative machinery. One of these proposals, Senate Bill 32, passed the Senate by a margin of 70 to 8 late in 1972, but failed to reach the floor of the House. Nevertheless, this particular bill may have served its purpose—to warn the administration to do something about the deteriorating state of nonmilitary research or else Congress would take the initiative. In its proposed 1975 budget, the administration recommended an increase in appropriations for civil research of 20 percent over the previous year's expenditures. This will probably be enough to appease the present Congress, but it is not out of the question, if the November elections should produce a harvest of new Democratic seats, that S. 32 will be revived and passed, given the proclivity of liberal Democrats for declared commitments and positive action by the federal government.

Congress has already taken one potentially important step, which in itself could well be considered positive action, in creating a congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). Technology assessment, in the words of the first director of the new agency, former Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario, is supposed to provide an "early warning system to protect man against his own inventions." The new office was established after many congressmen had come to feel a need for expert guidance in considering such new departures as the proposal to subsidize development of a supersonic civilian airliner. OTA presumably would identify likely new technological opportunities and investigate them to determine both benefits and costs, including the external costs that usually are neglected by their promoters but in the end must be borne by the public.[1]

Other developments may also affect the ability of Congress to pronounce on matters of science policy. These include the reorganization proposals which have now been tabled by a Select Committee on Com-

[1] Anne H. Cahn and Joel Primack, "Technological Foresight for Congress," *Technology Review* (March/April 1973), 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mittees in the House and the recently adopted Budget Reform Act of 1974 designed to enhance congressional influence over the budgetary process, even to the extent of creating a new legislative office to serve as a counterpart of the executive's budget agency.

Are these developments likely to coalesce to the extent that they will enable Congress to define and develop a lasting role in science policy? To answer this question we need to consider what role Congress has actually played in relation to science policy and then to consider whether, in view of the formidable obstacles to the reversal of the recent tendency toward the accretion of executive power, these new opportunities are likely to prove meaningful or largely illusory.

Congress' Past Record

Since the turn of the century, when the United States first began to assume a role as a world power, the presidency has become the focal point of popular demands for action in one area after another. To be able to respond to these demands, the president had to be provided with the capacity to control his own expanding administration. Minimally, this required that the president be in a position to set the legislative agenda, submit a budget reflecting his view of national priorities, and use his appointive power to assure compliance with his policies. Congress became the instrument, however reluctantly, through which much of the president's control was established and maintained. On the whole, the activities of Congress with respect to science policy serve to illustrate this general tendency.

Indeed, an unsympathetic critic reviewing the performance of Congress in connection with science policy might well decide that in this area as in others, Congress has been suffering from a kind of constitutional amnesia. In fairness, it should be noted that at least one disinterested appraisal does not reach such a negative conclusion. In its 1968 review of the American effort to cope with the challenges posed by advances in science and technology, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found reason to praise the achievements of the legislative branch. Congress, the OECD report declared, "has gone further than any other Parliament in seeking to respond to these challenges by equipping itself with a new set of bodies, most of which have brilliantly performed the role assigned to them by taking advantage of the instruments made available to them by Congressional institutions." In particular, the report singled out the accomplishments of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, citing an American study

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rating it as "probably the most powerful Congressional Committee in the history of the nation."[2]

In 1966, when the OECD examiners made their inquiry, the American way of managing and supporting science was still considered the best in the world. The "American model" had become a standard for worldwide emulation. Because the United States was devoting 3 percent of its gross national product to research and development, this became a target figure everywhere else. The high ratio of support allotted to development in the United States was thought to be responsible for America's ever-increasing lead in high-technology industry, and more often than not, the fact that the bulk of this expenditure had only indirect and sometimes distorting effects on the civilian sector of the economy went unnoticed.[3] The key to America's success was thought to be its political, economic, and institutional pluralism, which encouraged a wholesome competition in scientific creativity and technical inventiveness, as opposed to the stultification that plagued more highly centralized systems. The American legislature, standing free of the executive, and organized internally so as to allow for a decentralized examination of the particular aspects of science policy, seemed a perfect illustration of this dynamic pluralism at work.

The role of Congress must have seemed all the more impressive when contrasted to the role of parliaments in systems of government where the separation of powers is not the constitutional norm. Set alongside the inherently limited role open to parliamentary bodies in which the center of gravity is anchored firmly in the cabinet and the leadership of the party in power, the performance by Congress of even a modest proportion of its potential constitutional authority was bound to seem relatively significant.

The OECD appraisal points up one of the fundamental dilemmas in any assessment of the role of Congress in general, and with respect to science policy in particular. Congress actually is assigned two different and sometimes contradictory roles in the American scheme of government. One of these is to share in the setting of public policy, a function which it performs by exercising its power to legislate and appropriate. The other is to check the executive by seeing that the president and the

[2] OECD, *Reviews of National Science Policy: United States* (Paris, 1968), pp. 86–87. The comment on the JCCAE is from Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, *Government of the Atom* (New York, 1963), p. 226.

[3] For a fuller discussion of the impact of the American model, see Sanford A. Lakoff, "The Vicissitudes of American Science Policy at Home and Abroad," *Minerva*, XI, no. 2, (April 1973), 175–190.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agencies for which he is responsible follow the legislative mandate of Congress and do not administer the laws in an arbitrary, partial, or corrupt way. Congress does this by invoking its authority to interrogate administrators and to investigate allegations of wrongdoing and partiality. To appraise the performance of Congress in terms of its role in the American system, rather than in comparison with the role played by other legislative bodies operating according to a completely different constitutional principle, it is necessary to ask how well both of these functions actually are performed.

The case of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy is a good example of how an overemphasis of one function can lead to an atrophy of the other, but the problem it illustrates is widespread. It is a common tendency for congressional committees to develop close relationships with the executive agencies they are supposed to oversee. The Joint Committee is so closely involved in the day-to-day management of the Atomic Energy Commission that Congressman Melvin Price, the present committee chairman, once described it as a kind of board of directors for the AEC.[4] Even in the early years of the committee's existence, Senator Henry M. Jackson went still further, observing that in the field of atomic energy, "the Committee made the decisions, with the advice and consent of the executive branch."[5]

Behind the pluralistic façade, in other words, lies the reality of an arrangement whereby members of the legislature have been virtually coopted into the executive. This arrangement has enabled the committee to exert very strong, even determining influence in the development of atomic weapons and atomic power, and it has also made it a target of criticism from opponents of AEC policies who point out that the intimacy of the committee and the commission makes the former less the AEC's congressional watchdog than its "Siamese twin," as Ralph Nader has called it.[6] The result, the critics contend, is that instead of reviewing and monitoring the AEC's behavior, the committee is always ready to defend it from attack, whether against those who find its standards for radiation safety inadequate or those who question its encouragement of duopoly in the industrial development of atomic power.[7]

[4] Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 91st Congress, second session, *Toward a Science Policy for the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 109 n.

[5] Henry M. Jackson, "Congress and the Atom," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (November 1953), 76. Cited in Harold Orlans, *Contracting for Atoms* (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 161.

[6] Testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1974.

[7] For such criticism see H. Peter Metzger, *The Atomic Establishment* (New York, 1972); and Richard S. Lewis, *The Nuclear Power Rebellion* (New York, 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Critics of the way Congress works have often complained that such relationships vitiate the intention behind the separation of powers. The committees acquire an overly protective interest in the agencies and so long as the administrators take care to mend their fences on Capitol Hill, they can expect to be defended against any drastic budget cuts the president may seek to impose and against reorganization efforts which could weaken or eliminate the agency. The more narrow the jurisdiction of the committee, or the more its role is to supervise a particularly important agency, the more threatening such assaults are likely to be viewed by the members of the committee, for they come to feel that their own status and power are tied to the fortunes of the agencies they supervise. In the postwar struggle over unification of the military services, for example, the House and Senate Naval Affairs Committees were as protective of the organizational position of the navy in the proposed unified Defense Department structure as were the admirals and the Navy Department civilian officials such as Secretary James Forrestal.[8] On the other hand, it is easier for a committee to influence policy if it develops the kind of specialized expertise the members of the Joint Committee have acquired because of their unique access to the AEC.

Nor is this the only difficulty the committee system poses for the ability of Congress as a whole to fulfill its two major functions. Another problem is that the very diffusion of responsibilities among the committees and their powerful chairmen, which appears to have so impressed the OECD examiners, hinders Congress from performing a role as a corporate body, whether as partner or critic of the executive. The fragmentation of responsibility among committees and subcommittees results in such a wide distribution of the law-making and overseeing functions that the strings cannot be drawn together very easily.

With respect to science policy, the result is that Congress has taken no position whatever, either constructive or critical, except insofar as it is called upon to endorse the work of the committees. Since concern for science and technology is parceled out to the committees—and is in most cases only an incidental concern—there is no practical way for Congress as a body to make comparative judgments or to become involved with imbalances. Instead, some projects flourish while others languish, and in general the fate of particular projects requiring large-scale support is determined not in some comprehensive assessment but in accordance with the specific policy concerns of the committees and of powerful individual members of Congress. The fact that the United States had not even begun to pursue a broad program of research on energy until it was seized

[8] See Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification* (New York, 1966), especially chap. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by an "energy crisis" is due not simply to a general lack of foresight in government; it also is due partially to the fact that the only committee assigned a primary concern for energy is the one devoted to a particular kind of energy, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. Nor is it wholly in response to the "felt needs" of the electorate that Congress should authorize billions for a space shuttle but only a pittance for mass transit. There is a Committee on Science and Astronautics in the House and on Aeronautical and Space Sciences in the Senate, but none with a comprehensive responsibility for all transportation technologies.

Congressional Initiatives: The Problem of Particularism

It would not be correct to conclude that Congress has taken no initiatives in science policy; however, the initiatives that have been taken usually have been in isolated cases rather than in some broad comparative context. Certain highlights stand out in the record. In the immediate postwar period, Congress did not simply put into law the proposals for the control of atomic energy advanced by the president. Under the leadership of Senator Brian McMahon, Congress made its own inquiry, listened to the views of the scientists who had been associated with the Manhattan Project and wrote its independent conclusions into the Atomic Energy Act. Years of debate and deadlock preceded the creation in 1950 of the National Science Foundation, which also bore the stamp of congressional scrutiny and compromise, not to mention congressional hostility and suspicion. During the cold war paranoia of the 1950s, Congress may not have exercised a particularly benevolent role with respect to science and scientists, but it certainly made its views felt on the subjects of loyalty and security in government-sponsored research, ignoring the scientists' complaint that an obsession with negative security was counterproductive because it undermined the positive security that could come only from the encouragement of researchers. But the same Congresses which demoralized and alienated some scientists encouraged and supported others, notably by endorsing Edward Teller's crash program to develop the hydrogen bomb and Admiral Hyman Rickover's preference for nuclear-powered submarines over conventional naval vessels.

The record is replete with other examples of specific initiatives. In certain areas of health research, especially in connection with diseases likely to affect people of their own age, congressmen have been known to vote more financial support than the agencies have requested. During the "sputnik crisis," it was Congress, under the leadership of then Senator Lyndon Johnson, which took the initiative in creating the space program at a time when the administration was more anxious to balance the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

budget than to compete with the Russians in a contest that one official derided as a "celestial basketball game." The Space Act, as George Reedy has observed, "was one of the few examples in the last forty years of a major statute originating on the Hill rather than in the White House."[9] The role of a bipartisan group of mid-western congressmen in overcoming President Johnson's reluctance to approve plans for the 200-BEV accelerator, now located in Illinois, is well documented.[10] More recently, Congress has played an important role in the debate over the antiballistic-missile program and in the rejection of the proposal to subsidize development of the supersonic airliner. In adopting the Mansfield Amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1970 (which prohibits the military services from supporting research unless it is directly relevant to a "service mission"), Congress responded to the objections of academic critics to the channeling of funds for basic research through the defense agencies. Typically, however, Congress did not at the same time direct that these funds be reassigned to the NSF and other nonmilitary agencies. The result was that in answering one need it created another.

Compensating for Structural Weaknesses

No one reviewing this record would be justified in concluding that Congress has been entirely subservient to the executive in matters involving science and technology. Clearly, the weakness in congressional efforts has been the failure to develop and maintain a continuous, comprehensive, and internally consistent approach to the variety of elements that make up science policy. Because the Congress is a far less unified branch then the executive, which is itself fragmented to no small extent, it cannot easily develop such a comprehensive perspective. The difficulties that confront a president in developing and imposing a single set of national policies are easier to overcome than those facing Congress. The president can formulate his objectives and take steps to assure that they are observed by the agencies his appointees direct. With the considerable help of the Office of Management and Budget, he can expect to maintain a reasonable degree of control and integration, especially by the level of funding he assigns to different programs in his annual budget. Since he is usually in office for a fixed term, and possibly for as long as two terms,

[9] George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York, 1970), p. 54.

[10] See Daniel S. Greenberg, *The Politics of Pure Research* (New York, 1967), pp. 207–265; and Allan Rosenbaum, "Decisionmaking, Expertise, and the Processes of Federal Policy Formation: The Atomic Energy Commission, Congress and the National Accelerator Laboratory," forthcoming in Sage Professional Papers in Policy and Administration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the president can set relatively long-range objectives. Because he and his staff have direct access to information from the agencies, they need not be handicapped by ignorance of the real conditions as the agencies perceive them.

Congress, on the other hand, has no effective way of integrating the work of its committees. The legislation and appropriations arrived at during the legislative session are inevitably the work of many hands. In effect, the results seal the bargains among interests, regions, and powerful legislators. Unlike the policies set down by the executive, they do not reflect a single point of view or a single source of responsibility. To be sure, interest groups often exert pressure on the executive as well, and there is a certain amount of "horse trading" among the agencies, but at least the presidency provides a single focus of authority—from which ultimate decisions can emanate, and to which appeals can be carried. There is no such single focus in either house of Congress. Budgetary responsibility is divided among the appropriations committees and the authorization committees, and is split off from the legislative authority of the substantive committees. Although powerful appropriations committees in each house must assemble the budget, neither of them can give it the detailed and informed scrutiny the OMB imposes in reviewing agency submissions.

The only committee with a general responsibility for examining expenditures is the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, but it is not authorized to exercise any controlling influence over the powerful appropriations committees in both houses. In contrast to the ability of the executive to conceive of long-term program objectives, Congress is virtually a prisoner of the annual budget cycle. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of research projects, which usually require long-term commitments and are sensitive to sharp fluctuations in funding. As Philip Handler, president of the National Academy of Sciences, has rightly pointed out, "There is no relation between the useful life of a laboratory or scientific project and the time required for the Earth to complete one orbit around the sun."[11] Far from having the easy access of the executive to information, Congress has to pry information loose whenever the agencies suspect it may be used against them. When the president cloaks the activities of his staff with the mantle of executive privilege, inquisitive congressmen must rely on informal briefings or leaks that may or may not yield genuine information.

There are also other reasons why it is virtually impossible for congressmen to devote themselves to the determination of any broad national interest in the fullest and most objective sense. Congressmen are bound

[11] Quoted in *Toward a Science Policy for the United States*, p. 37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be especially sensitive to the interests and needs of their particular constituencies. Not only does this color their perception of the public welfare, but it also forces them to spend a good deal of their time providing services to constituents.

No group is more aware of all these difficulties than congressmen themselves. Some seem to have concluded that the best way they can influence the framing of public policy is not so much by making policy as by improving the decision-making system in the executive branch. This tendency was expressed with rare clarity as it pertains to science policy in an exchange between Congressman Ken Hechler and the last director of OST, Edward David, Jr., during a hearing to consider the president's reorganization plan abolishing the office. Dr. David warned that governments are inevitably tempted to concern themselves with short-run returns rather than with the long-term strength of scientific and educational institutions. Congress, he added, ought to be apprehensive about what might happen to these long-term considerations now that the functions of OST were to be transferred to the STPO in the NSF. Congress, and in particular the committee before which he was testifying, might well wish to monitor the activities of the new office, he said, to make sure that these interests were well served. Congressman Hechler responded:

> You are very charitable in using the word "monitor." We have the power of suggesting, occasionally, and we pass legislation, which results frequently in impoundments when there's a philosophic difference with what we do. I think you're attributing a great deal of power to this committee when you say we are to monitor this situation. *What the committee wants to do is to try to see that the structure is sound in the first place so that we don't have to spend all our time monitoring it.*[12]

The idea that the best way for Congress to influence the executive is by concerning itself with organization has the endorsement of at least one leading student of Congress. James A. Robinson even urges that Congress "concentrate on finding organizational devices to encourage the Executive to plan ahead in such a way as to represent the kind of values Congress favors."[13]

Critics of the "imperial presidency" may consider this advice a counsel of abdication, but they might bear in mind that Congress has found it difficult thus far to do even this much. In practice, Congress has de-

[12] House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Hearings, *Federal Policy, Plans, and Organization for Science and Technology* (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 143. Emphasis added.

[13] James A Robinson, "Decision Making in Congress," in Alfred de Grazia (ed.), *Congress: The First Branch* (Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 292.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ferred to the wishes of the president at every stage in the organization and reorganization of the administrative structure for science policy. By presidential decision, the post of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology was established within the executive branch in 1957, followed shortly afterward by the appointment of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). Congress had no direct role in either decision. In 1962, in what was described at the time as a move designed to give more permanent status to the role of the science adviser and his staff, the Office of Science and Technology was established within the executive branch. Although this was done at least partly in deference to the congressional desire to be able to summon the science adviser to testify, it was accomplished by a presidential reorganization plan. In 1973, in accordance with the principle that what the president can create he can also destroy, the office was abolished by another reorganization plan. The use of this device is another of the techniques developed by presidents to bypass Congress, or at least to reverse the ordinary legislative process. In using this procedure, as Michael Reagan has pointed out, the president "does not just *propose* a statutory change in administrative organization, but he *declares* that the change and his decision become law without further legislative approval. Only if Congress (currently, a majority of either house of Congress) disapproves and vetoes the President's action does it fail to become law. Thus the burden of proof is shifted. . . ."[14]

Venturesome committees which have shown a serious interest in fundamental issues of science policy have not been taken altogether seriously by their congressional colleagues, as is illustrated by the fate of the Subcommittee on Government Research of the Senate Committee on Government Organization. Chaired by Senator Fred Harris, this subcommittee was appointed in 1966 and spent a busy three years reviewing and analyzing some of the most important questions affecting the government's programs in science and technology. Valuable reports were produced on a number of issues, including the payment of indirect costs in sponsored research, the usefulness of social indicators, and the future of biomedical research. The subcommittee deliberately "chose to serve as a forum of debate and to encourage the discussion of high level policy issues with profound moral and social implications. . . . The main intention was to discuss the long-term implications of scientific research with those who came before the Committee." In 1969, this subcommittee was disbanded, ostensibly as a result of a decision to economize, but also because the

[14] Michael D. Reagan, "Toward Improving Presidential Level Planning," reprinted in Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg (eds.), *The Presidential Advisory System* (New York, 1969), p. 267.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Senate had lost interest in science policy,[15] and because Senator Harris had become unpopular with the senatorial establishment. Alternatively, we may explain its demise as a result of the inability or unwillingness of either its parent committee, or Congress as a whole, to make use of its findings.

Another case in point is provided by the experience of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the House Science and Astronautics Committee. Under the leadership of Representative Daddario, this equally active subcommittee produced a series of major proposals in 1971.[16] The subcommittee recommended that Congress formally enact a National Science Policy, to be drafted by a special task force, as a matter of statutory law. In addition, the subcommittee proposed that OST be upgraded so that it would no longer serve merely as the staff for the science adviser, PSAC, and the Federal Council for Science and Technology (FCST). Instead it was to be given the responsibility for formulating science policy, under the broad terms of the new statute, and of monitoring the activities of the federal agencies in all appropriate areas. It was also to prepare an annual report on the scientific state of the nation. In the same report, the subcommittee endorsed the proposal, which had been approved after much detailed consideration, for a National Institute for Research and Advanced Studies (NIRAS) to encompass the NSF. None of these proposals was acted upon, in part because Congressman Daddario vacated his seat in the House, but also because the committee's recommendations do not carry great weight compared to proposals from other more powerful committees.

Significantly, the one recommendation which has come to fruition is the proposal for a congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Congress, it would seem, cannot foist a scheme of executive organization on an unwilling president, but it can reorganize itself to improve its own ability to contend with executive policy proposals. The same motive led earlier to the establishment of the Science Policy Research Division in the Congressional Reference Service (CRS), which was created to answer the common complaint of congressmen and their staffs that they were unable to cope with many of the technical issues that came before them. Both the CRS and the General Accounting Office (GAO), the other external arm of the legislature, have been specifically requested to provide not only information but "policy analysis" as well. Congress has also called upon the help of the National Academies of Science and Engineering, a development which, if expanded, could vastly improve the con-

[15] Dennis W. Brezina, "Rise and Demise of the Senate Subcommittee on Government Research," *Federation Proceedings*, 29, no. 5 (September–October 1970), 1829.

[16] *Toward a National Science Policy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gressional capacity to act with more confidence in areas requiring scientific expertise. The new Office of Technology Assessment will add another important resource. The preamble of the act establishing OTA stresses the need for Congress to obtain "timely and unbiased" information from a source "independent" of the executive agencies;[17] it is clear from the language that the intention behind the establishment of OTA is to reduce the need for congressmen to rely upon the administrators and industrial lobbyists, who are usually more anxious to stress the benefits than the costs of the innovations they are promoting, for information on new technologies. It remains to be seen whether the new agency will be permitted to tackle highly controversial issues or whether, as skeptics anticipate, it will be compelled, in order to survive, to perform studies which will not risk offending powerful interests or competing with the investigative jurisdictions already well staked out by congressional committees.

Internal reorganization may soon be taken still further in the House, where consideration will shortly be given to a set of reorganization proposals drafted by a Select Committee on Committees, chaired by Representative Richard Bolling.[18] The draft report contains four recommendations which could enhance the ability of the lower chamber to deal with issues of science policy. One of the proposals would transform the present Committee on Science and Astronautics into a Committee on Science and Technology, presumably to signify a reduced concern for the space program and an increased concern for the general state of science and technology, including, for the first time, the military applications, which have previously been the exclusive preserve of the Armed Services Committee. A second element is contained in the proposal to reorganize several other committees. Thus, the Interior Committee would become the Committee on Energy and Environment, the Committee on Public Works would become the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce would become the Committee on Commerce and Health. A third element is that each House committee would be required to create a subcommittee on "oversight and forward planning," the second function to enable the committee to undertake "on a continuing basis, futures research and forecasting. . . ."[19] The fourth relevant innovation is the proposal for a new

[17] Technology Assessment Act of 1972 (Public Law 92–484); see especially preamble, "Findings and Declaration of Purpose." Reprinted in Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, *Technology Assessment for the Congress* (Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 44.

[18] House Select Committee on Committees, *Committee Structure and Procedures of the House of Representatives*, Committee Print (Washington, D.C., 1973).

[19] Ibid., p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Budget Committee designed to serve the function of comprehensive policy planning which, as previously noted, has been the major weakness in the organization and operation of Congress as a legislature. This new committee would be expected to "develop criteria of choice among alternative uses of Federal funds in terms of collective policy preferences and priorities. . . ."[20] Specifically, the committee would be charged with reviewing the five-year projections that must be presented by the president, in accordance with a provision of the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act, with every request for funds to create or expand a program. The Bolling Committee explicitly urges appointment of such a committee as a way of increasing the ability of Congress to share in the setting of general national policy by undertaking "periodic assessment of national goals, priorities, and future program costs."[21]

Future Prospects: The Campaign for a Statutory National Science Policy

Some of those keenly concerned with the federal government's science policies, having failed to persuade the current administration of the wisdom of declaring a national commitment to the support of science and technology, are turning to Congress in the hope that in its current mood of self-assertion, it will impose such a formal commitment upon the executive. This campaign has had an initial, if as yet incomplete, success with the passage by the Senate of the bill (S. 32) introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy, "The National Science Policy and Priorities Act of 1972." The Kennedy bill had three key provisions.[22] One of these would have declared a statutory national science policy providing that expenditures for nonmilitary research and development should grow at the same rate as the GNP and that they should reach a level of parity with expenditures for military research and development. The second would have greatly expanded the traditional emphasis of the NSF on the support of basic research, especially in the nonbiomedical areas, to make the foundation responsible for establishing priorities in nonmilitary research and development and for devising programs to assist industries in converting to high-priority activities. The third key provision calls for the creation of a "Civil Science Systems Administration" to be located in the NSF. This new agency would be charged with promoting the develop-

[20] Ibid., p. 89.

[21] Ibid.

[22] In this and the ensuing discussion I have drawn on the valuable report by Claude E. Barfield, "Congress Moves to Reset Priorities in Federal Research and Development," *National Journal*, 4, no. 40 (September 30, 1972), 1524–1533.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment of technology aimed at meeting public needs in such areas as transportation, health care, and sanitation.

The Kennedy bill was introduced in response to a belief fairly widespread within the scientific community that the nation's scientific capabilities had been so heavily committed to military programs and to space exploration that other vital public needs were being neglected. The bill evoked considerable support, largely because of concern over the acute unemployment among scientists and engineers caused by cutbacks in government contracting with the aerospace and other defense-related industries. An analysis prepared for the Kennedy subcommittee projected the creation of 200,000 new jobs through programs to be fostered by passage of the bill. (Whatever the exact figure, there can be no doubt that if the key provisions of the bill were to be adopted, there would indeed be a great expansion in nonmilitary research and development. Even in fiscal 1974, the budget for military research and development is estimated at $9.3 billion, whereas nonmilitary programs, excluding space, are estimated at $5.8 billion.)

Objections to the Kennedy bill were lodged by sixteen federal agencies whose representatives complained that NSF was being asked to take on responsibilities already assigned to them. The president's science adviser, Dr. David, argued that the setting of priorities should be done at a higher level than that of the NSF, and that the administration was already taking steps to give greater emphasis to civilian research and development. The director of the NSF, H. Guyford Stever, expressed misgivings over the broadening of the foundation's responsibilities, lest it be diverted from its primary role as the overseer and supporter of basic research.

Supporters of the bill responded that too little had been done by the administration to redirect scientific capabilities to civilian needs. They pointed out that the budget for research and development had declined from 2.6 percent of the total federal budget in 1963 to 1.6 percent in 1971. If the bill had been in force, the percentage decline would have been lower and funds saved because of cutbacks in the space budget would have been transferred to other types of research. The bill's major draftsman, Ellis Mottur, of Senator Kennedy's staff, defended the call for parity between military and nonmilitary research funding as a "symbol . . . of the necessity for reordering national priorities."[23]

The campaign for the declaration of a single coherent national science policy, to which the Kennedy bill was a response, has been led by many of the leading spokesmen for the scientific community and institutions of higher education. They began to urge this course even when research

[23] Ibid., p. 1529.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

budgets were expanding, both because they knew that the day would come when the budgets would have to level off and perhaps even decline, and also because they thought it was a bad idea to allow priorities in science and technology to be determined in response to particular pressures or dramatic and popular needs. Now that there is more intense competition for smaller allocations, it is said to be even more imperative that the government adopt a declared and carefully constructed national science policy. A Washington magazine writer recently concluded an article on the unhappy relations between scientists and the federal government by summarizing what he had learned after interviewing a number of leading scientists: "Most of all, the federal government must for the first time in history frame an overall policy that eliminates crash-basis science, erratic funding, and submission to faddish enthusiasms, and that substitutes consistency, continuity, balance between research and application, and long-range planning relating science/technology to national needs and goals."[24]

Because this campaign for a national science policy is now being directed almost exclusively at Congress, and has a reasonable chance of success, it is appropriate to ask whether this should be thought of as a logical next step in the extension of congressional authority over science policy. We have already noted that Congress is not well organized to make comparative and comprehensive judgments in this or other areas of policy. This remains a serious objection which would not be vitiated simply by the passage of a bill declaring such a policy to be in existence. The policy would still need to be put into effect by a fragmented and unequally powerful set of committees. Would the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, the parent of the Kennedy subcommittee, prove willing and able to enforce the legislation it has sponsored? Would it have the power to secure the cooperation of the appropriations committees in both houses to undertake the rather massive shifts of funding the policy would require? And if an administration opposed in principle to such legislation chose not to apply it with utmost diligence, would Congress be ready to compel stricter compliance? It can be argued that in this case as in others to pass legislation which risks being treated as an empty gesture is no way to reassert congressional authority.

There are other objections to the very concept of a single coherent national science policy which Congress would do well to ponder. The belief that such a policy would provide an answer to the shortcomings of the present ad hoc approach can arouse excessive expectations which almost surely would not be fulfilled. It is not possible by declaring a fixed set of

[24] Vernon Pizer, "Who Unplugged America's Science Machine?" *Washingtonian* (February 1974), 108.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

priorities to remove science and technology once and for all from the continuing struggle to determine these priorities that is after all the essence of democratic politics. Even those who have advocated such a policy do not generally harbor ecstatic visions of what it could accomplish. Most of these advocates do not couple their support of the principle with a preference for a highly centralized method for assigning research priorities and for managing the government's extremely diversified system for supporting and performing research. Very few have declared support for a cabinet-level Department of Science and Technology; even those who do support this proposal acknowledge that many important scientific programs are best left to be managed by the mission-oriented agencies they now serve. They are well aware that the present system, despite the criticisms it has received, enables scientists to appeal to a variety of agencies for support and to exercise a certain degree of control over the pattern of allocations by serving as advisers to the agencies and in some cases by supervising the distribution of grants through peer-review panels. A system which would centralize control over allocations and reduce the role that specialists in particular fields now play therefore holds no great appeal for the scientists, especially since a single agency would be highly vulnerable to "political accidents and personalities in the administration or the Congress."[25] Paradoxically, therefore, many of the same scientists who would prefer to see the declaration of a national science policy are not enthusiastic about the appointment of a single scientific czar or a single committee of national science policymakers. They seem to want to retain the pluralistic system at the same time as they decry the fragmentary, ad hoc character of the policy that results from the operation of this system.

There is little if anything to be gained by belaboring the inconsistency in this tendency to argue for a national science policy but against the machinery to create and enforce it. A few of the advocates do hold with both the principle and the practice. The others might explain that it is not necessarily inconsistent to believe in the development of a single national science policy by means of a diversified system of decision making and administration. It is not so much the discrepancy between theory and practice which is a cause for concern as the validity of the theory taken in its own terms. Some of the difficulties with it have frequently been pointed out, if not always in testimony before congressional com-

[25] Harvey Brooks, "The Physical Sciences: Bellwether of Science Policy," in James A. Shannon (ed.), *Science and the Evolution of Public Policy* (New York, 1973), p. 129. The view cited is that of the dissenting minority on the National Science Board commenting on the recommendation for a National Institution for Research and Advanced Studies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mittees. Several years ago, the secretary-general of the OECD convened a group of leading scientific administrators for the purpose of reconsidering the meaning of science policy in the light of experience. Their report admits candidly that "some observers have even questioned whether it makes sense to conceive of a science policy as a distinct and separate area of policy."[26] Especially in recent years, they observe, it has become increasingly hard to divorce policy for science from public policy generally. For better or worse, public support of research and development is shaped by the public perception of social needs. Since science and technology have become instruments of public policy, science policy must be thought of not as an independent, but as a dependent, variable of other public policy.

The OECD conferees do not concede that it is altogether meaningless to think of science policy as an autonomous issue. Science and technology, they contend, need to be considered "in their entirety as a set of means to other goals, having some coherence within itself across the functions that it serves."[27] This redefinition considerably narrows both the scope and the significance of the concept of science policy. If it is to be understood as a means rather than an end, there is no justification for assigning it a fixed level of support or for making the level proportional to the size of the GNP. The level might as well approach zero or rise considerably higher, depending upon social objectives. Nor does it make sense to set an ideal ratio for the division of funds into such categories as basic research, applied research, and development, or between military research and all the varieties of nonmilitary research. Ideally, "big science" projects in different fields would not be compared with each other but with other program elements in the sector of social need which they are designed to serve.

The resulting disaggregation of science policy into a set of instrumental sectoral policies rests on the recognition that science and technology are too pervasive and too differentiated to be treated as a single coherent entity. The result, as Herbert E. Carter, chairman of the National Science Board, has candidly admitted, is that a national science policy becomes "at best an umbrella that covers a wide variety of policies, all of which affect the course of scientific activities, but many of which are directed to quite different ends."[28]

In an effort to meet such objections, a distinction has often been drawn between two aspects of science policy, usually referred to as "policy for

[26] The Secretary-General's Ad Hoc Group on New Concepts of Science Policy, *Science, Growth and Society* (Paris, 1971), p. 37.

[27] Ibid., p. 38.

[28] Quoted in *Toward a Science Policy for the United States*, p. 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

science" and "science in policy." The first refers to the effort to develop and maintain a set of capacities in science and technology; the second refers to the effort to make use of this capacity in achieving social objectives. The trouble with this distinction is that the two aspects are often so intimately related as to make it impossible to treat one in isolation from the other. It is not easy to launch a grand national program aimed at improving health care—which would be one example of "science in policy"—if the medical schools have not previously been enabled—by "policy for science"—to produce enough doctors. Conversely, the funds made available for socially useful projects will influence and to some extent determine the directions pursued by researchers and the careers chosen by students. This relationship has been most dramatically evident in the important fields of engineering, mathematics, and the physical sciences known collectively as "EMP." As Harvey Brooks has pointed out, the expansion of university enrollments and staffs in EMP in the 1960s was influenced strongly by the employment opportunities and the availability of research support reflecting the high priority established by the federal government for military and space technology. Now that the size of the commitment has been significantly reduced and EMP faces a "glum future," the universities have found themselves overextended in these fields.[29] If science were an undifferentiated entity to be mobilized for a given set of purposes one year and a completely different set the next, the distinction between the two aspects of science policy would be a helpful one, but as this is hardly the case, it cannot rescue the concept of a single coherent science policy from its critics.

In view of its difficulties, the suspicion is bound to arise that the main reason this distinction has been introduced is to support the proposition that the needs of basic research and higher education should be provided for on a continuing and stable basis, while practical projects are treated more flexibly. The distinction, then, serves to narrow the effective meaning of the call for a national science policy to a concern for a "policy for science"—a policy that makes basic research and the education of scientists safe from the budget cutters. Even if we agree that the objective is desirable, we cannot conclude that such a conception of science policy is what it claims to be—namely, a better-balanced and more rational way of ordering the ensemble of activities in science and technology than short-sighted, pragmatic politicians are inclined to follow. Still worse, it will almost surely antagonize industrial researchers who are likely to see it, with reason, as a device for promoting the special interests of university scientists to the detriment of a genuinely balanced national program.

[29] Brooks, "The Physical Sciences," p. 111.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alternative Roles for Congress

If, for all these reasons, it would not be advisable for Congress to embrace the campaign for a declared national science policy, there are alternatives open to congressmen anxious to meet some of the serious concerns that have inspired this campaign. One such alterntive would be to recognize that the call for a national science policy is perhaps better understood as a plea for an improved system of establishing the social priorities which science and technology are thought to serve. No single institutional device will satisfy this need, but it would be helpful if the executive were to create an office—preferably one that would be independent of the OMB, and possibly one that would serve as a kind of common staff and unifying agent for the existing councils—which would serve a general policy planning function. The purpose of such a general policy planning staff, which has been proposed before,[30] would be to undertake fairly long-term planning so as to complement the necessarily more immediate focus of the OMB. Congress could perform a useful service by persuading the executive of the need for such an office, which might be thought of as a broadened Office of Science and Technology to serve at the level of the executive office. Such an office would be staffed by people in a variety of disciplines. Like the Office of Technology Assessment, it could seek outside assistance. OST, despite the best efforts of its staff, may have been too narrowly construed to serve such a general purpose. Similarly, PSAC could be reconstructed with a broader membership to restore communication between the academy and the executive and to provide the president with relatively disinterested counsel on the technical merits of proposals advanced by the executive departments and agencies.

On a more continuing and less institutional level, congressmen might also consider that they perform an essential and unique function in the American system simply by serving as the national platform for the debate of public issues concerning science and technology. Congress, precisely because it is designed more for deliberation than for action, and because it is a cockpit for contentious and ambitious politicans, is ideally suited to serve, as John Stuart Mill put it in describing the role of legislatures, as a "congress of opinions." The success of Congress in performing precisely such a function in the ABM debate and in the inquiry that led to the rejection of the SST could serve as a valuable precedent. The

[30] Among a number of such proposals is one calling for a presidential office for "strategic policy assessments" which emerged out of discussions in a Government Policy Forum at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., in 1973. For a similar proposal, see also the report of an ad hoc committee appointed by the National Academy of Sciences, "Science and Technology in Presidential Policymaking: A Proposal" (Washington, D.C., June 1974), pp. 34–35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

executive is almost bound to enlist experts who share its ruling perspectives. Congress, on the other hand, ought to aim at regularizing and institutionalizing the adversary process. As more and more issues require resolution in the light of the best technical advice rather than by compromise among interested groups, the effort to publicize and to come to terms with the conflicting views of experts becomes more and more imperative. Congress offers an ideal forum for the exposure of public issues involving conflicting expertise.

At present, as in the recent past, most such debates are likely to revolve around the role of science and technology in relation to the two key concerns of national policy: defense and the economy. In these areas, it is expected that the executive will exercise initiative and Congress will serve as consultant and critic. By encouraging thoughtful debate on new technologies, Congress performs an essential democratic function. And if we take seriously the predictions of those who argue that the preoccupation with national security and economic growth is being superseded by a concern for the quality of life, then it may well follow that the role of Congress will become even more significant in the life of the nation than it has been in recent years. If the issues of national security and economic management are debatable, as they surely are, the issues that arise in defining what is meant by the quality of life are even more debatable. Defense and the economy, moreover, are areas of policy which involve vital international issues in very complex ways—ways which may elude the grasp of congressmen whose careers are mainly dependent on their attention to domestic needs. The quality of life, however, is far more amenable to treatment in the light of domestic values and needs than these other issues.

The role of Congress in science policy has to be seen in the light of the larger role of Congress in the American political system and in the light of the critical importance of science and technology to the achievement of social objectives in virtually every area of public policy. The case for a larger role for Congress rests on the essential principle that decisions concerning the uses of science and technology are so vital to the citizenry that they should not be made in secret or bureaucratically or by the executive alone. The fact that this principle has been so egregiously violated in recent years should spur rather than deter congressional efforts to subject major policy issues to informed legislative scrutiny. Scientists should not expect Congress to take on a responsibility for leadership that is best exercised by the executive,[31] but they ought to insist that Congress

[31] G. B. Kistiakowsky, "Presidential Science Advising," *Science*, 184, no. 4132 (April 5, 1974), 40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

improve its performance as a representative assembly and watchdog of the executive.*

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in San Francisco, February 27, 1974. For research support, the author is indebted to the University of Toronto, the Canada Council, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Colleagues at the center, John Logsdon in particular, made helpful comments on an earlier draft.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Change in Israel: The Case of a New Town

MYRON J. ARONOFF

This study examines the social and political changes which took place during the development of a new town in Israel's Negev desert.[1] It explores the expanding sets of sociopolitical relationships in this town as well as the interdependence between these local relationships and the external environment of national Israeli culture, law, and, particularly, political institutions. The latter significantly determine the direction in which the local sociopolitical relationships develop.

There are two main themes in this study. First, there are extreme differences between the strong centralized national political parties and the much weaker local political groups with regard to access to and control over resources. Thus the latter, in their quest for resources and support, are almost inevitably forced into some sort of affiliation with or subservience to the national parties. It follows that one can trace the transformation of these political relationships from *informal* local factions to *formal* local branches of the national political parties.

The disproportionate monopolization of resources by the central government is not unique to Israel, and is particularly characteristic of de-

[1] See Myron J. Aronoff, *Frontiertown: The Politics of Community Building in Israel* (Manchester and Jerusalem, 1974). I am grateful to the Bernstein Israeli Research Trust which financed this research and to Professor Max Gluckman who supervised it and gave numerous helpful comments.

MYRON J. ARONOFF is senior lecturer in the political science department of Tel Aviv University. His publications include *Frontiertown: The Politics of Community Building in Israel.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

veloping nations. In those countries whose political systems are dominated by one major political party (such as the Mapai or Labor party in Israel or the Congress party in India), the party controlling great national resources (through domination of major government ministries and development funds) is most likely to choose local factions with the most resources (i.e., votes), while other national parties will align with other local factions to maintain their competitive positions. Even when a community attempts to maintain local political groupings independent from national political parties, the major competitors in the local struggle often initiate the very process which they previously sought to avoid. They do so at first with the intention of selectively using and controlling the external environment, but the consequences of their initial choices have ramifications which they had not envisioned or anticipated.

The second theme concerns the role of political strife in the creation of communal cohesion: that is, the merging of social and political leadership and activities in the early period of factional competition and strife was primarily responsible for the mobilization of large-scale involvement in public affairs. The participants, as concerned members of the developing community, created social roles for themselves. In this way the intensive factional strife led to cohesion at the higher community level. At a later stage, social and political activity became institutionalized in the structure of bureaucratic organizations, their leadership became more professionalized, and the spheres of activity tended to become differentiated from each other. This process was related (along with other intervening variables) to a dramatic decline in the scale of public involvement in political affairs. Both themes are interwoven through an account of the major political events of the town's history.

Through their mobilization of support within and without the community, the competing political participants innovate changes in local relationships, which are in some ways structured, influenced, and constrained by the external environment. Thus, to explain the process of change it is necessary to focus on the dynamics of the interrelationships between the local "field" of relationships and the "arena" of the external environment. However, one must first define these two terms.

Swartz gives Turner's definition of "field" as follows: "A field is composed of the actors directly involved in the process being studied. Its social and territorial scope and the areas of behaviour it involves change as additional actors enter into the processes or as former participants withdraw and as they bring new types of activities into their interaction and/or abandon old types."[2] Swartz defines an "arena" as "a social and

[2] Marc J. Swartz (ed.), *Local Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives* (London, 1969), p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cultural area which is immediately adjacent to the field both in space and time . . . . In addition to the actors who populate it, the arena also contains the repertory of values, meanings and resources these actors possess, together with the relationships among them and with the members of the field. Values, meanings and resources possessed by the field participants but not employed by them in the processes which constitute the field are also part of the arena."[3] In this article the term "environment" will be used for what Swartz terms "arena" since the latter has already been coined by other writers who have given it substantially different meanings. Particularly important is the environment of national Israeli laws, political institutions, values, and culture as they affect, impinge upon, and/or constrain the participants in the local field and social situations in this analysis.

Breach of the Peace[4]

The breach of the peace usually is heralded or signaled by breaching a norm that is considered binding on all members of the political field. In the first stage the team which planned Frontiertown developed an esprit de corps based on their pioneering role. They traveled in jeeps around the rugged desert terrain where they chose the exact location for the new town. They lived in a primitive base camp together while drawing up the last stages of the master plan, and while supervising the first stages of the town's construction in preparation for the first settlers. The members of the team interacted with their director and with each other on an informal basis of equality. The first director resigned at the completion of the initial planning stage and was replaced in the second stage, when the role of the team was drastically altered. With the beginning of the town's settlement, the team became primarily a body of administrators. The changes in the role from planning team (pioneers) to administration division (bureaucrats) coincided with the different background and style of the new administrator, who emphasized punctuality and hierarchy. This, in turn, led to the development of strife between the director and a group of his staff.

A pioneering vanguard of settlers was selected from a much larger number of applicants to be the town's first residents. They were chosen, in part, for their desire to contribute to the development of a new town

[3] Ibid., p. 9.

[4] I have adapted the framework of "political phase development" from Marc J. Swartz et al. (eds.), *Political Anthropology* (Chicago, 1966). Although appearing in the joint introduction of the co-editors, Swartz credits Turner for the formulation of the political phase development.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the desert. And yet the initial administration of the town did not provide any means for the representation in local government of the first settlers, which led to the frustration and disgruntlement of many of them. The principle of the government's right to build and administer, at least in the initial stages, new towns conflicted with the right of all citizens in a democracy to have an elected representative government. This conflict between principles was exploited by those political participants who opposed the administrator. In their efforts to replace him and to gain political power themselves, they mobilized support largely from among those who felt deprived of representation in local government.

Mobilization of Political Capital

Since decisions taken by the administration affected vital aspects of the settler's lives, they naturally took a major interest in them. The mobilization of support was facilitated greatly by the fact that the main leaders, who were parties to the original disputes in the administration, had both potential and actual access to considerable resources locally and through relationships with national political leaders. Finally the social and cultural diversity of the local population and their different interests provided latent divisions which became manifest in the mobilization of political support through various issues over a period of time. A pattern emerged in the initial stages of the town's development: a close group of socially interacting friends rallied to the support of the respective leaders after each series of disputes. They were most successful in mobilizing the support of people who were similar in age, country of birth, and in urban or kibbutz background.

The attitudes and expressions of resentment of many active supporters of the administrator against his opponents constituted a poorly articulated ideology. They resented what they considered to be the unearned privileged status in Israel's society of the young, native-born Israeli, who achieved even higher status from having lived on a kibbutz and/or having attained a higher education, two characteristics of the administrator's most active opponents.

The political groupings—or factions—that emerged, were characterized primarily by their informality and lack of organization and by the very large extent to which social and political activities were intermeshed. Political alignment or affiliation was generally a reflection of and a product of social interaction of many different kinds, from parties, social visiting, playing bridge, etc. There were no formal party organizations, officers, or membership, but people were very much aware of one another's local affiliations, and the predictability of the same or very

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

similar alignments on any given issue. They definitely tended to meet socially those people with whom they united politically on local issues; therefore, while there were few formal political meetings, political issues were one of the major topics at various kinds of social gatherings.

The role of the leader was most important since these factions lacked the organization and discipline characteristic of the more conventional political parties in Israel. The leader, with the active advice and aid of his closest supporters, decided the tactics and policies which were followed in the factional competition for public support and the resources of public office. Through his leadership, his access to resources, and his close circle of dedicated supporters, the leader established sets of relationships throughout the community which enabled him to generate large-scale involvement on issues and rally support for his particular stand. The fact that the most active political leaders were also the most prominent leaders of recreational and social activities greatly facilitated the communication, discussion, and propagation of political points of view. This had two main consequences: first, most of the residents of the town were mobilized over a series of issues into active involvement in public affairs; and second, many incidents and controversies that might not have become political issues in a more formally structured environment became politicized in Frontiertown.

In these first years there was a conscious policy tacitly agreed upon by both major factions to maintain the independence of the local alignments on local issues from affiliation with national political parties. There were several reasons for this: first was the generally held and deeply felt belief that this policy was the best way to maintain the primacy of local interests. Leaders in both factions, as well as many of the settlers, had come to this barren part of the Negev desert with the idealistic goal of helping to create a new, different, and qualitatively better kind of community. They felt that people with various ideological persuasions and different national party affiliations could cooperate for the good of their local community. They also hoped to avoid dependence upon national political parties and the subsequent loss of local autonomy to national party interests which they felt was the inevitable consequence of such dependence.

As it happened, the two main leaders and many of their close supporters were affiliated with the same national political party—Mapai. This probably gave them further reason for waging their battle with each other through local factions. The administrator, even more than his major opponent, drew support from people with diverse national party affiliations and it was particularly to his advantage to maintain the arrangement by which they could unite to support him on local issues without conflict over national affiliation or policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In spite of their policy to maintain local autonomy, however, in the course of seeking resources and support for their cause from national authorities and agencies, both leaders initiated what was probably the inevitable affiliation of their local factions with national political parties. This in turn significantly altered the internal relationships among supporters within the factions, as well as external relationships with their respective rivals. The choices made by the political leaders in their competition with each other can be examined in terms of the limited range of choices imposed on them by the constraints of the national political system.

Crisis

Turner defined a crisis as "a momentous juncture or turning point in the relations between components of a political field—at which apparent peace becomes overt conflict and covert antagonisms become visible . . . . Power crises sooner or later take a dichotomous form, and the field as a whole becomes . . .[one] in which the contenders are ultimately arrayed in two camps or factions."[5] In Frontiertown, the major crisis was divided into two stages: (1) a local election, and (2) a national election which drastically altered the nature of local political relationships and the rules of the local political game.

When the administrator's opponents sought to have him removed, their only recourse was to campaign for a change in the local status of government to a town council. They were eventually successful in this endeavor. However, the administrator then organized a local election, and by a landslide victory he became the first mayor of Frontiertown. Municipal councils are under the jurisdiction of the minister of the interior who, by political custom, includes among his appointees to new councils representatives of national political parties. The administrator, using this custom to get supporters (in addition to those who had been elected) appointed to the first town council as representatives of national parties, was the first to breach the local rules of the game by using national political party affiliation as an instrument for gaining local advantage. It would seem that he merely turned to his own political advantage what he felt would be the inevitable appointment of party representatives.

Following this initial breach of local political norms, the mayor's opponent sought to redress the defeat he had just suffered in the election of the new town council. He and his supporters joined and took over the local branch of Mapai, the most powerful party in the nation, and successfully participated in the national election campaign. This drastically al-

[5] Ibid., pp. 33–34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tered the local rules of the game. The mayor's faction was completely divided over how to meet this challenge. Some members, recognizing that in order to compete on equal terms with their opponents they had to follow their lead, began organizing and working through local branches of other national parties opposed to Mapai; others supported Mapai; and still others became politically inactive. The capture of Mapai by the opponents of the administrator (who had by then become mayor) enabled them to apply pressure through the national party headquarters; this led in turn to a diplomatic post for the mayor—in Africa (an example of the use of both carrot and stick by the national party). One can see how the constraints on local choice and action from the external environment of the national political system illustrate the plight of the pioneering settlers of Frontiertown who tried to maintain the independence of the sociopolitical groupings which they created.

The trend of national governments to increase their power at the expense of local ones is universal, and certainly not unique to Israel. However, because of the historic circumstances of Israel's birth as a modern state, and the nature of the perpetual state of seige in which it exists, national political parties and the national government have developed into highly centralized institutions which (with the army under the authority of the civilian government) share a virtual monopoly of most national resources. For example, in 1972 the Labor party controlled 90 percent of the national budget through the ministries which it headed.[6] Even the older and better-established municipalities have disproportionately fewer resources, but the new towns in the development areas are by far the most dependent upon national authorities and institutions.[7] In contrast, the kibbutzim (communal farms) have traditionally enjoyed a share of the access to national resources disproportionately greater than their numbers would seem to demand, because of the strong political links between the various politically affiliated kibbutz movements and the disproportionately large numbers of kibbutz members in top positions of national leadership.[8]

However, even in the United States, where the states and major cities have traditionally enjoyed a large measure of local autonomy, the trend is toward greater centralization of power in the federal government. In fact Vidich and Bensman summarize their study of a small American town in words which could be equally applicable to the study of Frontier-

[6] My thanks to my colleague Dr. David Nachmias, whose current work on the Israeli cabinet brings out the increasing domination of Labor over national resources.

[7] Myron J. Aronoff, "Development Towns in Israel," in Michael Curtis and Mordecai S. Chertoff (eds.), *Israel: Social Structure and Change* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1973).

[8] Myron J. Aronoff, "Party Center and Local Branch Relationships: The Israel Labour Party," in Alan Arian (ed.), *The Elections in Israel—1969* (Jerusalem, 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

town: "this study is an attempt to explore the foundations of social life in a community which lacks the power to control the institutions that regulate and determine its existence. It is in this sense that the community is viewed as a stage on which major issues and problems typical of the society are played out."[9]

Deployment of Adjustive or Redressive Mechanisms

The function of the next phase is to seal off or heal the breach; the mechanisms to carry this out can range from the employment of legal machinery to the performance of forms of public ritual. A number of incidents occurred in Frontiertown which illustrated the constraints imposed on the political strife by a high degree of communal consensus. One case involved a confrontation between merchants and housewives. Here a potentially explosive political issue was at least temporarily held in check through the employment of a ritual-like "encounter." This case places a factional dispute within the perspective of a general consensus of important communal norms. The social strife which developed in the early stages of the town's establishment played an important role in forming, defining, and preserving the town's main social groups, and in creating and maintaining widespread participation in communal affairs. The strife also helped to promote institutional change and contributed to greater communal cohesion and the development of a community spirit. Again we can stress the relationship of the leaders' voluntary social roles and their political activities with the factions they led. In fact, the mobilization of many citizens into activity in political affairs was facilitated by the politicization of social activities. This widespread citizen mobilization and involvement in communal affairs contributed greatly to the emergence of a strong sense of community spirit.

This conclusion that political strife in Frontiertown led to greater communal cohesion deviates from the findings in much of the literature about interest groups (with the important exception of *Union Democracy*),[10] as well as that of American pluralist political science in general. However, this finding fits within a general theoretical framework dating back to Machiavelli, which was systematically formulated by Simmel and developed by Coser, while it was independently developed and formulated by British social anthropologists, especially Gluckman, who applied that theoretical framework to the analysis of African political systems.[11]

[9] Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society: Class, Power and Religion*, rev. ed. (Princeton, N. J., 1968).

[10] S. M. Lipset et al., *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956).

[11] Machiavelli, *The Discourses*, chap. IV; Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The key to the stability of a system is the multiplicity of cross-cutting affiliations and loyalties. This is a point which Simmel, Kroeber, Gluckman, and Coser all have stressed. Coser expresses it as follows:

> If the members of a society should have mutually reinforcing interests, multiple affiliations, instead of crisscrossing each other, would eventually consolidate into basic cleavages. Only if there are numerous antagonistic yet diversified interests will the likelihood of consolidation in a cluster of affiliations be avoided and segmentation of participation maintained.[12]

This principle of social organization is particularly applicable to the sociopolitical situation in Frontiertown. While in the early stages there was a tendency for the two main groups to polarize the community along one main political cleavage with the multiplicity of associations reinforcing this cleavage, complete polarization did not take place for a number of reasons. In the first place the smallness of the town and the closeness of social relationships brought even the most bitter antagonists into close and diverse relationships in which interests, roles, and loyalties sometimes cut across political divisions. Contacts and relationships built through everyday and ordinary social interactions tended to check potentially divisive factional strife.

The fact that the political structure was so flexible that it allowed for the full expression of disagreement with the ruling powers, sometimes even to an extreme degree, and that the strife was most definitely within a basic consensus made it a major contributory influence in the growth of communal solidarity and spirit. There developed a fierce pride in the town and strong loyalties to the community.

New Breach of the Peace

The employment of the adjustive or redressive mechanisms of the "encounter" was only temporarily effective in reestablishing relationships between the contending parties. New breaches of the peace led to new crises; their resolution led, through mobilization of political capital, to a reversal in the relationships of power and to a significant change in the structure of local political relationships.

The first breach of the peace was precipitated by the local opposition, now operating within the framework of a branch of the dominant national political party, Mapai, which successfully persuaded the minister of the interior to set the date for a new local election. When it was discover-

---

Conflict (Glencoe, Ill., 1956); Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, trans. by Kurt Wolff and Reinhard Bendix (New York, 1955); Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (Oxford, 1965).

[12] Coser, *Functions of Social Conflict*, p. 78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ed that the election date did not allow sufficient time for the registration of the new voters, thereby depriving approximately half of the adult residents of their right to vote, the mayor and his supporters launched a successful campaign to postpone the election. This temporary coalition of the mayor's former supporters, who were now divided by their activities in the branches of several political parties, and new participants in the field, was successful on this particular issue because it exploited strongly held democratic beliefs about the right to vote.

The second breach of the peace came from the external environment: it was an order from the minister of religious affairs to establish a local religious council. Mapai successfully exploited this issue to divide the mayor and his supporters on the town council. In this case the imposition of a religious council on a community which was overwhelmingly opposed to its establishment was a violation of democratic values concerning the rule of the majority. It was also viewed by the residents as a violation of local customary relationships between religious and nonreligious Jews. The opposition could exploit this issue to the fullest to divide and conquer the mayor and his council without expending much political capital, without fear of alienating a single supporter, and with a certainty of reaping considerable political rewards.

The issue of the religious council also highlights the consequences of the mayor's dependence on national parties and ministries. Since the political parties dominate those ministries that allocate funds for development and for the budgets of local councils, it is incumbent upon the mayor, in his role as chief lobbyist for local interests in government ministries, to develop and work through close links with the national headquarters of important political parties. In this situation the mayor was enmeshed in the conflicts inherent in his role—that is, he was caught between the interests and demands of the national institutions, on whom he is dependent for his success in acquiring the necessary funds to develop his town, and those of his local supporters and constituents, on whom he is dependent for continuation in political office. It also proves the frailty of the old faction's lack of discipline and organization.

The presentation and analysis of each situation explores an aspect of the interdependence between developing local relationships and the external environment, and reveals the uniqueness of each situation as representing different phases in the development of political relationships in the community. Above all they reveal situations in which people in the community are mobilized for the attainment of specific goals.

The composite picture gained from the series of situations discussed is that of the decline and final disintegration of the administrator's faction. Even though its former members succeeded in forming a coalition of parties which defeated their old rivals—who then constituted the local

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

branch of Mapai—on the issue of postponing the election date, the Mapai leaders successfully exploited the divisions within the coalition to finally defeat them on the issue of the religious council. This illustrates why it is absolutely necessary to examine a number of different situations over a period of time in order to get an accurate picture of changing relationships.

New Crisis: The Local Election Campaign of 1967

During the campaign for the local council elections in 1967 the new political forms and relationships which had emerged during the previous series of events became crystallized; i.e., previous factional relationships were structured within a developing party system. It was a critical election in which changing relationships of power were made manifest and were consolidated in electoral victory. The leaders of Mapai built a winning coalition which brought their candidate into office in a landslide victory. Their success precipitated internal party competition for the distribution of the resultant captured resources. In a large and powerful party like Mapai there are several built-in loci of different and often competing roles and interests. For example, offices in the local worker's council of the Histadrut, the local town council, and the party secretariat provide the sources of differing interests and the resources for mobilizing competitive support for the party's control.

Restoration of Peace

The history of the relationships between the major political rivals during the first six years of the town's existence ends on an ironic note. The original competition and rivalry between two sets of participants, most of whom were affiliated with Mapai, led them to form local factions as a means of mobilizing political support. The constraints of the Israeli political system led the leaders of the factions into affiliations with competing national political parties (primarily Mapai and Rafi), as a means of conducting their competition for political support and office. As a result of national interests, and the pressure of mobilized national public opinion, during and after the war of June 1967 the three major labor parties—Mapai, Achdut Ha Avoda, and Rafi—merged, forming the new Israel Labor party. In spite of fierce local resistence the branches in Frontiertown, although they were the last in the country to do so, were finally forced by their respective national party headquarters to merge into one party. The old rivals became internal factions within the new party. This is a striking example of the consequences of the primacy of national interests over local ones, which had been a major reason that led the citi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

zens of Frontiertown to fight their unsuccessful struggle to maintain their local political autonomy.

Turner has stated in reference to the final stage of the restoration of peace: "But if the continuum is now analyzed synchronically, as a political field, and is compared with the political field that preceded the power struggle, many changes will usually be visible. As likely as not, the scope and range of the field will have altered; the number of its parts will be different; and their size will be different."[13] Not only have local factions become involved in relationships with branches of national political parties, and the relationships of power been reversed so that the former opposition is now in power, but major aspects of participation in public affairs have changed beyond recognition.

In the election of a new secretariat of Mapai an important new trend developed toward the professionalization of leadership. This trend is part of the formalization of institutions that transformed the voluntary sociopolitical factions of the early pioneering stage of Frontiertown into a bureaucracy of the main Israeli social organizations and political parties. The professionalization of the leadership of these organizations led to their concentration on a single sphere of activity. This tendency toward professionalization of, and differentiation between, social and political leaders and activities is related directly to the marked decline in large-scale public involvement in communal affairs which began in Frontiertown during the summer of 1968, continued through an extremely quiet election campaign in 1969, and still was in effect in January 1973. Of course, important intervening variables such as the rapid growth of the community, the length of time that such a high level of general involvement can be maintained in politics, and so on, may also have contributed to the observed decline in participation. It seems clear, however, that the incorporation of all the major participants into the Israel Labor party contributed to the general decline in public involvement in politics since political controversy, instead of taking place as before in public forums like bridge clubs and women's organizations, was confined to the privacy of the party secretariat.

The social process which characterized the development of and changes in sociopolitical relationships in Frontiertown was the same as that through which Israeli society as a whole has undergone; and as such, the town is a microcosm of Israeli society. Both Frontiertown and Israel were pioneered by highly idealistic and dedicated elites who constituted the social and political leadership of their respective communities long after they had been numerically outnumbered by the scores who followed them. The two both grew very rapidly. Eisenstadt has analyzed the process of

[13] Swartz et al., *Political Anthropology*, p. 37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formalization and bureaucraticization of the informal voluntary groups which pioneers originated in Israeli society as a whole,[14] and others have examined similar processes in the army and the educational system.[15] The ongoing process of rapid growth, formalization of voluntary groups, increasing bureaucratization, and professionalization is dramatically transforming the Frontiertown of the pioneers as it has transformed Israeli society generally.

The efforts of the original settlers to control their own destinies and their own political affairs by resisting all outside pressures were not successful. However their involvement in the affairs of the community through competition and rivalry helped to create roles for themselves, and also was related directly to the emergence within a remarkably short time of a sense of community spirit and pride. If the criterion of success is considered to be whether or not the residents care about and identify positively with their community, then it would seem clear that the experiment in community building in Frontiertown was an outstanding success.

Even the apparent failures of the community—i.e., the inability to maintain both local autonomy and a high level of participation in public affairs—are evidence of the integration of the community into the institutions of national Israeli society. Thus, even the limited local failures can be considered a part of a greater national success.

[14] Shumel N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (New York, 1968).

[15] Amos Perlmutter, *Military and Politics in Israel: Nation Building and Role Expansion* (London, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is Presidential Power "Poison"?

RICHARD M. PIOUS

Maybe it is time to give Henry Brooks Adams his due. He returned from Europe, took one look at the cabinet that President Grant announced at his inauguration, and observed that "The progress of evolution from President Washington to President Grant, was alone evidence enough to upset Darwin."[1] We have tended over the years to dismiss Adams too quickly. For who was willing to take seriously the claim that "power is poison" and that "its effect on Presidents has always been tragic." Instead, we followed the orthodox line: the presidency is a unique American contribution to the practice of democratic government, an institution nurturant and benign, whose accumulation of constitutional powers and statutory authority have been both inevitable and desirable.[2]

But presidential devolution seems not to have stopped with Grant, and recently political scientists and historians have begun the critical appraisal of the office so long overdue. Textbooks in introductory courses finally are responding to a critique made in 1970 by Thomas Cronin,

[1] Henry Brooks Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (Boston, 1927), p. 266.

[2] A critique of traditional descriptions is found in Thomas E. Cronin, "The Textbook Presidency and Political Science" (American Political Science Association, 1970) reprinted in *The Congressional Record*, October 5, 1970, S17102-17115.

RICHARD M. PIOUS, assistant professor of political science at Barnard College, has contributed articles to *Politics and Society*, *The Wisconsin Law Review*, and the *Journal of International Affairs*, and he is the editor of *Civil Rights and Liberties in the 1970's*. Currently he is writing a book on the presidency.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while at the scholarly level some approaches to the study of the presidency are showing new vitality.[3] Studies of presidential personality are making use of techniques drawn from psychology, psychiatry, and role theory. The fiasco in Indochina, attempts to centralize control of domestic programs in the White House, and some of the issues involved in Watergate have led to a revival of the public law approach to the study of the presidency, including new works on the war powers, budgetary process, appointment and dismissal powers, veto powers, and the doctrine of executive privilege. Based on the revival of public law scholarship—much of it centered in the law schools—the prescriptive tradition in political science again shows signs of life. When the possibilities of institutional change were nil, the reformers emphasized radical innovations, such as creating a modified parliamentary system, a council of state, or adding ten (or was it eleven?) vice-presidents.[4] Most recent suggestions are distinguished for their incremental approach and political viability: reforming the electoral college, regulating campaign financing or instituting public financing of elections, restructuring the presidential advisory system, and adopting legislation resolving disputes between Congress and the president regarding budget authority and war powers.[5]

It is worth noting that some approaches to the study of the presidency seem to be played out. We have not had, for example, works by former chief executives from recent administrations comparable to Taft's *Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers*, or even Cleveland's *Presidential Problems*.[6] The progress of literary evolution from Roosevelt's *Autobiography* to Johnson's *The Vantage Point* is alone evidence enough to confirm Henry Adams.

It may be useful at this point to offer some specific examples from recent literature on the presidency to indicate which lines of inquiry

[3] A sampling is contained in Rexford G. Tugwell and Thomas E. Cronin (eds.), *The Presidency Reappraised* (New York, 1974).

[4] Thomas K. Finletter, *Can Representative Government Do the Job?* (New York, 1945), called for a system of cabinet government; Herman Finer, *The Presidency: Crisis and Regeneration* (Chicago, 1960), suggested the additional vice-presidents.

[5] Organizations which have stimulated recent prescriptive literature include the National Municipal League, the American Bar Association, the American Enterprise Institute, Common Cause, The Brookings Institution, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency. See R. Gordon Hoxie (ed.), *The White House: Organization and Operations* (New York, 1973) and Hoxie (ed.), *The Presidency of the 1970's* (New York, 1973) for a sampling.

[6] Stephen Koss makes the suggestive points that British politicians resort to biography to justify their own decisions; similarly American presidents preferred at one time to write institutional studies of their office. See Stephen Koss, "British Political Biography as History," *Political Science Quarterly*, 88, no. 4 (December 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seem to be exhausted, and which are likely to advance our knowledge in the next few years.

Presidential Personality

The study of the impact of personality on political institutions is at least as old as Plato's *Republic*, but there has been little development of the discipline since antiquity. Most literature, now as then, focuses on the conscious dimensions of leadership; one rarely finds descriptions which indicate that a politician may be subject to subconscious forces beyond his power to control.[7] The very notion of *politician*, in the American context, connotes the flexible, accommodating personality type whose essential function is to mediate conflict and preserve the equilibrium of the system. If politics, in Weber's sense of the term, is a *vocation*, then the American politican in the White House will fill Bentley's mechanistic conception of the office: "if the group interests work out a fair and satisfying adjustment through the legislature, then the executive sinks in prominence; that when the adjustment is not perfected in the legislature, then the executive arises in strength to do the work. . . ."[8]

Yet the question arises: Are there forces operating upon the politician that come from *within*, and that he cannot control? The construction of the Constitution was based on an affirmative answer to that question, although presumably Madison and other politicians contriving a system of checks and balances assumed that the danger would come from a *conscious* decision to usurp state power. Similarly, the progressive historians viewed politicians in terms of support for either capital or community—again emphasizing the conscious dimensions almost to the exclusion of subconscious choice.

But some political scientists and historians are penetrating below the surface. The ambitious attempt by Freud and Bullitt to analyze Woodrow Wilson proved an embarrassment, but at least the authors raised the important questions.[9] More careful study by Alexander and Juliette George confirmed the suspicion that Wilson might better be understood after scrutiny by psychohistorians.[10] A forthcoming book by

[7] The exception here is Harold Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930) and *Power and Personality* (New York, 1948). Neither work deals with the presidency.

[8] Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 359.

[9] Problems with this work are discussed in Arthur S. Link, "The Case for Woodrow Wilson," *Harper's Magazine*, April 1967, p. 93.

[10] Alexander George and Juliette George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (New York, 1956).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Doris Kearns, former White House Fellow and member of President Johnson's staff, promises to shed new light on a second president.

In addition to portraits of individual presidents, one recent work by James David Barber, *The Presidential Character*, is an ambitious attempt to use psychohistorical techniques in a comparative framework.[11] Barber offers a typology based on two dimensions which classify presidential personalities and may be used to explain and predict the impact of personality on decision making. It marks the first significant departure from the "tactical" approach to the study of the presidency developed by Richard Neustadt in *Presidential Power*.

As stated by Barber, presidents may be classified according to their placement along two dimensions. The first dimension is conception of the office: presidents are classified either as "active" or "passive." This dimension has been used by political scientists since Federalist confronted Republican and Democrat challenged Whig. Barber's second dimension is innovative: presidents are classified as "positive" or "negative" according to their feelings about the work of being president—in Barber's phrase, "whether or not [the president] gives the impression he enjoys his political life."[12] Using these classifications Barber develops a typology with four types: active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive, and passive-negative.

Barber argues that decision-making styles can be identified for certain types, and he is concerned especially with the active-negative president dealing with a prolonged crisis. In particular, he argues that the active-negative may "rigidify" in such a crisis—i.e., demonstrate continuing adherence to a failing line of policy. Rigidification can be observed when a president works to exhaustion, isolates himself from allies and subordinates, succumbs to self-pity, and looks for scapegoats.

Barber is not arguing that all policy failures lead to rigidification, nor that all presidents are equally susceptible to rigidification. Active-positives are most likely to drop a failing policy line without permanent damage to their personality or political prospects. Presidents such as Truman, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Kennedy suffered defeats which exposed their ineptitude in solving certain problems, yet none adhered to the failing course of action, or showed to an excessive degree other traits linked with rigidification.

If Barber is right, then failure can be intelligently and rationally managed only by certain personality types. But before conceding the point, one must treat two possible objections to the typology: first, that

[11] James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1972).
[12] Ibid., p. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

selection of presidents is *a posteriori;* second, that the typology is simply a reaction to the fiasco of the Nixon administration.

The best evidence to suggest the value of Barber's work is its preparation and publication prior to Watergate. Barber places Nixon—at the height of his political success—in the active-negative category, and indicates that he will probably rigidify in his second term:

> The danger is that crisis will be transformed into tragedy—that Nixon will go from a dramatic experiment to a moral commitment, a commitment to follow his private star, to fly off in the face of overwhelming odds. That type of reaction is to be expected when and if Nixon is confronted with a severe threat to his power and sense of virtue.[13]

If the simple test of the validity of any hypothesis is its use in winning barroom bets, then Barber can win a pile. It is clear that placement of presidents need not be, and was not in Nixon's case, *post hoc,* and that the typology and theory about rigidification break important new ground.

Since the typology involves only two dimensions, neither of which is beyond the comprehension of a social scientist without psychoanalytic training, one has an initial tendency to be skeptical of its clarity and simplicity. But as in physics and architecture, *less is more.* The simplicity of Barber's theory provides its elegance, and its researchability demonstrates its utility. It should not be underestimated because it is free of the pretentious claptrap found so often in books purporting to make methodological breakthroughs.

The Activist Presidency Reassessed

Arthur Schlesinger, the eminent historian and former White House assistant, offers a careful assessment in *The Imperial Presidency* of an institution which has cut itself off from constitutional checks and political restraints.[14] His book is an impressive attempt to reintroduce constitutional standards (notably missing in *A Thousand Days*) into the analysis of the office. It provides a second example of an approach to the study of the presidency showing new vitality.

It should be said at the outset that Schlesinger has done an enormous amount of research, has used secondary legal and historical sources skillfully and carefully, and has been aided by the findings of a Columbia University Law School seminar on war powers directed by Professor Abraham Sofaer; consequently his book offers sources and case studies

[13] Ibid., p. 441.

[14] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston, 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which make it invaluable for reference. He brings to his discussion the skills of a literary historian and the materials of public law: presidential documents, speeches, and executive agreements; treaties and laws; legal briefs from the departments; congressional hearings, reports, and debates. With this book he joins Berdahl, Corwin, Henkin, and Wormuth as an indispensable commentator on the war powers of the presidency.[15]

The Imperial Presidency is, in large part, a history of the development of the war-making powers. Schlesinger's stated concern is with "the shift in constitutional balance" between Congress and the president, and he describes how both branches have interpreted their responsibilities, exercised their powers, and fought over their prerogatives. He argues that the original constitutional understanding was that Congress would make the decision for peace or war (except in the event of a surprise attack which the president on his own authority might repel) and that the commander-in-chief clause did not vest the president with independent constitutional authority to commence hostilities. Schlesinger concludes that several presidents have transgressed this understanding, but that primary responsibility for creation of an "imperial" presidency lies with Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.

One need not accept this conclusion. It can be argued that to reach it, Schlesinger does not apply the same standards to all presidents; instead, he shifts criteria, the effect of which is to isolate Johnson and Nixon. Some of his standards seem quite reasonable, while others are arbitrary and specious, having little to do with constitutional principles.

Schlesinger is on solid ground when he dismisses most cases concerning presidential war making on the ground that they involved inconsequential detachments of forces used against pirates or semicivilized tribes, and did not involve other sovereign states. If one is dealing with *war* powers, then historical examples should involve wars—otherwise one may just as well write a study of *incident* powers.

One can also agree with Schlesinger that Lincoln's use of prerogative powers during the Civil War should not stand as precedent for hostilities involving foreign powers. In effect Lincoln invoked a Lockean prerogative—he knew he was acting outside accepted constitutional limits, but felt it was required to save the Union.[16] The Congress subsequently ratified

[15] Clarence Berdahl, *The War Powers of the Executive in the United States* (Urbana, Ill., 1921); Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers*, rev. 4th ed. (New York, 1957); Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* (New York, 1972); Francis D. Wormuth, *The Vietnam War: The President vs. the Constitution* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1968).

[16] In Locke's words: "This Power to act according to discretion, for the publick good

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many of Lincoln's acts (as did the Supreme Court during the War), so that the constitutional accounting of Lincoln's conduct shows the books in order. It is doubtful that precedents set in the course of civil conflict are immediately applicable in international conflict.

It is in Schlesinger's treatment of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and John F. Kennedy that certain quasi-constitutional standards are smuggled into the argument. Here the discussion is less than convincing.

Roosevelt's orders to the armed forces prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor placed the United States in a state of hostilities with the Axis. Although Congress was not invited to declare a naval war in the Atlantic, Schlesinger offers the odd notion that Roosevelt's extensive consultations within the executive branch and with congressional leaders of both parties showed a "symbolic concern for Congress" which "expressed a lurking sensitivity to constitutional issues."[17] Schlesinger also defends Roosevelt's actions because he had substantial public support (this last is given without citation of public opinion polls).

No sooner has Schlesinger developed the "lurking sensitivity" test to replace the declaration of war, then he abandons it in his discussion of Truman's decision to intervene in the civil war in Korea. Truman ordered troops into hostilities without asking for a declaration of war or even a congressional resolution of support, relying instead on his powers as commander-in-chief to deploy forces according to the June 25 resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Schlesinger is careful to point out the constitutional difficulties with Truman's position, especially noting that the resolution was passed *after* Truman ordered military intervention. But again Schlesinger offers a quasi-constitutional standard to justify the decision: he argues that Truman "consulted fully and candidly with his executive colleagues" prior to making the decision and did not "make his decisions in royal seclusion."[18]

By invoking the test of "full and candid consultation" *solely* within the executive branch (while dropping the vox populis test used with Roosevelt) Schlesinger has developed a standard that can be used to justify Kennedy's actions in the Cuban missile crisis. "Here was the most authentic national emergency since the Second World War" he argues, and thus it was quite legitimate for Kennedy to act decisively without consulting Congress. He did not make his decisions "in imper-

---

without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative." *Second Treatise of Government*, Chapter Fourteen, "Of Prerogative."

17 Schlesinger, *Imperial Presidency*, p. 113.

18 Ibid., p. 134.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ial solitude" but instead consulted with the members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

But was the missile crisis an authentic national emergency? In *Essence of Decision* Graham Allison presents evidence that the secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, did *not* view the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a significant military threat against the United States.[19] Kennedy's advisers differed on the military significance of the crisis. But what they did agree on was that it represented a diplomatic and political crisis for the administration. Failure to act decisively against the challenge would lead foreign allies and domestic supporters of the administration to lose confidence in Kennedy's leadership. One wonders what standards of consultation with Congress should be applied to cover the creation of a nuclear confrontation over what could be argued was essentially a parliamentary crisis.

Even if Schlesinger's test is accepted, one can still ask: Did Kennedy consult fully and candidly within the executive branch? He absented himself from key deliberations of the Executive Committee, preferring to rely on advice from three members who had closest access to him, McNamara, Sorensen, and Robert Kennedy. There is some evidence to indicate that he may have used his brother to make arrangements with the Soviet leadership that were not divulged to members of the committee (not to mention Congress) at the time. Kennedy's most important decisions in orchestrating the blockade seem to have been made in "imperial solitude," especially in playing for more time when it appeared the Soviets would run the blockade.

The "consultation" test offers certain problems, especially if one attempts to distinguish the Kennedy administration from those that followed. What is the *constitutional* distinction between Kennedy's attempt to co-opt members of the Executive Committee, Johnson browbeating his cabinet secretaries, or Nixon retreating to some hideaway and consulting solely with his secretaries of state and defense? Certainly the political scientist studying the decision-making processes may find the differences in each pattern of action to be of utmost importance—but what do these things matter to the constitutional scholar? The Constitution admits neither the Lockean prerogative nor Schlesinger's various versions of consultation: it calls for a congressional declaration of war. Even if one assumes that such declaration can be couched in the form of subsequent ratification or appropriation of funds rather than prior assent, the tests that permit consultation solely within the executive branch appear specious.

[19] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston, 1971), p. 195.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the attempt to fashion a constitutional standard for exercise of the war powers fails, the book nevertheless is quite persuasive in a related argument. What separates the imperial presidents from their predecessors is not simply their isolation from reality and unwillingness to consult with Congress, but also their lack of awareness that they were acting beyond their authority. In effect, Schlesinger's ultimate standard is an application of the *chutzpah* test: "imperial" presidents who violated the Constitution did not show contrition, nor admit the violation, and they did not ask for subsequent congressional ratification of their actions.

The distinction between the different attitudes that lay behind similar transgressions makes some sense. The Constitution cannot admit emergency powers, but the political system can accommodate them. A president who admits his exercise of power and invites ratification by Congress has little to fear from either the Court or Congress, as past history has demonstrated. But if a president uses secrecy and deception to cloak his violations of the Constitution and does not explain, justify, or even admit his actions, and if he operates outside the context of an authentic national emergency—then the checks and balances themselves have been violated. Secrecy in such cases prevents the impeachment process from being used. If a president acts to prevent subsequent discovery of his actions, *that* approach to presidential power should not be forgiven or ratified, and impeachment and conviction are the remedies.

It is not certain where Schlesinger leaves us. His book begins as a constitutional treatise, but the ultimate criteria rest on both constitutional and policy grounds. If the standards applied are not consistent, it still seems that Johnson and Nixon *did* operate in a fundamentally different manner, and Schlesinger is, in the larger political context, correct in drawing the distinctions between them and their predecessors. It is worth the time of anyone interested in the presidency to study his argument and conclusions. His achievements are large (these include a valuable study of the executive privilege doctrine and classification systems), and in taking issue with some of his conclusions, one continues the necessary reeducation in public law which political scientists and historians who make any pretence to competence must undertake.

The Renaissance of Public Law

It seems only yesterday that political scientists were congratulating themselves for transcending the "formalistic" study of the institutions of government. The study of the presidency, we were told, was more than "the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Presidency as an organization, or as legal powers, or as precedents, or as procedures."[20] Instead, it was to be about "the power problem of the man inside the White House."[21] In retrospect, it appears that the two approaches are inseparable; not to discuss the formal powers of the office in dealing with presidential power seems as useful as trying to describe the functions of a railroad train without mentioning the use of the tracks. Legal powers, precedents, and procedures are, if nothing else, part of a president's resources in exercising power, as worthy of study as his tactical prowess. Recent literature demonstrates reawakened interest in legal issues.

Controversies over congressional-executive relations are treated anew from the public law approach in *President and Congress*, by Louis Fisher, an analyst in the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.[22] Fisher has stitched together some of his previously published articles into an informative discussion of legislative, spending, taxing, and war powers.

His approach is balanced and scholarly. He is neither a partisan of Congress or of the president. Especially interesting is his discussion of the delegation of power to administrative agencies, and the checks the legislature retains on administrative action. Readers familiar with Theodore Lowi's argument about such delegations of power in *The End of Liberalism* will be interested in this discussion.[23] There is also much useful information on the taxing powers, especially increased presidential discretion in setting tariffs. And quite useful is the discussion of the Pentagon's discretionary power to transfer funds, a power used to frustrate congressional intent.

The book could have been even better had Fisher omitted his section on the war powers. Many of his suggestive points on taxing and spending powers could then have been expanded; the treatment of the various suggested reforms and the assessment of their utility and viability would have been developed further. Nevertheless, Fisher provides the constitutional and institutional background necessary to an adequate understanding of present controversies, and also provides the detailed sources necessary for further reference. The book is clear enough for use in advanced undergraduate courses. One would hope that the work generated by Fisher would percolate into the comprehensive presidency textbooks used by undergraduates, since those who teach courses in the presidency know that the Constitution is making a comeback in the classroom.

20 Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York, 1960), "Preface" p. vii.

21 Ibid.

22 Louis Fisher, *President and Congress* (New York, 1972).

23 Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York, 1969) especially Part IV, "Beyond Liberalism."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Until such a textbook comes along, the closest thing to a serious, relevant text on the presidency is Rexford G. Tugwell and Thomas Cronin, *The Presidency Reappraised.*[24] It deals with domestic and war powers, and provides selections from scholars such as Tugwell, Pritchett, Fisher, Schlesinger, and Barber. With its publication, as well as the works by Schlesinger and Fisher, we have entered into a renaissance of the public law approach to the study of the presidency. The lessened legitimacy of both the presidency and Congress has led to a crisis of authority in each of the major governmental processes: legislative, administrative, budgetary, and federative. We are once again in times dominated by questions of structure and procedure as well as of policy; for the next few years historians, lawyers, and political scientists will be providing scholarly ammunition for the procedural ploys that often cloak substantive goals. It is useful, then, to remember that procedural consistency has never been the strong suit of practicing politicians, and the positions of protagonists have a way of shifting depending on which party occupies the White House and which party controls Congress.[25]

Moreover, the new fashion in presidential literature may be short lived. Congressional action on a modest budget reform bill has good prospects in 1974, and this will settle some questions regarding impoundment powers. The interest in impeachment issues—at least those on which scholars can shed light—will not last beyond Nixon's tenure. War powers legislation has already been signed into law. The most fruitful areas for inquiry will probably involve issues of executive privilege, classification systems, and invasions of privacy. Nixon's nervy decision to place privacy on the national agenda in the 1974 State of the Union Address should signal renewed interest in the works of Schlesinger, Westin, and Miller.[26]

An End to Anecdotalism?

One of the most intelligent and eloquent White House speech writers, journalist Emmet Hughes, wrote a significant postpartum assessment of the Eisenhower administration in *The Ordeal of Power.*[27] In that book Hughes demonstrated anew the value of the informed, intelligent, personal memoir in presidential literature.

[24] See footnote 3.

[25] Simply consider the switches of Madison and Hamilton from 1787 to 1803, recounted by Leonard White in *The Federalists* (New York, 1965) and *The Jeffersonians* (New York, 1965).

[26] Schlesinger, *Imperial Presidency;* Alan Westin, *Privacy and Freedom* (New York, 1967); and Arthur Miller, *The Assault on Privacy* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1971).

[27] Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power* (New York, 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What a disappointment, therefore, it is to read *The Living Presidency*.[28] This book will interest the informed layman too advanced for *Hail to the Chief*, *God in the White House*, or *America's Ten Greatest Presidents*, and should be of use to anyone who listens attentively to the commentators on network evening news. It offers little that is new or useful for political scientists in the way of sources, case studies, methods, or arguments. Hughes offers a cut-and-paste method that provides: (1) useful trivia for buffs interested in knowing how many chief executives were generals, atheists, etc.; (2) a sampling of quotations from presidential perennials such as Polk, Lincoln, Truman, and Kennedy; (3) passages from standard commentators such as Tocqueville, Bryce, Laski, et al.; and (4) a supplement, the best feature of the book, "The Presidency as I Have Seen It," which offers brief insights into the Oval Office by former operators such as Clark Clifford, Benjamin Cohen, Averill Harriman, and Samuel Rosenman.

Hughes simply is not up to sustained analysis of the presidency. Major emphasis is placed on the study of personality and leadership traits, yet he makes no attempt to work with findings of psychohistorians. His approach implies a rational, one-dimensional presidential personality; if the president is prudent and careful he will avoid excesses and be a wise statesman. But to rely on the president to consciously understand and transcend his limitations is something not intended in the checks and balance system. And in the light of recent findings about presidential personality, to deal solely with the rational presidency is to deal with the tip of the iceberg. To suggest that "the president needs help" meant one thing when Louis Brownlow applied it to Franklin D. Roosevelt; it means something altogether different when applied to Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon.

Hughes's book lacks new case studies of presidential decision making: the material on Korea is presented better in *The Ordeal of Power*, and the findings on Vietnam do not advance beyond those presented by Townsend Hoopes, David Halberstam, and Daniel Ellsberg.[29] The description of the institutionalized presidency deals with trivial aspects: the collective cabinet, the vice-president, and various commissions on executive branch reorganization. Missing are detailed studies of the national security advisor, the joint chiefs of staff, and the secretaries of state, defense, and the treasury.

Hughes fails to discuss the functioning of the presidency in the in-

[28] Emmet John Hughes, *The Living Presidency* (New York, 1972).

[29] Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention* (New York, 1969); David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York, 1972); and Daniel Ellsberg, *Papers on the War* (New York, 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ternational political economy; such a discussion would be especially useful in the section describing the rise of the institutionalized presidency. It would include attempts to protect the value of the dollar as a medium of international exchange, provide raw materials and energy sources for industry and consumers, promote exports, and defend domestic industry against "unfair" foreign competition through trade negotiations. Since successful policy making will involve restructuring what is left of the Atlantic Alliance, works on the presidency must pick up where Neustadt's *Alliance Politics* left off. [30]

Hughes is superbly qualified to undertake this kind of study, as his previous book demonstrated. But instead of a functional analysis, we are treated to anecdotes, and generalizations based on a reification of the institution. Here, for example, is a passage on the president as a leader of public opinion:

> If the man who is President is a national leader both purposeful and persuasive, he catches the strongest light about him, so that witnesses of even dim vision can glimpse it. He then calls the people to see and to know the true time that it is in the day and the history of the nation. And he thus becomes the style of the Republic.[31]

Now what are we supposed to make of that? And which president "becomes" the style of the republic—Jonathan Livingston Nixon?

From the Pharmacopoeia

It is not surprising that the loss of confidence in the institutions of government, now shared by the general population as well as by political scientists, should have led to a revival of reformist literature. And, as usual, when fundamental remedies for political ills are proposed, someone comes along to suggest (a) some form of modified parliamentary system, based on (b) some form of responsible party system. The latest effort to resurrect a quasi-Jeffersonian model comes in the form of a slim polemic, *Presidential Power and Accountability*, by Charles M. Hardin, a political scientist at the University of California, Davis.[32]

Hardin has written an extraordinary tract. A reader must hang on for the ride, since the author is capable, in the space of a twenty-one page chapter, of dealing with the following: MacArthur's drive to the Yalu in Korea, the Tonkin Gulf incident and subsequent American involvement in Vietnam, military bases in Spain, chemical and biological warfare,

[30] Richard Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York, 1970).
[31] Hughes, *The Living Presidency*, p. 115.
[32] Clifford Hardin, *Presidential Power and Accountability* (Chicago, 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the missile gap, and the concept of strategic deterrent. He can also argue, in one page, that responsible party government might have resulted in "manageable" (i.e., better) decisions in each of these policy areas.[33]

Yet Hardin is also capable of extraordinary insights. His Chapter 7, "Greater Resistance to Pressure," which deals with the functions of interest groups in a responsible party system may be the best short comparison of the British and American experience with pluralism now in print. He makes a number of interesting points regarding research by Theodore Lowi, Edward Banfield, and Samuel Beer, and students of comparative government will find this chapter the best in the book.

Finally, Hardin is an imaginative craftsman of constitutional amendments. One almost wishes he had been present at the Constitutional convention to argue the case for legislative supremacy against Madison, Hamilton, and Morris. He develops skillfully the notion that party government *need not mean mandate government.* The only function of responsible parties is to create a government and an opposition—ensuring that each speak with one voice.[34] This point is crucial, because by conceding that parties need not translate voter preference into policy making, Hardin can accommodate himself to the evidence provided by studies on opinion formation, constituency pressures on Congress, and voting behavior. And he can also concentrate on providing a constitutional mechanism to guarantee the creation of a government and an opposition as a result of the presidential election.

The two crucial elements in Hardin's constitutional mechanism are, first, abolition of the nominating convention and its replacement by a version of the congressional caucus; and second, the automatic election of an at-large slate of candidates for the House of Representatives sufficient to ensure the winning presidential candidate of a majority in the lower House.[35] The result is a close connection between the legislative and executive branch as a result of the nominating process, and a working majority for the winning candidate after the election. To form a coherent opposition, Hardin would provide that the defeated presidential candidate be given a seat in the House, and other minor changes in House rules would make him the spokesman of the minority. Finally, Hardin contemplates presidential resignation upon a vote of no confidence, followed by immediate new elections.[36] Other proposals are to abolish both the office of vice-president (bravo!) and the electoral college system. Presidents would be elected by a plurality of the voters.

[33] Ibid., p. 117.
[34] Ibid., p. 169.
[35] Ibid., p. 183.
[36] Ibid., p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One could write a book criticizing each of these proposals separately, or even the notion that parliamentary government might be better than the system we now have.[37] Obviously the critique in a short article can do no more than point out a few difficulties which immediately spring to mind. First, it is doubtful that a system in which a president would automatically receive a majority in the House from members who owe their election to *his* election, could provide a check against excessive use of presidential power. If party discipline were enforced by the White House, it would make the situation worse, not better. Second, the argument that better policies result from the clash of a government and a unified opposition is at least debatable.[38] For one thing, the function of an opposition is to attack from *any* position. Party orthodoxy inhibits the tactical flexibility of the opposition and stifles dissent. Opposition to presidential excesses in both the Johnson and Nixon administrations came, at least initially, from the mavericks in both parties rather than from the mainstream. Finally, the British experience with Suez should prove, if nothing else does, that a responsible party system does not prevent harebrained international adventures: at best it provides for a subsequent check and accounting. One can argue that such an accounting, complete with resignation after a vote of no confidence, is a sensible way to deal with the failure of an administration. But that is not the same thing as arguing that a responsible party system will initially lead to more viable policies. The connection does not seem to exist, either empirically or logically.

What is ironic about Hardin's approach is that it proposes to scrap a system designed to correct the abuse of power—the check and balance system of separated institutions competing for power—just at the time when it seems to be proving its worth. If anything, recent events should demonstrate the utility of an enterprise designed to strengthen centers of autonomous political power. One suspects that if Hardin had his way at the first constitutional convention, some later-day reformer would now be resurrecting the arguments in *Federalist* #51 as the solution for present problems.

[37] A useful critique of the concept of party government is contained in Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* (Urbana, Ill., 1962). A sober assessment of the merits of abolishing the electoral college is contained in Judith Parris and Wallace Sayre, *Voting for President* (Washington, D.C., 1971). A good critique of proposals for parliamentary government is found in Clinton Rossitor, *The American Presidency* (rev. ed.), chap. 8 (New York, 1959).

[38] Hardin's arguments and suggestions about the role of the defeated presidential candidate in leading the opposition are more convincingly presented by Norton Long, "Patriotism for Partisans: A Responsible Opposition," *The Antioch Review*, 12 (December 1952), 448–456, reprinted in Norton Long, *The Polity* (Chicago, 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Research Agenda

In addition to some of the fruitful lines of inquiry discussed above, there are several areas in which research on the presidency might prove productive in the next decade.

First, there is the traditional concern with the role of the president as manager of the economy. In the next few years, fiscal and monetary policies will be set in the context of double-digit inflation and severe economic dislocations. The increasingly erratic role of the president and the executive branch in fiscal policy and wage-price controls needs further examination. Unless precise interdisciplinary studies of the role of the president as economic manager are presented, still another generation of economists and political scientists will propagate the myth, so prevalent in the textbooks, that governmental decision making is rational, coherent, and imbued with "the public interest."

Second, the interactions between the departments, the president, and Congress need more attention in the aftermath of Watergate. It seems that a revival of "departmentalism" is underway. To what extent will the administrative pattern resemble periods such as the Era of Good Feelings, the Whig presidencies, or the period of congressional government after the Civil War? Research will necessarily focus on the Department of State and Department of Defense. Use of the case-study method to determine the extent to which presidential decision making controlled policy making in these departments should be the most fruitful approach.

Third, the relationship between the American economy and the international economy should be studied. Here a functional analysis of the use of presidential power is indicated. To what extent can the presidency initiate the process of reeducation needed by the American people in the context of the energy crisis and the food crisis? To what extent can the president make his constituency more than the multinational industries, so that he can raise the issue of creating new international mechanisms to facilitate trade, investment, and exchange of raw materials on a basis of perceived equity? Is the president interested primarily in redistributive negotiations in creating new mechanisms of exchange, or is he attempting to fashion a new economic order on the basis of efficiency negotiations designed to increase the availablity of industrial goods and postindustrial services to all populations? The events of the past few years seem to mark a turning point in international economic relations, as the pattern established after World War II has lost its political viability. The task for political scientists studying the presidency will be to determine to what extent the president acted as an autonomous force in helping to shape the resolution of present economic con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flicts, and to assess the composition of the constituency to which the president was responsive.

Each of these three areas illustrates one point about the study of the presidency: the current crisis over the abuse of power tends to divert attention from the legitimate exercise of power within the executive branch. While the psychohistorical and public-law approaches to the study of the presidency will flourish in the present climate, there will still be a need for studies of decisional processes and conscious policy making in order to make an accurate assessment of presidential functioning in the context of current international crises. We no longer naively assume that the key to viable policies is the wisdom and temperament of the sort of men we elect to the presidency. But it is still our function, in attempting to make the president accountable to the people, to describe accurately what he does—and why.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Coping: On the Practice of Government *by Daniel P. Moynihan. New York, Random House, 1973.—430 pp. $10.00.*

Not all of us would have the courage to republish our essays of the last decade so that a new audience could assess, after the fact, how right or how wrong we were. Daniel Patrick Moynihan has dug into his file drawers for twenty-two articles written between 1961 and 1973 on subjects ranging from the architecture of government buildings to welfare reform to the tribulations of the New York State Democratic party.

Some of these articles hold up well. "Traffic Safety and the Body Politic," written in 1966, is still a persuasive attack on the automobile industry for putting profits ahead of human lives and on the public and the government for letting them get away with it. "The Automobile and Courts" (1967) remains a cogent indictment of our automobile insurance laws. Other articles, however, only reveal how drastically public problems, or our perceptions of them, change in relatively short periods. In "Nirvana Now" (1967) Moynihan exhorts the reader not to turn a deaf ear to campus protests: "Young people are trying to tell us something." In 1974, even if adults were listening, young people are no longer sure they have anything to say. Indeed, in one essay we meet Mr. Moynihan himself coming full circle. In "The Crisis in Welfare" (1967) he advocates family allowances as an "ideal solution" to the welfare problem and attacks the negative income tax. He also alleges that while the current welfare system is pernicious, "the nation is not likely to do anything much to change it." In a footnote added later, Moynihan acknowledges that he put tremendous personal effort into the Nixon administration's negative income tax proposal for welfare reform, although he should have known the 1967 pessimism was well founded: "There are some things that cannot be done."

All the essays are short and well written. If you are interested in Moyni-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

han or in the recent evolution of policy ideas—especially if you enjoy leafing through old magazines on a rainy Sunday—you will find browsing in this book rewarding. Unfortunately, Moynihan does not leave the reader to browse alone. He provides a ponderous introductory essay that attempts to tie the disparate pieces together and tell the reader what lessons to draw from them.

The first lesson is that the problems of governing a great modern democracy are very hard. There are no easy answers, no quick solutions. The public servant and the policy maker have to take one problem at a time and try to "*cope*" (hence, the title).

The second lesson is that the people who make decisions at the highest levels of government are not always "competent." They make mistakes, are prisoners of their own perceptions, and often fail to evaluate objectively the future consequences of their actions. They are not "fore handed."

The only surprising thing about these lessons is that they appear to surprise Moynihan. A clue to his surprise is found in a highly personal passage in the introduction which reveals clearly that the Irish-Catholic lad who was shining shoes in Times Square on Pearl Harbor Day was immensely awed to find himself on November 22, 1963, sharing another national trauma with the nation's most recognizable names. Moynihan, then an assistant secretary of labor, happened to be at the White House when the news came of President Kennedy's assassination. A decade later he cannot resist impressing us with the historic figures who shared his shock (Bundy went to the phone and said, "This is Mr. Bundy. Get me Mr. McNamara please." This is pure namedropping, we are not told whether Bundy reached McNamara or what he said.) In the hours and months that followed, the former shoe shine boy found out that these demigods did not know all the answers. They were only people—smart, dedicated, hard-working people, who tried to cope, but sometimes did the wrong thing.

In particular, they did not always listen to Moynihan. Immediately after the assassination it was "clear" to Moynihan that the Dallas police could not be trusted and the federal government should take custody of Oswald. He tried to tell "them," but they did not listen. Incredibly, they were all so preoccupied with managing an orderly transition in the White House and avoiding dangers to the United States at home and abroad that they paid no attention to a young Labor Department official expressing his paranoia about Texans. This was the beginning of Moynihan's disillusionment with great men: "I then realized it was possible to grow enormously successful and powerful in America without knowing that the world is a dangerous place." The disillusionment grew and became a negative creed: " . . . [I] had acquired the discipline of not being too much impressed by clever-seeming people. I no longer took competence in government or politics for granted. I had once. I no longer did."

The villains of the book, however, are not clever-seeming people in general, but "liberals." Liberals are held responsible for the ghetto riots ("The sum-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mer of 1967 came in the aftermath of one of the most extraordinary periods of liberal legislation . . . we have ever experienced.") , for the Vietnam war ("Liberals have simply got to restrain their enthusiasm for civilizing others"), for the excesses of the New Left, which Moynihan regards as a liberal heresy, and even for drying up the "wellsprings of emotion" and the "primal sense of community." Says Moynihan, " . . . to the rational liberal, the tribal attachments of blood and soil appear somehow unseemly and primitive. They repress or conceal them, much as others might a particularly lurid sexual interest."

Moynihan never defines "liberal," except to say that liberals are "concerned with values" while conservatives "think about consequences"—which is not very enlightening. In some places "liberals" are intellectuals who do not appreciate the values of the working class. In others, "liberals" are labor union leaders unable to appreciate the virtues of the intellectuals' revenue-sharing proposals because they are blinded by the liberal myth that state and local governments are reactionary. Eventually the reader abandons the search for consistency and realizes that "liberal" is just a convenient designation for those whom Moynihan regards as muddle-headed or wrong.

This is a peevish review, but it is a peevish book. The individual essays have some interest for the intellectual history of our time, but the lessons that Moynihan draws from that history are mainly negative and singularly unhelpful for the future. There are no suggestions, no constructive proposals for better coping. He is just fussing at us all for not having been smarter and more realistic and more fore-handed. Perhaps there was a time when we all needed to be reminded that our system is not run by philosopher-saints, but that time is not now.

ALICE M. RIVLIN
The Brookings Institution

Political Organizations *by James Q. Wilson. New York, Basic Books, 1973.—359 pp. $10.95.*

As we have learned to expect from James Q. Wilson, his latest book is full of insightful observations elicited from well-chosen empirical cases. The questions he addresses have long intrigued political scientists. For example, observers of the American scene since Tocqueville have noted that politically, Americans are a nation of "joiners." While typical contemporary interpretations revolve around political culture, Wilson discusses the larger question of the structural constraints which facilitate or inhibit formation of political associations. Comparing the political structures of England, France, and the United States with the number of politically active voluntary associations in each country, and then making the same kind of comparisons *within* the United States, between machine- and nonmachine-run cities as well as strong-mayor versus weak-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mayor cities, Wilson concludes that there is a direct positive relationship between greater decentralization and dispersion of political authority and the proliferation of voluntary political associations.

Wilson also explores how social structure limits or encourages associational possibilities, asking, e.g., under what conditions lower-class persons will join political associations. The economic, social, and psychological position of the lower-class person sets up a formidable barrier to his participation in political associations: "economically, he cannot afford to defer his gratifications, psychologically, he may be unable to do so, and, socially, he is uncomfortable with unfamiliar surroundings and unfamiliar with comfortable ones" (p. 72). The few political or related associations which have succeeded in inducing lower-class persons to join have had to operate within these tight constraints. The point is aptly illustrated by a case history of the Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization, which at its high point in 1970 had enrolled approximately 4000 welfare mothers in its local chapters by promising—and delivering—to each a direct material benefit within a short time after she had attended her first meeting. Though ingenious in its details, Wilson notes that the MWRO's strategy was not without flaws: after obtaining their benefits or having complaints settled, members tended to drop out. Morever, the strategy was peculiarly vulnerable to government action since it was based on the bureaucracy's own rules.

The difficulties of the MWRO in maintaining itself over time point to another issue. Why is it, Wilson asks, that some political organizations, like NAACP, can grow and continue to flourish for decades while others, like SNCC and CORE, fade quickly from the scene? The answer is to be found in examining the congruence between the incentives for participation the organization offers to its members, the degree of individual member commitment required to maintain the organization and achieve its goals, and the realism of an organization's goals and strategies. The NAACP has persevered so long because early in its history it developed a structure which required little of the average members, permitted flexibility in the incentives employed at the branch level, limited its purposes to fairly specific goals widely approved in the black community, and engaged in campaigns that made it possible to win some short-run victories. By contrast, the organizational features of CORE and SNCC manifested a built-in "suicidal" tendency. Both were "redemptive associations," orienting themselves toward goals which were virtually unattainable since they required a total transformation of society and a total commitment from each member. While for the NAACP, the narrower gap between expectations and payoffs and the higher ratio between goal attainment and personal commitment, produced a sense of ongoing success in the minds of members, the opposite situation bred feelings of frustration in SNCC and CORE members, culminating in a nihilism which destroyed their organizations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wilson also discusses contemporary theorists, Mancur Olson in particular, as well as classical thinkers such as Robert Michels. Wilson's chief quarrel with Olson's "logic of collective action" is that in explaining why organizations do not necessarily emerge spontaneously to represent any aroused or socially important interest, Olson's theory ends by being unable to account for much of the associational activity which does occur. According to Olson, men behave in a rational self-interested manner, which precludes their joining a large organization seeking either a "class" objective or a "public good" since (1) the potential contribution of any single member cannot significantly affect the organization's chances of attaining its objective and (2) should the benefits be gained, the nonmember will enjoy them equally with the member. Wilson points out that the flaws in Olson's argument lie first in his limitation of "rationality" to actions which are rational from the viewpoint of the organization's goals, rather than those of the individual, and second in his implicit characterization of the rational self-interested man as *homo economis*. In thus defining his terms, Olson overlooks such important "rational self-interested" motivations as the desire to augment one's prestige by joining an organization, the desire to fraternize with one's fellows, or the desire to perform acts which give one a sense of "personal moral worth." Theoretically one could broaden the model to include noneconomic motivations such as power, prestige, sociability, and moral purpose. However, while all the relevant parameters of economic choice can be stated in common terms—i.e., dollars—it is difficult to imagine how one could discover how many units of status a person would forego to obtain a unit of power, or what a unit of status is and whether it would remain the same from one person to another or for one person in different contexts.

Wilson's exceptions to Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" are similarly astute. He points out that labor unions are actually a special case of voluntary association: it is only in organizations where the incentives are primarily material—and especially where some form of coercion (such as the closed shop) prevents members from quitting—that leadership will tend to become oligarchical. Where the incentives offered to members are "solidary" or "purposive" either exclusively or in addition to material benefits, member commitment, hence participation, will be high and leaders will be constrained in their actions by the knowledge that disaffected members can always "vote with their feet."

Finally, Wilson presents evidence that far from becoming more conservative as the elites become more solidly established, and more bureaucratic, the converse is often the rule. A shift toward conservatism is likely to reflect a change in the organization's incentive system from "purposive" to "material." The point is underscored when one compares the political stance taken by American "bread-and-butter" unions today relative to more purposive British trade unions, which have managed to retain the aura of a social movement.

Wilson is explicitly wary of general theories since, as he puts it, they tend to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"overpredict the phenomenon in question." As we see it, however, his emphasis on the character of the inducements offered to participants in political organizations, as well as many other more specific points, could easily find a home in the compliance theory set forth in *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations.*

PAMELA DOTY
Center for Policy Research
AMITAI ETZIONI
Columbia University and Center for Policy Research

Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems *by Raoul Berger. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973.—xii, 345 pp. $14.95.*

The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson *by Michael Les Benedict. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973.—x, 212 pp. $6.95.*

Once a subject that elicited only casual attention, impeachment has become a topic of intense journalistic and partisan discussion. It seems almost providential that long scholarly silence on impeachment should have been broken just before the first serious consideration of impeaching and convicting a president in over a century. These two books represent some of the best work done. The authors have set different tasks for themselves, but there are interesting similarities in the books as well.

The reader who is familiar with Raoul Berger's previous work will open the present volume expecting a deeply researched and carefully reasoned discussion, and he will not be disappointed. There is more sense in this relatively small volume than in a score of briefs and statements from the parties in and observers of our present controversy over impeachment. Berger has performed the thoroughly meritorious task of demonstrating convincingly the rich historical meaning underpinning the vague phrases found in the Constitution.

In the best tradition of American legal scholarship, he begins with British usage and traces the development of impeachment in both law and practice on both sides of the Atlantic. The second chapter, "High Crimes and Misdemeanors," struck this reviewer as the heart of the book. Berger argues that the ambiguity of that now famous phrase in the Constitution is merely superficial. In neither Great Britain nor the United States was it intended to be limited to indictable crimes. The fact that the first use of the phrase (1386) substantially predates the use of the term "misdemeanor" in criminal law together with the regular use of the impeachment process by Parliament to discipline servants of the Crown lead Berger to conclude that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" composed a category of *political* crimes against the state. In the United States,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it clearly was intended to fulfill the necessity of having some constitutional procedure whereby a president (or other civil officer) who had committed "great offenses" against the Republic could be removed from office. It was considered to be one more "auxiliary precaution" essential for the preservation of free institutions.

While Berger is firm in his conclusion that the grounds for impeachment are not restricted to indictable offenses, he is equally insistent that the power is not an unlimited one. It is clear that the framers intended the provision to cover malpractice and neglect of duty. As if to suggest another possible ground, Berger quotes Madison with telling effect: impeachment is the proper remedy "if the President be connected, in any suspicious manner with any person, and there be grounds to believe that he will shelter him" (p. 89).

Conceding that the impeachment power is not unlimited and that considerable insight can be gained from a close study of the convention and ratifying debates, it is nevertheless true that what constitutes "great offenses" is still very much in doubt. Berger's own analysis of various impeachment proceedings shows that usage has not gone very far toward establishing greater precision.

That such imprecision still constitutes the greatest problem in understanding the impeachment power is well illustrated by the dramatically different assessments of the Johnson impeachment by Berger and by Michael Les Benedict. Benedict's study, in the useful Norton Essays in American History series, is a valuable example of current revisionist writing. For present purposes, the value of the book lies in three areas. First, his examination of American experience with impeachment and removal before the Johnson crisis is carefully and clearly done. Treatments of the trial have often proceeded from an inadequate understanding of the historical and political precedents for impeachment proceedings. Benedict provides us with a clear synthesis of the situation before the trial. Secondly, he securely places the trial in its political context. There were partisan forces at work, notably hard money versus soft money, far beyond what most analysts consider, and Benedict discusses these in context. But most important, Benedict correctly views the major participants in the trial as antagonists in a great constitutional struggle between the executive and legislative branches.

In Benedict's view what was at stake, and what transcended the more petty concerns of partisanship, was the very nature of the constitutional system. What were the limits of presidential authority? What was the role of Congress in the policy-making process? Benedict's reading of the record causes him to conclude that far from a partisan drive by radical Republicans for congressional supremacy, the intensive struggle had been precipitated by the president himself by claiming and exercising broad new presidential powers. Impeachment was thus a "defensive weapon" against a president whose "great offense" was the bold attempt to redraw the historic boundary between the executive and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legislative branches. This interpretation is a significant departure from the orthodox view well expressed by Berger: "The impeachment and trial of Andrew Johnson, to my mind, represent a gross abuse of the impeachment process, an attempt to punish the President for differing with and obstructing the policy of Congress" (p. 295).

These two books are major contributions to a most timely topic. We appear to be on the verge of a new political understanding of the impeachment power, and both Berger and Benedict have explored in different ways the most fascinating and important aspects of the problem. We are approaching a genuine test of Benedict's proposition that "the only effective recourse against a president who ignores the will of Congress or exceeds his powers is democratic removal at the polls" (p. 180).

LARRY R. MATHENY
Centre College of Kentucky

"God Save This Honorable Court!" *by Louis M. Kohlmeier, Jr. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972.—x, 309 pp. $8.95.*

In His Own Image: The Supreme Court in Richard Nixon's America *by James F. Simon. New York, David McKay Co., 1973.—310 pp. $7.95.*

Much interest has attended the initial terms of Warren Burger's tenure as chief justice of the United States. Indeed, the interest has probably been more pronounced than might naturally be expected when a new chief justice is appointed. Redirection of the Court was promised in campaign statements made by Richard Nixon in 1968 and the announcements which have preceded and accompanied each appointment and attempted appointment to the United States Supreme Court since that time. Such would-be change gains its significance from the activist and generally liberal record the Court compiled during Earl Warren's chief justiceship. Some students of the Court have even queried whether the present period will amount to a constitutional juncture, or turning point, near the order of those symbolized by the succession from Marshall to Taney, from Waite to Fuller, and from Hughes to Stone.

The two books at hand evidence the current interest both in the politics of appointment and in the prospects for change in policy choices which adjustments in constitutional jurisprudence would entail. Both books review the work of the Court through June 1972—that is, through three terms for Burger, two for Blackmun, and a half each for Powell and Rehnquist. The authors, both journalists, develop the expected topics: the "revolution" of the Warren Court; the campaign of 1968; the Fortas affair; the politics of presidential appointment and disappointment; and, important decisions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Substantively, Kohlmeier and Simon find the most noticeable change in the Court to have come in the attitude with which the present majority views protections to be accorded persons accused of crimes. Both note the equally important but more subtle shift in the propensity of the Court to lead in the manner many had come to expect during the Warren era. Kohlmeier errs, however, in overstatement. He finds greater policy changes than the record, perhaps, fairly establishes, and his writing suffers from the tendency to paint images in black or white. There is not very much gray in Mr. Kohlmeier's legal cosmos.

By contrast, Simon's discussion of both personalities and issues is more balanced, and hence more useful for the highly readable political narrative which forms the bulk of the volume. Moreover, his book is the better written. While not approving the policy shifts which have occurred, he draws perceptive contrast between the Burger and Vinson Courts, finding the former considerably more sympathetic to claims of individual liberty than the latter. Much of the contemporary apprehension in certain quarters over the direction of the present Court is, he maintains, a product of perception. "The trouble is that the Burger Court will not be matched up with the Vinson Court, but rather with its immediate predecessor, the Warren Court" (p. 285). The very apparent interest of the ex-president in the Court, moreover, did little to soothe these anxieties. The situation thus seems to be one of disjuncture of image from reality. While Simon does not explore the significance of this separation, there would seem to be important implications for the power base of the Court.

Kohlmeier attempts to do more than Simon, but actually accomplishes less. While his book contains greater amounts of information, much of the volume appears hastily written. Furthermore, his design is grander than the result. Unlike Simon, Kohlmeier tries to relate the political narrative and analysis to a general theory of the role of the Supreme Court in the American political system. The effort is not altogether successful, for he injects critical issues, only to treat them too lightly. In the prologue, for example, he declares, "If the essential humanism of the Constitution is not to be found in the consciences of the members of the Supreme Court and in the wisdom of a Court that is independent of the political majoritarianism of the other two branches, then the nation can seek solutions for its crises only in constitutional amendment or, as it has once before in history, in consummate national violence" (pp. ix–x). Later he says, "the Supreme Court fails the Constitution and the nation when its members take a restrained and subordinate view of their role in government" (p. 19). Yet, he also says that judicial activism may lead to "national disaster, as when the Court has used its power as final arbiter . . . to obstruct or defeat the legitimate leadership of the other two branches in the resolution of large social, economic and political problems" (p. 19). There is conflict here, yet Kohlmeier seems to pass it by.

His book suffers as well from several errors of fact and interpretation. The author reports (p. 55) that 6 percent of black children in the eleven southern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states in 1969 were enrolled in desegregated schools. Statistics released by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in January 1969 indicate that figure to be 20.3 percent. At another point (p. 57), Kohlmeier misreads the record when he asserts that the Court "remained steadfast" during the anti-Court fight in Congress in the late 1950s. In decisions dealing with alleged subversives, the Court did not.

In a discussion of campaign statements (p. 183), Kohlmeier quotes several lines from a campaign speech delivered by President Nixon in 1970: "Dissenters, he said, 'are the same thugs and hoodlums that have always plagued the good people.' " Nixon, however, did not use the word "dissenters." Rather, he said "they," which fairly seems to refer in the text of the speech to "rock throwers and obscenity shouters."

Kohlmeier seems free as well with the use of innuendo. For instance, after describing the appointment of Harry Blackmun, the author writes, "Blacks . . . would see that a strict constructionist from the North bears a striking resemblance to one from the South" (p. 180). Almost nothing Kohlmeier includes in the volume supports such a conclusion about Blackmun.

There is a major technical oversight as well. The text of Chapter 16 contains forty footnote numbers, but a look at the notes themselves reveals only twenty-seven. The last thirteen citations are simply missing from the book.

Clearly, whatever their shortcomings, both books provide contemporary evidence of the continuing tension in American constitutional politics between the Supreme Court as an antimajoritarian institution and the political branches of the government. Moreover, each raises implicitly a question of the relation between periodic shifts in the direction of the Court and the maintenance of judicial power itself. Neither confronts these questions directly; rather, they are skirted in favor of less heady stuff. Furthermore, neither establishes a basis for the conclusion that an overall redirection has yet occurred in our constitutional jurisprudence even though Kohlmeier tries very hard to do just that. One leaves the volume and the past four or five terms of Court with the tentative judgment that the justices are not in the midst of a constitutional juncture; they seem instead to be, collectively speaking, in a constitutional quandary.

D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.
Franklin and Marshall College

The Future of Foundations *edited by Fritz Heimann. The American Assembly, Columbia University. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973.—v, 278 pp. $6.95.*

The Tax Reform Act of 1969 included among its many provisions some that affected the creation and operation of philanthropic foundations. Rightly or wrongly, these provisions were experienced as being restrictive, and inevitably

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they provoked much thought about their justifiability and about the impact they might have on the scope and character of philanthropic activity. Now, more than four years after the passage of the act, responsible people in the foundation world may still deplore some of its provisions, but, as McGeorge Bundy put it in his Review in the 1973 Annual Report of the Ford Foundation, "Our central finding . . . is that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 has given statutory endorsement to a role for private foundations that is sound in itself and consistent with the best of American traditions."

The contributors to this volume, participants in the Forty-first American Assembly at Arden House, were writing their papers in the fall of 1972, when it was not yet so easy to take Bundy's balanced view. There was much worry about the extent of public acceptance of the kinds of criticisms of foundations that are presented in the essay by Jeffrey Hart, a professor of English at Dartmouth College. A few quotations may convey the nature of Hart's argument. At one point he says, "The deep issue concerns the role of the foundations as a kind of shadow government, disposing of substantial political and social power, and using that power in ways that are in fact highly questionable" (p. 47). And after enumerating a number of foundation activities that he finds objectionable, he berates those who "evangelize for social activism in the world of foundations. . . . [T]hey exaggerate the seriousness of our various social difficulties. They falsely suggest, and may even believe, that the activities they propose and sponsor will ameliorate those difficulties—though the reverse is more often the case : . ." (p. 54). Although the large foundations are on occasion also taken to task for not being sufficiently innovative and for being too closely identified with "the Establishment" (eastern variety), hostility from the right tends to be more worrying than attacks by the radical left.

Responses to the kinds of charges made by Hart and others are contained in several of the essays in the present volume. John G. Simon, professor of law at Yale and president of The Taconic Foundation, insists on "the presumption favoring full foundation participation in public affairs activities" (p. 69), though he agrees that legislators should not needlessly be provoked by activities that, in fact or in appearance, deny any inconsistency between charity and politics. Perhaps the most persuasive argument against the restrictions imposed by the Tax Reform Act is made by Boris I. Bittker, Sterling Professor of Law at Yale and a specialist in the field of taxation law, entitled "Should Foundations Be Third-Class Charities?" After examining with great care the presumed abuses that the Tax Reform Act is supposed to prevent, Bittker concludes that these provisions of the act penalizing by taxation the unreasonable accumulation of income rest on the most solid base, while provisions assuming that private foundations are inordinately prone to self-dealing are unwarranted. He also argues that taxes on certain expenditures (specified political activities, unrestricted grants to individuals, and grants to other private foundations without exercise of "expenditure responsibility") have been imposed "not because

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[foundations] are more likely than other exempt institutions to engage in 'the development of trivia into nonsense' (Congressman Patman's label for 'esoteric' research), but because restrictions on their activities are not so readily perceived as inconsistent with the spirit of free inquiry and cultural pluralism" (p. 159). Bittker appreciates the difficulty the foundations had in denying the legitimacy of the legislative objectives and their inclination to live as best they can with the new law, but he deplores the fact that "a consequence of continually focusing on palliatives is that every criticism of the private foundation becomes sanctified and every statutory restriction becomes a plateau; the only remaining issue is whether another step will be taken, not whether the ratchet should be released because the original assumption was fallacious" (p. 162).

The book is weighted fairly heavily toward material dealing with the new legislation affecting foundations and the extent of its justification and of its consequences. But there are also two good articles that give a close-up view of the ways in which a foundation's staff carries out its work and the particular occupational stresses it experiences. H. Thomas James writes from his perspective as the first president of the new Spencer Foundation: he describes his dealings with trustees, his building of a staff, and his developing of a program, and he makes the important point that it is the expertise he and his staff have in a particular professional field (it happens to be education), not their skill "in the fine art of giving money away," that "equips [them] with some useful expertise in investing funds to stimulate inquiry in that field, and that funds so invested may promise larger returns to society than random distribution might offer" (p. 196). And Orville G. Brim, Jr., former president of Russell Sage Foundation, reveals the need felt by people who work in foundations to assess the effectiveness of their grant making and suggests some methods for evaluating them. Since we in the foundations talk so much about evaluation, it is good to get an expert view of how it really should be done. It may be fair to wonder, however, whether the execution of some of the kinds of studies suggested may not do more to advance "evaluation research" than effective grant making, even though some amount of assessment of degrees of success and failure is inescapable.

The volume's title surely claims too much, in that the book does not tell us much about the directions in which foundations are changing, but it does illuminate some of the recent travails that foundations have gone through and some of the perennial problems they face.

ELINOR G. BARBER
Ford Foundation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Building Coalitions: American Politics in the 1970s *by Andrew M. Greeley. New York, New Viewpoints, a division of Franklin Watts, Inc., 1974.—430 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $4.95.*

A political debacle like the McGovern defeat of 1972 leaves those who fashioned it wide open to polemical attack. It also invites scholars to search for what went wrong—whether an ill-conceived strategy, faulty tactics, the managers' and candidate's lack of comprehension of political reality, or their outright disdain for it. After the Goldwater Republican fiasco of 1964, some eloquent diatribes and excellent analysis appeared—which were quickly taken to heart by Republicans, with resultant success.

Now comes Andrew M. Greeley with a combination of polemic and analysis for the benefit of Democrats. His book is at once an unsparing condemnation of the McGovern New Politics and a how-to-do-it guide for putting the Roosevelt coalition back together to win the next election.

The volume is dedicated to Senator Edward Kennedy, and while the senator could not have read it before his celebrated July 4 reunion with Governor Wallace in Alabama that is exactly the trip he would have taken if he had followed its advice. Kennedy can win, says Father Greeley, if he learns how "to listen sympathetically, though not uncritically, to what nonelite America is really saying" and "respond to the hopes and fears, the anxieties and the generosity of those who were both turned off and turned out by the 1972 New Politics" (p. 415). That surely includes the Wallaceites, although this book is focused on other and more important groups—the Catholic working-class "ethnics" (whom the author is careful to distinguish from Wallace's racist following) and Democratic party regulars like Mayor Daley.

The book presents a portrait of the "ethnics," through the medium of public-opinion data, that shatters the media stereotypes. They remain preponderantly Democratic, despite their late defection, and their views on public issues make them ready members of a restored Roosevelt coalition—provided only that those who understand the art of building coalitions regain control of the Democratic party. The ethnics are not bigots, or conservatives. They are about as liberal on race issues as are white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. They are, on the whole, more liberal than Anglo-Saxon Protestants on welfare and anti-poverty issues, and they take a tougher stand on pollution. They are more inclined to be anti-big business and pro-labor. They are against busing and for capital punishment and concerned about crime—but so are the Anglo-Saxons. They were even more strongly against the Vietnam war than were the Protestants. Even their views on abortion are not strikingly different from those of the non-Catholics. The "real stupid bigot," says Greeley, is the intellectual liberal "who does not recognize a potential ally when he sees one" (p. 378).

The successful political leader is one who builds coalitions, makes compromises, avoids coalition-splitting issues and positions, and settles for a moderate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pace of social change, the author argues passionately and with impressive insight. His fourteen "rules of the political game" (pp. 243–245) are well worth pondering by students and practitioners of politics. Unfortunately, those who most need to ponder them, the New Politicians of 1972, are liable to have been turned off long before they reach those pages by the polemical side of Father Greeley's work—by the repetitiveness, bitterness, and scatter-shot character of his attacks upon them. Father Greeley's intolerance is not noticeably less than theirs, and if he "went fishing" on election day in 1972 because the outcome of the Democratic convention did not please him (p. 86), then, they will ask, who is he to talk of what others should do in the interests of party unity and victory?

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST
The Brookings Institution

The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief *by Richard F. Haynes. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1973.—vii, 359 pp., $12.95.*

The book's jacket best describes its purpose: "Since World War II the importance of the military command function of the American presidency has increased dramatically. U.S. chief executives have emerged virtually unchecked as wielders of enormous military power." It is this "awesome power" which has drawn the author to Harry Truman, the first post-World War II commander-in-chief to wield it and to engage in a "presidential war"—at least until the Congress disapproves (now embodied in the War Powers Act), a tradition contrary to the constitutional mandate that the president cannot engage in warfare until after Congress has given its approval. Besides the Korean War, which comprises about half the book, Haynes in what the publisher claims to be the first comprehensive study of Truman as commander-in-chief presents detailed accounts of the following decisions: the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, the establishment of civilian control over atomic energy, and Truman's leadership during the early cold war years. Balanced, well written, and generally carefully reconstructed, Haynes provides a scholarly account of these many decisions and events.

One may on occasion question his judgment, however, as in his conclusions about the use of the atom bombs. Japan, he says, would have surrendered anyway; Truman knew Japan was trying to negotiate a conditional surrender but did not sufficiently pursue this alternative means to ending the war. And having claimed this, military advice to the president notwithstanding, Haynes says that if Japan had been informed that a second bomb would be dropped if it did not surrender within a specified time, "there is little reason to doubt that [Japan] would have submitted" (p. 58)—despite the facts that the Japanese army tried

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to prevent the surrender even after the two bombs, plus the intervention of Russia upon which Japan had relied for mediation, and that it took an extraordinary intervention by the emperor to conclude the hostilities. Another questionable judgment is Haynes's opinion that Truman had to confront the criticisms of his Korean intervention because he did not associate Congress with his action through a resolution. It would be more to the point to say that had Truman achieved a fairly quick and successful end to the war he would have been praised; and no congressional resolution would have saved him any more than it did Lyndon Johnson once the war procrastinated and the opposition increased. The question of the capacity of American democracy to fight long limited wars, whose total casualties over several years are fewer than the people we ourselves slaughter on our highways each year, is not ever raised.

More surprising, however, particularly in a work by a historian, is the failure to deal with the issue of the president's military power and the subordinate congressional role in a historical context beginning in 1940. There is only a short and totally inadequate paragraph condemning both the Destroyer Deal and Lend-Lease as constitutionally improper. And quoting Senator Burton Wheeler on what is constitutional is as inappropriate as the once liberal proponents of presidential preeminence in foreign policy quoting Senator Taft, whom they had rightly earlier denounced as an unilateralist and isolationist, in favor of restraining the president today.

Indeed, Haynes does not touch on the basic democratic dilemma stemming from having to deal with other states to protect the national security in an anarchical state system. This dilemma is that on the one hand, if the president accumulates enough power to act with the necessary authority, dispatch, and secrecy to protect the nation he might become so powerful that he will erode the restraints on his power which were intended to preserve the constitutional nature of the American polity. On the other hand, if the president is limited sufficiently to protect American democracy the danger is that he might also become so enfeebled that he will not be able to effectively defend the nation's interests.

Finally, it is disappointing that Haynes basically neglects domestic politics. While rightfully regretting Truman's decision to invade North Korea after Inchon, the author ignores the pressures on the administration after Chiang's demise and the McCarthyite accusations of "softness on Communism," which played a role not only in the crossing of the 38th Parallel but in Truman's inability to sign a peace reaffirming the *status quo ante*—a peace acceptable only to an Eisenhower who could not be accused of appeasement.

JOHN SPANIER
University of Florida

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, Volume III: Governor of Illinois, 1949–1953 *edited by Walter Johnson with Carol Evans, assistant editor. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1973.—xiii, 621 pp. $15.00.*

This third volume of *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson* covers his life in Springfield as governor of Illinois, excluding papers pertaining to his nomination and his subsequent campaign for president in 1952. The governorship was the only important elective office that Stevenson ever held. It was a period of great and rapid political advancement. When he took office in January 1949, he was a political unknown outside of his own state—and very little known within its borders. In barely three years he was presented as a presidential possibility on the cover of *Time* magazine, for January 28, 1952. The *Papers* give some clues as to how this rapid rise occurred.

It is worthy of note that Stevenson, whose interest had been principally in the field of international affairs, devoted his term as governor strictly to local matters. His speeches, which include many lengthy messages to the legislature, only touch on foreign affairs when the occasion demanded, as in his Founder's Day address at Northwestern University (pp. 358–367) when he was specifically asked to speak to this subject.

His national recognition came from the breath of clean fresh air he brought to Springfield. Traditionally, state governments have not attracted first-class people in depth, but Stevenson was determined to build the finest governmental team in the country. Due to his own quality and sincerity, he was able to bring to Springfield an extraordinary group of brilliant, high-minded, and ambitious young men. The best proof of this is in the positions they later achieved. Despite Stevenson's defeat for the presidency, his Springfield group went on to become national figures of great distinction, including two cabinet officers, one federal judge, a chief justice of the Supreme Court of the state of Illinois, an ambassador, a college president, and the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, not to mention the mayor of Chicago!

With his strong group of associates, he was able to make many important administrative changes, such as a reorganization of the Department of Insurance, and modernization of the police structure, but he was faced with constant opposition from a hostile state legislature, with an intractable Republican majority in the senate for both sessions. But despite his frustration with the legislature, he was able to leave a lasting and constructive mark in the state government.

His national reputation was based as much on what he said as what he was able to do. During this period, he developed that eloquent power of expression, combining succinctness and common sense with humor, which was to have so much influence in his later career. Probably his best-known writing was a trivial bit of humor—his veto of the so-called Cat Bill. This bill would impose fines on owners or keepers who permitted their cats to run at large off their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

premises. His veto contained the classic statement, "It is in the nature of cats to do a certain amount of unescorted roaming" (p. 73), which is still widely quoted.

An early draft of the Cat Bill veto had been sent to Stevenson by his dear friend, Lloyd Lewis, who died suddenly that same day. Stevenson came up to join in the memorial service on the banks of the Des Plaines River, and gave a deeply moving address, one of his finest (p. 72).

In preparing this volume, the editors have done an excellent job in providing the connecting thread that pulls together the narrative of the Springfield years. For the sake of completeness, considerable material of only minor interest is included, so that most readers will find much which can be advantageously skipped, or at least skimmed. However, they will be assisted in this by the excellent index, so it is possible to spend a few hours profitably and pleasantly, getting a picture of a happy and fascinating interlude in the usual mediocrity of state politics.

HERMON DUNLAP SMITH
Chicago, Ill.

The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946 *edited by John Morton Blum. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1973.—x, 707 pp. $15.00.*

The Rise and Fall of the People's Century *by Norman D. Markowitz. New York, The Free Press, 1973.—xi, 369 pp. $8.95.*

The reputation of Henry A. Wallace, severely damaged by his quixotic and foolish campaign for the presidency in 1948, has undergone some restoration as the result both of recent biographical studies and of changes in the climate of opinion associated with the easing of cold war tensions. In varying degrees and in different ways, the books reviewed here reflect this more benign attitude.

At the initiative of Mrs. Wallace, John Morton Blum was given access to Henry A. Wallace's diary, which will be closed to others until November 1975. Based on these and other materials, Blum has prepared a fine edition of the diary together with a thoughtful and sympathetic evaluation of Wallace's character, ideas, and career. Concise introductory headnotes and helpful footnotes assist the reader in identifying various issues, individuals, and situations.

The first section of the diary covers the period from February 1942 to July 1943 during which Wallace, as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, fought with Cordell Hull and Jesse Jones for control of the procurement of strategic materials overseas. The period ended with the abolition of the BEW and the defeat of the Wallace policies. The second section covers the period from August 1943 to January 1945, which includes Wallace's visit to Soviet Asia and China,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his failure to regain the vice-presidential nomination in 1944, and his appointment as secretary of commerce in 1945. The final section covering the period from April 1945 to September 1946 deals with Wallace's concern for problems of postwar reconversion and economic planning and reflects his increasingly fervent and public opposition to the "get tough with Russia" policies of Truman and Byrnes. It was this opposition, of course, which led to his forced resignation from the cabinet in 1946.

Throughout these years Wallace viewed himself, and was viewed by others, as a spokesman for liberal internationalism. In Blum's words "he was determined . . . to stir the blood of democrats everywhere, to prophesy, as he did, the coming century of the common man" (p. 26). He saw no conflict, as Roosevelt did, between "Dr. New Deal" and "Dr. Win the War" and consistently held to the view that planning for peace was an essential element in achieving victory in war. Wallace argued for a United Nations endowed with extensive power and responsibilities, opposed British imperialism and balance-of-power international politics, and felt that the key to postwar peace was a cordial relationship with Russia. Domestically, Wallace opposed the big-city Democratic bosses, favored "genetic democracy" and civil rights, believed in government planning for full employment, and urged the development of "economic democracy," a concept which he believed was somehow institutionalized in the Soviet Union.

As the cold war grew in intensity, he came to believe that American "fascists" were determined to start a war with Russia and, as Blum says, "for several years his passion overcame his practicality" (p. 48) and led him in 1948 to the imprudent decision to seek the presidency under the banner of the Progressive party. While acknowledging Wallace's "blindness to Russian tyranny" and his "indifference to the debilitating tactics of Communists within the Progressive Party," Blum, as the title of his book suggests, concludes that Wallace was a man of "extraordinary foresight" because he feared the growing influence of the military-industrial complex, anticipated some of the dangers of unilateral military intervention, and was concerned about the effects of balance-of-power politics upon the United Nations. In sympathizing with the need for social and economic progress in Latin America and in maintaining that communist ideology "did not constitute an insuperable hurdle to communication," he was, asserts Blum, "a man far ahead of his times" (pp. 48–49).

It is difficult to share all of Blum's judgments about Wallace. One can recognize that he had typically American qualities of "practical intelligence" and "transcendental faith" (p. 3) without admiring the shallow rhetoric of his speeches, the superficial quality of his political thought, and the prejudiced character of some of his attitudes. More to the point, the Wallace/Blum view that Truman's policy of containment of Soviet power in Europe was based on unwarranted assumptions about Soviet intentions cannot, I believe, be supported. Blum himself admits that "In the absence of access to the Soviet archives there can be no sure assessment of Wallace's case" (p. 47).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Norman Markowitz's monograph seeks to analyze Wallace's ideas and actions both in terms of chronological development and in the context of American liberal thought. His narrative deals primarily with the years covered by the Wallace diary, but he also discusses the Progressive party campaign of 1948 and briefly describes Wallace's last years, during which Wallace modified many of his earlier opinions.

Markowitz is concerned principally with understanding Wallace's ideas. While sympathetic to the humane aspects of Wallace's progressivism, Markowitz argues that "Wallace's career also displayed the poverty and ultimate emptiness of social liberalism" (p. 3). Failing to recognize the class nature of political power and failing to understand the inherent contradictions of liberal thought in an advanced capitalist society, Wallace's "people's century . . . was nothing more than a fascinating and courageous false consciousness" (p. 328). Furthermore Wallace's "humane liberalism" was seriously dependent on the "Roosevelt personality cult," frequently corrupted by the "corporate liberalism" of other New Dealers, and ultimately overwhelmed by the "cold war liberalism" of such "crack pot realists" as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Markowitz acquits Wallace, however, of the charge of "Open Door" imperialism made by recent New Left critics and, along with Blum, questions the authenticity and significance of many of the so-called "Dear Guru" letters.

Though Markowitz did not have access to the Wallace diary, he did make use of the Wallace papers, as well as many other primary sources. Thus, his narrative is based on solid foundations and when read in conjunction with the diary illuminates many of the issues and events of the period. Blum accurately describes this monograph as an "informed but doctrinaire interpretation" (Blum, p. 39n.).

ROBERT F. CAMPBELL
Clark University

Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal *by Frank Freidel. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1973.—x, 574 pp. $15.00.*

Professor Frank Freidel has written another excellent book in his series on Franklin D. Roosevelt. This volume covers the nine-month period from the 1932 presidential election through approximately those first 100 days. In the manner of a craftsman weaving a complex tapestry, Freidel has carefully interlaced the development of Roosevelt's domestic program with his assertion of leadership in foreign affairs.

There are few surprises. Roosevelt is seen as a cagey politician; a cautious president-elect, anxious to maintain his alternatives; a dynamic and innovative president, cajoling Congress and craftily dealing with allies. It is a sympa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thetic portrayal. While some admonishment is gently tendered toward Roosevelt's "bombshell" diplomacy, the picture that unfolds is one of a courageous, skillful and forceful leader, a man who "had established himself as a spectacular figure, far out of the usual run of Presidents" (p. 499). Even Roosevelt's early vacillation as president-elect is viewed as beneficial for his subsequent maturation as a strong national leader (p. 305).

In the preinaugural period Freidel suggests that Roosevelt had not yet worked out his plans in great detail. As a consequence, he avoided taking public stands, sidestepping President Hoover's attempts at policy coordination. Rexford Tugwell and most particularly Raymond Morley, emerge as the president-elect's major policy advisers (although it should be noted that Freidel depends heavily on their diaries, letters, and other writings in documenting this influence). After he becomes president, a quite different impression emerges. Roosevelt literally directs the special session of Congress: sending dramatic messages to the Hill, drafting bills to be introduced by his lieutenants, and then lobbying effectively for their passage. Unlike Hoover, he carefully maintains his flexibility, allowing Congress to contribute to and in some cases even modify his proposals. And parenthetically, he withholds patronage until the end of the session.

Freidel extends this "lion and fox" image to foreign affairs in describing Roosevelt's initial skirmish with Hitler and his international economic moves. He analogizes Roosevelt's diplomacy to that of a yachtsman who steers as steady a course as the winds would allow (p. 454). In an extended discussion of his sabotaging of the World Economic Conference in London, Freidel shows how the president consistently undercut and failed to advise his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, even sending Morley as a kind of personal envoy to London. But in the end, Morley too was left holding the bag.

Freidel's emphasis on the president's relations with those around him provides insight into Roosevelt's operating style, his use of people to achieve flexibility and to maximize his options. The reader, however, has to draw his own psychological inferences. Freidel does not explain what Roosevelt says and does on the basis of personality. Rather, he sees politics and ideology, men and ideas, as shaping the critical decisions and actions of this period.

Incidentally, the term "men" should be taken literally. Whereas some recent authors have stressed the women in Roosevelt's life (such as Joseph P. Lash, Elliott Roosevelt, and James Brough) Freidel is clearly concerned with the men. He devotes approximately three pages to Roosevelt's appointment of the first woman cabinet officer, Frances Perkins (pp. 155–158), and then mentions her only infrequently thereafter. There is just one chapter on Eleanor Roosevelt. It deals largely with her innovations in the White House: the serving of beer, the smoking of cigarettes by women, and the holding of her own press conferences. Though Freidel states, "it was generally assumed that Mrs. Roosevelt had influence on her husband . . . " (p. 295), he cites very few examples of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this influence (pp. 296, 478–479). This peculiarly segregated treatment of Mrs. Roosevelt suggests by its emphasis as well as its omissions that even "A Most Extraordinary First Lady" (the chapter title) had little effect on the development of the president's programs and policies, at least as Freidel describes them during this nine-month period.

Despite his failure to deal with the more intimate aspects of Roosevelt's personal needs and familial pressures, Freidel does successfully convey political motivations. He has written a good history: detailed, cogent, lucid, and thoroughly documented. Its value lies not only in its description of how the New Deal was launched but how a new presidency was begun. For it was Roosevelt's personal assertion of power, his combination of political finesse and awesome mystique, that augured the great potentialities of the office. Those first 100 days were but a prelude of things to come.

STEPHEN J. WAYNE
The George Washington University

Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis *by William H. Harbaugh. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.—xvi, 648 pp. $15.00.*

This is an admirable legal biography, especially impressive when one considers the difficulties Professor Harbaugh faced when he began it more than fifteen years ago. Davis offered little intellectual substance to analyze, once having freely conceded that he "never had any interest in the philosophy of the law" (p. 413). Then, too, his public career climaxed rather suddenly, in the disastrous presidential campaign of 1924, after which his life—according to one observer—was mere "epilogue" (p. 266). Finally, access to the records of his last three decades, practicing law in New York, was necessarily constrained by the requirement of confidentiality between client and counsel. Though so limited, Harbaugh has managed very well to place Davis in "both historical context and historical perspective" and to present "Davis the man" (p. ix), in graceful prose that conceals laborious research.

Davis was a man with a passion and a genius for lucid, elegant advocacy—"just a law lawyer," it was said, unlike his policy-oriented brethren in the corporate bar (p. 263). His talents as an advocate were quickly recognized in his native West Virginia and then in the House of Representatives, and earned him applause as solicitor-general from 1913 to 1918. In that position and later as ambassador to Great Britain, Harbaugh shows, Davis sometimes doubted the views he advanced, but—having learned to suppress a fiery temper—he seemed content to be thought of as a skillful technician, without moral fervor or enthusiasms. In 1922 he turned down a Supreme Court nomination, preferring the lucrative Wall Street practice that he had commenced a year earlier. Subsequently, his inherited "Jeffersonian" principles appeared to converge with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interests of his clients. His opposition to the New Deal and his defense of segregation in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* went deep, Harbaugh makes clear.

Appropriately, for one who has written a sympathetic study of Theodore Roosevelt, Harbaugh does not hesitate to censure Davis. He could be "chillingly insensitive" to social distress (p. 342); his "bedrock conservativism" (p. 233) primarily reflected concern for "the freedom of the entrepreneur" (p. 417). Still, it is apparent that Harbaugh is as fascinated as Learned Hand confessed he was by Davis' "eloquence and charm" (p. 405), and perhaps therefore has softened some of his judgments. He is not fully persuasive, for example, in suggesting that Davis—who earlier had counted himself among those "who resent all immigration in general and that of the Russian Jew in particular" (p. 118)—simply "acquiesced" in the exclusive hiring patterns of his New York law firm (p. 254). Nor is he convincing that there is much to be said for Davis' overall record on civil liberties.

Davis' career also raises larger issues. Seemingly in accord with the argument that Davis' concept of advocacy was flawed, to the advantage of large business interests (pp. 57, 201–203), Harbaugh records few examples of such skepticism within the professional community. Partly because of his occasional public-service cases, Davis came to be acclaimed almost universally as the worthiest of elder statesmen of the law. (As late as 1962, his celebrated apologia of 1924 furnished the inspirational motto of *The Case for Courage*, by William M. Kunstler.) Why this should have been so when criticism of the American advocacy system had been growing in some quarters ever since David Dudley Field served Gould, Fiske, and Boss Tweed in the 1870s, is of course a question well beyond the scope of Harbaugh's book. Not the least of the merits of *Lawyer's Lawyer* is that it will provoke further inquiry and thought. Anyone interested in American law and lawyers must read it.

STEPHEN BOTEIN
Harvard University

Woman's Consciousness, Man's World *by Sheila Rowbotham. Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1973.—xvi, 136 pp. $1.95.*

Socialist analysis of the women's movement has not been especially inventive, concentrating as it has on the exploitation of women as a special case of the exploitation of labor by capital. According to the familiar argument, the economic vulnerability of women produces an exacerbated instance of a general condition. In recent times we have been witnessing a reaction against this oversimplification. That the experience of women affords not simply a more egregious illustration of capitalist oppression but rather a useful point of departure for the reexamination of doctrinaire socialism itself is an idea being promoted by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more adventurous radical feminists. England has had an articulate advocate of this position in Sheila Rowbotham, out of whose earlier *Women, Resistance and Revolution* this book grew.

Though *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World* attempts to combine the deeply personal with the political, the author's youth makes this difficult. Barely out of her twenties, she lacks the range of experience to bridge the two realms as effortlessly as a Simone de Beauvoir. Nor does she more than perfunctorily acknowledge those contradictions between political beliefs and private emotions that every self-respecting feminist takes as the starting point for an honest confrontation with social reality. (It is by doing precisely this that Kate Millett's autobiographical *Flying* enhances the interest of *Sexual Politics*.) Despite these cavils, the book moves with logic and gathers impact as it explores in turn the differences between the family mode of production and commodity production, the role of these differences in shaping the contrasting outlooks of men and women, and the resulting masochism governing the behavior of women both inside and outside the home. Crime and violence are seen as the male's psychological release in the face of exploitation; in contrast, the female resorts to neurosis rather than criminality.

Thus Rowbotham links feminine passivity, the genesis of which is examined in the earlier autobiographical sections, with the "lack of wage militancy" (p. 94) which divides men and women at crucial moments in the battle against capital. Using the example of the Leeds clothing strike of several years back, Rowbotham points to the problems which arise even when women are able to summon the fervor to strike. The skilled male labor that had supported the women's strike was in the course of the alliance revealed to be earning more than twice what the women were earning. The women's hostility in the face of this blatant inequity produced division among the strikers. And when men, alternately, have resisted the entrance of women into traditionally male occupations there is further erosion of the solidarity that might make possible a proper recognition of the value of women as producers.

Yet it is not so much Rowbotham's quarrel with the degraded status of women as it is her conviction that attitudes of women in the labor force "often have a progressive human content which is completely unharnessed" (p. 101) that is the basis for her socialist revisionism. Because of the unique vision women have acquired in their dual lives as homemakers and participants in the working world, they are singularly equipped to challenge some of the economic assumptions by which men themselves have so long been tyrannized. Rowbotham is acute in her perception that male-dominated capitalism increasingly requires of the individual a schizoid loyalty to disciplined work habits and untrammeled consumption, and that it is abetted in this by the standardization of sex roles. However, Leninism is in its own way no less subject to shaping by the dominant group within its ranks—men. A revolutionary socialism, according to Rowbotham, would for this reason reject it almost as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

emphatically as it rejects capitalism in the interests of a more humanized society.

ANNETTE K. BAXTER
Barnard College, Columbia University

Party and Opposition: Congressional Challengers in American Politics *by Jeff Fishel. New York, David McKay Company, Inc., 1973.—xviii, 254 pp. Cloth, $7.95; paper, $3.95.*

This new study by Jeff Fishel is intended to be an assessment of the possibilities and limitations of electorally based opposition in the United States. It is therefore a welcome addition to the existing literature on both political recruitment and Congress—indeed, it serves as a link between them.

The study is based upon a series of mailed questionnaires to all candidates in the 1964 election for the House of Representatives, open-ended interviews with many of the elected challengers ("the class of 89"), and roll-call and electoral analysis for the period 1965–1970. The issues dealt with range beyond the standard "social background and representation" formulation to include also questions of ideology, ambition, campaigning and campaign financing, committee assignments, performance in office (including assessments of the roles and options of freshmen representatives), strategies for "maximizing electoral investments" by policy-oriented groups, and even, briefly, the possible future of Congress. There are sufficient policy implications to elicit a foreword by Allard K. Lowenstein.

The treatment is judicious, with liberal use of tables and quotations, so as to satisfy both methodologists and nonmethodologists. No statistics more elaborate than percentage distributions are employed—probably a wise decision, considering the noninterval character of much of this data. The writing is generally lucid—a major achievement for academic social science—although it suffers from occasional attacks of cuteness.

Fishel has appended an excellent methodological chapter, which would be of value for classroom use. It includes discussions of mailed questionnaire techniques, direct elite interviewing, and (briefly) appropriate data-analysis techniques. There is also a useful bibliography.

Any quibbles this reviewer has revolve about a tendency to overgeneralize upon this fairly limited empirical basis. Since only one year was analyzed, there is of course no time dimension; unfortunately, serious questions can be raised as to how "typical" 1964 actually was. Although Fishel recognizes these dangers in Chapter 1, they receive insufficient attention in the subsequent analysis. Many of the hypotheses advanced to explain why Republican challengers often did not fit the same patterns as Democratic ones could perhaps have been more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parsimoniously treated by testing whether "hopeless" districts (of which there were many in 1964 for Republicans) attracted a different sort of challenger than did competitive districts. Similarly, since 37 percent of the newly elected Democrats lost in 1966, as opposed to only 7 percent of the new Republicans, it might have been interesting to analyze the differences between the "re-winners" and the "losers" (with the "one-time winners" forming an intermediate group?). Indeed, throughout this book, the analysis tends to assume that all winners were running against all losers. There is also no attempt to match candidates with district (or even with regional) characteristics.

In addition, primaries are still not incorporated, which gives an incomplete picture, particularly since there are so many one-party districts. The perceptual data are subject to bias (such as Kingdon's "congratulation-rationalization" effects), since they were collected after, not before, the elections. And the data do not deal at all with some of the most interesting portions of the theory. For example, Fishel provides little evidence that candidates are actually receiving the incentives that he postulates are offered by the parties. Indeed, his treatment is limited throughout by the absence of personal interviews with losing challengers.

In all, however, these are minor objections, which are sure to be answered in later studies upon this subject. Fishel's work, by taking an important area, placing it in context, and recognizing (if not always fully answering) most of the crucial questions, should be an invaluable "jumping off" point.

RAISA B. DEBER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Deceived Majority: Politics and Protest in Middle America *by Gordon Fellman in association with Barbara Brandt. New Brunswick, N. J., Transaction Books, 1973.—265 pp. $9.95.*

The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, inaugurated by the 1956 Federal Highway Act, is now virtually complete. Some 40,000 miles of new roads have been built, with 90 percent of the cost paid for by the federal government. This is surely an unparalleled example of business and government at work together, with the apparent support of the majority of Americans. The businesses are, of course, the "highway lobby," consisting among others of the auto, petroleum, trucking, and construction industries for whom new and better highways mean increased demand for cars, fuel, trucking, and construction. But the huge swaths of new road have to go somewhere and, in urban areas, the somewhere usually turns out to be not the neighborhoods of the well-to-do, but of poor and working-class people. This book is a study of what happened among the residents of one such working-class area in Cambridge

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when their homes were scheduled for demolition to make way for a section of the Boston Inner Belt Highway.

It is hard to think of a better case through which to examine the American political process from the bottom up. Ordinary working-class people were threatened with what must have seemed to many of them almost total loss: of the homes they had painstakingly improved over the years, of kin and friends, of neighborhood. And lined up on the other side were the classic villains of American politics: the state and federal bureaucracies that planned the road, and the highway lobby that breathed life and funds into the bureaucracies.

Fellman and Brandt examine this particular struggle of a neighborhood against the highway power structure by participant observation of neighborhood activities over a number of years while the highway plans were pending, supplemented by a survey of residents. They quickly establish that most people were attached to their homes and neighborhood, and did not want to leave, and their description of the neighborhood and of the feelings of the residents is written with warmth and simplicity.

The authors are more interested, however, in the efforts of residents to fight the Inner Belt, which took form largely in neighborhood protest meetings, letter writing, and petitions. They discover that, while three-fourths of the people in the area were vigorously opposed to the road, only one-third attended protest meetings or hearings, and only 10 percent attended such meetings regularly. The authors go on to account for what they consider to be a low level of participation by presenting data on the political attitudes of residents. About half of those interviewed seemed to feel that government did not care about the problems of individuals, and half also believed that opposition was useless. Fully 45 percent agreed with the statement "I have no influence at all." And more than half the residents did not know the position taken on the road by twenty-five of a list of twenty-seven individuals and institutions important in the highway fight. Finally, when residents and their leaders did talk about the actions they could take to stop the highway, they emphasized personal appeals to important officials, mainly in the form of letter writing.

The significance of these findings in the authors' view is the political alienation that is revealed, and fully half the book is devoted to speculations about the features of the American political structure that produce alienation and ignorance among "middle Americans," the deceived majority. Their discussion suffers by attempting to be too broad and therefore becoming sketchy and disjointed. Continuous resort to condemnation and exhortation does not make it more convincing.

There are flaws in the case study as well. Most obvious, the authors consider that a participation rate in meetings of one-third is low. Yet, by almost any standard of comparison, it is extraordinarily high; even 10 percent is exceptional. One would expect that if any political issue would galvanize people, the threat of removal from their homes would be such an issue. And this seems

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to have happened. Given their data, the authors could have more reasonably speculated that even political alienation can be overcome when politics takes on urgent and immediate meaning for people.

The second major flaw has to do with the outcome of the highway struggle. The authors treat their case as an example of the abuse of ordinary people by government and the "rich and powerful class" that government reflects. This is true enough, most of the time. But the Inner Belt was stopped. Indeed, Massachusetts declared a moratorium on all highway construction. This was an extraordinary reversal of the usual successes of the highway forces, and we ought to know how it happened. But the authors pay little attention to the victory, dismissing it as incidental—the result of efforts by more influential people, such as sympathetic academics—in no way interfering with their generalizations about the political ineffectiveness of working-class people. It is not that these generalizations are incorrect; it is rather that this particular case was different, suggesting that ordinary people may occasionally win (partly by prodding more influential people to act on their behalf). When that happens, it is worth understanding why.

In short, the virtues of this book are that it deals with a potentially revealing example of class politics in America, reported in refreshingly simple language, with sympathy for the people involved. Its failures are in its analysis, both of the political system that produced the highways, and of the efforts of neighborhood people to resist.

FRANCES FOX PIVEN
Boston University

Black City Politics *by Ernest Patterson. New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1974.—x, 310 pp. $5.95.*

This book in the words of its author "reflects a black man's concern about the powerlessness of black Americans" (p. ix). In his analysis of black urban politics Ernest Patterson examines the often frustrated past attempts of blacks to gain meaningful participation in urban government and he proposes specific institutional and structural changes designed to make city government legitimate to black residents. Focusing on both electoral and protest politics, Patterson details the efforts of blacks to "open up" the decision-making process so that by gaining political power blacks may overcome economic inequality. Although his analysis centers mainly on black politics in St. Louis, Patterson also touches on black efforts to correct the unresponsiveness of government in such cities as Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Cincinnati. He focuses on various types of black politicians ranging from those who were chosen and supported by the white establishment and were reflecting their standards, to the activist leaders emerging in the 1960s who are responsive to the black com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munity. In addition, he notes municipal obstructions to black advancement in the form of ethnic polarization, the increasing unionization of public employees, and the expanding power and militancy of civil service unions. He also discusses the crucial factor of timing in regard to the in-migration and density of the black population which partially determine the speed with which blacks win elective offices in cities.

Patterson warns that the powerlessness of blacks will lead to dire consequences if urban government fails to become responsive to the needs and aspirations of the black community. Appealing to blacks, he calls for the effective use of the vote and the establishment of urban political power-seeking organizations to lobby vigorously for black demands. Appealing to the entire urban population, he advocates the formation of natural neighborhood communities, and the encouragement and maintenance of business-industrial location in the central cities. Also, to facilitate the entry of blacks into politics, Patterson urges a return to the partisan small ward system in those cities which have replaced it with the nonpartisan at-large system. Finally, cautioning blacks against coalition politics, he notes that traditionally black-white alliances tend to blur the distinction between the self-interests of the oppressed and the oppressor.

This book is a very readable and thought-provoking account of black urban politics largely mirrored in the politics of St. Louis. Although Patterson offers no new strategies for the attainment of political power by blacks, he does draw together and delve into various measures which have previously been advanced in whole or in part by others, such as Charles V. Hamilton, Hanes Walton, and Milton Kotler, thereby serving to reinforce the merits of these earlier proposals. While alluding to the fact that economic change will follow political change, Patterson does not venture beyond the structural and institutional reforms which will produce black political power, to the crucial substantive public policies which will diminish economic inequality once political power is attained. Thus he leaves the reader pondering the next step. On the whole, however, Patterson's careful analysis of black attempts to gain power in St. Louis, in its historical context, is an important addition to the growing body of knowledge about the struggle surrounding the emergence of black politics in America.

SHIRLEY E. OSTHOLM
York College, City University of New York

Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking *by Leon V. Sigal. Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath and Company, 1973. xiv, 221 pp. Cloth, $11.50; paper, $4.50.*

In the opening portions of *Reporters and Officials*, Dr. Sigal, a staff member of the Twentieth Century Fund, takes a close look at news reporting, using the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* as illustrations. He covers such

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

basic aspects as the nature of "news," the influence of organizational structures in the press and government on newsmaking, and the characteristics of common news sources. Unlike many social scientists who discuss such questions from an abstract, normative, or reformist point of view, Sigal takes a realistic, practical approach, describing what actually occurs. For instance, he explains how small staffs make it impossible to provide full coverage of newsworthy events in most parts of the United States and abroad. Limited news staff dispersal leads to disproportionately heavy coverage of routine beats in Washington, D.C., and a few foreign and domestic news centers. Scarcity of news space, particularly on the front pages of the *Times* and *Post*, produces strains within news organizations as editors of international, national, and metropolitan news compete for prominent coverage of their stories. Sigal describes the time constraints which impede thorough news analysis. Stringent deadlines must be met to get the paper out on time and many stories must be completed early to assure a steady flow of copy to the composing room. Competition among papers may force editors to cover unwanted stories merely because rival papers are carrying them.

After unraveling the inner workings of newsmaking and news reporting, Sigal turns the focus of attention on the symbiotic relationship between government officials and newspapers. This is the most unique and interesting part of the book. Sigal shows that government officials need the press as much to accomplish their political objectives as the press needs officials to provide it with news stories. Internal communication systems linking the many branches and agencies of the federal government are inadequate. Consequently, public officials must use the press to disseminate information to their colleagues.

But the press is far more than a mere conduit for information. It is a tool for political manipulation of politicians and publics. Officials use the press to rouse and attract potential supporters and workers for particular policies. An example, discussed in detail, is the effort of the United States Air Force to publicize and thereby kill plans for the abandonment of the Skybolt missile program. Public officials also solicit newspaper publicity to force rival political leaders to take stands on issues on which they would like to avoid commitment and to make or break the reputations of people in power by linking them to controversial activities, viewpoints, or future plans. Disgruntled officials, who often are afraid to express their dissent through bureaucratic channels, find ways to vent their opposition through newspaper stories.

Sigal acknowledges that it is difficult for officials below the top levels to get the ear of the press. The bulk of news is taken from "routine" channels, which means top officials or their press aides who hold press conferences and background briefings and dispatch news releases. Officials who are outside this regular communications structure are limited to "leaking" stories to individual reporters or developing special relations with particular newsmen to get coverage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sigal's systematic discussion of the leak system and its manifold uses by officials at all levels to spread news under the cloak of anonymity is engrossing. The reason is not only that leaks have leaped into national prominence in the wake of Watergate and its ramifications. More importantly, the leak system and other aspects of government-press interrelations covered by Sigal have been largely ignored by other mass media studies. This makes *Reporters and Officials* a much-needed, valuable addition to the literature which pokes behind the myths of everyday political reality to reveal how government interacts with major nongovernmental institutions such as the American press.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality *by Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. New York, Harper & Row, 1972. —xxiii, 428 pp. $10.00.*

Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie have helped to fill a very large gap in the literature on American political behavior. The classic descriptions of American electoral behavior—*Voting*, for example, or *The American Voter*—have been around for some time, but no comparable work on participation existed until the publication of *Participation in America*.

Verba and Nie use a 1967 NORC cross-sectional survey of 2549 respondents as their principal source of data. Because the sample and the questionnaire were designed specifically to examine political participation, the authors consider a broader range of participatory behavior than secondary survey analysis would have permitted. The limitations of cross-sectional surveys, particularly their restrictive sense of time and development, are acknowledged by Verba and Nie. But there is really no alternative to survey data for analyzing individual-level correlates of participation.

Like most academic observers of the American public's political behavior, Verba and Nie interpret their findings within the standard framework of democratic theory. Unlike much of the previous research on American political behavior, however, *Participation in America* escapes a narrow emphasis on the social psychology of participation. The authors are less concerned with nomothetic explanation, with the discovery of "laws" that govern the behavior of individuals, than were the early works on voting behavior. Verba and Nie have not only recognized the variability of social and political context, but they have in fact used it to good theoretical advantage. They have also carefully avoided overgeneralizing their findings.

Four modes of participation are developed and analyzed in the book: voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and particularized contacting. The latter two modes are nonelectoral. Communal activity refers to one's participation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in groups that are oriented toward influencing social and political issues, while particularized contacting refers to one's discussion of individual or family concerns with a public official. The participatory profile of the American public reveals six combinations of behavior: total inactivity, voting, parochial participation (where the emphasis is on particularized contacting), communal activity, campaign activism, and complete activism (where every mode of participation is present).

Parts I and II of *Participation in America* contain most of the interesting findings. Social status, race, age, community size, organizational membership, policy preferences, and partisanship each are used at some point to explain differences in participation. The evolving (in 1967) group consciousness of American blacks, and its stimulation of black participation, is especially well treated. (Blacks outparticipated whites in five of the six levels of socioeconomic status used by Verba and Nie). Viewed generically, Verba and Nie think, "group consciousness may substitute for the higher social status that impels citizens into political participation. It may represent an alternative mechanism for mobilizing citizens to political activity" (p. 150).

Social status figures prominently in American participation, not a new discovery, to be sure, but one whose significance is not often treated in studies of presidential voting. Data from *The Civic Culture* show a higher correlation between social status and participation in the United States sample than in any of the other four samples (Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico). More recent comparative data, gathered as part of a cross-national study of participation, indicate that the status-participation link is stronger in America than it is in Nigeria, the Netherlands, Austria, and Japan. Of the nations surveyed, only India matches the United States. The resulting skew of policy attitudes among American participators suggests that the growing attention being paid to "issue voting" is partly misplaced: given its class and racial antecedents, "issue nonvoting" is probably a more revealing feature of American electoral politics.

In the latter third of the book the authors attempt to link community participation and leader responsiveness, an interesting notion, but one that is slippery, both conceptually and empirically. Verba and Nie use survey data (NORC oversampled sixty-four small communities and interviewed public officials in each community) to assess the amount of variation in elite-mass consensus attributable to the level and types of community participation. The concept of concurrence, upon which this portion of the analysis rests, refers to citizen-leader agreement on *which* community problems are important, not *how* these problems ought to be solved. When the latter consideration is accounted for on one policy domain, race relations (pp. 328–329), the correlation between community participation and responsiveness is quite frail (.25). Verba and Nie conclude, somewhat surprisingly, that "participation does indeed make a difference. If we think of the community as a whole, there is a tendency for leaders to be more responsive to the citizenry in communities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with high participation rates" (p. 333). Even if this conclusion is granted, the significance of leadership responsiveness to participation depends on how participation is regulated (and with what effect), and how different demands are weighted by political elites.

Overall, Verba and Nie have written a very good book, one that is certain to become the standard reference on American political participation. They have helped to broaden the study of participation by considering nonelectoral involvement. At the same time, a more substantial theoretical perspective than inputs and outputs, or demands and allocations, is required for the analysis of political participation and regime behavior.

GERALD FINCH
Columbia University

One Last Chance: The Democratic Party, 1974–76 *by John G. Stewart. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.—xiv, 203 pp. $8.00.*

The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972 *by Denis G. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Pressman, Benjamin I. Page, and John J. Lyons. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974.—viii, 149 pp. Cloth, $8.95; paper, $3.95.*

Both these books discuss the contemporary Democratic party. Stewart, a seasoned political activist (for Hubert Humphrey and the Democratic National Committee staff, and for the McGovern-Shriver campaign) as well as a political scientist, has written an essay based primarily on his own political experience and observations. Sullivan, Pressman, Page, and Lyons have produced a more explicitly empirical study of delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention.

Stewart seeks lessons from 1968 and 1972 that will help the Democrats regroup their party while it is out of presidential power, regain the White House in 1976, and govern well thereafter. He believes that victory is not enough: "Entirely too much time and attention are still being devoted to speculation about the identity of the next Democratic presidential nominee. Entirely too little concern is being expressed over the character of the party that person will represent" (p. 166). Using poll data to good advantage, Stewart argues that the electorate in 1972 rejected George McGovern as a candidate rather than the Democratic party or its program; that internal party reform, while needed, became involved in presidential nominating politics and alienated many leaders and activists; and that numerous "Democrats who weren't supposed to win but did" (p. 67) in 1972 did so by abandoning McGovern and stressing that their own capacity to govern was superior to that of their opponents.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From this analysis, Stewart contends that Democratic candidates should appeal to the operational liberalism of the electorate without arousing its philosophic conservatism; that a winning Democratic presidential campaign must not merely include the old New Deal coalition or the new politics coalition but rather emphasize the Democrats' ability to meet the needs of all Americans better than the Republicans; and that in stressing the "governing issue" the Democrats should attempt to restore public belief that government can work well and that it cares about average citizens. In an appendix, Stewart chronicles recent Democratic developments concerning delegate selection, a party charter, the congressional party, the national committee, and access to the broadcast media.

Sullivan, Pressman, Page, and Lyons set out to explore certain questions about representation: Who should participate directly in the nominating process? How are outside group interests represented at conventions? How are the interests of old constituencies believed necessary for party survival reconciled with the issue concerns of potential new constituencies? How is the desire for issue purity reconciled with the need for organizational power? Their study is based on 234 interviews with randomly selected delegates, a preconvention poll conducted by the Columbia Broadcasting System, and observations at Miami Beach by a student-faculty group associated with the Dartmouth Public Affairs Center.

Sullivan and associates find that the 1972 delegates were more "liberal" than the party rank-and-file on selected issues. They attribute this difference to a customary gap between party activists and party voters, reinforced by new delegate-selection rules and the successful McGovern insurgency itself. Candidate organizations and state delegations were more important arenas of convention decisions than the various new caucuses (blacks, women, young, elderly, et al.), the authors conclude. Somewhat in contrast to other observers, they find that the Wallace delegates were more interested in the party platform than either McGovern delegates or supporters of "regular" candidates (Humphrey, Edmund Muskie, Henry Jackson); in addition, delegates committed to the "regular" candidates listed more often than did McGovern delegates ideological reasons for their support for particular platform planks. Finally, the authors' data suggest that while McGovern delegates did not become steadily less ideologically purist as their convention victory was assured, "regular" delegates became steadily more purist as their defeat became certain. And while the attitudes of both the McGovern delegates toward Humphrey and the "regular" delegates toward McGovern personally turned more favorable by the end of the convention, the attitude of the "losers" toward the party became more unfavorable.

Stewart's is the more compelling book to the reader. One need not always agree with his judgments (and this reviewer is more urgently concerned with assuring equal opportunity) to be impressed by his common sense, his thoughtful tone, his well-constructed case, and his emphasis not simply on winning but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on governing well. *The Politics of Representation* suffers occasionally from the unevenness to which books of multiple authorship are vulnerable and from imprecise or questionable phrases, e.g., "the average Democrat" (p. 17); "the small number of McCarthyites at the 1968 convention" (p. 39); "the establishment politicians" (p. 46); and "people engaged in foreign trade" (p. 97). Nonetheless, the authors' data and the implications that they draw represent a solid contribution to the literature on political parties.

The controversial 1972 delegate-selection rules are evaluated differently in the two books. Stewart says that the rules alienated many party leaders (some of whom lost delegate races because they backed the wrong candidate and hence could not attend the convention because of the ban on ex-officio delegates) and "casual Democrats" (nonactivist Democratic voters). For party unity, Stewart favors "a firm commitment to openness and fairness" but an end to "artificial" demographic criteria in delegate selection (p. 162). The Dartmouth group contends, however, that "the proposition that the so-called quota system was responsible for the radicalization of the convention" is used "to discredit spokesmen for the new constituencies" and "signal the old constituencies in the party-labor, blue-collar factions . . . that they are returning to positions of leadership within the party" (pp. 35–36). They add: "Conservative Democrats say the quota system must be abolished; yet they want quotas for senior party leaders. The issue, we think, has never been the presence or absence of quotas; rather, it has been which groups should receive their protection, how decentralized the system should be, and, finally, how formally the requirement should be stated" (p. 37). The debate, it seems, goes on.

JUDITH H. PARRIS
The Brookings Institution

Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States *by James L. Sundquist. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1973.—xiii, 388 pp. Cloth, $8.95; paper, $3.95.*

The subtitle of this book is more descriptive than the title. James Sundquist has organized a valuable volume around the single issue of realignment in the American party system over the past 120 years and into the near future.

The book's plan falls roughly into three parts. The first three chapters cover the basic concept of realignment, some hypotheses about its occurrence, and five "hypothetical scenarios" for a party system impelled toward a possible realignment. The central middle section of the book describes and analyzes three realignments in American party history: those of the 1850s, the 1890s, and the 1930s. The final chapters contain amplified conclusions about the process of realignment (with sixteen explanatory propositions) and discus-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions about the possibilities and potentialities for realignment in the coming years.

Overall the survey is successful. It is marked by order, clarity, and logic. The author favors succinct propositions, and everywhere there is evidence of his sensible and common-sense approach. In these respects his scholarly style reminds one of the best of E. E. Schattschneider. At the same time it must be said, however, that scholars working with the literature and the problem are not apt to find a great deal that is new here. No new data are presented, nor are the major concepts and outlines of the argument new. In the main the emphasis is on the lucidity and judiciousness of the statement rather than its originality.

In all of this it is not easy to characterize Sundquist's scholarly assumptions and commitments. The approach is above all eclectic, drawing on a wide range of sources and analysis. More or less traditional historical analysis sits comfortably next to survey research. And yet there is a perceptible, if discreet, point of view. The overall outlook, the point of vantage, is macropolitical. Sundquist looks at aggregates rather than individuals. And in his assumptions about realignment—and indeed about all partisan behavior—the author espouses a heavily ideological or issue-oriented view. Those two fundamental commitments are, to my mind, at the root of the book's limitations.

Because of the macropolitical outlook the book describes realignments in terms of shifting party factions, wings, blocs, groups, and sections. There is too little attention to the individual voter's perceptions and decisions. How indeed does the individual political actor relate his attachment to a political party to issues of public policy, to broader ideologies, to perceptions about government and the political system, and to other group attachments? That is to say, there is unrepresented here a sizable literature on the cognitions and decisions of the American voter that might have added to the conclusions about the shift to new party loyalties. In fact, attention to that literature might also have led the author to qualify his issue-centered assumptions about realignment. To be sure, large numbers of partisans undoubtedly do react to new and unresolved issues of public policy. But many also react to political leaders or personalities, to social and political events, to administrations and parties in office. More specifically, it is hard for me to believe that much of the realignment of the 1930s was more than a reaction against the party in power and an attachment to a popular and reassuring new president. In short, the concern with aggregates and the commitment to issue-centered explanations leads to a greater concern for party leaders and activists than for the broad party electorates. It is, at the very least, an elite-oriented approach to realignment.

Nonetheless, *Dynamics of the Party System* is a very useful book. It explores with considerable insight one of the dominant themes in the study of any party system. It also organizes a good bit of American party history in a compelling way. And it does so with a clarity that is quite uncommon these days. All in all,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it is a good introduction to the subject, both for professional political scientists and their students.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

Yankee Politics in Rural Vermont *by Frank M. Bryan. Hanover, N. H., The University Press of New England, 1974.—xx, 314 pp. $12.00.*

In writing an in-depth study of Vermont politics, Frank M. Bryan has recognized that no political scientist has undertaken a systematic analysis of the New England states since Duane Lockard's oft-cited work appeared in 1959. The political systems of all fifty states have been affected in fundamental ways by changes in the mode of representation necessitated by the Supreme Court's apportionment decisions, by advances in campaign technology, and by changes in citizens' expectations concerning governmental policies. Bryan attempts to fill this gap in the literature on comparative state systems by testing theories on the relationship between population density and politics and on policy making in one-party states. This work is not successful in all it attempts, but it does provide new information and raise interesting questions for future study.

After a brief historical review, Bryan analyzes the composition and background characteristics of Vermont's governmental elite for the period from 1947–1971. Comparing his data with those reported on officials in other states, Bryan is unable to prove his hypotheses about the unique qualities of the rural polity. His analysis is marked by statements such as the following: "Although there is no strong relationship between malapportionment and farmer representation . . . " (p. 39); "No connection between education levels and ruralism . . . " (p. 43); "We find few consistent patterns that can be tied to the rural-urban dichotomy" (p. 46). We should note, however, that this consistent *lack* of positive correlation between elite characteristics and ruralism in and of itself might represent a significant finding.

Bryan does note interesting recruitment patterns for Republicans seeking the higher offices in this, the most Republican state in the Union. Consistently the gubernatorial candidate served an apprenticeship as lieutenant-governor before seeking the higher office; furthermore, no incumbent United States senator faced a serious opponent within his own party. A strong tradition protects incumbent officials from challenge. In addition, the home towns of candidates for statewide office have been first from one side and then from the other of the Green Mountains which divide the state geographically.

In his remaining major sections, Bryan compares party and legislative politics in this rural setting to what has been noted by others about state parties and legislatures in general. Combining voting data with those on elite recruitment, he concludes that the dominant Republican party has been characterized

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by "a benevolent unifactionalism, maintained by unwritten subtleties and a consensus concerning recruitment patterns and the Mountain Rule" (p. 93). Although the Democrats have enjoyed some recent successes, and although the recruitment pattern has occasionally been violated, Bryan concludes that Vermont politics have been marked by neither interparty nor intraparty democracy. In discussing legislative politics, he stresses the importance of structural changes following reapportionment in describing increased cohesion in the minority party.

Finally, Bryan speculates about future politics in a "rural technopolity." His conclusion is that the active participation of Vermont citizens cannot be maintained when party labels seem to be giving way to candidate-oriented campaigns and citizens are concerned more with policy output than input. He predicts the rise of a dominant rural bureaucracy, but he does not decry this as it will lead to efficient administration of what are generally agreed upon policies.

Unfortunately this work suffers from serious flaws. First, no logical thread connects the chapters. One comes away with the distinct impression that Bryan has written a number of articles and grouped them under a common title. His caveat concerning the rejection of the Green Mountain Parkway in 1936 is particularly out of place; but generally the chapters can stand independently and should have been presented in article form. Second, as the author repeatedly admits, his empirical data are quite weak. In the legislative chapter the bloc-cluster analysis is largely unrevealing and serves mainly to demonstrate the author's skill as a technician. Third, the entire work suffers from poor editing, for instance the frequent repetition of nearly verbatim passages referring to one-partyism, the Mountain Rule, and the glories that are Vermont. Finally, apparently swayed by love for his home state, Bryan is notably uncritical of the workings of a system which seem to offer no recourse to an unrepresented minority. Rather, he concludes that Vermont is fortunate—and will be fortunate—that the rulers govern benevolently.

Bryan has immersed himself in Vermont politics. How else could he refer to the "Onion River Trio" as if they were as well known as the Chicago Seven? His excellent annotated bibliography attests to his concern for fitting this work into an existing gap in the literature. However, although these data will be useful for research in the future, the narrow focus, limited findings, and failure to present an integrated picture of the state's entire political system keep this from standing as an important book.

LOUIS MAISEL
Colby College

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Deep South States in America *by Neal R. Peirce. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974.—528 pp., $12.95.*

This is the fourth of a projected eight-volume series by the same author, a well-established political journalist and editor, designed to "let Americans (and foreigners too) know something of the profound diversity of peoples and life styles and geographic habitat and political behavior that makes this the most fascinating nation on earth" (p. 7). In pursuit of that objective, the author has provided us with a thirty-two page opening essay discussing the Deep South as a whole, followed by separate chapters ranging in length from thirty-eight to seventy-six pages covering each of the states of Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida. Each chapter is organized around a common set of concerns: the history and culture of the state, its politics and economics, its representation in Washington, and the most important and interesting cities and communities. The author draws upon secondary sources, his own travels and observations, and an unspecified but sizable number of interviews with journalists, activists, analysts, and leaders in the various states.

The result is a basic description of contemporary conditions in these states. Its utility lies primarily in the unexpected width and fine mesh of the net cast. Assembled in one convenient volume we have a wide range of relevant and aptly chosen statistics such as income levels, employment patterns, literacy rates, port tonnages, and so on, set forth in the text rather than in tables. There are countless profiles of political, group, and civic leaders, past and present. There are careful reviews of recent events and more distant history, along with accurately done profiles on party and factional politics. Race relations, group influence, community power—no stone of any size is left undisturbed.

And yet on balance this book is a bit of a disappointment. Its shortcomings are not due to lack of effort, for the evidence of extensive reading, observing, and interviewing is all about. Nor are they to be attributed to faulty methodology, for there is probably no great difference in the approach employed for this book and that used for V. O. Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (though the latter undoubtedly required more man-hours).

Rather, the limitations of *The Deep South States* have other origins. There is, first of all, a failure to be sufficiently selective in the choice of materials and topics, so that one soon feels a bit overwhelmed by it all. Second, there is too little effort to pull material together and to integrate it into broader statements. As do many journalists, the author often seems to labor under the mistaken belief that the facts and events speak for themselves. Finally, the book suffers from insufficient insight. Most of the time the level of analysis does not rise much above that associated with in-state journalists, activists, and group leaders. As a consequence, scholars interested in the South, and attentive readers of the *New York Times* or other journals of opinion, will not find their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knowledge and understanding extended very far by this book, no matter how useful it may be for reference or memory-jogging purposes.

What we have here, then, is a descriptive treatment of the states covered, clearly and soberly written, abundant in detail, and remarkable both for its balance and for the pitfalls avoided. For those with little knowledge and background, this should be a very helpful introduction to the political, economic, and social life of seven puzzling and fascinating states. I do hope, however, that all readers will see that the inclusion of Florida in an analysis of the Deep South owes more to writer's convenience than to any resemblance to the other states in that category.

CLIFTON MCCLESKEY
University of Virginia

An American Philosophy of Social Security *by J. Douglas Brown. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1972.—x, 244 pp. $8.50.*

Few economists, in looking back on their involvement with public affairs, can have as much reason for satisfaction as Douglas Brown. As staff members of the Committee on Economic Security in 1934, he and Barbara Armstrong, Professor of Law at Berkeley, were the architects of that most popular and far-reaching of all New Deal reforms, now known as Social Security—the old age, survivors, and disability insurance system (OASDI). At a time when the administration and the then-handful of experts were concerned almost exclusively with unemployment insurance (and fighting among themselves) and when the spokesmen for the aged were divided into those who advocated means-tested federal-state old-age assistance and those who agitated for a liberal demogrant (the Townsend Plan), Armstrong and Brown were convinced from the first that a federal social insurance system was the only appropriate answer to the problems of the aged. When public protests against the neglect of the needs of the aged on the part of the administration and the Committee on Economic Security (in its interim report) forced the inclusion of proposals for the aged in the committee's recommendations, they were ready with a well worked-out plan to fill the gap. Even then it took much maneuvering and what Dr. Brown calls "desperate measures" to ensure inclusion of the proposal in the Final Report. Dr. Brown's account of those hectic and exciting days is all too brief, probably because of his own modesty.

Since 1935, when the act was passed, Dr. Brown had continued to influence the development of OASDI through his chairmanship of the 1939 Federal Advisory Council and his membership on the subsequent councils. He attaches high value to the device of such advisory bodies as he traces the evolution of the original limited program for the aged into the present massive OASDHI

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

program with its wide population and risk coverage, its greatly increased benefits and taxes, and the final inclusion of Medicare. Strangely, he makes no mention of Secretary Hobby's Advisory Committee of 1953, whose recommendations were the basis for the 1954 amendments greatly broadening coverage and introducing the principle of the "drop-out" years in calculating benefits.

In his discussion of the various provisions of the act as they have emerged from years of amendment, he is highly critical of those economists who would determine policy solely by reference to economic criteria and cold logic. As he shows again and again, social policy involves the balancing of a great variety of considerations (prevailing ideas of fairness, competing demands of various groups, relative intensities of need, fiscal considerations, political acceptability, and the like), and the selection of the best possible compromise. Repeatedly Dr. Brown uses the word "reasonable." For students of social policy his book is thus an essential counterpart to such critical studies as those of Pechman and associates and Brittain.

Experience has justified the preference of Armstrong and Brown for a system with a small contingency reserve and the inclusion of a contribution from the general revenues in the financing of the system, on both of which their recommendations were not accepted. But it is curious that Dr. Brown does not discuss the increasing difficulty of combining in one and the same system the objective of assuring an adequate minimum of security for all covered workers and the objective of providing benefits that reflect previous earnings. It would have been interesting to have his evaluation of proposals for dealing with this dilemma, such as that for the double-decker system with a uniform basic benefit financed from the general revenues, on top of which would be a contributory system with benefits actuarially related to the individual's contributions.

EVELINE M. BURNS
Columbia University

Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy *by Stephen P. Strickland. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972.—xiv, 329 pp. $9.95.*

When the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research was formally opened in 1906, L. Emmett Holt noted the existence in Germany, France, England, Japan, and Russia of "well-equipped and endowed institutions for research in medicine" and emphasized their lack in the United States. Since then the American scene has changed radically with respect to medical research. Today there exists a group of established national institutes for health research with impressive intramural and extramural programs. From the turn of the century until the 1930s, medical research was supported chiefly by private agencies. The changes that have occurred since the 1930s—the explosive expansion of health

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

research, the active and massive role of the federal government in this area, and the increasingly close relationship between medical scientists and federal agencies—have come about so recently and so rapidly that an adequate perspective on them is still not available. Articles by Donald C. Swain, Elizabeth B. Drew, and this reviewer have provided some historical perspective, but Strickland's book is the first monograph on the history of medical research policy in the United States. Using cancer as the point of departure for his story, Strickland traces the evolution of national policy from 1927, when the first bill to support cancer research was introduced in Congress, to 1971, when the Conquest of Cancer Act was passed. The emphasis is not on the substance of scientific research but rather on the politics of policy formation, on the relations among elected public officials, science administrators, and medical lobbyists in determining the role of government in medical research. The author analyzes the forces and portrays the personalities that helped to bring about the elevation of the National Institutes of Health to the important place it achieved in medical research after World War II. There are interesting vignettes of Senator Lister Hill, Representative John Fogarty, Dr. James A. Shamson, and Mrs. Mary Lasker, and it is worth noting how they differ in the evaluation of their respective roles.

As long as Strickland sticks to the political game which he describes with considerable sensitivity, he does a first-rate job. But he is not equally sensitive or accurate when he deals with other aspects of the story. He mentions the laboratory for the study of cancer set up at the Harvard Medical School in 1922 by J. W. Schereschewsky, but does not indicate that at the same time experimental work was being carried on in the Hygienic Laboratory on the production of malignant growths in rabbits by applying irritants to the skin. Nor does Strickland refer to the fact that the Public Health Service, of which the Hygienic Laboratory was the research arm, had turned its attention to cancer in 1910, indicating that there was a certain sense of where the coming tasks for research would be. Also in this connection, he does not seem to appreciate that the mission of the Hygienic Laboratory was quite limited—simply to do research on problems encountered by the Public Health Service. The Hygienic Laboratory was not intended to carry out basic research. Indeed, this continued to be and still is a concern of the National Institutes of Health. The institutes are officially mission oriented, a characteristic derived from their origin in the Hygienic Laboratory. Exploration of basic science has had to be brought in under the broad emphasis on disease problems and solutions.

Another weakness of the book appears in the evaluation of the approaches of the various actors in the story and the results obtained in terms of medical knowledge. Strickland does not seem to realize that the Lasker lobby used an approach characteristic of voluntary health agencies (such as, for example, the National Foundation) in seeking support and funds, an approach which may be termed that of the microbe hunter and the hunger fighter (*pace* Paul de

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kruif). Nor does he seem to appreciate that what appears as scientific conservatism to a Mike Gorman (p. 201) may simply be a recognition on the part of a medical scientist that many highly touted drugs and methods have not always worked out well and indeed have been detrimental to patients. One need only refer to the therapeutic use of tuberculin, the introduction of the sulfonamides, and the employment of antibiotics and steroids. The question of whether or not enough is known about a problem to establish a reasonable research program is not easily answered, and Strickland tends to regard the position of the Public Health Service and the National Institutes of Health as overly conservative. However, the fact is that science tends to grow chiefly by accretion; the "breakthroughs" so highly regarded by journalists and public relations personnel do not occur often.

Finally, a few minor items should be noted. Strickland tends to minimize the steps taken in the 1930s to provide funds and means for medical research within the framework of the Public Health Service. He does mention Title VI of the Social Security Act of 1935 which authorized the expenditure of up to $2 million annually for research on disease but not that Lewis E. Thompson and Thomas Parran were involved in achieving this. Nor does he mention that Thompson went to Europe in 1936 to study the organization of medical research.

All in all, this is a good book and deserves wide distribution. It contributes to our understanding of the formation of national policy in medical research, but the implications of the subject range much more widely than Strickland suggests. The book is well produced, has only very few typos, and has an adequate index.

GEORGE ROSEN
Yale University School of Medicine

Foreign Policy and U. S. Presidential Elections, 1940–1948 *by Robert A. Divine. New York, New Viewpoints, a division of Franklin Watts, Inc., 1974.—xii, 353 pp. $4.95.*

Foreign Policy and U. S. Presidential Elections, 1952–1960 *by Robert A. Divine. New York, New Viewpoints, a division of Franklin Watts, Inc., 1974.—x, 359 pp. $4.95.*

Robert Divine has written a highly readable popular history of foreign policy in presidential election campaigns from Willkie to Kennedy. The presentation is vivid, and the coverage, within the frame of focus that Divine has chosen, is remarkably balanced and knowledgeable (somewhat more in the second volume than the first). General readers and college students will learn much from these books.

The focus is upon the behavior of presidential campaigners and their top-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

level aides as it is interrelated with events and policies in American foreign relations, 1940–1960. Thus Divine is not writing a general history of the domestic politics of American foreign relations in that period, nor is he even writing a general history of the *party* politics of American foreign relations in the period. Interest and cause groups and party organizations do not figure prominently except in the context of top-level presidential campaigning at quadrennial intervals. This choice of focus, while defensible, has the indirect consequence of blurring developments between elections and tending to produce some disjunction between the account of each campaign and the explanation of its outcome; the outcome is likely to rest on longer-term variables than the conduct of the campaign itself.

Even less than the outcome of the election is the subsequent conduct of American foreign relations likely to be determined by specifics of what was said and done during the election campaign. Divine was rather disillusioned at this finding. "Ideally, a presidential campaign should be a great educational experience, in which would-be leaders make clear the issues confronting the nation and offer positive programs to the voters. In fact . . . I was driven to the inescapable conclusion that politicians treat foreign policy as an elaborate charade . . . . [Yet] the process has not broken down completely . . . . The American electorate [has] tended to cut through the charges and countercharges [and] displayed an innate wisdom in choosing its presidents for qualities of international leadership" (*1940–1948*, pp. ix–xi; *1952–1960*, p. ix). Divine might perhaps have found some additional salve for his disillusionment about public influence on American foreign policy if, for the pre-Vietnam period of which he was writing, he had not been focusing so heavily on the electioneering and had broadened his coverage of years between the campaigns, when more sustained efforts to influence may have had more success.

However, it would be wrong to imply that Divine lets his overall judgment of the political process shape his books. Quite the contrary. "I have tried to tell the story dispassionately, letting the actors in the historical drama speak for themselves. I have no strong views I wish to impose on my reader, and I feel deeply that the attempt, especially in the last decade, to channel history along rigid ideological lines has retarded rather than advanced our understanding of the recent past" (*1940–1948*, p. x). Yet the deliberate avoidance of "developing any rigid thesis" (*1954–1960*, p. ix) can also exclude significant perceptions. Most political scientists will find Divine's approach too amorphous.

One kind of concern that recent revisionist "consciousness-raising" has tried to bring into focus but remains out of focus here is the influence that major United States corporate interests oriented toward the world economy may have had in swinging both parties toward interventionism and ultimately into the cold war consensus in the 1940s and early 1950s (Willkie versus Dewey et al., 1940; Truman versus Wallace, 1944 and after; Eisenhower versus Taft, 1952). Republican party history in these years seems especially suitable for reapprais-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

al in these terms, and the main focus could even be upon the quadrennial presidential nominating process—but the field of vision would have to be more catholic than is Divine's in these books.

All reviewers are familiar with the caveat that they should avoid criticizing an author for not having written a book that he did not even attempt to write. Yet I cannot resist concluding that this work is so good as to make me disappointed that it is not much more ambitious. Divine has missed the opportunity to write books that would be of importance to scholars and practitioners as well as to the general readers to whom he does pitch his presentation. If he had provided much fuller footnoting (textual, as well as more citations) and if he had not eschewed interpretive theory, he could, I think, have met the needs of both audiences. As the books stand now, however, there is almost no basic analytical thread (only the few prefatory paragraphs for each volume), and the chronicle, while sound, is too thin to be mined as a thorough secondary source by other scholars who might like to apply analytical schemes of their own to the data. This is a pity, because the subject is important and the existing literature sparse (except on individual elections), both in political science and in history; a truly comparative study in depth would be very useful. Perhaps Divine, well grounded as he is, can be persuaded to essay it as his next major scholarly contribution.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
Yale University

The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy *by Bernard C. Cohen. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1973.—222 pp. $4.95.*

The decision-making approach to foreign-policy analysis seeks to expose the perceptions of policy makers to scholarly scrutiny. An important set of perceptions are those which define the limits of permissible policy in terms of the tolerance of domestic opinion. Generally, "orthodox" scholars argue that American public opinion imposes constraints on policy makers. Radical critics, spurning as naive this projection of democratic theory, contend that public opinion is there to be manipulated in support of predetermined policy choices. These rival interpretations have been applied to such key decisions as American recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, Roosevelt's proposal to "quarantine" the aggressor nations in 1937, the Truman Doctrine, Kennedy's refusal to support China's admission to the United Nations, the Sino-American rapprochement, and Lyndon Johnson's abandonment of escalation and office. The issue has been kept alive by speculations about the international bargaining strength of an administration weakened by scandal and sagging public support.

Several years ago Bernard Cohen commented that the scholarly community

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had done very well in the analysis of public opinion *up to* the point where it impinges on policy makers. But the linkage between what the public believes and how policy makers behave was a gap which this new book is designed to fill. Its approach assumes that the best way to discover the degree to which policy makers are influenced by public opinion is to ask them. The book reports on two series of informal open-ended interviews with officials at different levels of the State Department. It explores their attitudes toward various manifestations of the American Demos. They rarely perceive mass opinion as a constraint. Rather, polls, public reaction letters, and inquiries are regarded as encouraging when favorable and are discounted when unfavorable. Elite opinion is more salient and more respected. Officials say they pay particular attention to elite opinion on issues in which organized groups take an intense interest: e.g., Israel, Africa, and the United Nations. Today one might add detente and human rights in the Soviet Union.

Data from these interviews are supplemented by a review of the machinery at State for analyzing and transmitting public opinion to policy officers. In Cohen's account this is a forlorn tale. Department and Foreign Service officers repeatedly told him that they were sceptical about the scientific claims of survey research and preferred to rely on intuition. They regarded opinion digests as a waste of time and money.

Cohen's history of the decline of public studies operations is accurate enough but he seriously underestimates their importance during the heyday of Public Affairs between 1944 and 1947. This was a by-product of the war when new ground was broken by the Office of War Information in analyzing public opinion and mounting campaigns to mobilize support for wartime and postwar programs. Hadley Cantril, of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton, was the seminal figure in this field; he does not receive a single index reference. As a private consultant first to Roosevelt, then to OWI and, after the war, to the State Department, he did more than anyone else to bring survey research to the attention of foreign-policy makers and to convince them of its relevance to their work.

The analysis of public opinion and of the diffusion of foreign-policy information to the public played a critical role in the drive for American membership in the United Nations. The specter of isolationism and the negative example of Wilson's failure with the League in 1919 combined to inject Public Affairs into the heart of postwar planning. Stettinius, a keen public relations man, elevated Public Affairs to organizational parity with the major specialized and geographical offices and gave it its own assistant secretary.

Cohen does not come to grips with the "revisionist" argument that the Truman Doctrine provides a classic example of manipulation. Did the ideological tone of the doctrine spring from the communist threat to Greece and Turkey? Or was this local Balkan crisis reinterpreted in terms of the appeasement analogy to neutralize the potentially negative effects of domestic opinion?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similar questions must be asked about many key decisions before scholars can untangle the manipulation-versus-constraint controversy. Only if an issue is followed through the various stages of decision can an assessment be made of the impact of different segments of the public at each stage. Such an approach might reveal that in some cases of apparent "manipulation" a policy has been adapted at early and less visible stages of the process in anticipation of congressional or public opposition.

But this study is cast in general terms. Historical particularities are interwoven with theoretical problems, precluding detailed consideration of controversial examples. This approach does yield several high-level generalizations which tend to support the radical, manipulative interpretation of the opinion-policy relationship rather than the "orthodox" model of built-in constraints. This conclusion reflects the judgments of Cohen's interviewees who, of course, had their professional esprit de corps to protect from encroachments by the lay public. Although they were interviewed in two batches, with more than a decade intervening, little indication is given of any changes in official attitudes.

Despite these quibbles, Cohen's book provides the most lively and complete synthesis of scholarly thought on this complex question now available.

MICHAEL LEIGH
University of Sussex

The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction *by Akira Iriye. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.—x, 214 pp. Cloth, $7.50; paper, $3.95.*

Designed to serve as a classroom text, this volume indeed fills a need for a short, interpretative analysis of how the Cold War developed in Asia during the 1940s. But teachers should be warned this is not the usual fast-moving, anecdotal text designed to seduce as well as enlighten students. It is a sophisticated, subtle, and impersonal work that is an important addition to the literature. With his usual exploitation of multilingual sources (Chinese, Japanese, Russian, English), and multiarchival materials (American and British), Iriye has outlined a framework for understanding Asian-Western relations in that crucial decade, a framework he apparently plans to fill over the years with more detailed work.

He begins with an overly cryptic description of the late nineteenth century, emphasizing how the United States ambition to become a "big power" dictated its Asian policies, but "power" is never defined or properly placed in the nation's 1890s world view. Excellent quick insights follow on the 1920s and 1930s, decades about which Iriye has published pioneering work. Then comes the provocative interpretation that the crucial factor determining American entry into World War II was the Japanese challenge to the status quo in Southeast Asia. Flatly opposing the widely accepted view, most authoritatively stated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Paul Schroeder, Iriye argues that the breaking point occurred over Japan's insistence on a Southeast Asian empire, not over the stalemate in China.

The heart of the book covers 1941 to 1946. Soviet and Chinese perspectives abound (the section on Russian activity in Manchuria is especially important), but American and British policies are central. There is a superb analysis of the key, overlooked difference between American Ambassador Patrick Hurley and the Foreign Service officers who debated the fundamentals of American-Chinese relations in 1944–1945. The split between Hurley and such men as Davies and Service occurred less over the future of Chiang Kai-shek than over their view of Stalin. Hurley was sanguine about the Soviets while the anti-Russian views of the Foreign Service officers dictated their pleas to court Mao in order to separate him from the threatening Soviets. The crucial sections on Anglo-American relations, however, contain contradictions. Although Iriye believes that "From the British point of view . . . there was no real contradiction or conflict between their policy and that of the United States" (p. 87), he proceeds to show bitter splits between Washington and London over colonial policies and the role China was to play. Conceptually this is the book's least satisfactory section. United States-USSR relations are viewed as culminating in a "Yalta system" in which each nation recognized the other's sphere, and allowed China to move relatively independently between the two powers. This system lasted until 1949 when Mao's triumph frightened Washington into solidifying its military control over Japan and moving into Southeast Asia. The new strategy is labeled "The San Francisco system" (site of the 1951 Japanese peace treaty ratification), and is seen as ushering in the Cold War era in Asia. Throughout, the perspective is from civilian policy makers' viewpoints. There is little investigation of military records, as is done in Paul Varg's recent important work, or of the impact of domestic-interest groups.

These problems await Iriye's future publications. Here, he makes another major contribution, and also—if the teacher conscientiously works through the book with the students—provides a stimulating volume for the classroom. We look forward to Iriye's development of this book's many new insights.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

Party and Faction in American Politics: The House of Representatives, 1789–1801 *by Rudolph M. Bell. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1973.—xiii, 311 pp. $13.95.*

The author of this book attempts a revisionist interpretation of congressional and national politics in the decade from 1789 to 1801. He distinguishes factional politics, which he asserts prevailed until the mid-1790s, from party politics, which he contends prevailed thereafter. He further argues that concern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over substantive issues and important policy outcomes ceased once party politics took hold and he explains this by arguing that factional politics encourages and produces mere jockeying for office. He thus dismisses the period after 1795 as far as policy issues and outcomes are concerned and contends that the election of 1800 was a sham.

Despite the highly analytical nature of the argument and the prodigious amount of statistical evidence presented, traditionalists need have little fear of this assault. The conceptual foundations of the thesis are weak and the data brought to bear to confirm it are not equal to the task.

Conceptually, the author is, of course, correct in recognizing that a political party's needs as an organized, power-seeking entity can have an independent impact on policy outputs, quite aside from the views and interests of the groups that compose it. Issues do become politicized to the detriment of the substance involved and the need to compromise differences may well water-down content. But it is also true that factional politics often lack the cohesive force to forge majorities, which can have an even more detrimental impact on policy outputs. Thus there is little reason to presume general and overriding relationships between factional politics and the production of significant policy solutions and party politics and issueless, empty posturing. Indeed, the weight of the evidence over time for the U. S. Congress, American state legislatures, and legislatures in Western Europe strongly suggests the opposite conclusion.

Nor is this the only conceptual problem in the book. There are a number of others. For example, though there are significant differences between parties and factions, the differences are relative and should not be rigidly dichotomized in terms of the partial truth that parties seek office whereas factions seek policy results. To cite another example, the author distinguishes between party as a cohesive voting bloc and party as an entity with internal, organizational force to account for highly polarized voting along partisan lines before party organization in the electorate took place in the mid-1790s. However, along with an earlier rather tenuous distinction between ideologically motivated factions and interest-oriented representatives, this distinction seriously undermines the author's presumed dichotomy between issue-oriented factional politics and office-seeking partisan politics. A third and final example concerns the key relationship between partisan politics and issueless conflict. At times the author treats partisan politics as the causal factor in issueless conflict and at other times treats issueless conflict as the causal factor in the rise of partisan politics (compare pp. 15–16 and 191–192).

Conceptually, then, there is reason for doubt and such doubt is strengthened by an inspection of the evidence which the author brings to bear. The bulk of the evidence involves roll-call analysis of cohesion differences among factional blocs in various Congresses, supplemented by a similar analysis framed in terms of party. This evidence does indicate that a factional pattern of politics was transformed into a partisan pattern. Even in this regard, however, it is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marred by the fact that the party analysis is constructed so as to overestimate partisan affiliation in the early Congresses and by the fact that the author insists on defining the major policy issues himself rather than finding them through quantitative analysis. More important, roll-call evidence on cohesion differences in voting cannot by itself establish significant linkages between factional politics and policy outputs on the one hand and party politics and the dominance of expediency on the other. Nor does the author's attempt to subject his roll-call data to some further gross analysis remedy this defect (see pp. 185–190). First, he has no measure of policy outputs to relate to his voting data. Second, the author simply presumes an internal organizational presence and impact from the existence of external organizational activity. This, however, cannot be presumed and without convincing evidence that party in this sense was present his findings are simply attributable to voting-bloc cohesion, the same factor he relies on to explain substantial polarization along partisan lines in the mid-1790s when significant policy outputs were produced. Third, it is quite possible that the sheer number of Federalists and Republicans present in a Congress explains more of his findings than the conclusions he draws and doubtful that his categories of "polarization" and "divided success" measure what they purport to measure.

We are left then primarily with the author's revisionist interpretations of events and these can easily be countered. Even if we were to concede that policy outputs declined between 1795 and 1801, should we not expect outputs to be greater in the initial years of a new government than in the immediately succeeding years? Equally important, the fact that policy outputs are limited does not mean that policy issues do not exist. Hence, cannot limitations in outputs between 1795 and 1801 be attributed to the lack of sufficient partisan strength rather than the opposite? And, if we remember what the author chooses to ignore—that the aims of Republican policy were negative and restrictive—is this view not made credible by Jefferson's legislative record during his first term? Given all this, it still makes more sense to accept the judgment of Jefferson and his contemporaries who saw the election of 1800 as a great victory for American democracy rather than to read the disillusionment and discontent of this period back into the past.

JOSEPH COOPER
Rice University

The Radical Republicans and Reform in New York During Reconstruction *by James C. Mohr. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1973.—xv, 300 pp. $12.50.*

The post-Civil War Republican party has been widely studied for what it did—or tried to do—to the Southern states, but its activities at home in the North,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

where most Republicans lived, have been less carefully explored. James C. Mohr's book on Reconstruction-era politics in New York begins to fill in this gap. How the Republicans maintained power in that state from 1865 to 1867, what issues they developed to replace the issue of the Civil War itself, and why their coalition is the story of a "reconstruction at home," a phrase which, although repeated a bit too often, admirably captures Mohr's goal of examining one Northern political arena in the context of dramatic national events.

The "reconstruction" program devised by New York Republicans comprised a variety of reforms—in health and fire protection, labor law, tenement-house regulation, education, and black suffrage. Many of these measures involved efforts by upstate Republicans to intervene in the municipal affairs of heavily Democratic New York City and Brooklyn. Relying on expert testimony and on statistical data as a basis for their legislation, New York Republicans anticipated a technique for which their successors in the Progressive era usually are credited. Theirs was an impressive program and, with the exception of the effort to obtain racially impartial suffrage, it was a success.

Mohr's chapters are devoted to careful narratives of the progress of the different Republican measures. He distinguishes three components of the party's legislative majority: Whiggish followers of Thurlow Weed, politically oriented adherents of Governor Reuben E. Fenton, and idealistic Republican legislators such as Andrew D. White. Mohr does not employ sophisticated quantitative methods in his roll-call analysis, but he has done the research thoroughly enough to pinpoint the important votes, identify the shifting coalitions, and analyze the inevitable compromises.

Mohr's major point is that the enactment of the Republican program depended upon a delicate alliance between two groups of "radical Republicans": the highly partisan members of the majority coalition and their more idealistic colleagues. The health, fire, and tenement-house laws imposed on downstate cities were designed as much to reduce Democratic electoral majorities as they were to improve the welfare of urban residents. The establishment of Cornell University—which Mohr recounts in the most sparkling pages of this well-written book—was the fruition of several political "deals" as well as of Ezra Cornell's dream of a great upstate university. Finally, the party's short-lived commitment to black suffrage reflected the desire to make Republican voters of hitherto disfranchised Negroes as much as it did the racial idealism of the Reconstruction era. When politically oriented Republicans sensed that espousal of black voting would cost more white votes than it would win black ones, politics and idealism parted company, and the Republican party abandoned its stand for impartial voting rights.

Although Mohr argues that the Republican policy program was intended to enlarge the electoral coalition created by the Civil War, his analysis of the impact of those policies upon voting behavior is only superficial. He asserts that few urban Democrats changed parties in response to the reform measures and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the suffrage issue was decisive in the Republican defeat in 1867, but neither of these contentions receives conclusive treatment. In the light of the attention which Reconstruction historiography has paid to constituent attitudes toward Republican policies, Mohr's focus on the narrowly legislative side of the issues must be considered a weakness.

Mohr's use of the phrase "radical Republicans" in his title and throughout the book raises some problems. Defining "radical" in terms of the national issue of the remaking of Southern society, Mohr then applies the phrase to New York politics where its relevance is uncertain. Most of the civic and institutional advances accomplished between 1865 and 1867 had prewar antecedents, if less successful ones. The strategy of "reforming" downstate urban life from Albany was a staple of Republican policy before the Civil War, and it has continued to the present day. There was nothing "radical" about it, certainly nothing "radical" that had anything intrinsically to do with the aftermath of the Civil War. The problem is largely verbal, and one is inclined to be sympathetic to Mohr. The historian of state politics walks a fine line between "just" doing local history and the inevitable impulse to find national analogies, whether or not they are there.

RICHARD L. MCCORMICK
Yale University

Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948–1957 *edited by John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis. New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Company, 1973.—xi, 344 pp. $12.50.*

The second volume of Lester Pearson's memoirs deals with his years as secretary of state for External Affairs. The book was only half completed when Mr. Pearson died. It has been finished by two research associates using diaries, letters, and other materials that made possible the use of the author's own words. The job has been done so skillfully that these pages may truly be called memoirs rather than biography. Two appendices contain fifty pages from Mr. Pearson's diary at the time of the Korean War.

Pearson was at External Affairs during a decade that saw important shifts in Canadian policy. Mackenzie King, who retired as prime minister in 1948, had followed a nationalistic line. Everything was made subordinate to the attainment of equal status abroad and the maintenance of unity at home. He was suspicious of the Great Powers and of all forms of collective activity in times of peace. Formal commitments were abhorrent to him.

By the end of World War II, however, Canada's status was assured; and the cessation of hostilities released some of the tensions that threatened unity. Louis St. Laurent as prime minister and Lester Pearson in charge of foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy reversed the King approach to international affairs. Under them, Canada was active and even innovative in world politics, anxious that her rank as a Middle Power receive full recognition. Both men were convinced internationalists.

From the standpoint of Canadian diplomacy, the highlights of the decade covered in this volume were NATO, Korea, and Suez, each of which is treated at length. There are also chapters on Pearson's experiences as a politician (up to 1957), on the postwar Commonwealth, and on a visit to Russia.

One detects in Pearson's account a certain tension between the diplomat's desire to put the best front on what was done and the author's clear grasp of the realities of world politics. Realism wins out most of the time. Certainly Canada's role is not minimized; but neither are its achievements (which were considerable in those years) blown up. The treatment of NATO is a good example. Pearson had pressed strongly for the inclusion of an article in the NATO treaty which would promote economic and social cooperation. He succeeded in having such an article (Article 2) included but admits frankly that it remained a dead letter. He recognizes, too, that the United States got its way when it felt strongly enough about any issue. And he refers sadly more than once to the problems arising out of the complex processes of decision making in the American system and the confusion that sometimes is the result of their complexity.

However the diplomat—or the politician—seems to win out over the candid commentator in the account (pp. 261–271) of the difficulties encountered in trying to persuade Nasser to accept Canadian ground troops as part of the United Nations Emergency Force in Suez. Canadian soldiers looked too much like British soldiers and were organized in regiments bearing provocative names like "The Queen's Own Rifles." So contrary to the UN plans no Canadian infantry were sent. Pearson tries hard to make it appear that the substitution of technical forces was based on military rather than political considerations. Canadian public opinion was not convinced of this in 1956–1957, nor is the reader likely to be now.

For the serious student this volume may contain little that is new. But he will find it useful in throwing light on the problems of coalition diplomacy and on the workings of the UN. It also reveals, as does almost every book by a Canadian politician, some of the difficulties faced by a small power jealous of its independence but living side by side with a dynamic great power. Of course it is only one man's account of a decade, one that differs at some points, for example, with the views of Dean Acheson as presented in his *Present at the Creation*. But Lester Pearson was a careful and modest observer whose conclusions are worthy of consideration.

Certainly every reader will enjoy the book for its excellent style, its out-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spoken estimates of many great men, and its humor that pervades everything the author has to say.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
Barnard College, Columbia University

By-Elections in British Politics *edited by Chris Cook and John Ramsden. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1973.—xii, 406 pp. $17.95.*

Nuffield College, unable to compete with its more venerable Oxford neighbors in terms of architectural splendor or the prestige of its wine cellar, has compensated by offering a distinctive approach to the social sciences with which its name is now synonymous. Largely through the inspiration and example of David Butler, who has been stationed there since 1949 and who is well known to BBC audiences for his election night broadcasts, it has made a specialty of psephological studies. The present volume, spawned during a 1971 Nuffield conference and dedicated to the warden and fellows of the college, features contributions by a dozen young scholars, all but two of whom boast Nuffield connections. With an introduction by Butler, this collection provides stimulating, sometimes penetrating assessments of electoral behavior and results in by-elections over the past half-century.

Starting with the 1922 contest at Newport, which stiffened Conservative resolve to break with Lloyd George, these essays carry the reader down to the issues and events of the present decade. Admittedly, by-elections were held with fanfare and frequency before this time: Butler makes passing reference to their importance during the Restoration Parliament of the seventeenth century and again during the reign of George III. But it is argued that only with the fall of the Lloyd George coalition, when "the style of politics changed so abruptly," that one arrives at "an appropriate moment to begin a study of the role of by-elections in modern politics" (p. 2). To an extent, the choice is arbitrary, reflecting certain limitations and predispositions in the Nuffield perspective. "Perhaps," Butler himself concedes, "1904 and 1905 . . . provide the period when by-elections had most significance in British politics" (p. 1). Others, without necessarily disputing his criteria, might make a case for Barnard Castle in 1903, Jarrow and Colne Valley in 1907, or Spen Valley in 1919. "As long as the Coalition survived," John Ramsden endeavors to explain, "Liberals and Labour had enough in common in their hostility to it to postpone the death of the old politics a little longer" (p. 20). Implicit in such a view is the presumption, which some may reject, that the practitioners of the "old politics" had it in their power to retard, if not to arrest the drift to class or economic factors as the determinants of electoral patterns. In any case, as Chris Cook clearly indicates in his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discussion of Arthur Henderson's successful candidacy at Burnley in 1924, the revolution of 1922 was far from complete.

Editors as well as contributors, Cook and Ramsden have provided sections of commentary that link the various essays into a coherent narrative. The usefulness is perhaps more apparent than real, for the volume draws its principal strength from its injunction against any interpretation that does not take into account a multiplicity of personal, local, and national factors. In addition, the component parts differ markedly, as they should, in conception as well as execution. While Gillian Peele's account of the 1931 conflict in the St. George's division of Westminster is a spirited foray into high politics, Martin Ceadel undertakes an astute historiographical evaluation of the so-called pacifist explosion at East Fulham two years later. Iain McLean, with closer attention to constituency structure, tests the hypothesis that the 1938 by-elections at Oxford and Bridgewater can be taken as an index to popular sentiment over Munich, concluding that "grandiose generalisations about the changing mood of the British public ought to be left to the Churchills, the Catos and the old newsreels" (p. 162). Paul Addison, richly endowed with the benefit of hindsight which was denied to contemporaries, discerns in the insurgent candidacies of 1939–1945 "valuable evidence of the role of the war in initiating a new leftward swing" (p. 190). With a masterly grasp of sociological theory, Ken Young examines the impetus behind the Liberal victory at suburban Orpington in 1962. As an inquiring journalist, David McKie surveys the disastrous by-election showing of the 1964–1970 Labour government. And Ramsden, in collaboration with Richard Jay who had conducted on-the-spot polls, presents a lively analysis of Dick Taverne's adventures at Lincoln in 1973. Finally, Matthew Oakeshott ventures an "economic theory" of postwar by-elections, and Stan Taylor and Clive Payne engage in detailed quantification.

Despite the disparities in methodology and content, let alone the complexities of the situations which are encompassed, a number of patterns emerge. One is the part played by the national press, for whom by-elections invariably pose special opportunities: whether it was Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere conspiring against Baldwin's leadership in 1931, or William Rees-Mogg and Bernard Levin celebrating the Lincoln result as the harbinger of a new Centre party, publicists have a habit of seizing any by-election as a mirror for their own views and aspirations. Another is the tendency for a by-election to "swing" against the party in power, particularly if that party had exceeded its normal constituency. Not least of all is the temptation for by-election voters, with the national spotlight upon them and the comforting knowledge that they cannot normally bring down the government, to cross party lines in order to make surprising, even fanciful choices. "It is easier to change people's voting habits at local elections than at by-elections, and at by-elections than at general elections," (pp. 199–200) observed Mark Bonham Carter, who won Torring-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ton in a 1957 Liberal upset, only to lose the seat in 1959. The contributors to this most welcome collection, including those who buttress their arguments with correlation coefficients and equations, could hardly put the matter better than that.

STEPHEN KOSS
Columbia University

Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy, 1918–1922 *by D. G. Boyce. Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1972.—253 pp. $10.00.*

Behind Dr. Boyce's easy title lies the difficult but rewarding topic indicated by the subtitle. Between 1918 and 1922 Anglo-Irish relations were transformed. The Union was undone; Ireland was partitioned and the greater part of it obtained from a British coalition cabinet responsible to a predominantly Unionist House of Commons, a status far in advance of home rule. How and why did this come about?

Dr. Boyce's answer, in effect, is by a revolution in British public opinion. Two quotations serve to lend color to it: "it was the revolt of the British conscience, not the defeat of the British army, that obliged Lloyd George to seek terms of peace and settlement with Sinn Féin" (p. 180). In November 1920, Sir Henry Wilson told Winston Churchill bluntly "to remember that in the end the authority of the Cabinet rested on the bayonets of the soldiers." The story of the Irish troubles shows that Wilson was very much mistaken. In the long run Lloyd George was not sitting on a row of bayonets, but rather on a pile of newspapers (p. 181).

The possibility of such an explanation of the transformation, remarkable by any reckoning, in British policy toward Ireland at this time, has not been disregarded by earlier writers but it has not previously been advanced in such absolute terms, nor formulated on the basis of sustained analyses of the diverse sources of evidence which Dr. Boyce has now done. The originality of his study accordingly is twofold: he focuses first sharply on the public opinion factor in the shaping of British policy; and second, on the attention paid to the British press and journals, to unofficial and in some cases ad hoc pressure groups, as well to the more direct influence of persons and parties upon cabinet thinking. Some things stand out afresh: the impact on British readers of accurate as well as vivid first-hand reporting of violence in Ireland, notably that of Hugh Martin of the *Daily News*; the intermittent but not negligible influence of the Irish Conciliation Committee, exercised chiefly by maintaining long-term and pacific aims; the inhibitions and hesitations of high church dignitaries, Catholic as well as Protestant; the comparable inhibitions of the trade unions, whose strong predisposition toward peace was rarely expressed because of vocal Irish Protes-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tant and Irish Catholic union membership. When the crunch came, the trade unions subordinated everything to their overriding preoccupation with postwar unemployment. Although the collective influence of both churches and unions were diminished by these inhibitions, there was no doubt that neither would support a settlement resting on repression and force. And that after all was close to the heart of the matter. Even the Unionists, so Dr. Boyce concludes, from 1918 onward began to recognize that union could not be sustained, even by force, over a long period of time. Thus they were in the process of discarding their Unionism and, in deference to opinion in the country, reverting to an older Tory-Conservatism.

Yet while Dr. Boyce maintains interest in his developing theme, his overall conclusion is somewhat less than convincing. He himself supplies two reasons for this. The first was the degree of British boredom with the Irish question. It had never been a major concern of the trade unions and now even the Unionist right was apparently weakening in its convictions. But an outside initiative was needed to translate boredom into a readiness to concede what had previously been regarded as "not negotiable" and this the Irish Republican Army supplied. British public opinion was indeed important, but only because it was compelled to react to violent protest. Its influence may therefore be thought of as a secondary rather than a primary factor even while conceding that the IRA had not won the war. The second is the action which the cabinet was prepared to take in extremity, irrespective of public opinion. Dr. Boyce himself gives a hypothetical, but none the less telling illustration of this. "A resumption of the fighting," he writes on December 1921, "might have been highly distasteful to the British public but it is safe to say that no desire for peace by Great Britain was compelling enough to overcome her unwillingness to admit the Irish Claim to complete independence" (p. 170). In other words where public opinion and cabinet conclusion coincided or were not in conflict, public opinion might seem, or be allowed, to prevail; but when this was only questionably so the cabinet was ready to assume final responsibility, if necessary disregarding public opinion. This suggests that the Irish would in fact have been ill advised to place too much reliance on the influence of public opinion on British policy.

NICHOLAS MANSERGH
Cambridge University

Europe Since 1870: An International History *by James Joll. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973.—xiii, 541 pp. £6.20.*

A good case could be made for applying the "German" label to the century since 1870. For the major part of that period Germany more than any other country has been the initiator of international activity, even if German leadership has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proved disastrous. That is the interval with which Joll deals, and he quite rightly begins by emphasizing the importance of the Franco-Prussian War, which opened the gates to an extraordinary outburst of energy and also gave Europe a master where she had previously had a mistress. The century clearly falls into two very distinct parts divided by 1914. But it is wholly sound to point out that "if the First World War speeded up the transformation of European society, the forces making for change were already there before 1914, and the stability which observers a century later are sometimes inclined to attribute to European society at the end of the nineteenth century was already being undermined" (p. 25).

These undermining forces are examined in the opening chapters, where their analysis is skillfully interwoven, bringing together the impact of social and political challenge with the more purely artistic and cultural manifestations of restless social discontent. Futurism and syndicalism were not without points of contact, though how they might interact was left to the future to disclose.

In this atmosphere of ferment war broke out. War, especially one of such dimensions as World War I, is inevitably an accelerator of change, and some would say of progress. By 1914 the French Revolution had been a success, in the sense at least that democracy was widely regarded as the wave of the future. It was also the war that made possible the Russian Revolution of 1917. For a brief moment the possibility seemed to exist that the latter could prove to be an extension of the former. But as early as November 1918 Albert Thomas wrote in *L'Humanité*: "Either Wilson or Lenin. Either democracy of the French Revolution, reinforced by the struggles of a whole century or else the primitive, incoherent, brutal force of Russian fanaticism. We have to choose" (p. 257).

This judgment contains the kernel of the second half of the story, during which a harsh contest developed, a contest that has caused much confusion among liberal ranks. Joll's own appraisal is revealing: "For all Stalin's tyrannical hunger for power, for all the empty repetition of Marxist-Leninist jargon in the Soviet Union, for all the suffering caused by the rigours of the Soviet economic system, Marxism remains one of the great European political doctrines and deserves an intellectual respect which it is impossible to give to any form of fascist ideology" (p. 357). How true, yet how similar the totalitarians have been in their ways!

Until World War I, and for some centuries prior to it, Europe had been the powerhouse and mistress of the planet, not only or so much in the crude form of conquest, as in the more fundamental one of originating the ideas and the institutions that have shaped the modern world. The war showed that Europe was incapable of resolving her own problems, for which the determining American intervention was needed. Though it took another world war to establish beyond question the effacement of Europe, the seeds of her demotion had been planted by 1918. It was not so much the injury done to the material power of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe—witness Germany's military performance in World War II—as the fact that in much of Europe that elusive but indispensable component of power —will—had been eroded. The meek, if civilized, British retreat from empire is the best illustration of this.

The question thus is raised of Europe's present place and role and of her future prospects. The loss of her world dominance is irretrievable and she is divided in two, each part an appendage of external powers. (France, incidentally, is not a member of NATO as the map on p. 424 would indicate.) Yet both sections are straining at the leash, a phenomenon far more visible in the freer Western milieu. The attempts at freely formed integration in that sector have so far achieved only moderate, though not insignificant, results. And the question reappears again, put on ice for the moment but not buried, of German reunification, the possible key to a larger unity.

The resources of Europe, both material and moral, remain considerable. But prospects are clouded, and Joll appropriately concludes on a qualifiedly somber note: "The last hundred years of European history have been a period of splendours as well as of miseries: let us hope that there will still be historians left a hundred years from now to assess whether the past century was just the end of an epoch or the beginning of a new one" (p. 484). What else could a liberal historian, not a prophet in any case, say?

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ
Columbia University

The Face of Defeat: Palestinian Refugees and Guerrillas *by David Pryce-Jones. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973.—179 pp. $5.95.*

The Palestinians have been a "political football" of the Middle East, persistently ensnared in the machinations of both the Arab states and Israel. This is the central message of *The Face of Defeat,* in which David Pryce-Jones presents a tapestry of his impressions of Palestinian refugees and guerrillas. Many of the author's most suggestive insights, however, are buried in lengthy descriptive passages; and the absence of a logical sequence of ideas detracts from the quality of the analysis.

Pryce-Jones, who is an English novelist and journalist, conducted extensive interviews with Palestinians since 1967. He wisely eschews simplistic explanations of the Palestinian dilemma, claiming that "labels do not fit a riddle like this" (p. 117). Over 700,000 Arab residents fled Palestine during the 1948 war, incited either by rumors of Israeli atrocities, or by their own leaders who promised a speedy return in the wake of Arab victories. Arab host states then refused to resettle residents of refugee camps, declaring that the recovery of Palestine must be fueled by the frustration of its rightful inhabitants. Under

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United Nations auspices, the Palestinians subsisted on the "crumbs and condescension" of international donors.

Demoralization was heightened after the Six-Day War, because "the Arabs are a shame-oriented people and they have lost face" (p. 74). Initiative passed from discredited Arab governments to Palestinian guerrilla organizations that strove to remold the Palestinian destiny and to put a "good face" on defeat. However, in addition to internal dissension, external actors undermined the guerrillas. Pryce-Jones accuses Egypt and Syria of opportunistically backing competing Palestinian groups "in a manner calculated to bypass the consequences" (p. 52), by insisting that raids against Israel be conducted from other Arab countries. The eviction of the guerrillas from Jordan during 1970 intensified factional strife within the resistance movement and compelled the diversion of its operations into Lebanon.

The Face of Defeat, like most literature on the subject, fails to explore the extent of popular allegiance to the Palestinian resistance. Pryce-Jones addresses the issue only indirectly, in his discussion of Israeli administration of occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza). Whereas a ruthless occupation would have played into guerrilla hands, the low profile of the Israeli military presence, the policy of "open bridges," and the economic benefits of regular jobs at Israeli wages cushioned Palestinian adjustment to new realities. Moreover, firm reprisals by Israeli authorities discouraged even sympathetic Palestinians from harboring or abetting the guerrillas.

Occupation did, however, cause psychological strains for West Bankers, who had lived since 1948 "like patients in some isolation chamber, breathing the rarefied ether of revenge" (p. 71). The unexpected goodwill of Israelis constituted an "unsolicited gift"; indeed, former hatred of the enemy was easier than the new "slippery and unwilling slide into toleration" (p. 112). To whom might the Palestinians turn for a way out of their dilemma? The legitimacy of the traditional West Bank elite, empowered through heredity and wealth, was rejected by Arab advocates of social change. Lacking clear direction from any source, the Palestinians were beset by a crisis of leadership that exacerbated their dependence on others.

Pryce-Jones offers no systematic conclusions to his study. Implicitly, however, he suggests that genuine peace in the Middle East is contingent upon resolution of the status of the Palestinians. Optimally, the positive impact of recent personal interaction between Palestinians and Israelis may encourage the lifting of the face of past defeats through mutual fulfillment of national aspirations, rather than by an endless cycle of violence. One implication of Pryce-Jones' analysis is that such an accommodation is unlikely until the other pieces of the Middle East peace-making puzzle have fallen into place.

NAOMI WILLIAMS
Columbia University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Managers of Modernization: Organization and Elites in Turkey (1950–1969) *by Leslie L. Roos and Noralou P. Roos. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.—xii, 292 pp. $14.50.*

Many students of Turkish society, regardless of their particular interest, will want to read and use this book. The authors have set out to analyze the stresses to which the higher reaches of the Turkish bureaucracy were subject during an era marked by "ruralizing elections" and characterized by accelerated economic growth. The effects of such stresses may be studied both at the individual-behavioral and at the institutional levels; this study concentrates more on aspects of institutional imbalance than on the alienation of the individuals caught in the process. The book focuses on fluctuations of institutional status as they affect differentially various Turkish ministries and other comparable bureaucratic organizations. These fluctuations are reflected in problems of recruitment and turnover.

The basic data used came from two overlapping surveys: one carried out in 1956, the other in 1965. The respondents to the questionnaires were graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Ankara in state employment at both times. This procedure made panel and cohort data available to the authors: "241 graduates answered both the 1956 and 1965 questionnaires, while 139 graduates responded in 1956 but not in 1965 . . . 69 younger graduates received only the 1965 questionnaire."

The authors combine this basic survey data and analysis with other Turkish survey data and studies of Turkish administration. They also have a detailed historical introduction to the problem. All together the coverage is many sided and extensive. The authors have kneaded these materials together with recent theoretical literature on bureaucracy and produced a synthesis of great interest.

One of the most interesting of their conclusions has to do with the process whereby the potential downward mobility of state-employed graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences has been mitigated. Bureaucratic downward mobility is understood by the authors in terms of income—absolute losses of real income for certain positions and relative losses with regard to the enhanced position of a formerly weak business class which has come into its own since 1950. But it is also—and much more—a downward mobility of prestige in the face of the power acquired by politicians after the ruralizing elections; in short, it is debureaucratization. Downward mobility in this sense has been precluded in part by the migration of bureaucrats to state economic enterprises in an economy where the public sector is sizable. With economic development these new organizations began to grow at an accelerated rate as compared with "old line" ministries, thus offering new outlets for those with the technical capabilities and motivation who were willing to change their old jobs for new ones. As the authors point out, this equilibrating effect of the state economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enterprises has not been stressed before: the usual tack is to berate them for their inefficiency.

This, however, is only one of the numerous aspects of change in the Turkish upper bureaucratic establishment that the authors highlight.

In a way—and this is as it should be—the work raises more questions than it answers. Thus we know little about the rate at which Faculty of Political Sciences graduates have been siphoned into the private sector. If it could be shown that this has not occurred at the highest levels—where these bureaucrats are the most useful to business—the absence of such shifts in itself is significant especially when compared to the French practice of *pantouflage*. From the information informally acquired concerning the graduates of the first class I taught at the Faculty of Political Sciences (the class of 1958), I know that two of my former students who started their careers in the Ministry of Finance are now working for Murat industries (Turkish Fiat) and one former member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become the export director of a macaroni firm (fall of 1972). Such impressionistic knowledge points to an interesting area of research.

As is usual in studies of Middle Eastern elites, there is in this study too a tendency to identify the power elite in Turkey with officials. The authors do not clearly identify a notable class thus missing one nodal point for the articulation of power. In this respect officials emerge only in one of their roles: that of a confrontation with the rural masses. The actual set of linkages is much more complex.

Another point which is more germane to the methodology used by the study is related to the comparability of positions across bureaucratic organizations. Thus employees of all ministries might not define job satisfaction in the same terms. One distinction suggested by Mack [Raymond Mack, "Occupational Ideology and the Determinate Role," *Social Forces*, 36 (October 1957)] is that between the rewards of a *position* measured in prestige or in income terms. This is different than the evaluation of the prestige of a *ministry* as a whole for which the authors use sophisticated techniques.

When one states that there were only twenty-eight graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences working in the state planning organization in 1963 (p. 75) the characteristics of the hierarchical structure of this organization and the special place occupied in it by the all-important category of "expert" has to be taken into consideration. In general, ministries are not identical in terms of hierarchical structure and neither are the state economic enterprises. The authors do partly allude to such differences but the answer to some unresolved questions which they pose might be found here.

There are a number of general statements about Turkey which are somewhat arresting in view of the extensive knowledge of Turkey that the authors show. Thus the view that "Turkey seems to be passing from the stage where an elite individual's status tended to determine that of his organization to a situa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion where organizational prestige is important to personal prestige" (p. 71) will raise doubts—and not only among those who have studied the Turkish army in a historical perspective.

There are a number of minor inaccuracies such as that Ataturk "discouraged foreign business" and that "he rejected the possibility of outside help," and the information given about the formation of the Iş Bankasi skips over some important aspects of its foundation (p. 26).

All together, however, this is a tight, disciplined, informative, and enlightening book with which few studies of Turkey can compare.

SERIF MARDIN
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul

Ethnic Conflict and Political Development *by Cynthia H. Enloe. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1973.—xvii, 282 pp. $4.95.*

An analysis of most of the literature on nation building published during the 1960s reveals that scholars either ignored the issue of communalism or assumed that it constituted a minor impediment to effective integration. Communalism and ethnicity did not receive sufficient attention for many reasons. Among them, many social scientists were still overly influenced by the models of evolutionary social change of the early twentieth-century sociologists which led them to assume that all societies would inexorably move from traditionalism to modernism. The preoccupation of political scientists with social classes as the "real" structure of society and ideological formulations as the only legitimate form of modern politics also caused them to underrate or ignore religion, ethnic group, race, language, and region as enduring bases of division. Because some scholars interested in national integration posited models of successive stages, each of them more depluralized than the preceding one, they tacitly assumed that new states would gradually move from one level to another and that older nations would not regress.

During and since the 1960s, however, country after country, both industrialized and developing, has experienced strains wrought by the competing demands of communal groups within their borders and sometimes this competition has brought with it conflict and political instability. In response to these developments a new social science specialty is appearing and with it a considerable number of publications. Cynthia Enloe's *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*, which was published in the analytic studies series of Little, Brown and Company, shares the unwarranted pessimism of much of the recent publications on ethnicity and communalism. Enloe not only rejects the nation-state orientation and assimilationist bias characteristic of many of the early studies of nation building, she suggests that nations are artificial collectivities often sustained by oppression. Although she posits the possibility that ethnic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

militancy could lead toward greater national cohesiveness based on more equal distributions of power, she believes that decentralization and autonomy for constituent political units are more probable results. Yet nowhere in her study does she take up the central issue of the management of ethnic conflict. Contrary to the assumption underlying Enloe's book and many of the other recent works, the politicization of communal attachments does not doom a political system to continuous conflict and instability. As the research of Eric Nordlinger (*Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for the Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, 29, 1972), Milton Esman (*Administration and Development in Malaysia: Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society*, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), and Arend Lijphart (*The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) has shown the structure and policies of a political system significantly influence the dynamics and consequences of communal competition. It is possible to achieve a kind of national accommodation even in a deeply divided society that will sacrifice neither the interests of the state nor the component groups. Furthermore, Enloe's provocative statements regarding the future of nations in the conclusion bear little relationship to her thread of analysis in the remainder of the book.

There is much to commend this book. Enloe employs data from fifty-seven different cases in her examination of the origins and varieties of ethnic conflict. Her grasp of the details of these cases and her ability to synthesize them into intellectually meaningful and well-written chapters dealing with such disparate topics as the varieties of ethnicity, ideology and the reality of ethnic identity, and revolution and ethnic conflict sets Enloe's book apart from most other publications of this genre, like Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle's *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972). Her championing the cause of the constituent ethnic communities while at the same time displaying some awareness of the dilemmas of policy makers endows the work with an interesting perspective.

One major problem comes with Enloe's conception of ethnicity. Enloe distinguishes between three types of ethnic groups: those based on tribal, national, and racial origins. She never satisfactorily demonstrates, though, why race and not language, religion, or region can constitute the basis for an ethnic group. It would have been preferable for her to narrow her definition of ethnicity or to broaden the scope of the book to include all forms of communalism. Moreover, Enloe's discussion focuses disproportionately on racially divided societies. Perhaps because of her own field work experiences in Guyana and Malaysia, she exhibits much greater sensitivity to the dynamics of racial competition than to the so-called national or tribal competition. Little in the book is directly relevant to Africa.

Enloe does not conclusively ascertain the relationship between ethnic con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

flict and political development. At one point she suggests that "In multi-ethnic states where several communities are undergoing political mobilization, national development may be conceived as the sum of communal developments plus the central government's capacity to cope with those separate developments and their accumulated consequences" (p. 215). Thus in contrast to some other analysts who are more pessimistic, Enloe does not believe that the intensification of ethnic attachment and political development are necessarily inversely related. If she had pursued this theme more systematically and considered its relevance for the future of political systems, her book would have been a more original contribution to the literature.

AUDREY C. SMOCK
Columbia University

Marx and Burke: A Revisionist View *by Ruth A. Bevan. La Salle, Ill., Open Court, 1973.—xiii, 197 pp. $7.95.*

The pairing of Marx and Engels is clearly appropriate; that of Marx and Lenin we have learned to accept, but the combination of Marx and Burke—the revolutionary and the reactionary—seems at first sight totally implausible. It is to Ruth Bevan's credit that she has made credible her rejection of the conventional categories. Four of her five chapters have the words "Historical Empiricism" in their title, denoting the main area of agreement between Burke and Marx. Both were keenly aware that any social formation is the product of a long historical process and that recognition of the restraints imposed by social reality is a precondition for a plausible political policy. Burke and Marx both accepted the Aristotelian tradition of man as primarily social. Also "as empiricists" they "vehemently attacked the 'metaphysicians' and the 'utopians' " (p. 38) for attempting to abstract the individual from his social context. Alongside these similarities of analysis are certain biographical similarities. Marx and Burke both wrote poetry in their youth and later became journalists, thereby gaining awareness of the power of language; both came from religiously heterogeneous families, lived most of their adult lives as outsiders in England, and "had to be partially supported by a patron" (p. 29); tendencies toward fanaticism and a "missionary quality" (p. 19) were part of their political style. Clearly an ingenious mind has been at work on the biographical details although it is far from clear what these similarities are intended to prove. More valid is Bevan's contention that both thinkers are much appreciated today and so cannot be neglected by students of politics. Marx is now even being taken seriously in America, if only by the New Left. Appreciation of Burke and Marx is presented as appropriate, for we are still in need of their method. "At a time when anarchism flowers" (p. 187) among our youth we must reemphasize man's social nature; and while behavioralism is still fashionable among aca-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demics we must reemphasize both the need for a historical perspective and for political science to coexist with political philosophy. Thus the ideas of Burke and Marx remain essential to a "politics of reality" (chap. IV) and their similarities of analysis create the "possibility of dialogue" (p. 184) between groups otherwise regarded as antagonistic.

This argument unites two thinkers holding opposite political views but hardly considers the problems raised by this unlikely conjunction. Thus there is a sense in which the work appears incomplete, for the similarities are not placed in the context of the differences. We are advised to accept the points of agreement between Burke and Marx but receive no evaluation of their points of disagreement. Are the similarities major or minor components of their respective totalities? Should the conventional placing of Burke and Marx be completely rejected? If not, how do certain similarities of analysis fit into the context of differing political opinions? Are the similarities merely coincidental? A brief suggestion that Burke might have influenced Hegel is insufficient to explain this. One should also relate Marx to the German Romantic tradition and both Burke and Marx to right- and left-wing anti-individualism. Unfortunately Bevan is quicker to relate them to Greek thought than to their own immediate heritage. Yet such a sense of historical context should have been a primary acquisition from reading Burke and Marx. These questions surely merit more attention than speculations on the outcome of a meeting between Burke and Marx or of the way Burke might have reacted to the Industrial Revolution. Also an index would have been useful. Nevertheless, this book deserves to be widely read, for it provides a stimulating, highly readable, and fresh approach to the subject.

MICHAEL LEVIN
The University College of Wales

Developing the Third World: The Experience of the Nineteen-Sixties *edited by Ronald Robinson. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.—vii, 289 pp. $13.50.*

This is an awkward volume with which to confront a reviewer. Its origin is the annual Cambridge Conferences on Development, which assembled a mixture of practical administrators and technical (that is, academic) development experts to discuss development problems and strategy. Its contents are a mixture of documents from the conferences of 1964 to 1969—late in the decade but rather early for evaluating "the experience of the nineteen-sixties." The book is also a mixture of individual papers written for the conferences and conference reports summarizing "Arguments" of the various conferences. A collection of outstanding individual papers culled from the various conferences might have served to represent the best of late-1960s thought on development

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems, and so be useful to scholars. A chronologically arranged series of conference reports might have given the reader a guide to evolving themes and fashions of thinking on development economics during a decade marked by strong trends of change in both practical and theoretical approaches to the subject. The present volume offers neither. Instead it offers a jumble of documents—some good, some bad—grouped under the headings of "General Perspective," "Industrialization," "Rural Development," "The Role of Government," and "Aid." Moreover, these documents represent, not an accurate record of the debate on development during the period, but the views of one side of that debate; they were modified gradually in reaction to criticisms and emerging facts of experience. One gets a strong impression of conferences at which the underdeveloped administrators were assembled to be propagandized by the "in-group" of acceptably "radical" Western theorists, committed to economic planning, industrialization, and development aid; the main item on the agenda was why the ideological prescription did not work and how it could be improved in practice. The obvious missing representative of the other side is Professor P. T. Bauer, though at least toward the end of the decade there should have been plenty of other sceptics about both political centralization and the desirability of available foreign aid participation.

There was still plenty of reason for debate among the committed over such issues as whether to choose high-productivity over high-employment investment projects, industrialization versus urban development, and the relative priorities of economic and sociopolitical development. In this connection, attention should be called to E. F. Schumacher's prescient paper on "Industrialization through 'Intermediate Technology,'" which was hotly debated, and Edmundo Flores' wise paper on "Priorities in Agricultural Production and Rural Industry."

The papers and discussions are summarized in the editor's somewhat misleadingly named "Practical Politics of Economic Development." Robinson is professor of the History of the British Commonwealth, and neither an economist nor a political scientist; he has the historian's irritating habit of striving for fine writing, vivid phrases, and analogies rather than clear explanation of issues, without displaying a historian's sense of the evolution of contemporary history and ideas. Ideas on development evolved very rapidly in the 1960s, especially in the latter half of the decade, reflecting accumulating experience of the process and disillusionment with its results. Ideas from 1964 cannot be treated on a par with ideas from 1969, as Professor Robinson is inclined to treat them. Nor is the subject best approached on the basis of subservience to the political objectives of existing nation-states; peaceful or revolutionary changes may alter those objectives and, indeed, the domain of the state itself. Nevertheless, the major issues are covered by this chapter and the rest of the book, though in much more sporadic and uneven fashion than by the Pearson Report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Developing the Third World cannot be recommended as high-priority reading for serious scholars in political science or economics; however, other readers may find some useful insights in the way the editor-rapporteur Ronald Robinson formulates and summarizes the issues discussed. The sections on general perspective and rural development are probably the most usable, together with Chapters 6 to 8 in the industrialization section (the others are country studies). The two sections on the role of government and aid are too dated to repay the time required to read them.

HARRY G. JOHNSON
London School of Economics

Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform *by John D. Buenker. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.—xi, 299 pp. $8.95.*

For at least the past twenty years, American historians have been disproportionately concerned with the question: who were the urban reformers in the period between 1880 and 1915? The debate—among Richard Hofstadter, Samuel P. Hays, James B. Crooks, Robert Wiebe, and Richard C. Wade, among others—has focused on whether they were young businessmen on the way up or professionals on the way down. The great weight of evidence has suggested that the reformers were white, native-born, affluent residents of the urban periphery who were concerned with efficiency, moral uplift, and lower taxes. Thus, they supported immigration restriction, civil service requirements, the short ballot, the city-manager and commission forms of municipal government, prohibition, and women's suffrage.

The prevailing view of the urban machines, on the other hand, has held that they were conservative, self-seeking, and corrupt. Bosses were opposed to reform and entirely willing to sacrifice the interests of their inner-city constituents to political or economic expediency. Thus, they accepted bribes from transit tycoons like Charles Yerkes in Chicago in return for voting approval of higher fares on the streetcars. Even historians who have followed Robert Merton's functional analysis of the machine and have credited the boss system with providing necessary services to urban newcomers have not often placed the machines in the reform camp.

Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform challenges the predominate stereotype. Focusing upon New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Illinois, Buenker finds that "urban new stock legislators," far from being a conservative force, constituted the major progressive element in those states. Among the reforms in which their influence was decisive, Buenker cites the federal income tax, business regulation, workmen's compensation, and the direct election of senators. Thus, the book does not reverse earlier interpretations as much as it suggests that the identity of the "reformers" depends upon the particular "reform" one is interested in or even on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the definition one gives to the word "reform." To his credit, Buenker does not push his thesis too far and admits that urban new stock liberalism was not "the progressive movement" any more than was native middle-class reform.

Unfortunately, *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform* is more argumentative than analytical. Buenker continually hammers away at large themes while avoiding the challenge of discussing any single issue in depth. Important legislative votes are treated in a cursory and superficial manner while the narrative moves monotonously from the situation in one state to that in another. Nevertheless, Buenker has made a good case for the "progressivism" of inner-city ethnics, and *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform* should serve as a useful corrective to those whose lectures define urban reform largely in terms of middle-class attempts to alter the structure of municipal government.

KENNETH T. JACKSON
Columbia University

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-1791, vol. II: Senate Executive Journal and Related Documents *edited by Linda Grant DePauw. Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.—xvii, 574 pp. $22.50.*

The National Archives and Urban Research *edited by Jerome Finster. Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1974.—xii, 164 pp. $20.00.*

The United State Congressional Directories, 1789-1840 *edited by Perry M. Goldman and James S. Young. New York, Columbia University Press, 1973.—417 pp. $20.00.*

Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941: A Research Guide *edited by William James Morley. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974.—xv, 618 pp. $25.00.*

Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, vols. I-VIII *edited by Robert Rhodes James. New York, Chelsea House Publications in association with R. K. Bowker Company, 1974.—8917 pp. $185.00.*

History of U.S. Political Parties, vols. I-IV *edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York, Chelsea House Publications in association with R. K. Bowker Company, 1973.—3544 pp. $135.00.*

Sources of Information in the Social Sciences: A Guide to the Literature, 2nd ed. *edited by Carl M. White and associates. Chicago, America Library Association, 1973.—xvii, 702 pp. $25.00.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HARPER TORCHBOOKS

NO CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II

Bruce M. Russett

"Participation in the war against Hitler remains almost wholly sacrosanct, almost in the realm of theology. Yet it seems to me that many of the arguments against other wars can also be applied, with somewhat less force, to this one too."—*from the Preface* **TB/1649 $1.95**

MILITARY FORCE AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

Bruce M. Russett & Alfred C. Stepan, Editors

"The volume begins with an examination of attitudes and socialization within the military, then broadens to the study of the attitudes and behavior of major civilian political actors in regard to defense issues, and finally [explores] the underlying ideological assumptions that explain or sustain new American patterns of civil-military relations."—*from the Introduction* (Includes 161 pages of Bibliographical Notes) **HR/1719 $4.95**

"Both volumes underscore the increased sophistication with which the military and militarization of policy is being examined today. . . . The assumptions and myths of one generation are being questioned by a new generation."
—*The Nation*

For a complete catalog, write
Harper & Row
Paperback Dept.
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PASSAGE OF POWER

Studies in Political Succession

by ROBBINS BURLING

A Volume in the STUDIES IN ANTHROPOLOGY Series

In this volume one of America's most distinguished anthropologists brings fresh insight to an old and much-debated question: What is the best way to choose the chief power holder in a society? Defying the usual boundaries of anthropology, he has sought a universal principle of approach that may disturb those anthropologists who are totally committed to cultural relativism. He considers the most diverse possible range of societies—from ancient to modern times—and a wide variety of processes for political change: hereditary succession, elections, choice by the incumbent of his own successor, military coups, choice within a one-party system. Examining these case studies one by one, he comes up with some challenging—and perhaps controversial—new theories on the societal ramifications of succession. Equally important, the book offers a major examination—applying the techniques of modern anthropology, sociology, and political science—of the fundamental worth of the democratic process. Hence, an entire section of the book is devoted to analyses of the two types of systems that compete with electoral succession in our times: the military dictatorships characteristic of much of the third world, and the one-party regimes of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European dependencies. These are then contrasted with the modern electoral process.

1974, 326 pp., $11.50/£5.40

REBELLION, REVOLUTION, AND ARMED FORCE

A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa

by D. E. H. RUSSELL

A Volume in the STUDIES IN SOCIAL DISCONTINUITY Series

The successful Cuban rebellion of 1958-59 is often cited as proof that oppressive policies backfire, and that even the strongest army can be overcome by a resolute band of rebels. Yet the South African regime has been oppressive for many years without being disturbed by a mass rebellion. Why? The key, according to Professor Russell, author of this most original study of modern rebellions, is the willingness of the armed forces to fight for the ancien régime. In this book, a systematic study of fourteen twentieth-century rebellions, he places special emphasis on the behavior of the establishment armed forces in each instance.

CONTENTS: The Ancien Régime, its Armed Forces and the Outcome of Rebellion: The Wisdom of the Past. Oppression and Rebellion: A Comparison of Cuba and South Africa. South Africa's Missing Rebellion: A Search for Explanations. Rebellion and Revolution: Conceptual Clarifications. Method: The Whys and Wherefores of an Empirical Study. Analysis, Conclusions and Implications. Successful Rebellions and the Behavior of the Armed Forces. Unsuccessful Rebellions and the Behavior of the Armed Forces. Appendix I: Operationalizing the Definition of Mass Rebellion. Appendix II: Diagrams of Case Selection Procedures. Appendix III: Assessments of Scale of Rebellions Sampled. Selected Bibliography.

1974, 224 pp., $14.50/£6.95

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE HIDDEN FRONTIER

Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley

by JOHN W. COLE and ERIC R. WOLF

A Volume in the STUDIES IN SOCIAL DISCONTINUITY Series

Two peasant villages, one speaking German, the other a Romance dialect, have lived side-by-side in a forbidding valley of the Italian Alps for more than 700 years. They have similar ways of coping with their mountainous environment: yet many aspects of their culture, social structure, and ideology are strikingly different. Eric Wolf and John Cole went to this valley to trace the development of these two villages through a long history of shifting political and economic currents. The results of their research, lucidly presented in this volume, support a thesis whose impact on anthropological studies will become significant: ethnicity is primarily a political tool. The book begins with a historical account of the forging of the Tyrolese identity, followed by a discussion of how that identity was subjected to the contradictory pull of rival nationalist movements. It then explores the economic forces at work in shaping the life of the mountain peasantry; examines the historical past of the two communities; studies the problems of wrestling a living from a forbidding environment and a marginal economy; and looks at the inheritance process and the bonds of kinship, friendship and neighborliness characteristic of the two communities. All of which leads to a discussion in the final chapter of the ways in which contradictory political commitments pull people in opposite directions, despite their very similar ways of meeting the problems of survival.

1974, 352 pp., $12.50/£5.90

THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM

Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century

by IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

A Volume in the STUDIES IN SOCIAL DISCONTINUITY Series

Not since Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy has a work of social science provoked such advance excitment as this first volume of a comprehensive four-volume treatise on the modern world-system. In this volume, covering the period from 1450 to 1640, Dr. Wallerstein clearly and forcefully charts the emergence in Europe of a capitalist world-economy based on what he defines as a single division of labor. He examines the various sectors of the world-economy in conjunction with one another: He relates, for example, what happened in the Americas to what occurred in the Indian Ocean; compares the development of the Netherlands with that of northern Italy; and deals with the growth of France, England, and other countries in the context of their different involvements with sources of wealth in scattered parts of the world.

1974, 424 pp., $16.50/£7.90

ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.

A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers

111 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10003
24-28 OVAL ROAD, LONDON NW1 7DX

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Politics of Representation

The Democratic Convention 1972

By **Denis G. Sullivan, Jeffrey L. Pressman, Benjamin I. Page,** and **John J. Lyons**

- A unique supplementary text, based on extensive field interviews at the 1972 Democratic Convention.
- Illustrates and explores questions that are central to all nominating conventions: who is to be represented and how? how can a party appeal to new constituencies and still retain its traditional membership? how does a party coalesce to produce its platform?
- Offers a wealth of statistical data, blended into a clear narrative that conveys much of the detail and color of the nominating convention.

January 1974 152 pages, paperbound $3.95

Energy Politics

By **David Howard Davis**

- For public policy courses or American government courses with an emphasis on public policy.
- A critical and often controversial analysis that examines the political and historical background of the major energy sources used in this country.

September 1974 about 200 pages, paperbound
$3.95 (tentative)

Political Alienation

By **Robert Lamb, Robert Gilmour**

- The first empirical measurement of political alienation, based on surveys by the Institute for Social Research and in-depth interviews by the authors and others.
- Brief and thoroughly readable, *Political Alienation* demonstrates the crucial impact of alienation on political behavior.

October 1974 about 200 pages, paperbound
$3.95 (tentative)

If you wish to consider any of these books for adoption as a required text in your course, please write for a complimentary examination copy.

St. Martin's Press
P.O. Box 5352, New York, N.Y. 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pork Barrel Politics

Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968

John A. Ferejohn. Are a few powerful senators and congressmen able to treat the public purse as a development fund for their states or districts? This study examines the extent to which a pork barrel system exists, in the process illuminating the procedures and influences involved in all federal funding of public works. It traces the complex path taken by rivers and harbors projects from origination to funding and then examines the fate of such projects in Congress. $12.50

Latin America and the United States

The Changing Political Realities

Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen, Editors. It is clear today that the realities of Latin America are changing more rapidly than knowledge about those realities, that Latin America can no longer be understood as merely the shadow cast by the Colossus of the North. In an effort to explore the nature of these political relations, a group of social scientists present 22 papers covering such topics as the politics of the multinational corporation, military elites and military thinking, and the sources of U.S. foreign policy. Paper, $4.95; cloth, $17.50

Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia

John Wilson Lewis, Editor. Ten essays examine the Asian revolutionary experience both theoretically and from the point of view of three main questions. In what social settings did Communist revolts take root or fail? How did Communist groups arise and respond to social pressures for rebellion or order? To what extent did the structure of revolt correspond to society-wide structures? $12.95

Stanford University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

essential reference books from CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY

★ "valuable"
BOOKLIST

★ "highly recommended"
CHOICE

★ "an absolute must"
SOCIAL EDUCATION

★ "One of last year's outstanding reference books"
ALA

★ "a winner"
RQ

★ "highly recommended"
LJ



Congress and the Nation, Vol. III (1969-1972)	$39.50
Congress and the Nation, Vol. II (1965-1968)	39.50
Congress and the Nation, Vol. I (1945-1964)	31.50
The Guide to Congress	39.50
Historic Documents 1973	27.50
Historic Documents 1972	27.50
America Votes 10	27.50
Editorial Research Reports, Vol. I, 1973	30.00
Editorial Research Reports, Vol. II, 1973	30.00
CQ Almanac 1973	52.50

Please order direct from:
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
Box 43
1414 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OXFORD

Religion and Revolution

GUENTER LEWY, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. ☐ Through seventeen case studies that cover a vast range of traditions and cultures, Lewy brings challenging new insights to the complex relationship between politics and religion. "[It] will be read and discussed by scholars for many years."

—Myron Weiner, Mass. Inst. of Technology

1974 704 pages $17.50

Israeli Ecstasies/Jewish Agonies

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, Rutgers University. ☐ "Direct and provocative, yet written with compassion and deep sympathy....The Jewish question is dealt with in all of its ramifications."

—Amos Perlmutter, American University

1974 272 pages $7.50

The Brazilian Communist Party

Conflict and Integration, 1922-1972

RONALD H. CHILCOTE, University of California, Riverside. ☐ Chilcote examines and analyzes the Brazilian Communist Party from historical, political, and economic perspectives. He focuses on party structure, both local and national, and studies the interaction of the Communist party with Brazilian society as a whole.

1974 368 pages $15.00

Imperialism and Nationalism in the Fertile Crescent

Sources and Prospects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

SIR RICHARD ALLEN. ☐ Avoiding the oversimplifications of partisan writings and drawing on his long experiences in the British Diplomatic Service, Allen has written a thorough, balanced and concise history of this centuries-old conflict, emphasizing the crucial role of major world powers, from the Persian Empire to the U.S.

1974 450 pages 5 maps $15.95 cloth, $4.95 paper

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N Y 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from Columbia

FRENCH COMMUNISM, 1920-1972
RONALD TIERSKY

This ambitious study of one of the largest communist parties in the non-socialist world is made even more significant by Pompidou's death and the real possibility of a leftist coalition government in France. It is the most complete treatment of the subject in either French or English. $15.00

THE FAILURE OF U.S. ENERGY POLICY
RICHARD B. MANCKE

Present energy policy was designed by officials who have misperceived our world, Dr. Mancke maintains in this scathing indictment. His analysis is bolstered by historical case studies and supplemented by reform programs for the future.
$10.00, cloth; $2.95, paper

AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE CIVILIZATION
ARTHUR E. TIEDEMANN, Editor

Articles by such distinguished scholars as Wm. Theodore de Bary, H. Paul Varley, Donald Keene, Hugo Munsterberg, and Arthur E. Tiedemann provide a comprehensive survey of all aspects of Japanese history and culture. $17.50

PALACE AND POLITICS IN PREWAR JAPAN
DAVID ANSON TITUS

From 1868 to 1945, Japanese political controversies were not resolved in the public forum but in corridors leading to the walled and moated imperial castle. Titus analyzes the palace as the key institution relating the emperor to the political process. A. Clark F. Ansley Award winner.
Studies of the East Asian Institute $20.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To the author in search of a publisher

YOU ARE INVITED to send for a free, illustrated brochure which explains how your book can be published, promoted and marketed.

Whether your subject is fiction, non-fiction or poetry, scientific, scholarly, specialized (even controversial) this handsome 52-page brochure will show you how to arrange for prompt publication.



Unpublished authors, especially, will find this booklet valuable and informative. For your free copy, or more information, write to:

Vantage Press, Inc., Dept. F-75
516 W. 34 St., New York, N. Y. 10001

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asian Affairs

An American Review

ASIAN AFFAIRS, *An American Review,* a new policy-oriented periodical of Asian affairs, began publication in September, 1973. It is published by Crane, Russak & Company for the American-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc.

The new periodical, which is published bi-monthly, will concern itself primarily with United States policy in Asia and will include, as well, articles on the domestic politics and economics of the Asian countries, and on their international relations. Its geographic scope will extend from Japan to Afghanistan, inclusive of Southeast Asia and the mainland countries.

ASIAN AFFAIRS addresses itself primarily to the well-informed citizen. The articles will avoid scholarly jargon in favor of simple, declarative, well-written journalistic prose. ASIAN AFFAIRS will also direct itself to social studies and political science teachers at high school and college levels, to executives in international business, current affairs groups, people in government and politics, journalists, and political analysts.

William Henderson III is editor. He was formerly associate executive director of The Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of *Foreign Affairs*. Dr. Henderson is currently president of his own consulting firm, William Henderson Consultants, Inc.

Chairman of the Editorial Advisory Board is Frank N. Trager, professor of international affairs and director of the National Security Program at New York University, and director of studies of the National Strategy Information Center. He writes on Asian topics and is a consultant to the Department of Defense.

ASIAN AFFAIRS is published in a 7 x 10 format. The subscription price is $12 per year in Continental North America, postpaid; $14 elsewhere. Single copies: $2.00

Published by

Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.

347 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SEEKING A PUBLISHER?

AN INCREASING NUMBER OF AUTHORS IN THE ACADEMIC FIELD ARE DISCOVERING IT PAYS TO

PUBLISH YOUR BOOK with EXPOSITION PRESS

So you've written a book—at considerable cost in time, resources, and energy—and you feel it's a major contribution to literature in your field. That is, it would be a contribution if you could get it published and on the market.

Economics prevent trade publishers from accepting scholarly books, or any others, which do not have an early guaranteed sale of 7,500 copies.

There's no argument about the contribution of university presses. But you may find them overcommitted and under-funded. Even when they accept a manuscript, they often schedule publication two to four years in the future.

There's another way: Our special "Exposition-University" imprint offers you a complete publishing service under one roof—editing, quality manufacture and dynamic marketing—with completed books in just three to four months. Our 35 years of experience is producing a growing level of sales to libraries, colleges, learned societies, professional groups, and interested laymen.

Our two FREE fact-filled books and literature provide costs, details and success stories. An editorial report on your manuscript will be furnished without obligation. Write Dept. 493.

EXPOSITION PRESS, INC.

Jericho, New York 11753 516 997-9050

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Let's bring government documents down to size.

By that we mean make them more manageable and accessible through microforms.

Take, for example, THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Our new subscription service can provide not only each month's issues of the RECORD on microfiche, but also a hardcopy *Monthly Index and Guide to the Congressional Record*. This Index is the first comprehensive, easy-to-use guide to the RECORD ever published — making the RECORD more accessible than ever before.

Thousands of other documents are available from our microform collection, including many that are out-of-print or difficult to obtain. Among these are *The Catalog of U.S. Census Publications, 1820-1945* ... *Congressional Hearings* from 1839-1954 ... *The Annals of Congress* for the 1st through 18th Congresses, 1789-1824 ... *Session Laws* for all states and territories prior to 1900 ... and *The Monthly Labor Review*, 1915-1972.

We also offer many non-governmental source materials, including a tape cassette series on the structure of American government, and thousands of doctoral dissertations about the government.

To size up our resources, write our Literature Services Department for information on the government materials you're interested in.

XEROX

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

XEROX® is a trademark of XEROX CORPORATION.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Politely AWAITING THE REVOLUTION



Despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the French Communist Party is a legitimate public institution, functioning peacefully within the constraints of bourgeois politics. This paradox at the heart of French Communism is exhaustively explored in Ronald Tiersky's impressive historical study—the most complete treatment of the subject in either English or French. No one interested in contemporary politics can afford to miss this indispensable work. $15.00

FRENCH COMMUNISM 1920-1972

RONALD TIERSKY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York, New York 10025

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Franz Schneider
Chairman of the Board

Emilio G. Collado
Vice Chairman of the Board

Robert H. Connery
President

Andrew W. Cordier
Vice President

Thomas M. Macioce
Vice President and Treasurer

John V. Connorton
Secretary

Charles Preusse
General Counsel

Douglas M. Black
Courtney C. Brown
Arthur F. Burns
Douglas Dillon
Thomas S. Gates
Leland M. Goodrich
Grayson Kirk
Alfred C. Neal
Mary G. Roebling
George T. Scharffenberger
Harold A. Stevens
John R. Stevenson
Alan H. Temple
Aaron W. Warner

HONORARY MEMBERS

Miguel Alemán
David Bruce
W. Randolph Burgess
Roberto de O. Campos
Louis Camu
John Sherman Cooper
Arthur H. Dean
Milton S. Eisenhower
Luther Gulick
W. Averell Harriman
Jerome H. Holland
Lady Bird Johnson
Mary Lasker
John J. McCloy
Harold Macmillan
Charles Malik
Paul Martin
Jean Monnet
Galo Plaza
Sir Eric Roll, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Carlos P. Romulo
Dean Rusk
Margaret Chase Smith
U Thant
Sir Duncan Wilson, G.C.M.G.

The Academy of Political Science was founded in 1880 to promote objective, scholarly investigations of political, social, and economic problems. Through its conferences and publications it seeks to inform the public by presenting widely divergent views of these problems. It does not make specific policy recommendations.

In addition to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, the Academy publishes the PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE twice a year at irregular intervals. Members receive both publications and invitations to all Academy conferences and functions.

Regular membership: One year, $12. Three years, $30. Student, $9 a year.

Special membership: Life, $300. Supporting, $50 a year. Sustaining, $30 a year. Contributing, $20 a year. Special members receive a certificate.

Contributions are tax deductible.

Dues are payable in advance. Checks should be made payable to the Academy of Political Science and mailed to 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, 10025.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED